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This dissertation seeks to answer the question: what impedes/drives policy change? This 
objective is sought by analyzing the policy-making process behind recent pension reforms in 
four European countries (Belgium, France, Sweden and the UK). Despite similar pressures, 
policy responses have been quite varied. The UK and, to a lesser extent, Sweden have 
introduced substantial changes to their pension system (programmatic reforms) while France 
and Belgium have resorted to altering existing parameters (parametric reforms) to resolve the 
same issue. The dissertation offers an institutional model, comprised of two ordering 
principles, to explain this divergence. The first ordering principle states that the type of 
administrative structure associated with public pension schemes defines the strength and 
legitimacy of actors in the reform process. More specifically, the presence of social partners 
in the reform process, as a result of their management and financial roles, constrains 
governments to adopt parametric reforms while their absence is more conducive to a reform 
that can overhaul the pension system. The second ordering principle claims that the higher 
the number of veto players (political parties) required to pass a legislation the less likely 
programmatic reforms are to occur. Based on these two ordering principles, a typology of 
policy change is created. It is argued that a high number of veto players can still result in a 
substantial change if the political parties are able to carry legislation without external 
influence, but will likely result in policies near the status quo if social partners are involved. 
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Introduction – Policy Change in Difficult Times 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The 1990s will be remembered as a period of welfare retrenchment, stopping decades 
of welfare expansion. Research focusing on the evolution of the welfare state has been 
replaced by research on its reform (or lack thereof). Dismantling the Welfare State? (Pierson, 
1996), Welfare State in Transition (Esping-Andersen, 1996), and Globalisation and the 
Welfare State (Mishra, 1999) are all evidence that the welfare state is entering a new era, or at 
the very least that the expansion of the welfare state has been put on hold. This book seeks to 
contribute to this debate by seeking to answer what impedes and/or drives policy change. In 
order to answer this question, the recent evolution of pension policies in four European Union 
countries (Belgium, France, Sweden, UK) is analysed.  
Throughout the investigations leading to this book, one of the most frequent question 
encountered was why do you study pensions to achieve this aim. After all, public pension 
systems are notoriously cited as being persistent to change.1 However, it has been known for 
quite some time that the upcoming retirement of the baby boomers will cause serious 
financial difficulties to public finance. Thus, public pensions were chosen because most 
industrialised countries are faced with the prospect of reforming their system amidst 
structural difficulties and popular disenchantment to enact reforms. 
 
                                                 
1 For example, both Pierson (1994; 1998) and Bonoli (2000) have utilized pensions to demonstrate the 
importance of path dependency in public policy. For further discussion, see below and chapter 1. 
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The Extent of the Problem2 
“If pensions are not reformed…In Italy, 
workers would have to be paying 48% 
contributions to their salaries to balance the 
pensions budget by 2030” (Financial Times, 
Nov. 17 1999). 
“…despite the absence of a strong 
case for funding, the momentum for 
shifting from PAYG to funding remains” 
(Hemming, 1999:20) 
 
With the upcoming retirement of the baby-boomers in industrialized countries, 
governments have been pressured to find a solution to the so-called pension ‘time-bomb’ in 
order to avoid a stark rise in pension expenditure. Despite the urgency being portrayed in the 
mass media due to the alleged lack of action on the part of governments, the so-called 
pension ‘time-bomb’ is far from being an unexpected surprise. Already in 1975, a leading 
political scientist in the study of welfare state claimed that “if there is one source of welfare 
spending that is most powerful – a single proximate cause – it is the proportion of old people 
in the population” (Wilensky, 1975: 47).  
Most industrialised states have been expecting a significant increase in pension 
expenditure over the course of the next 50 years. As a result, pension reform3 figures 
predominantly on the agenda of most governments within the member states of the 
European Union (EU) as they seek to reduce the upcoming financial pressure.4 The 
impact of pensions within public finance should not be underestimated. It is the biggest 
item within all social expenditure and already accounts for more than 10% of GDP in 9 
EU member states (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and Sweden) (EPC, 2000: 27).  
With the exception of Italy, Sweden and the UK, the financial weight of public 
pension will increase significant (see table 1). For most countries it is expected to rise 
by 3 to 5% of GDP. Belgium and France are quite similar to this effect as pension 
expenditure is expected to increase by 3,7 and 3,9% respectively. Portugal, the 
Netherlands and Spain are expecting increases above 6%. By 2010, public pensions 
will represent more than 14% of GDP in 8 of the 13 countries studied.   
 
                                                 
2 Four separate appendices are attached to this book for those who seek a better understanding on public 
pensions. Appendix A provides a discussion on what is a public pension. Appendix B includes a review of the 
evolution and classification of pension systems. Appendix C includes an in-depth analysis of the so-called 
pension time-bomb. Finally, appendix D tackles the pay-as-you-go and fully funded debate as discussed among 
economists. 
3 It is important to note that pension reform does not mean retrenchment. Most reforms in this century have 
actually led to an increase in the generosity and scope of the benefits made available to citizens. Nonetheless, 
pension reform is employed in this dissertation to signify a reduction in the size of financial commitment and 
benefits. 
4 With the exception of the United Kingdom, where expenditure is expected to fall (EPC, 2000: 5). 
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Table 1 Projected Pension Expenditure (%of GDP, before tax).  
 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 Change 
2000-peak 
year 
Belgium 9,3 9 10,4 13 12,6 3,7 
Denmark 10,2 12,7 14 14,7 13,9 4,5 
France 12,1 13,1 15 16 15,8 3,9 
Germany 10,3 9,5 10,6 13,2 14,4 4,3 
Greece NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Spain 9,4 9,3 10,2 12,9 16,2 8,3 
Ireland 4,6 5 6,7 7,6 8,3 4,4 
Italy 14,2 14,3 14,9 15,9 15,7 1,7 
Luxemb. NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NLD 7,9 9,1 11,1 13,1 14,1 6,2 
Austria 14,5 14,8 15,7 17,6 17 3,1 
Portugal 9,8 12 14,4 16 15,8 6,2 
Finland 11,3 11,6 14 15,7 16 4,7 
Sweden 9 9,2 10,2 10,7 10,7 1,7 
UK 5,1 4,7 4,4 4,7 4,4 0 
Source: EPC, 2000: 37. 
 
Reforming public pensions has been a prominent feature within the political agenda of 
most governments for the past two decades. Nonetheless, it has proven to be quite difficult to 
move pension reform from the political agenda into legislation. This outcome reflects both 
the complexity of the issue at hand and the popular support that pension programs have 
within the populace. Our knowledge of upcoming demographic trends is not sufficient to 
understanding the financial difficulties of pension programs since other factors such as 
economic growth, unemployment, inflation, and immigration are directly related to them. For 
example, a strong increase in economic growth could partly compensate for the higher 
number of retired individuals expected from the ‘pappy boom’. Thus, generating a consensus 
on the extent of the sickness can be as difficult as agreeing on a cure.5  
As underlined by the work of Pierson (1994), the welfare state has strong support 
within the population since many individuals now benefit from it. Public pensions represent a 
good case where public policy creates politics as many beneficiaries are now organized to 
protect their interests. For example, no US politician has the luxury of ignoring the American 
Association of Retired People (AARP) with its 30 million members. Europeans do not have 
such powerful organizations, but the elderly have been able to use other channels to defend 
the benefits promised to them by earlier governments. Most unions have included a pensioner 
                                                 
5 One of the main points in contention is how much change to pension systems is necessary. The key difficulty 
lies with the reliance on projections. Reliance on projections in the making of public policies can be more an act 
of faith than a ‘scientific’ calculation. In projecting pension expenditure parameters for fertility, life expectancy, 
unemployment, immigration, and economic growth must be included. These elements can act like compounded 
interests. Any departure from the estimated parameters could result in a large change in the end. A small baby 
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wing within their organization. The extreme case remains Italy, which has more than 50% of 
all its elderly belonging to a pensioner union (Campbell and Lynch, 2000). In Sweden, the 
elderly have shied away from the unions, but have been able to infiltrate the powerful 
committee system where most expertise for legislation is gathered (Feltenius, 2002).   
Finally, the structure of public pension programs constraints severely the choices 
available for reforms. Most public programs are financed as pay-as-you-go systems, meaning 
that contributions from current workers are used directly to pay for the benefits of current 
retirees. Public pensions were created to alleviate poverty among the elderly and payg 
systems ensured that no waiting period would be necessary. Yet, it is now difficult to move 
away from payg system since a full privatization of benefits would imply that the current 
workers would be faced with a double payment as they would have to contribute for their 
own pensions while still contributing to finance the pensions of current retirees.  
 
Why Study Public Pensions? 
Regardless of the economic and/or demographic evidence presented, reforming public 
pensions is first and foremost a political problem. Who gets what remains a political and 
controversial question. The extent to which pensions should be reformed addresses this 
fundamental question. Five other political conflicts are analysed in this study. First, even 
though overstated, a potential intergenerational conflict is looming, if it is not already present. 
As a result of population ageing and high unemployment, any countries have now reached the 
point where the active population support a larger inactive population putting a big financial 
weight onto the shoulders of the former (Appendix C). Despite this new situation, pensioners 
are viewed as deserving of their benefits, even among the younger generations making 
retrenchment unpopular. Still, is it fair to allocated more than 50% of the social budget to the 
elderly (Pierson, 1998), jeopardizing other social programmes such as day care and social 
housing?  
Second, this problematic goes further than a simple intergenerational conflict. 
Reforming pensions also impact individuals very differently even though they are within the 
same age group. Continental countries tend to have a plethora of public pension programs 
tailored to the occupational status of employees resulting in different rules and benefits. 
While seeking to reform these schemes, governments are finding strong resistance from 
groups claiming special circumstances, the most popular being civil servants claiming that 
                                                                                                                                                        
boom or a significant change in immigration policy would render these estimations useless (for an interesting 
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their pension is part of the status of being civil servant. As it will be demonstrated in this 
book, occupational divides may even exist within universal systems since uniform rules 
advantages certain categories of workers over others. For example, the former Swedish 
pension system granted more generous benefits to those with fast rising wages overtime than 
to those who maintained a steady income (see Chapter 4). 
Third, reforming public pensions relates to the role of the state in providing 
adequate support for its elderly. Governments have been under both ideological and 
financial pressure to reduce the size of the state. The traditional picture presents 
business seeking tax reductions in order to remain competitive in an open world while 
unions seek to hold on to what they consider earned rights. Financial pressure is strong 
within the European Union, where its members must actually maintain their public 
deficit under 3% as part of the Maastricht Treaty. Yet, pension expenditure is expected 
to grow tremendously if legislation remains unchanged. Should the private sector take 
an increasing responsibility in this field? The crash of 1929 was actually a key reason 
behind the introduction of pay-as-you-go (payg) public schemes. The recent poor 
performances of the stock market coupled with corporate scandals in the US are, once 
again, raising doubts over the capacity of the private sector to deliver safe pensions. 
Fourth, reforming public pensions also raise gender issues concerning the equality of 
treatment between men and women. The application of a similar retirement age for both 
genders, as a result of an old EU directive, has provoked stark debates over the adequacy and 
fairness of such measures.6 Should the state correct for the inequalities produced by the 
market? Should this be done within the scope of pension policies? Further, with low levels of 
fertility being a cause of the pension problem, attention has focused on the role of women 
within the society since they face pressure to be active participants in the labour market while 
still bearing most of the responsibilities for child care. 
Fifth, the literature on ‘neo-institutionalism’ has emphasised the importance of 
institutions when analyzing political conflicts. This literature has stressed that institutions 
influence and shape political power. What is their role in the field of pension policies? A key 
question is to determine whether or not specific institutional constellations are better 
equipped to reform pensions. 
                                                                                                                                                        
discussion on this subject, see Math, 2001: 13-25). 
6 Also quite controversial, is the fact that most continental countries still grant pension rights on the basis of the 
breadwinner model where women’s benefits are dependent on that of her husband. 
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Finally, alternative solutions that could partly resolve the potential increase in public 
pensions without changing them remain quite controversial. The ‘new’ countries such as 
Canada, the United States, and Australia face less of a pressure because of their high level of 
immigration. However, an increase in the immigration levels in Europe risks generating more 
support to extreme right parties, which have experienced substantial support in many 
countries this past decade. 
  
Are Pensions ‘Immovable Objects’? The Argument in Brief. 
Pierson’s claims that the welfare state is an immovable object (Pierson, 1998) have 
resulted in a debate as to whether or not the welfare state has been retrenched. The stability of 
the welfare state has been put under scrutiny. Hinrichs (2000), for example, argues that the 
‘elephants’ are on the move. Clayton and Pontusson (1998) and Ross (2000) have stressed 
that the short time period under study in Pierson’s analysis cannot yield conclusive results. 
This book seeks to distance itself from this debate fearing that it can only lead to a discussion 
similar to that of the budget literature where the end result was an article on the size of an 
increment (Dempster and Wildavsky, 1980).  
This book argues that pension systems have been altered differently both in terms of 
scope and domain across Europe. The interesting question remains what has caused certain 
countries to restructure their whole pension systems while other have simply tinkered with 
the rules. It is argued that we can find the answer to such a puzzle by focusing on the process 
under which reforms are being undertaken. 
Two important institutional variables are considered to be the determining factors for 
the type of pension reforms that are being introduced. Moreover, these two institutional 
factors are ranked according to two ordering principles. The first ordering principle states that 
the institutionalization of the social partners into the management of public pensions grants 
them a place within the pension reform process, thus constraining the ability of the 
government to carry a reform. In this case, pension programs tend to have been built outside 
the state with the management confined to the social partners. The financial contribution of 
the social partners is also quite substantial in these pension schemes. Thus, social partners 
represent a ‘veto point’ (Immergut, 1992) in the process.  
In the case where the state manages and bears most of the financial responsibilities, 
public pension schemes are considered to be within the state. The influence and power of 
unions is constrained to their ties with the social democratic party. It acts as a filter of 
influence. A similar logic applies for employers and right-wing parties. This situation 
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occurred because unions and employers did not fear the state and/or had trust that the state 
would administer this program properly without seeking to diminish their power and 
responsibilities. In order to have a strong influence over the public pension schemes, social 
actors must find a way to ‘capture’ or influence the state. 
The second ordering principle is inspired by Tsebelis’ (1995; 1999) work on veto 
players. His theory predicts that the larger the governmental coalition, the more likely is the 
likelihood of policy stability. In this case, this implies a lack of pension reform or a simple 
tinkering of the rules. Thus, one party governments should be better equipped to introduce 
substantial pension reforms (but see Pierson, 1994; Weaver and Pierson, 1993; Chapter 1). 
This book argues that Tsebelis’ conclusions only apply once in concert with the first ordering 
principle.  Coalition governments have many tools under their disposal, such as the 
negotiations on the government declarations, to negotiate binding agreements to tackle major 
policy challenges such as pension reform. However, the institutionalization of social partners 
complicates the implementation of coalition agreements since it allows unions and employers 
to ‘poke’ at the negotiation process. Thus, it is argued here that a coalition government might 
be able to carry on more substantial reform than a coalition government and/or a one party 
government that must negotiate with social partners in an institutionalized relationship (see 
Chapter 1). 
 
Methodology 
Different approaches could have been utilized ranging from the case study to the 
statistical method where all industrialized countries could have been analyzed. The case study 
method was rejected because it does not provide the same kind of generalization that can only 
be obtained by analyzing many cases. Further, many case studies have already been 
produced. The statistical method was left aside because of the lack of comparable data 
available. The European Commission7 began gathering genuine comparable data only few 
years ago, and it remains extremely difficult to justify similar assumptions across all EU 
countries. Further, the use of the statistical method for the study of pension is quite 
unreliable. As stated earlier, the success of a public pension reform is highly dependent on 
‘external’ factors such as unemployment, fertility rates, immigration and economic growth 
and it takes many years, if not decades, to truly assess the financial impact of a reform.  
                                                 
7 In collaboration with Eurostat and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
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This book opted for a ‘middle of the road’ solution by focusing on four cases, each 
representing a different scenario based on the combination of the two ordering principles 
presented above. This has the advantage of generating multiple comparisons and controls, 
which can help to test hypothesis more rigorously than using one or two cases. Another key 
advantage of using four cases is that one can go beyond comparing within the confine of the 
three welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990), which has been common in the literature.  
The four cases chosen for this book are: Belgium, France, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom.8 European cases were selected because they face the greatest pressures to reform. 
European countries have the oldest population in industrialized countries, with the exception 
of Japan, while facing pressure to maintain their public finance in check as a result of the 
Maastricht Treaty.9 
The evidence presented is the result of numerous stays in Europe where more than 40 
interviews were conducted with most of the actors involved in the policy process (members 
of parliament involved in pension committees, ministers, bureaucrats, union and employer 
representatives). Policy documents from these groups were also studied and analyzed 
alongside official publications. Finally, a careful review of national newspapers was 
conducted for the four countries under study. A caveat is in order for the British case, where 
field research was not conducted. This omission is compensated by the vast amount of 
literature available on the pension reforms introduced in the past 20 years (for example, see 
Pierson, 1994; Nesbitt, 1995; Boneli, 2000).  
 
Overview of this book. 
Chapter 1 presents the main analytical framework employed in this book as 
summarized above. The argument presented is compared to current theories prevailing in the 
literature to enhance the discussion. Finally, a series of hypothesis are introduced to test the 
theory elaborated for this study. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the case of France and it analyzes the various attempts to reform 
pensions in the past twenty years. It represents the scenario where a one party government 
must include social partners in order to obtain a successful reform. More than ten 
commissions have been mandated since the mid 1980s and the Balladur government of 1993 
generated the only successful attempt to reform the system. Another serious attempt was 
                                                 
8 For an in-depth justification of these cases, please see chapter 1. 
9 Even though the UK and Sweden are not part of the Euro-zone, both countries have sought to keep the 
Economic and Monetary Union question a political one by seeking to adhere to the convergence criteria. 
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made in December 1995 by the Juppé government. However, it was made without consulting 
social partners and it resulted in the most disruptive protests since the events of 1968. 
Chapter 3 presents the Belgian case, which is the nearest case to the status quo. The 
only significant reform occurred in the mid 1990s under pressure from the European Union to 
alter its system so that it would not violate the directive on the equal treatment of men and 
women. Minor reforms were introduced in the past few years with the objective of 
encouraging the development of occupational pensions within the private sector. The unions 
have played a big role in ensuring little action on the part of the government. Their presence 
in this process has forced the government to adopt a small step by small step attitude. 
Chapter 4 discusses the case of Sweden. A long process beginning with a 
parliamentary committee in 1984 has produced a complete overhaul of the system with the 
agreement of five major parties within the Parliament. The political parties were able to 
shield themselves from other social actors by restricting their access during the sessions of 
the Working Committee on Pensions (1991-94), which served as a negotiating trampoline for 
the five party accord. The agreement has withstood critics within the political parties and 
social actors, and has begun to be implemented in 1995. Last minute meetings saved the 
agreement from collapsing in 1998. The unions and employers were not actively involved 
during the negotiations and were unable to ‘poke’ at the process, as they were faced with a 
fait accompli. 
Chapter 5 analyzes the British case where the most radical reforms were introduced 
by the Thatcher government. The extent of her reforms has resulted in the near impossibility 
of restoring a viable public scheme. The new alternatives presented by the Blair government 
confirm that the presence of the private sector is not going to be challenged by focusing on 
regulatory aspects. The unions and, even to a lesser extent the employers, were left out of the 
policy circle that presented most of the reforms. The role of unions was actually dubious 
since many of their members enjoyed good benefits with occupational pensions contracted 
out of the state. 
Finally, the conclusion reviews and compares the four cases by presenting a detailed 
analysis of the hypothesis developed in chapter 1. It also reflects on the applicability of the 
theoretical framework to other cases. The last section tackles further avenues for research and 
inquiries.  
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1 -  Theorizing the Causes Behind the Substantial 
Differences in Pension Reforms 
  
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces a new typology emphasizing the role of actors within the 
institutional structure of public pensions considering the policy-making environment of each 
state. The institutional structure matters because it grants specific roles to various actors and 
generates veto points (Immergut, 1992; Tsebelis, 1995). Further, it is argued that these 
structured relationships are tied to state formation and the creation of pension programs. 
Strongly rooted within the neo-institutionalist literature, this chapter argues that the electoral 
system and the institutionalization of pensions are the two dimensions that should be 
emphasized in order to comprehend the ability or disability to make substantial pension 
reforms. As pension reforms during the period studied have taken the form of retrenchment 
measures, halting a long period of expansion, literature relevant to these policy changes are 
also reviewed.10 Nonetheless, contrary to what has been said by some others advocating a 
‘new’ politics of welfare (see Pierson, 1996; 2001) some ‘old’ theories of the welfare state 
deserve to be analyzed since they generate insights into the politics of pension reforms. These 
competing theories are discussed and compared with the approach selected for this book in 
the last section of this chapter. These approaches are referred to at the conclusion of each 
following chapter, as they act as a null hypothesis, and can provide some light into possible 
contradictory results from the expected outcome developed in the theory. 
 
                                                 
10 For a good overview of the theories pertinent to the rise of the welfare state, see Skocpol and Amenta (1986) 
and Esping-Andersen (1990). For a similar overview with pension policies in mind, see Palme (1990). 
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The institutionalization of Social Partners and the State, and its incidence on reforming 
public pensions. 
 This book seeks to contribute to the debate on the retrenchment of the welfare state by 
comparing the attempts and failures to reform pensions in Belgium, France, Sweden and the 
UK.11 All four countries adopted at least one pension reform within the period studies that are 
quite different in terms of cost reduction, scope, and domain. While also presenting a test of 
previous theories to be analyzed at the end of each chapter, it seeks to add to the theoretical 
field by emphasising the importance of institutions while considering the ‘nature’ of the state. 
This section discusses the theoretical framework that will be used for the remainder of this 
book and the methodology employed to evaluate its usefulness. It advocates the use of an 
institutional theory that encompasses both formal and informal theory acknowledging the 
nature of the state. This is the kind of institutionalism referred to as ‘normative theory’ by 
Peters (1999), which originates from March and Olsen (1989).  
 The book seeks to answer three broad questions: 1) What are the reasons behind the 
different routes taken to reform pensions? 2) What accounts for the inclusion/exclusion of 
social partners in the process? 3) Does the decision on social partners have an impact on the 
outcome of a reform? Thus, the main focus of the book is on the process under which pension 
reforms are undertaken, and the outcomes of such processes. The book does not seek to 
challenge the difficulties associated with retrenchment politics. Retrenchment is a more 
difficult enterprise than expanding welfare rights and benefits. Consequently, governments 
seek (preferably) to retrench public pension programmes via ‘sneaky’ routes to avoid any 
political backlash via obfuscation, division and/or compensation strategies (Pierson, 1994). 
However, this does not imply stability. Policy change is an inherent outcome of the policy 
process experienced in the four countries studied and different outcomes have been obtained.  
 Key is the ‘nature’ of the state and the institutionalization of relationships among the 
various political actors. It is argued that these two variables are crucial in explaining 
divergence in the type and scope of reforms. As these relationships have been structured 
overtime, the construction of the welfare state becomes a central element because it 
established, to use March and Olsen’s (1989) terminology, the ‘appropriate’ relationships 
among the various political actors. 
 
                                                 
11 The justification for selecting these cases is provided below. 
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Bringing Institutions in line with the state! 
“It is deprived of any particular history in each of the countries where it 
comes into existence. Without institutional reality, it benefits only from a 
certain functional autonomy, which enables it to better control the world of 
business. Thus, the problem of the state – of its origin and of its nature – 
remains ignored” (Birnbaum, 1988: 110). 
 
 Birnbaum’s critique of corporatism could easily be applied to most studies of welfare 
retrenchment. The state remains largely ignored as an important variable worthy of analysis. 
By stressing that the ‘new’ politics of welfare was sharply different from theories related to 
the development of the welfare state, the historical features of the welfare state have been put 
aside. Not only is the politics absent from this framework (Ross, 2000a), nothing is said about 
the nature of the state or the historical relationships among the political actors. 
 Further dissipating the importance of the state and its relationship with political actors 
(politicians, unions, employers) is the strong reliance on the Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990) as the basis of comparison for retrenchment measures. It 
has resulted in a high number of studies comparing ‘similar’ cases within the Bismarckian 
family without any real consideration for the nature of the state. Thus, France is now similar 
to Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Spain. The policy structure may be similar, 
resulting in somewhat similar policy options available, but it is a leap of faith to assume that 
the political constellation is similar as well. Belgium and France may have the same type of 
welfare state and pension system, but it originated from very different conditions and the 
political relationship surrounding their creation are starkly different. In France, unions and 
employers first built friendly societies to keep social affairs out of the state. When the French 
state began to institutionalize its social security, “the distrust of the state meant that major 
groups successfully insisted that they have legally defined roles in the new structures” 
(Ashford, 1986: 298). While similar action was taken in Belgium, it was because the state 
was too weak to assume this responsibility (see Chapter 2 and 3)! 
 Hinrichs (2000) also criticizes the use of Esping-Andersen’s typology when analyzing 
pension reforms, but on the grounds that it fails to take into consideration timing as an 
important variable for the creation of pension systems. He stresses that the latecomers 
(Netherlands, Australia, Denmark, Switzerland and the UK) have all established a strong 
private component within their system even though they come from the three different 
welfare regimes. Therefore, the issue of pension reform operates in a very different problem 
dynamic for politicians. The strong reliance on the private sector makes reduction of public 
benefits more acceptable (359; Myles and Pierson, 1998). 
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  A key starting point is King’s (1995) conclusions on the evolution of employment 
policies in the US and UK. Path dependency does not only have an impact on policies and 
choices to reform them, but it also locks-in political relationships. “It is not just institutional 
arrangements that are tenacious, but the political interests and choices reflected in them may 
remain influential upon future policies... The compromises and interests influencing 
institutional arrangements do not necessarily evaporate or dissipate over time. Institutionalists 
are in danger of neglecting the politics and history of institutions” (212).  
 Even though there are some reasons to justify a theoretical break between theories of 
welfare expansion and retrenchment, the interactions among the political actors involved in 
these activities remain embedded into the same institutional structure and follow the same 
logic of appropriateness (March and Olson, 1989). This book seeks to underline that the 
organizational structures and relationships among political actors are also path dependent. 
The establishment of welfare institutions brought with it an institutionalization of 
relationships between the state and social partners. Any alteration to welfare programmes 
thus required the participation of social partners to the extent in which they have been 
historically involved with the policy in question.  
 As underlined by Olsen (1983), there are costs and benefits linked to the association 
of interest groups in the organization and management of the welfare state, and their role vary 
across countries and policy sectors. He emphasizes three broad forms of coordination. First, 
cooperation between the social partners and the state occurs because they share similar ideals 
and goals. Second, a hierarchical structure fosters coordination with most of the powers in the 
hands of the legislator. Third, interest groups seek to manage on their own and the state 
intervenes to ratify agreements and act as a referee when needed. The key variations in 
coordination “reflect either formal separation or formal merger” (150). 
 Olsen (1983) stresses the strong variations of integration of the interest groups in the 
state apparatus by comparing Scandinavia, Britain and the US. This brings us back to 
Birnbaum (1988) who stresses the importance of the relationship between social partners and 
the state. No interest group can really decide all of a sudden to integrate itself within the state 
or not by simply calculating the costs and benefits it may obtain from such action. The forms 
of integration that have been adopted are the result of long conflicts among political actors, 
some of which dates back to the formation of the state. Thus, the introduction of one form of 
coordination over another may not be harmonious. For example, the non-cooperation of the 
social partners with the state in France is the result of a long history of the État dirigiste 
where state-building involved a stark centralization of powers (Rokkan, 1999). As stated 
 13
above, the state has sought to integrate the social partners under its roof according to its own 
set of rule and did not seek to cooperate with them. “The working class has always been 
excluded from the state; it always had to act conflictively” (Birnbaum, 1988: 123). Thus, the 
interest groups have sought to maintain social policies away from the state (Olsen’s second 
type) fearing a loss of control over an expanding state (seeking type three). As a result, most 
strikes are very political and unions seek to protect themselves via the introduction of laws 
rather than negotiations (ibid, 124). This is the key reason why unions sought to build social 
insurance “outside the state” (Ashford, 1986). It is worth pointing out that, contrary to what 
Olsen (1983) argues, the institutionalization of unions in France has not resulted in silencing 
its likelihood for mobilization due to their increase responsibility. The introduction of the 
state as a key variable helps us explain this behaviour. Based on the empirical material 
presented in chapter 2, it can be argued that the conflict between type 2 or 3 has actually 
never been resolved resulting in strange mix of the two, which is favouring the state.  
 Rothstein (1991) presents a totally different picture for Sweden. He claims that the 
key reason why unions did not oppose their integration into the state was because its power 
was ‘lagom’, a Swedish word meaning just about right. They did not feel threatened by the 
state. On the contrary, unions and social activists sought to introduce their policy of choices 
within the state, to a point where they could effectively control the bureaucracy (Lindqvist, 
1990; Rothstein, 1996). This is in stark contrast to France’s recruitment of civil servants 
within the social domain, traditionally composed of énarques with the lowest exam results 
who marked social affairs as their last choice (Jobert, 1981: 253).12 Therefore, there were no 
objections to the institutionalization of social programmes within the state in Sweden. On the 
contrary, unions continued to insist on granting further responsibilities to the state. The ATP 
struggle is a clear reflection of this strategy. The main union, LO, did not consider a shared 
management with the employer but rather sought (and obtained) a pension programme within 
the state (see Chapter 4). The end result is Olsen’s first type of policy co-ordination: goals 
that are shared by both the state and interest groups.  
 Belgium represents the institutionalization of Olsen’s third type. The state was not 
perceived as a threat, and the state “could not permit itself social and political conflict to the 
breaking point” due to its fragile international situation and its dependence on international 
commerce (Rokkan, 1999: 336). The state was even weak from within. The bourgeoisie, 
dominated by French merchants, sought to have a minimal state. The presence of multiple 
 14
cleavages provided a strong obstacle in the extension of state power. Unions were thus in a 
strong position to further their interests. With union membership rising because of the Ghent 
system, unions did not want to move away from Olsen’s third type and the state could not 
really alter this choice nor did it seek to. The Belgian pension system followed similar lines 
and was thus based on a compromise reached by the social partners during WWII, which 
confined its management to social partners (see Chapter 3). 
 Britain represents a difficult case to label. The state has never been considered strong 
with an endorsement to laissez-faire. Originally, a Bismarckian type of pension solution was 
rejected because state intervention was alien (Ogus, 1982: 165)! For the most part, unions and 
employers attempted to resolve their own conflicts among themselves and the unions sought 
to increase its representation via the parliamentary process (Birnbaum, 1988: 121). The main 
union confederation, TUC, attempted to obtain more power via the state, Olsen’s first type, 
but the Labour Party was never as successful as its Swedish counterpart. The first type was 
never achieved because of the pre-dominance of the Conservatives, who entrenched their 
choice of pension system following a long back and forth struggle with Labour (see Fawcett, 
1995). 
 
First Ordering Principle: Parliamentary Integration vs. Social Partnership 
Parliamentary Integration 
 Based on the previous discussion and analysis of our four cases, we could classify 
social insurance programmes, resulting from the institutionalization of social conflicts, into 
two relationship structures: Parliamentary Integration and Social Partnership.13 This 
distinction represents our first ordering principle. In the first case, the unions have sought to 
gain influence or control of pension programmes by capturing office and/or the state 
bureaucracy. Thus, they are built within the state. This implies that the state is the main 
financial contributor (see table 1.1) and manager of social programmes. The Parliamentary 
Integration structure corresponds to countries that have been influenced by ‘Beveridge’ (such 
as Canada and the UK) and/or have universal programs (Scandinavian countries). Although 
this categorization includes both liberal and social democratic welfare regimes (Esping-
                                                                                                                                                        
12 France’s social engineers where within the unions and were behind the instauration of its social structure 
following the war (see Marier, 2002). 
13 The following is mostly based on the four cases that are being analyzed in this dissertation. Further 
generalization would require further research and analysis. The generalized assumptions made here have been 
introduced to put the four cases into a broader context. Although aware of the potential ‘concept stretching’ 
(Sartori, 1970) these terms were chosen instead of Beveridgean and Bismarckian to denote the emphasis on the 
relationship among the political actors rather than on the type of programmes. 
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Andersen, 1990), it is worth stressing that the difference between these two lies in the 
generosity and coverage that is being offered and not in the way programs are being 
administered.14  
 
Table 1.1 Employers’ and Employees’ Contributions in the financing of Public Pensions 
Relative to the Government. Aggregate Figures (Average 1990-1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, Social Protection: Expenditure and Receipts (Bruxelles: Eurostat, 1999). 
 
 Sweden represents a case where union’s influence was expanded successfully within 
the state (Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1985; Rothstein, 1996) while the UK is a case of 
limited success due to Labour’s electoral difficulties (Fawcett, 1995). Key is that unions 
sought primarily to achieve their policy objectives via their link to the Social 
Democratic/Labour Party in the Parliament. It is important to reiterate that this apply only to 
pensions. For example, unemployment has been under the control of unions in Sweden and 
follows a logic that is more in line with the Social Partnership structure. 
 In the case of relationships structured by Parliamentary Integration, governments have 
strong influence since they do not have to seek a broad consensus outside the government 
like countries bounded by a Social Partnership structure, which include more formalized veto 
points (see below). This does not imply that actors other than political parties can influence 
and shape the pension debate. However, their access into the policy making process is 
constrained by this structure. One aspect could be the absence of involvement in the formal 
                                                 
14 The major difference relevant to this discussion concerns the role of the state in term of social responsibilities. 
It is minimal in the liberal countries where reliance on the private sector is relatively strong. In Scandinavia, the 
state plays an important role in providing universal social protection. 
Country Employers’ + Employees Contributions/ State Contributions
France 3,82 
Netherlands 3,27 
Belgium 2,97 
Spain 2,46 
Germany 2,44 
Italy 2,18 
Greece 1,97 
Austria 1,77 
Portugal 1,3 
Luxembourg 1,18 
Finland 1,08 
Sweden 0,88 
United Kingdom 0,85 
Ireland 0,61 
Denmark 0,24 
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process of pension reform. For example, Thatcher’s reforms were adopted without any 
consideration for the unions, while Könberg (the former Minister of Health and Social 
Insurance) was able to institute a Working Group on Pensions without the formal 
involvement of unions and employers. The influence of the social partners is mostly filtered 
via the political parties rather than via the state. 
 Unions and employers’ associations are therefore more likely to seek support from 
political parties to advance their agenda. This can be best exemplified by the passage of the 
mandatory supplementary pension  (ATP) in Sweden in the late 1950s, which was established 
as a result of a conflict between a Social Democratic proposal (put forward and pushed by 
LO, the most important trade union), a Centre party proposal, and one emanating from a 
bourgeois coalition (backed by employers’ associations). After an intense struggle, the Social 
Democratic proposal was adopted (see Chapter 4). 
 The financial contributions of the government are much more substantial where 
Parliamentary Integration has been the norm. As demonstrated by Table 1.1, Anglo-Saxon 
and Scandinavian countries are found at the bottom with a ratio below one, meaning that the 
government contributes more to public pension schemes than both employers and employees 
combined. Denmark represents an extreme case since its pension system is mainly financed 
via sales tax. This leads to a greater influence of the government and the Parliament in the 
budgetary process for the public pension schemes. Contrary to the situation prevailing in 
Bismarckian countries, both of these actors are actively involved in the preparation of the 
budget for this social item.15 
 Before raising the ire of Swedish political scientists with this categorization of the 
integration of unions and employers, let me summarize briefly my reasons for doing so prior 
to discussing Social Partnership structures.16 Olsen (1983) clearly exemplifies his first type of 
co-ordination, where interest groups and the state share similar goals, with Scandinavian 
countries. The key argument is their strong presence within parliamentary committees, 
independent agencies (the so-called verket or styrelse), and they have many possibilities to 
influence the policy process because of their active participation within it. On this basis, 
Olsen concludes, “organizations have legitimate and institutionalized rights to participate in 
all phases of governmental policy making as representatives of specific interests” (166).  
                                                 
15 One possible exception could be mandatory public occupational pension schemes, which are an off-budget 
item. Nevertheless, the Parliament has much greater oversight power than in continental countries with regards 
to its development. It can alter its ceiling and can easily play with the value of its indexation. The Parliament has 
full budgetary control of the non-contributory pension. 
16 For a more detailed explanation, see Chapter 4. 
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 This picture has been strongly modified in the past 15 years. The participation of 
unions and employers has been sharply reduced within both parliamentary committees and 
independent agencies. Their scattered presence has lost a lot of legitimacy as a result of 
employers’ withdrawal from the board of independent agencies in the early 1990s. Thus, they 
now tend to focus more strictly on labour market issues. Contrary to both sickness and 
unemployment insurance, pensions fall closer to being a state responsibility because the ATP 
reform granted this responsibility to the state. This is evident by the lack of formal 
participation within the pension reform process versus the continuous presence of both unions 
and employers within the realm of sickness and unemployment insurance. Könberg attempted 
to create another small group of politicians excluding unions and employers, along the lines 
of the Working Group on Pension, for the reform of sickness insurance but failed as a result 
of their strong objections. Even the composition of bureaucrats within the Ministry of Social 
Affairs has changed with the arrival of new recruits in the early 1990s coming from a more 
diverse background and other Ministries such as Finance (Marier, 2001; Chapter 4).  
 
Social Partnership 
Found in both Belgium and France, albeit for different reasons, Social Partnership 
indicates that social partners are highly involved in the administration of pensions. This is 
usually the case in ‘Bismarckian’ countries17 where benefits are granted mostly on the basis 
of occupational status. In this case, social conflicts between social partners and the state were 
attenuated by including social partners into the affairs related to public pension such as its 
management. This institution is legitimized by the strong reliance on contributions, rather 
than general revenues from the state, to finance pension benefits. Thus, pension can be 
viewed as a salary because of the contributions made by the employers to the employee for 
this purpose (Friot, 1998). With regard to the pension scheme for public servants, unions 
have sought (and obtained) strong protection from the state via the legislative process leading 
to the inclusion of pensions within the status of civil servant. These give social partners a 
formal role in the pension policy process18 resulting in a genuine veto point (Immergut, 
                                                 
17 Countries where benefits have been granted on the basis of employment and not citizenships. The coverage is 
based on the occupations of the employees and varies from one profession to another. The financial and 
administrative roles of the social partners in these countries tend to be relatively high compared to Scandinavian 
and Liberal (anglo-saxon) countries. For a more detailed description, see Esping-Andersen, 1990. 
18 Although the administration of public pensions is mostly consensual since it involves the application of 
current legislations, its membership reflects the importance of specific actors within this policy field. 
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1992).19 Discussions to alter pension programs tend to be internalized, especially in the case 
of Belgium. This implies that a reform proposal is unlikely to become public unless it has 
some kind of support from the social partners. As demonstrated by the numerous committees 
in both France and Belgium, the social partners play an important role in the search of a 
pension reform that is politically acceptable and cannot really be excluded (see Chapter 3 and 
4). These institutional features are quite difficult to alter or bypass. For example, France’s 
Juppé government in late 1995 enacted a decree to force change. By seeking to alter a 
previous social arrangement without consulting social partners, Juppé was forced to retract 
his attempt to reform pensions for public employees due to the massive protest movement 
that paralysed France in December of that year. 
In countries with Social Partnership, the financial and supervisory roles of the 
government over social programs have tended to be limited. As demonstrated by Table 2,1, 
the financial burden of social programs is clearly on the shoulders of the social partners. In 
most ‘Bismarckian’ countries, social partners contribute twice as much as states.  As a result 
the state has traditionally been confined to a supervisory role. For example, in France, the 
financial aspects of social security are found in le jaune entitled l’éffort social de la nation, 
which is an off budget item, underlining its independence from the state.20 This is a common 
situation for many continental countries (Von Hagen, 1992). Still in France, prior to 1996, the 
Parliament was only informed post-priori of social security’s financial situation and could not 
pronounce itself on these budgets administered by the social partners (Mekhantar, 1996: 37-
8). In Southern European countries, social contributions have also been employed as a mean 
to fight tax evasion. Therefore, those who work in the black market do not earn entitlements 
to public programs.  
An exception applies to public employees whose social security is financed mainly by 
the state, via the Ministry of Finance. Public servants have been able to secure their schemes 
with the inclusion of a pension within their job description. This results in the maintenance of 
the civil servant status beyond the age of retirement. 
Social Partnership thus consists of a strong dialogue between trade unions, employers’ 
associations and the government, with the latter also needing a majority in parliament to 
                                                 
19 I opted for the term veto points purposefully. Immergut’s conception of veto point includes doctors, an extra-
parliamentary actor, while Tsebelis’ (1995; 1999) more restrictive veto player applies only to parliamentary 
actors. The difference stems from the more rigid focus on formal institutions by rational choice institutionalists 
(see Peters, 1999). 
20 Les jaunes consist of general appendixes to the national budget (consisting of les bleus). Les jaunes do not 
follow the same procedural rules as they act mainly as information material for parliamentarians (Mekhantar, 
1996: 37).  
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enact reform. Any reform proposals must include the social partners who have an institutional 
veto because of the legitimacy gained via their high contributions and management of 
pension schemes or the inclusion of pension within their statute. The difficulties are 
accentuated by the fragmentation of these schemes in three broad occupational statuses.21 
Since these pension schemes have different rules and benefits, generating what is considered 
a fair reform for one group may be resented by another. Certain groups tend to be more 
vulnerable than others. This results in targeted reforms where certain pension schemes are 
reformed while others remain unchanged. For example, the public pension schemes for public 
sector employees have escaped reforms in many continental countries where the lack of 
financial involvement is compensated by a strong unionization of the workforce, the 
conception of deferred wages, and a lower cost associated with strikes.22   
Without going into all the possible implications of an integrated participation (see 
Olsen, 1983: 157-164), unions have a very different cost/benefit calculus than political 
parties. Contrary to politicians, they have very specific clients and they do not face elections. 
Their logic is to protect the droits acquis (earned rights) of their members, and the impact of 
this defence on elections ranks really low in terms of concerns. Social Partnership leads to an 
institutionalized structure of relationship where unions are virtually locked-in the policy 
process. They represent, therefore, a genuine veto point. In this case, it is nearly impossible 
for the government to ignore them. 
This particular institutional constellation impels the government to adopt what Bonoli 
(2000) calls a quid pro quo strategy. It seeks to gather union support (or their silence) by 
granting them specific requests (49). Thus, logrolling may be employed to gain the 
acceptance of the unions. Natali (2002) goes in a similar direction by stressing the need of a 
political exchange between the unions and the government. This conceptualization is 
interesting but is severely limited by its implications since it underlies that unions can be 
fooled by accepting a small concession for the endorsement of something that has far more 
reaching consequences. However, a key benefit from an integrated participation of unions 
into the policy making process is expertise making it extremely difficult to fool them. As 
unions tend to be an established institution, they will even be less inclined to enter into 
negotiations involving a lot of risks because they tend to be quite conservative, preferring to 
exploit “acquired advantages and the profits accruing from the stats quo than in adjusting to 
                                                 
21 Private employees, public employees and independents (which include among others self-employed and 
owners). 
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new circumstances, grasping new opportunities or innovating (Olsen, 1983: 159). If we 
assume that unions are not being fooled, then we accept the idea that similar costs are added 
elsewhere.   
 The first ordering principle, being the distinction between Parliamentary Integration 
and Social Partnership structure of relationships, allows us to introduce the first major 
hypothesis for this book: 
Hypothesis 1: Parliamentary Integration structures are more conducive to broader pension 
reforms than Social Partnership structure since the latter has more built-in veto points. 
 
The key to achieving a successful reform within a Parliamentary Integration structure 
consists of ensuring a majority in the parliament. The social partners may be involved but 
their support is not as crucial as in countries experiencing Social Partnership, because their 
influence is filtered through the political parties. In order to maximize their preferences for a 
reform that is not too punitive for its members, unions depend on the strength of the party 
they are associated with. Therefore, we can expect programmatic changes in pensions with 
the Parliamentary Integration structure, especially if Socialist parties are not involved in the 
coalition behind the reform proposal. Programmatic reform encompasses any significant 
change in a program resulting in a different logic including new sets of rules, benefits and 
coverage once a pension is fully implemented. 
Pension reforms done within a Social Partnership structure are more conducive to 
parametric reforms or ‘tweaking’ since it is extremely difficult to reach a broad consensus to 
introduce a major pension reform because social partners have an institutionalized veto point. 
Tweaking implies that a government seeks only to alter the parameters of an existing scheme 
such as the contribution period, the indexation or other rules within the scheme. The 
philosophy and logic of the system is no threatened by the changes being presented. This 
argument is supported by Bonoli‘s (2000) analysis of pension reforms in France, the UK, and 
Switzerland where he states that only non-concerted efforts succeeded in affecting the politics 
of the pension system, while concerted efforts “did not significantly alter the political 
equilibria” (168). In the case of retrenchment, the veto point is most likely to be used by 
unions as employers generally support policies favouring pension reforms, especially if they 
result in reducing or maintaining current level of contributions on their part. 
                                                                                                                                                        
22 In Belgium, civil servants usually receive their lost wages following a strike as part of the negotiated 
agreement with the state. 
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This hypothesis also contributes to the ‘veto debate’. Rational choice theorists are 
proponent of a rigid conception of veto player, such as the one advocated by Tsebelis (1995; 
1999) for political parties within Parliaments. Empirical institutionalists (see Peters, 1999) 
advocate the use of veto points which focus on the formalized relationships between the 
government and outside interest groups. The government must be able to pass this hurdle in 
order to implement a policy (Immergut, 1992). The hypothesis number 1 clearly provides an 
endorsement for the latter.  
 Thanks to the fact four cases are being studied, two other related hypotheses can be 
tested, which improves our understanding of the formalized (or lack thereof) relationship 
between government and social partners: 
H1a: Reforms are most likely to occur when unions have a co-operative relationship with the 
state (Belgium) compared to a confrontational one (France). 
H1b: Assuming that Rothstein (1996) is right about the capture of the state by unions and 
Social Democratic interests in Sweden, then the expertise of the state is more likely to be 
accepted and trusted by unions in Sweden than in France, whose state has a confrontational 
relationship with unions. 
 
H1a compares two formalized relationships (Social Partnership). Even though both France 
and Belgium have very similar pension institutions, the relationship between the social 
partners and the state differs strongly. Social partners are less likely to help a government in 
times of need if a relationship is confrontational rather than co-operative. H1b also relates to 
the relationship between the state and the social actors and provides a test of Rothstein’s 
work on the subject. 
 
Second Ordering Principle: Proportional vs. Majoritarian Visions. 
 Electoral systems tend to produce different types of government and add to the 
complexity of reforming pension schemes. It is actually more appropriate to refer to 
majoritarian and proportional influence visions because of the broader implications generated 
by the electoral rules. As stated by Powell Jr. (2000): 
“In the majoritarian vision citizens use elections to choose decisively 
between two competing teams of policymakers, providing the winner with 
the concentrated power to make public policy, allowing the loser only to 
continue to challenge in future elections. In the proportional influence vision 
citizens use elections to choose political agents to represent their diverse 
views continuously in postelection bargaining that will influence policy 
making. The predominant constitutional arrangements in these countries can 
be interpreted as designs intended to realize these visions” (233). 
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 As a result of strong divergent groups, many states especially in what Rokkan (1999) 
calls the city-belt have adopted the proportional influence vision to ensure the inclusion of the 
various cleavages present within a society. This vision has tended to freeze cleavages and has 
generated ‘consensual’ democracies (Lijphart, 1984). Birchfield and Crepaz (1998) 
demonstrate that this ‘collective’ veto has been responsible for the highly egalitarian features 
present within these welfare states since they tend to be inclusive of the divergent interests. 
Belgium is a typical case of consensual democracy (Lijphart, 1984), while Sweden, albeit 
having experience few coalition governments, has had many minority governments led by the 
Social Democrats. For the enactment of most policies, they have had to obtain the support of 
other political parties. 
Opposite to the concept of proportional influence visions is the majoritarian vision 
where first-past-the-post systems are employed. A majoritarian vision provides a winner-
take-all framework for the winning political party, which tend to experience a strong 
concentration of power. The UK is the prototype of this system. France is included into this 
category for two reasons. First, the powers of the President are close to nil when it comes to 
pensions. Thus, whether or not cohabitation occurs does not influence our analysis. Second, 
the coalition government present are locked-in. The right wing parties (UDF, RPR) never co-
operates with the left (PS, and PCF) and vice versa. It is argued in this book that the 
majoritarian/proportional distinction is very important when policy reforms must be 
introduced.23 
 On one hand, a proportional influence vision results in a high number of actors 
involved in the conduct of government business, thus raising the number of veto players. Any 
reforms must be negotiated among the coalition partners, or in the case of a minority 
government, with other parties within the Parliament. This type of government makes 
significant changes extremely difficult to achieve and tend to favour the status quo. This 
outcome is best exemplified by the writings of Tsebelis: 
“(P)olicy stability (defined as the impossibility of significant change of the 
status quo) will be the result of large coalition governments, particularly if 
the coalitions partners have significant ideological differences among them” 
(Tsebelis, 1999: 591). 
 
On the other hand, single-party governments face fewer hurdles in introducing significant 
changes since they do not have to deal with other political parties and they only have to 
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answer to their members. Therefore, single-party governments produce more significant laws 
than coalition governments (Tsebelis, 1999). 
 If Tsebelis is right, a systematic bias towards parametric reforms, rather than 
programmatic reforms, should be the result of having a large coalition of political actors. This 
type of conclusion is supported by Swank (2001), who concludes that institutions of 
collective interest representation - social corporatism and inclusive electoral institutions - are 
more resistant to the neo-liberalisation of the economy. Thus, to borrow Scharpf’s (1988) 
language, coalition governments might be engaged in a ‘parametric trap’.24 This is highly 
interesting since most studies on the retrenchment of the welfare state emphasize the need of 
a large coalition behind a reform in order to avoid a concentration of blame, which can have 
negative electoral consequences in the future (Pierson, 1994; Bonoli, 2000; Green-Pedersen, 
2001; Schludi, 2002). This occurs because the majoritarian vision generates a concentration 
of responsibilities into the hands of a single party, which is held accountable for the public 
policies it enacted via elections (Powell Jr., 2002). This in turn results in governments 
seeking to avoid blame when introducing retrenchment measures because the electorate can 
trace those responsible for their introduction (Pierson, 1994). 
 As stated earlier, Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) stress that coalition government 
are able to act with budgetary constraints despite a high number of actors because they tend 
to agree on the use of binding targets. Binding agreements are usually done prior to building 
a coalition government. Coalition partners have very little incentive to break these targets 
since they are likely going to be reconsidered as a coalition partner in the future (224). A 
similar logic could be applied to pension by proposing the scheme of a future reform within 
the governmental declaration for example. As underlined in Peters (1994), a political agenda 
can include multiple issues to facilitate the emergence of compromise via logrolling. This is 
usually what is done in Belgium where each coalition partner obtains a Ministry close to its 
preference and then negotiates its policy objectives with other. Thus, party A gets a diluted 
version of policy X, but accepting a diluted version of policy Y for party B. Finally, 
Hallerberg (1999) demonstrates in his study of the Belgian and Italian miracles leading them 
to membership within the EMU, that institutions can be strengthened or altered to favour a 
certain outcome despite the presence of coalition governments.  
                                                                                                                                                        
23 This is also consistent with recent research in the field (for example see Hallerberg and Von Hagen, 1999; 
Powell Jr., 2000). 
24 A key difference would be, however, that this is the result of the electoral system and not federal institutions. 
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 Based on the previous discussion, three null hypotheses can be presented. They are 
considered null because the main argument of this book is that the interaction between 
electoral systems and institutionalized structure of relationship matters most. Key is not the 
number of vetoes present by the nature of these vetoes (see upcoming section).   
Hypothesis n2: The higher the number of political parties within a government, the less likely 
a programmatic pension reform will occur. 
Hypothesis n2a: Based on Tsebelis (1999), a broad political coalition that includes 
ideologically polarized political parties is unlikely to yield a (major) pension reform. 
 
A Model of Pension Reform – Patterns of Pension Reforms 
 A more theoretically interesting use of both electoral systems and the structure of 
relationships between the state and social partners is the amalgamation of them to generate a 
typology – Patterns of Pension Reforms - that is presented in table 1.2. Four types of patterns 
are generated: Committee, Cabinet, Consensus, and Social Conflict. They are expected to 
yield different kinds and ‘levels’ of pension reforms. Prior to discussing each of the cells in 
depth, it should be emphasised that these patterns are based on the analysis of four countries 
and they should, therefore, not be taken as a generalization of all European countries. Further 
research into other cases would be required in order to make this kind of assessment. 
Nonetheless, a preliminary evaluation of the theory to other European cases is made in the 
concluding chapter of this book. 
 
Table 1.2 Patterns of Pension Reforms. 
Institutionalized Structure of Relationship Democratic Visions 
Parliamentary Integration 
“In the state” 
Social Partnership 
“Out of the state” 
Proportional 
Influence Visions 
Committee 
• • Sweden 
Consensual 
Belgium 
Majoritarian Visions Cabinet 
• • UK 
Social Conflict 
France 
  
 By far the most interesting feature of the ‘Patterns of Pension Reforms’ is the perfect 
match it has with Lijphart’s (1968) typology of political systems even though a different 
theoretical road was undertaken (see table 1.3). The relationship among the elites is 
considered to be coalescent when a proportional system is present while they are expected to 
be in conflict with a majoritarian system. This comes as no surprise since the winner-take-all 
attitude of the majoritarian vision is conducive to a competitive environment between two 
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rival blocks of political actors. This may create instable public policies, as demonstrated by 
Steinmo (1993) in his analysis of tax policies where a switch of government often resulted in 
a new tax policy. On the contrary, elites within a proportional influence vision need to co-
operate in order to avoid either a constant state of stalemate or the explosion of the whole 
political system by ignoring the political needs of minorities. In fact, proportional systems 
tend to be built as to encourage or even force the creation of super parliamentary majorities 
inclusive of minorities. In order to function properly these types of political system rest on 
the hopes that elites sing to the same tune irrespective of cleavages.25 
 
Table 1.3 Patterns of Pension Reform with the inclusion of Lijphart’s (1968) Typology of 
Political System. 
Institutionalized Structure of Relationship 
(Political Culture and Society) 
Electoral Systems 
(Political Elites) 
Parliamentary Integration 
“In the state” 
(Unified) 
Social Partnership 
“Out of the state” 
(Fragmented) 
Proportional System 
(Coelescent) 
Committee 
(Depoliticised) 
• • Sweden 
Consensual 
(Consociational) 
Belgium 
Majoritarian System 
(Competitive) 
Cabinet 
(Centripetal) 
• • UK 
Social Conflict 
(Centrifugal) 
France 
 
 The matching of institutionalized structure of relationship with political culture and 
society is even more appealing. As seen earlier, the social partners sought actively to keep 
social insurance out of the state’s hands, a ‘centrifugal’ logic (Chapter 2). The Belgian state 
has left a strong control of social insurance in the hands of the social partners, therefore 
adopting a consensual approach consistent with Lijphart’s consociational democracy because 
of the pillarization of the culture and society, which does not escape unions (Chapter 3). With 
regards to the Swedish case, the term committee has pretty much the same meaning as the 
term depoliticised, since both assume an important role for experts and a co-operative 
approach to problem-solving (Chapter 4). Nonetheless, the Committee pattern also implies a 
stronger concentration of power in the hands of the state vis-à-vis interest groups. This is not 
explicit in Lijphart’s typology. Finally, the term Cabinet was chosen because powers are 
highly concentrated within the executive, creating a centripetal concentration of power 
(Chapter 5). Thus, the patterns of relationship discovered for pension reform are highly 
                                                 
25 As stressed by Lijphart and other before him, a PR system without co-operating elites can have disastrous 
results. France’s Fourth Republic and the Weimar Republic are prime examples. 
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correlated to the type of political system inherent in each of the four cases studied and 
deserve to be used in conjunction for the studies of pension reform.  
 Prior to study the implication of each cell, we can consider another way to look at the 
same phenomena by ‘quantifying’ it. Table 1.4 is obtained by multiplying both kinds of veto 
points/players: veto players related to parliamentary actors (average number of parties within 
a government for the period 1990-7) and veto points embracing social partners (average share 
of contributions/financing from general taxes, 1990-7). The 1990s were chosen since they 
represent the period under which most pension reforms occur. However, this table is provided 
to provide a snap shot picture of the combination of both veto points and veto players, as no 
further step into quantification is presented. As a matter of consistency, I shall refer to their 
aggregation as the pension reform index from now on as it goes beyond the original 
conception of both veto points and veto players. 
 In line with the ordering principle established earlier, France’s pension reform index 
is above that of Sweden meaning that the nature of the veto matters more than the number of 
veto found within a governmental coalition. Based on the pension reform index Belgium is 
expected to have the most difficulties to address its pension troubles while the UK is 
considered to have the least difficulties. Two scores were provided for Belgium because the 
number of governmental parties is inflated due to the regionalization of political parties. For 
example, there is a Flemish and French socialist party, so another score was added (number 
of parties in government was divided by two). Nonetheless, this is still not representative 
since some divergence between them has been occurring making a proper assessment more 
difficult. Therefore, its ‘true’ score is likely to be somewhere in between the two presented in 
the table. Even though it is not a subject of investigation within this book, Denmark finds 
itself at the bottom of the index because of its very high reliance on public funds to finance its 
pension system. Denmark represents a peculiar case since its pension system relies heavily on 
a value added tax leading to a very low score in terms of institutionalized structure of 
relationship.   
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Table 1.4: Pension Reform Index based on the type of institutionalized structure and 
the number of parties in government (1990-97). 
Country 
Institutionalized 
Structure of Relationship Number of Parties in Government Pension Reform Index 
Belgium 2,97 3,85 (1,93) 11,42 (5,73) 
NLD 3,27 1,96 6,42 
France 3,82 1,41 5,38 
Germany 2,44 1,92 4,68 
Austria 1,77 1,96 3,47 
Italy 2,18 1,49 3,26 
Finland 1,08 2,7 2,92 
Spain 2,46 1 2,46 
LUX 1,18 1,96 2,31 
Greece 1,97 1 1,97 
Portugal 1,3 1 1,30 
Sweden 0,88 1,45 1,28 
Ireland 0,61 1,56 0,96 
UK 0,85 1 0,85 
Denmark 0,24 1,72 0,41 
 
Consensus: Easier to achieve in time of expansion (Chapter 3) 
  The first cell to be discussed is that of the proportional influence vision, which is 
generates coalition governments combined with an institutionalized structure of relationship 
that is out of the state. Potential conflicts resulting from the various cleavages are attenuated 
by coalescent elites and the integration of minorities and social partners within the decision-
making structure. Belgium represents the prototype of this cell.  
 Belgium is considered to be one of the poster children of consociational democracy 
(alongside with the Netherlands). Not only it is fragmented along class and religious lines, 
like its Dutch counterpart, but it is also divided along language lines as well. Re-enforcing the 
power of the elites is the lack of interaction among the three pillars (catholic, socialist and 
liberal). Belgians simply live in different sociological worlds, even though their importance 
has been decreasing in the past decade (see Chapter 4).  
 With regards to pension reform, an optimal retrenchment strategy would be the 
introduction of a grand social agreement. Traceability to a specific political party would be 
nearly impossible for the electors (Pierson, 1994) or the unions (Schludi, 2002). In the 
countdown towards EMU the Belgian coalition government actually sought such a strategy 
with its ‘Plan Global’, which aim was to redefine the welfare state in the way it was done 
after World War II in the so-called ‘Social Pact’. It was a big failure because the unions 
simply did not co-operate.    
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 As stated earlier, the creation of a broad coalition among the governmental parties is 
simplified via the creation of binding agreements, usually found within the governmental 
declaration, and continuous co-operation. However, these are more likely to be less stable in 
the Belgian case since unions have the opportunity to ‘poke’ at these agreements. For 
example, it can stress publicly the failure of the Socialist Party to address workers’ demands, 
thus ensuring that it maintains a more leftist profile. 
  Under these conditions, the governmental strategy tends to consist of a slow but 
steady evolution, which includes the promotion of proposals that do not seek to provoke stark 
reactions among all actors involved in the policy process.26 Proposals are rarely debated on 
the public sphere, since it could accentuate rather than decrease the differences among the 
cleavages. A reform proposal is unlikely to be made public if it is clear that unions are 
strongly opposed to it. The consensual pattern is marked by what a cabinet members refers to 
as ‘petit pas’ (slow steps). Therefore, this is the case where the least amount of ‘reform 
action’ is expected. 
 
Social Conflict: A winner-take-all system bounded by social partners (Chapter 2). 
 The combination of a majoritarian vision and social partnership is labelled social 
conflict because these two categories are strange bedfellows more likely to quarrel than co-
operate. The powers of the executive is highly concentrated making it prone to a winner-take-
all attitude in a highly fragmented society. At the same time, however, the inclusion of social 
partners within the institutional structure should be more conducive to a social dialogue, but 
this is clearly not the case in France. The antagonistic nature of unions comes from a 
continuous struggle to remain independent from a state seeking to preserve a dominating role 
in most aspects of the society. Even employers often complain about the interference of the 
state into its affairs, such as the management of social security. This context of opposition to 
the state and its subsequent lack of consensus building have resulted in France being labelled 
a “société bloquée” (paralysed society) (Crozier, 1970). 
 With regards to retrenchment, this case is very enlightening because traceability is 
definitively not an issue here: The executive is strong, visible, and highly centralized (Vail, 
1999). Most constraints are actually found outside the legislative arena. The social partners 
have an important role within the management of social security and discussions to reform 
pension includes them. At the very least, they need to be consulted about any proposed 
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changes. Even though they are weaker than in Belgium, they are more likely to mobilize and 
have a tradition of striking for political reasons rather than for better working conditions 
(Birnbaum, 1988). 
 The ‘new’ politics of welfare literature has stressed that this institutional situation is 
very difficult for reformers since a government cannot escape blame, and can therefore, be 
punished at a subsequent election (Pierson and Weaver, 1994; Pierson, 1994). However, this 
argument has a flip side: pension reform can be easier because social partners do not have the 
ability to disturb the policy direction or the types of reform a government seeks to pursue. 
Contrary to Belgium, unions cannot ‘poke’ at multi-party agreement. The government is in a 
stronger bargaining situation since it does not have to consider other parties, and is well 
placed to adopt a strategy of ‘divide and conquer’ versus the fragmented French unions.  
 
Committee: An expert led democracy? (Chapter 4) 
 The third cell represents the case where a coalition of political parties is required to 
enact a reform, but it does not have to face an institutionalized structure of relationship where 
unions have an important role in the management of pensions (Parliamentary Integration). 
Their influence tends to be filtered through the Social Democratic Party. The use of Sweden 
to represent this cell might raise some eyebrows. Despite a PR system, the Social Democrats 
have historically dominated governments. Less emphasized, however, is that they often had 
to rely on other parties to maintain a parliamentary majority. Further, the early 1990s marked 
a point where social democratic support was quite low, and shifting electoral majorities 
seemed a genuine possibility. After all, the bourgeois parties were able to held office for a 
similar length of time during the period 1976-1994. The support of the Left Party can also no 
longer be taken as granted, which was the case for most of the 1980s. In conclusion, a single 
party cannot carry through a pension reform on its own, as it needs, at the very least, the 
support of another party. 
 The other key point in contention is the role and influence of unions, both of which 
have been in constant decline since the end of the 1970s prompting vigorous debate on the 
end of corporatism in Sweden. Briefly, the argument presented in chapter 5 stresses that the 
adoption of the supplementary schemes in the late 1950s confined this responsibility to the 
state, a position favoured and pushed by LO. However, when it came time to reform the 
system in the 1990s, it was difficult for unions to advance the claim that they were deserving 
                                                                                                                                                        
26 However, it may have a better capacity to respond to crisis or international requirements (see Hallerberg, 
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of representation because they were not as involved in this program as health and 
unemployment insurance. Therefore, politicians were able to create a very small committee 
without any interest groups. Contrary to most other European countries, parliamentary 
committees in Sweden exerts a strong influence in the policy process (Arter, 1990). A great 
number of multi-party agreements originate in the committees. The various pension 
committees have included thorough investigations that have involved many experts. 
 Based on the patterns of pension reform presented in table 1.2, the main stumbling 
block is considered to be reaching an agreement among political parties. Because such 
negotiations are made among veto players, and do not require negotiations with another type 
of political actor (due to the absence of additional veto points), it should be easier to generate 
a substantive pension reform in Sweden than in France. Contrary to Belgium, a negotiated 
agreement should be more impermeable because of the exclusion of unions in the formal 
proceedings. It is far easier to influence an agreement while it is being made rather than 
facing a final product.  
   
Cabinet: Unlimited powers? (Chapter 5) 
 The fourth and last cell is composed of a majoritarian vision and a Parliamentary 
Integration structure of relationship. The government faces no veto points, as it does not have 
to negotiate with either social partners or other political parties. This results in a strong 
concentration of decision-making power. It must still face the approval of the cabinet and the 
parliament, but formal opposition is kept at a minimum. Furthermore, the British society is 
not as divided as the French and tends to accept authoritative commands (Crozier, cited in 
Peters, 1995: 60). The strongest capacity for a pension reform should be this case, 
represented by the United Kingdom.  
 Pierson (1994) challenges these conclusions on the grounds that actions from this type 
of government are highly visible and could, therefore, be punished easily by the electorate. 
Interestingly, this cell represents a situation where the government really has no formal way 
out in terms of accountability. Contrary to the three other cases, the government cannot blame 
any other actors for its action. It is worst than France because it cannot blame unions for 
lacking true leadership to manage pensions, and so on. It can still create expert commissions, 
attempt to sell the expertise from a think-tank, or blame external events or actors such as the 
European Union, but at the end of the day the responsibility of a reform rests with the 
                                                                                                                                                        
1999). 
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government. Nonetheless, Pierson’s (1994) list of retrenchment strategies can still be 
employed and, contrary to his conclusions, have a significant impact. 
 These four patterns of pension reform provides us with another set of hypotheses: 
H3: The impact of pension reforms should be very limited in the Consensual pattern of 
reform making, and most extensive in the Cabinet pattern. The overall reform ranking should 
go as follow: Cabinet > Committee > Social Conflict > Consensual.  
Application: Belgium should be the case closest to the status quo, and the most extensive 
reform(s) should have occurred in the UK. Overall, the ranking of the four pension reforms 
should be as follow: UK > Sweden > France > Belgium. 
H3a: Unions will be better equipped to block drastic reforms when they are institutionalized 
within Social Partnership regardless of union density. 
Application: Unions are more likely to have a disruptive role in Belgium than in Sweden 
despite a similar level of unionization. 
H3b: Regardless of the number of veto players (Tsebelis, 1999), it is more difficult to 
generate a pension reform with the Social Conflict pattern than with the Committee pattern. 
Application: France is expected to have greater difficulties in generating a reform than 
Sweden even though it has fewer veto players. 
H3c: The Cabinet pattern generates more extensive reforms than the Social Conflict pattern 
because the latter faces veto points. 
Application: The UK should be able to generate more extensive reforms than France because 
it does not have a structured relationship based on Social Partnership. 
H3d: The Consensual pattern leads to more reform difficulties than the Social Conflict 
pattern because it has more veto players in a similar structure of relationship (Social 
Partnership). 
Application: Belgium is expected to have more difficulties than France in generating reforms. 
H3e: The Committee pattern leads to more reform difficulties than the Cabinet pattern 
because it has more veto players in a similar structure of relationship (Parliamentary 
Integration). 
Application: Sweden is expected to have more difficulties than the UK in generating reforms. 
 
Methodology and Case Selection 
Prior to discussing alternative theories and hypotheses to the framework presented 
above, it is worthwhile discussing the method used and the selection of the four cases 
(Belgium, France, UK and Sweden). First with regards to methodology, Scharpf’s (1997) 
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discussion on the backward looking bias found in policy research is quite enlightening. He 
criticized King, Keohane and Verba’s (1994) focus on search for the effects of specific 
variables rather than the causes specific outcomes. Scharpf (1997) demonstrates skilfully that, 
in policy research, the chain of causation must be long enough to explain also why 
independent variables behave in a certain way. It is not sufficient to argue that the presence of 
unions compelled country x to act in a manner y, we need to know the mechanism under 
which the actions of the unions exercise influence because the presence of unions elsewhere 
do not generate a similar outcome.27 Extending Scharpf’s logic, Pierson’s work starts with the 
picture of a frozen welfare world and he goes backward into the process to explain why. This 
book does something similar but emphasises the importance of the policy process since it is 
assumed that different outcomes are observed across the cases. In order to do that, several 
step backwards into the process are necessary making the use of a qualitative framework, the 
analysis of four case studies, more appropriate. 
Besides addressing the difficulties stressed by Scharpf, in depth analysis of four 
countries has some clear advantages. First, the variance obtained is likely to be larger than a 
comparative study of two or three countries, which tends to be the norm for many 
publications. This reduces the likelihood of falling onto only exceptional cases. Second, an 
analysis of four different policy processes is going to be more accurate and helpful than 
quantitative studies comparing all EU countries at once. It would be quite difficult to quantify 
policy processes behind granting certain values to institutional features. Further, the outcome 
of pension reforms cannot be determined in the present since they seek, mostly, to attenuate a 
possible explosion of costs in the future.  
Third, the study of four cases allows various matching combinations among the cases 
resulting in a clearer picture of the sources of variations. This is key since, for example, we 
can compare the actions taken by a single party government (France and UK), or a multiparty 
coalition (Sweden and Belgium) while comparing both groups. A similar logic can be applied 
to compare the actions taken by Bismarckian countries (France and Belgium), where reforms 
are considered to be more problematic, with themselves and two others cases from different 
‘welfare regimes’ (Sweden and UK) (Esping-Andersen, 1990). A total of nine combinations 
are possible. Regardless of combinations, however, it must be underlined that generalization 
cannot really be made beyond these four cases.  
                                                 
27 Using an example from earlier writings, Scharpf (1997) stresses these difficulties: “it would have been 
enough…to show that inflation in the 1970s was controlled by union wage restraint; it was also necessary to 
identify the factors that enabled the unions in some but not all countries to practice wage restraint” (25). 
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 The four countries analysed in this book were selected on the basis of both 
institutional structure and electoral systems (see above). Thus, they represent four different 
ways to reform pensions. The EU is often mentioned as a source of pressure to reform the 
pension system, therefore four EU cases were selected to remove this variable as a key 
alternative explanation. The four countries were also chosen because they do not represent 
strong exceptional cases for the study of pension reforms. For example, the selection of 
Ireland would raise suspicions because of its very high birth rate, which have pushed ageing 
issues further down in the future. Norway was dismissed because it can avoid making painful 
decisions due to the large financial resources it possesses, as a result of its oil. The four cases 
were also selected on the basis that they complement each other quite well, thus helping to 
reject other alternative theories. For example, both France and Belgium are considered to be 
prototypes of the Bismarckian social insurance system present throughout continental 
Europe. Belgium and Sweden are also highly unionized and are both considered to be highly 
de-commodified (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
 
What is a pension reform? 
 Public pensions are quite complex and are influenced by a multitude of factors, many 
of which are external to pension systems (fertility rates, labour force participation, growth, 
immigration). As demonstrated by the numerous projections made in the four countries 
studied, the alteration of these parameters can yield very different results. The key difficulty 
in assessing pension reform remains, however, that its effects are far from being immediate. 
Most measures are implemented over a long period of time with new rules targeted at the 
younger generations. For example, the Swedish pension reform includes a transition period of 
20 years. Thus, it can take 30 to 40 years before the full impact of a reform can be assessed. 
Moreover, due to the strong variations in all the factors affecting pension systems across 
Europe systematic comparison are extremely difficult to generate. The figures obtained by 
the European Union represent an amalgamation of various econometric models where each 
‘external’ variable (growth, unemployment, immigration, etc.) were agreed upon and then put 
directly into each national model. 
 Nonetheless, these difficulties should not stop us from attempting to rank or classify 
pension reforms, and few solutions have been proposed to deal with this issue. First, Pierson 
(1994) stresses three key elements: spending, program structure, and systemic retrenchment. 
The later implies changes that are indirectly related to the program, but that still have 
important implications for the future such as constraining the sources of revenues, weakening 
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popular attachment to a program, alter the institutional structure of a program, and weakening 
pro-welfare groups (14-7). He returns to these elements in his conclusion and provides a 
ranking of programmatic retrenchment outcomes with the approximation high, low/moderate 
and low, an analysis of spending figures, and a qualitative analysis of systemic retrenchment. 
The programmatic impact of the British pension reform of 1986 is considered to be a ‘high’ 
success (142-163). The comparison of two countries allows Pierson greater latitude that he 
could not have had with more cases.  
 Second, Bonoli’s (2000) The Politics of Pensions compares and analyzes pension 
reforms in the UK, France and Switzerland. However, the four pension reforms covered in 
his book are never really ranked and pension reform is not really defined.28 Nonetheless, his 
conclusion provides us with an important element to consider: the difference between reforms 
that only seeks a reduction in expenditure and reforms that seek to alter the politics of a 
particular programme.29 For example, he argues that the 1986 reform in the UK has created a 
new bread of private pension holders who are likely to oppose changes related to capital 
gains (167). 
 Third, Schludi (2002) compares five cases (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden) 
and begins his discussion with “an index for the overall need for adjustment”. He obtains this 
index by presenting data (pre-reform) for 10 possible reform goals of government on the 
basis of need, and then ranks the need of each country from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest) for each 
item. For example, Sweden obtains a score of 1 on the need to harmonize its pension system 
because it is already universal. He adds the score of each reform goal to obtain his index. He 
eventually ranks the five countries according to the estimated change in pension outlays 
2000-2030, whether or not there was a switch from defined-benefits to defined-contributions, 
an harmonization of public and private sector schemes, and the promotion of fully-funded 
pillar. Despite adding clarity to the judgement of pension reforms, his ranking of the five 
countries remains quite arbitrary since it grants an index point for reform elements that yield 
very different results. For example, harmonizing pension benefits may not generate as much 
savings as altering their indexation.30  
                                                 
28 He restricts himself to a discussion of five reform options: shifting financing from payg to funding, increasing 
the age of retirement, targeting of benefits, changes in the benefit formula, and changes in the indexation 
mechanism (23-27). 
29 As underlined in Chapter 1, a reform does not have to cut expenditure. However, since most difficulties are 
related to pension expenditure during the period under study, reforms are associated with retrenchment 
measures. 
30 The Belgian case (chapter 3) clearly illustrates the strong variation in the effects of different pension 
measures. 
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 In this book, three broad elements are analyzed in the assessment of pension reforms. 
First, the financial impact of a reform is scrutinized under two different angles: The expected 
reduction of governmental expenditure and the expected costs to groups of individuals. 
Regardless of the fact that spending does not tell us a whole lot about social programmes 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990), it is financial concerns related to the public budget that are pushing 
politicians to seek reforms. Despite a variety of acceptance in terms of taxes and benefits, all 
four countries studied have required changes in order to avoid a stark increase in public 
expenditure as a result of the ‘pappy-boom’. Thus, a key goal of pension reform remains the 
reduction of expected outlays. Another interesting way to study the effect of a pension reform 
is to analyse its impact on groups of individuals. This is very interesting for political 
scientists since it tells us who shoulders the burden of these reforms.  
 Second, the program structure is analyzed. An important distinction is made between 
parametric versus programmatic reforms. A parametric reform occurs when a government 
only alters certain parameters of a specific programme without challenging its basic 
principles. For example, an increase in the length of contribution does not change the 
philosophy or the basic way under which the system operates. A programmatic reform 
presupposes a significant departure from an existing system. In such a case, all parameters are 
likely to be changed and new principles are likely to be added. It is like buying a new house 
instead of fixing the roof. A programmatic reform is more encompassing and seeks to resolve 
the ‘pappy-boom’ with one major overhaul of the pension system. It is therefore more far-
reaching than a parametric reform. 
 Finally, the political implications of the reform are studied. Of major importance for 
this book is the implication of a reform on the relationship between the social partners and the 
state. Do social partners gained new powers in exchange for their co-operation? What were 
the social partners able and not able to obtain? Is the government seeking to marginalize them 
by reducing their institutional role? Does the reform introduce new divisions among future 
groups of pensioners? The answer to these questions has implications for the way pensions 
will be addressed in the future and need to be considered. 
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 Theoretical Background and Alternative Explanations: Theorizing Institutions at a 
Time of Retrenchment 
The ‘ new’ politics of the welfare state - immobilism 
 The re-emergence of institutions within political science (March and Olsen, 1989: 
Peters, 1999) has not escaped studies related to the retrenchment of the welfare state (for a 
review see Green-Pedersen and Haverland, 2002). For the most part, institutions have been 
considered to be a hindrance for politicians seeking to reform the welfare state because of 
veto points (Immergut, 1992; Bonoli, 2000) and institutional stickiness (Pierson, 1994; 1998). 
It is rare to find cases where a single majority of 50% + 1 in a national parliament is 
sufficient to carry welfare reforms. Even though this assertion has been widely supported in 
the literature, there have been few studies where institutions have been analyzed as favouring 
retrenchment (King, 1995; Ross, 2000b). For example, King (1995) demonstrates that the re-
introduction of workfare in both the US and UK was facilitated by the institutional structure 
that was in place.  
No one can deny the impact of Pierson’s work, which has theorized the difficulties 
associated with retrenchment politics (1994, 1996, 1998, & 2000; Pierson and Weaver, 1993) 
and generated an important debate within academic circles. It is therefore logical to begin our 
theoretical discussion of pension reform by reviewing his work and its critique. His work is 
strongly rooted within the neo-institutionalist literature and its key contribution is that welfare 
retrenchment is quite different from welfare expansion. Pierson (1994) argues that 
retrenchment is a difficult and costly political undertaking, as it is much easier to share 
benefits than the burden of retrenchment because it is an exercise of blame avoidance rather 
than credit taking. Moreover, the electorate tends to have a negative bias, by being more 
aware of losses than equivalent gains (Weaver, 1986). As a result, he claims that the welfare 
state is like an immovable elephant.31  
 
Popularity of the welfare state 
Pierson (1994) states three key elements behind the stability of the welfare state. The 
first is the popularity of the welfare state. Social programs, public pensions being a prime 
                                                 
31 Albeit for different reasons, Esping-Andersen (1996) supports Pierson’s conclusion by stating that the welfare 
landscape is frozen. 
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example, enjoy broad support among the electorate because they benefit from them. This 
rests on the argument that ‘policies produce politics’ (39). For example, it is very difficult for 
a politician or a political party to get elected on a platform where pension cuts is one feature. 
This is emphasized by the fact that the elderly have higher election participation rates than 
the young. Further, recipients are now members of interest groups defending their interests. 
Pierson claims that the welfare state actually fostered the creation of interest groups that seek 
to protect their benefits (30). His reference to the American Association of Retired People 
(AARP) with its 28 million members and 1300 staff members is a case in point (3).  
The ‘grey power’ thesis has been questioned. The elderly do not represent a single 
unified interest. In the four countries studied here, associations representing the retirees tend 
to be divided along ideological (Sweden) or occupational (France) and religious (Belgium) 
lines. Pierson (1994) himself acknowledges that one of the key reasons why Thatcher was 
able to push through her reform in 1986 was the divisions among the types of British 
pensioners (71). Further, Lynch (2001) underlines that countries do vary with regards to how 
much they spend on the elderly vis-à-vis the non-elderly, with the US favouring the elderly. 
She states that “younger age groups enjoy significant benefits” in many countries (433). 
Thus, the influence of elderly groups might be stronger in the US than elsewhere prompting 
the question why, and challenging the generalization of the grey power thesis.  
Another problematic assertion is the linkage between public opinion and elections. 
Thatcher introduced what are considered ‘unpopular’ reforms, but she was still able to hold 
office for over 10 years. These actions are even more challenging once we consider that the 
British political system offers little room for blame avoidance tactics. Contrary to the US, for 
example, a policy cannot be blamed on the Congress or the Second House of Parliament.  
 Finally, Ross (2000a) challenges the power of the opinion polls in sustaining the 
welfare state. She does not dispute this support, but also directs our attention to other polls 
suggesting that retrenchment measure such as the “Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act,” associated with the phrase ‘ending welfare as we know it,’ 
became a highly popular initiative from the Clinton Administration (19). 
 The cases reviewed in this book partly support Pierson. A key difficulty for the 
evaluation of this thesis remains that there is a widespread consensus among politicians in all 
countries that pensions had (have) to be reformed. The source of the conflict centres more on 
its degree and on how. Swedish politicians went out of their way to ensure that pensions were 
not going to be on the electoral agenda. The latest French election, however, resulted in both 
camps proposing a similar reform to the public sector despite the stark opposition such 
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attempts faced in 1995 from public unions and the a large segment of the population. Thus, 
the electorate is faced with a choice between two main blocks advocating pension reforms. 
 
Path dependence 
 Path dependency has been linked mostly with Historical Institutionalism (for a more 
in depth review see Hall and Taylor, 1996; Immergut, 1998; and Peters, 1999), which 
emphasises the “legacy of the past” (Peters, 1999). It advances that an institutional structure 
creates a path restraining the number of policy options available by increasing the costs of 
alternatives. North (1990) describes this phenomenon by citing an article explaining why 
QWERTY persists on keyboards even though more efficient alternatives now exist.  
According to Historical institutionalists, institutions also delimit the power and even 
the interpretation of one’s interest while enhancing that of other political actors. Even if 
actors act rationally, institution structures create unintended consequences. For example, 
Steinmo (1993) argues that Sweden was able to build a stronger welfare state than the United 
States not because Swedes wanted the welfare state more than Americans, but rather because 
the American tax system was not as efficient as its Swedish counterpart. The Americans were 
unable to create a national sales tax comparable to their European counterparts and to hide 
taxes (195-98). The lack of a strong welfare state in the US is an unintended consequence of 
its tax system. 
Pierson (1994) also argues that previous choices, such as opting for payg schemes, 
constrain the range of options available to policy makers who wish to introduce a reform. 
Pensions are considered to be a clear example of a path dependent policy, since a move away 
from payg to a fully funded system would result in a double payment problem for a 
generation, who would have to finance its own pensions and the one of their elders. This is 
one of the key reasons why pension reforms are introduced over a long period of time. A 
pension reform must allow individuals to adjust their savings and working career in 
accordance with a new reform. A person near retirement would face immense difficulties in 
improving his/her savings if someone were to reduce the benefits by 10% tomorrow. This 
reality is, at the very least, as much a reflection of this problematic as a strategy to avoid 
blame on the part of governments. Even though this conceptualization provides some 
understanding as to why substantive reforms have not occurred in many countries, it is not 
heuristically useful in explaining the fact that some countries have been able to introduce 
substantive pension reforms while others have not. Pierson acknowledges that his theoretical 
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framework cannot really account for the drastic changes to the British public pension scheme. 
Nonetheless, he claims that this is the ‘exception rather than the rule’ (Pierson, 1996: 161).  
To their credit, Myles and Pierson (1998) provide an explanation to this exception by 
underlining the importance of program maturity in generating reform.32 They claim, on the 
one hand, that countries who were able to introduce significant reforms by adding a funding 
component into their scheme have been latecomers in the development of their public 
pension programs (8). They state, on the other hand, that diverse countries such as Italy and 
France have had major difficulties in introducing these kinds of reform because of the high 
level of maturity of their public pension schemes (30). Even though this explanation increases 
our understanding of pension reforms, it does not explain a key case of this book. Sweden’s 
ATP program was fully developed when it was transformed in the 1990s. 
Nonetheless, key in Pierson’s analysis is the static ‘nature’ of welfare programs. His 
theoretical framework, strongly influenced by the new-institutionalist school, is quite prone 
to that. A common critic is that this school emphasizes (not to say inflate) the stability of 
institutions and policies. The strong reliance on ‘path dependency’, a key tool employed by 
Pierson and others belonging to the historical institutionalist school, reinforces this scenario. 
As stated by Peters (1999): 
“the entire analytical framework [historical institutionalism] appears 
premised upon the enduring effects of institutional and policy choices made 
at the initiation of a structure. Thus, the approach appears much better suited 
to explain the persistence of patterns than to explain how those patterns 
might change… [T]here appears to be little or no capacity to predict 
change” (68; see also Pierre et al., 2002). 
 
Thus, it begs the question what is a move away from the status quo? There is still no 
clear definition of what is the null hypothesis of Pierson’s static elephant. This makes 
Pierson’s work nearly tautological. At the macro level, all of his cases are considered to be 
‘successful’ (Pierson, 1996; 1998) meaning that no substantive changes have been performed. 
The term path breaking policy is now surfacing within this kind of literature, implying that 
certain actions are made to favour retrenchment at a later date. For example, Palier and 
Bonoli (1999) have argued that the inaction of the government with regards to pension 
reforms in France increases the uncertainty among the population reducing its faith on public 
pensions and leading them towards private options. Nonetheless, there is nothing on when a 
path actually gets broken. 
                                                 
32 Pierson (1994) alludes to this in ‘Dismantling the Welfare State’ where he states that one of the key reasons 
behind Thatcher’s success in reforming the public pension scheme in Britain was that it had not yet reached a 
high level of maturity like social security in the US (71-2). 
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 Another difficulty lies with the meaning of retrenchment. Parametric reforms are a lot 
easier to implement than a sweeping reform of a program and have been advocated in many 
countries. However, the cumulating effect of parametric reforms can end up having a similar 
impact as a sweeping programmatic reform. This outcome has been noticed when analyzing 
the rise of the welfare state and must be considered while analysing retrenchment as well. 
The evolution of the welfare state is the result of a slow incremental improvement in social 
policies occurring in the last 100 year. As stated by the late Ashford (1986), “there was never 
an historical turning point where leaders sat around the table and said to each other that we 
must now devise a welfare state” (4). Thus, Ross (2000a) argues that “welfare states were not 
built over a decade or two, so why would we expect them to be dismantled over a decade of 
two?” (16; see also Clayton and Pontusson, 1998). Even though such criticism strikes a cord, 
it does not resolve the problematic of measuring change as stated above. We replace move 
from the status quo with increments. A similar discussion occurred in budgetary politics 
resulting in a debate over this size of an increment (see Dempster and Wildavsky, 1980). A 
move away from stability towards a more dynamic transforming configuration still requires a 
solution for this measurement problem.  
Pierson’s association of policy stability partly as a result of path dependency can also 
be questioned. Baldwin (1990b) demonstrates that path dependency has restricted the 
opportunities made available to reformers but did not halt the development of public pensions 
in the five European countries studied (Denmark, Sweden, UK, France and Germany). Of 
importance is the fact that major changes occurred despite the difficulties associated with 
path dependence.  
Governments have historically acknowledged these difficulties, but have also been 
using them to their advantage. In the case of the Swedish mandatory supplementary pension 
reform (ATP), the social democrats provided highly generous benefits to white collars 
workers to gather their support for their public system because they were already covered by 
private alternatives. Even though the compromise formula led to better benefits for white-
collar workers, LO accepted this, as they understood that it was the price to pay for the 
creation of ATP. This major shift in pension policy was part of a social democratic strategy, 
which resulted in an extension of popular support in subsequent elections (Svensson, 1994). 
Had there not been extensive private alternatives enjoyed by white-collar workers, it would 
have been very difficult for the social democrats to defend its ATP position with LO. Thus, 
the efforts made to break the private path turned out to be beneficial politically.  
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Even if we accept that retrenchment is very different from expansion, the association 
of policy stability with path dependency does not always hold. This is clearly demonstrated 
by King (1995) in his study of the politics of unemployment in the US and UK. Part of his 
argument states that the institutional arrangements of both countries have facilitated the re-
introduction of work-to-welfare programmes. 
The four cases studied in this book emphasise that path dependency does not mean 
‘frozen’ dependency. Two of the four countries studied (Sweden and the UK) have 
introduced significant changes to their pension system, and, despite adopting less drastic 
measures, some substantial changes have been adopted in Belgium and France. 
  
Institutional stickiness 
The third key point for Pierson is institutional stickiness. Many countries have formal 
rules requiring a majority well above 50% for the removal or alternation of a law. The United 
States, with its Congress, Senate and Presidency is a case in point (Pierson and Weaver, 
1993). Many authors have referred back to the concept of veto points (Immergut, 1992) and, 
in a more rational choice perspective, veto players (Tsebelis, 1995; 1999) to analyze the 
impact of institutional stickiness.  
 Pierson (1994) focuses on formal institutions. His discussion on the subject 
emphasises the centrality of power in the hand of the British government and the opposite for 
the United States. Based on these characteristics, he builds a framework stressing the 
advantages and disadvantages of such institutional structures. For example, he underlines that 
the British political system makes it easier for a government to introduce retrenchment 
measures because it does not have to deal with other chambers or federal actors as in the US. 
However, this concentration of power gives great visibility to retrenchment actions and may 
be punished by the electorate (31-6). Pierson’s characterization of institutions falls in line 
with what Peters (1999) refers to as empirical institutionalism. Institutions are considered to 
be taken as a given, and are not expected to change. The key element in analysis emphasising 
empirical institutionalism is the design of the institution (Peters, 1999: chapter 4). Such 
framework does not leave any space for the role of the state, how these institutional structures 
came into formation, and on the day-to-day operation of these institutions. 
 To emphasise the kind of misrepresentation of the reality that can be found as a result 
of this type of institutional framework, a look at a recent publication on pensions emphasising 
formal institutions is very enlightening. Bonolli’s (2000) emphasis on institutional design and 
the creation of veto points is extremely clear when he considers the French President as a 
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veto players because of France’s semi-presidential system. Thus, he argues that this veto 
point was very important in distinguishing success (1993 Balladur Reform) and failure (1995 
Juppé Plan):  
“In line with the theoretical approach adopted in this study, it can be argued 
that this difference in policy-making patterns relates to the different power 
configurations at the time when the reform was decided. The division within 
the executive in 1993 constituted a veto point which put pressure on the 
government to negotiate with the unions. In contrast, two years later, the 
high level of power concentration which resulted from the same camp 
controlling both the presidency and parliament did not create the conditions 
favourable to negotiation. In 1995 the government felt strong enough and 
thought it could act without the approval of the labour movement” (Bonolli, 
2000: 147). 
  
To those familiar with French politics, these conclusions raise suspicions. The debates 
surrounding the separation of powers between the President and the Prime Minister in time of 
cohabitation have centred mostly on ‘grey areas’ such as foreign affairs and the EU. 
Informally, social security is considered to be a purely domestic affair where the intervention 
of the President simply does not occur in time of cohabitation. There is simply no evidence, 
even in his discussion of the reform of 1993, to suggest that Mitterrand had any say on this 
matter, let alone that he had a veto and forced Balladur to negotiate with the unions.33 It is 
also clear from the Constitution that the Mitterrand could not intervene in this matter. The 
President has denounced the actions (or inaction) of the government on the subject of 
pensions, as Chirac did frequently during Jospin’s tenure at Matignon, but this is something 
quite different from a veto. This sort of intervention is actually very similar to the protest 
made by parties in the opposition. Thus, for this particular policy matter, Balladur had similar 
power as the Juppé/Chirac team. However, in order to make such a statement Bonolli would 
have needed to pay closer attention at the informal relationship between the two. 
 As demonstrated in this book, institutional stickiness can be avoided because actors 
are embedded in such system and have had experience with these systems and can thus find 
exit doors. Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) came to similar conclusions in their analysis of 
budgetary politics by emphasising the role of fiscal pacts when coalition governments come 
into being, thus reducing the importance of a high number of parties within a coalition 
government. With regards to pensions, Sweden has been able to reform deeply its pension 
system relative to France even though it has more veto players. As it will be argued later in 
                                                 
33 Even the word negotiate is extremely strong in this case. As it is stressed in Chapter 2, Balladur consulted the 
unions. No negotiations or concertation occurred. 
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this chapter, it is not the number of veto points or veto players that matters but the nature of 
the veto. 
 Finally, the coinage ‘new’ politics of welfare has also faced its share of critics. First, it 
has been demonstrated that Thatcher’s pension policies did not mark a significant break from 
the past, but rather followed previous Conservative ideas (Fawcett, 1995). Second, Ross 
(2000a) provides another set of criticism by stressing that the debate on welfare retrenchment 
has been ‘de-politicized’ (12). She asks where are the political leaders, the elites and their 
influence, and, ironically, institutions such as the bureaucracy. Third, Scarborough (2000) 
concludes in a recent article that the specificities of a ‘new’ politics of welfare “slips away 
when welfare reform is considered in terms of why governments took to engaging intimately 
with the lives of their citizens…a definitive account remains elusive” (251). Her empirical 
analysis of ‘old’ theories of welfare state (industrialization, Marxist explanation and nation-
building) demonstrates that it may be too early to retire them. As a conclusion, it should be 
acknowledged that the sheer number of critiques is in itself a testament to the importance of 
Pierson’s work. Many of his inputs into the differentiation between welfare state 
retrenchment and expansion, such as goals and context, remain highly consensual. 
 Without negating the importance of path dependency and the difficulties of 
retrenching the welfare state, the theoretical framework presented earlier addresses some of 
the critics related to Pierson’s work. First, there is variance among the four cases, allowing us 
to go beyond the general conception of the welfare state as an immovable object where all 
dependent variable are expected to remain static (Pierson, 2000). By introducing variance 
within the dependent variable, we can better comprehend the elements that are conducive to 
pension reforms and those that are not. Second, the typology states explicitly how the 
institutions influence the process and outcome of pension reforms. We can achieve these 
results by focusing on both formal and informal institutions; hence the creation of a pension 
reform index that includes both veto players (formal institutions) and veto points (informal 
institutions). 
 
Ideology and Party Politics 
 Ross (2000b) points out that the ‘new politics’ of welfare has seriously 
underestimated the importance of ideology and party politics. Nonetheless, some insights are 
available and worth mentioning. In one of the first study on the retrenchment of the welfare 
state, Mishra (1990) presents a dichotomy in the approaches made to the welfare state by 
stating that a social democratic world, including Sweden and Germany, is seeking to maintain 
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the current structure of the welfare state while a conservative world led by the US and the UK 
has attempted to alter it significantly. 
 Levy (1999), following in the footsteps of Garrett (1998), argues that the difference 
between the Left and Right matters. He claims that within continental Europe, considered to 
include many inequities in its welfare system, left parties have pursued a strategy of turning 
‘vice into virtues’ by altering ineffective policies in favour of the most needy. Comparing 
France’s governments throughout the 1990s, he concludes that partisan politics is an 
important source of differentiation both in terms of approach and policies (Levy, 2001: 281). 
An important element missing, however, is the failure to acknowledge that the Jospin 
government has not altered previous retrenchment measures implemented by the right wing 
government of Balladur and Juppé and did not face an economic crisis while seeking to 
adhere to EMU’s convergence criteria (see chapter 2). 
 Advocating a logic similar to Nixon goes to China, Ross (2000b) argues that left wing 
parties are more likely to be trusted with welfare reforms since they have been associated 
with the promotion of social programmes. A key reason behind this argument is the long 
lasting relationship between parties and issues, which are long standing “leading voters to 
develop deep-seated partisan issue associations” (163).34 Thus, the degree of risk while 
undertaking welfare reform varies between the right and the left, with the former being more 
vulnerable than the later. Key is the credibility of the source. In the case of pensions, Hinrichs 
(2000) provides support to this thesis by claiming that vast efforts to reform pension were 
undertaken by political parties helping rather their damaging their electoral fortune. 
“Retrenchments are not punished by voters if their identity is based on a reputation for 
pursuing foresighted, purposeful policies, which they try to utilise for increasing their appeal 
to the electorate” (371). His concluding logic on this point, however, echoes Pierson since 
Hinrichs advocates a long-term perspective to diffuse immediate costs and de-politicize the 
implementation process while stressing the lack of transparency as an element helping the 
instauration of large pension reforms. 
Political parties are influenced by other factors than ideology such as seeking 
opportunities to get into power or to secure its hold onto power (Mayhew, 1974). Some 
course of actions can be vote ‘grabbers’ and thus be adopted by political parties even though 
it does not reflect a traditional ideological representation. A clear example would be Clinton’s 
‘ending welfare as we knew it’, something that would be expected from the Republicans, not 
                                                 
34 She argues that the long transformation of Labour resulting in new Labour is a case in point. 
 45
the Democrats. Therefore, it is possible that retrenchments can be viewed as vote winners for 
political parties. Thus, parties would seek to introduce retrenchment measures because they 
expect electoral benefits.35 
 The ideology argument is quite insightful when dealing with two-party systems. 
However, it becomes difficult to acknowledge an ideological dimension when analyzing 
coalition governments. This is the rule rather than the exception in Europe. For example, 
what would be the ideological inclination of the current rainbow government in Belgium, 
which includes neo liberals, greens, and socialists?  
Linking both partisan politics and institutions, King (1995) demonstrates that the 
institutionalization of a liberal conception combining training and unemployment insurance 
have helped conservative parties in re-establishing work to welfare programmes in the 1980s 
while preventing left to centre parties in establishing less stigmatizing programmes in the 
1960s and 1970s.  
Few authors have actually tackled this difficulty. For example, it has been argued that 
certain party systems might be more prone to retrenchment measures than others (Kitschelt, 
2001; Green-Pedersen, 2001). Green-Pedersen (2001) argues that retrenchment measures in 
the Netherlands were easier to implement than in Denmark due to the pivotal role of the 
centre party, which was prone to create a party consensus, including the labour party, about 
welfare retrenchment. Similar actions were blocked by the Social Democrats until 1993 when 
they returned to power. 
Such argument, however, has been put aside because interviews conducted in the 
countries studied have demonstrated a consensus among the political elites to reform the 
pension system. Differences persist between the mainstream right and left wing parties, with 
right wing parties being more inclined to favour a larger role to the private sector. Even if one 
acknowledges these differences, it still does not help us explain why certain right wing 
parties are more successful than others in their reform endeavours. For example, the British 
Conservatives have had more ‘success’ than their French counterparts.   
 
Theorizing Political Actors and Welfare State Reforms 
Policy networks and its applicability to the study of pension reforms. 
  The current debate between advocates of policy networks and neo-institutionalism 
shares some similarities with the previous one between pluralism and corporatism. The role 
                                                 
35 Even though less applicable than in the US, parties may adopt specific policies in order to raise financial 
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of the state remains sharply divided by these two ‘new’ schools of thoughts. Within the 
policy networks literature, there is a hollowing out of the state. We can even find governance 
without government. The state is now powerless and cannot control independent actors that 
effectively govern sectors of the public domain. The ‘new’ institutionalists, on the contrary, 
emphasize the role of the state via its institutions. The key distinction is whether or not the 
state dictates the debate. This section does not seek to review the different typologies 
presented to describe the types of policy networks (see Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; Rhodes, 
1997), but rather to present the core elements of this approach and to analyze its applicability 
to public pensions. It is argued that the policy network framework is ill equipped to tackle the 
subject of pension reform. 
The policy networks research agenda stems from the belief that “the reality of policy 
making as recognized by competent observers was changing” (Jordan and Schubert, 1992: 
11). Rhodes (1997) best describes this view by stating that we are now faced with “plenty of 
governments which government cannot steer” (3).  
Six key elements can be found within the policy network approach. The first four are 
based on Rhodes’ model (1986) while the last two are based on Wilks and Wright (1987). 
First, the organizations involved in the policy networks are interdependent. They need each 
other for a policy to function properly, thus justifying their presence in the articulation of a 
policy. This feature differentiates the policy network approach with that of pluralism and 
corporatism where it is assumed that the government still has the capacity to act alone. 
Second, an exchange of resources between the groups occurs within the network. The amount 
of resources available by a group defines its power. Three, there are some (informal) rules of 
the games, which define the relationships between the organizations involved in the network. 
For the most part, these rules are considered to have been routinized and find their legitimacy 
in previous practice. Fourth, the access to the policy network is restricted in terms of 
membership and policy output. The restrictive criterion is essential for the effectiveness of 
the network. The ideal type would have few members with a clear agenda, which policy is 
not challenged by other networks or organizations outside the network. Fifth, personal 
relationships are considered to be very important in creating and maintaining a policy 
network/community. Finally, all policy sectors are considered to be disaggregated. This 
becomes important because the smaller the scope, the higher the likelihood of a policy 
network. Marsh and Rhodes (1992) emphasize this point when they claim that the capacity of 
                                                                                                                                                        
support for their re-election (Mayhew, 1974). 
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a network to run its own affairs is dependent on the salience of the policy issue (ie. the more 
peripheral an issue is for the government, the less likely it will interfere) and the ‘range of 
interests affected’ (196). This is one of the key reasons why a large amount of studies has 
focused on sub-policy sectors and central/local issues.  
Another strand of policy network places greater emphasis on institutions and the 
policy process while continuing to stress the importance of interdependent relationships 
among the actors. For example, Klijn (1996) argues that the relationship among the policy 
actors tend to stabilize leading to a process of institutionalization. However, contrary to most 
studies coming from the neo-institutionalist school, Klijn’s approach is also dynamic; 
institutionalization processes are always occurring “because actors regularly interpret and 
reinterpret the structural characteristics of the network” (101). 
The key question is whether or not such framework applies to the study of public 
pensions. The literature on policy network is ill equipped for this policy sector, especially if 
one seeks to apply the Marsh and Rhodes’ (1992) version. First, if there is interdependence 
among the main political actors, it is quite asymmetric because power is not diffuse. It is also 
not related to a lack of expertise within the state (or a better one found outside it), but rather 
on the need to avoid conflicts with the social partners whose participation is dependent on the 
level of contributions to the system resulting in different structures. Political power is 
concentrated within the state in the case of the Parliamentary Integration structure since it 
manages the public pension scheme and does not require external expertise to carry these 
functions. For example, the state does not have to negotiate with third parties like doctors, as 
it would be the case in many Health policies. A better case can be made for the social 
partnership structure because management is formally in the hands of the social partners. 
However, all actors interviewed in both Belgium and France have stressed that once a law is 
adopted, their implementation powers are close to nil. This can be understood by the fact that 
public pensions are a transfer, and not a specialized service like health. Once the rules are in 
place, it is rather easy to determine the appropriate course of action for all (future) 
pensioners. The interdependence is related to the passage of a legislation and not day-to-day 
practice or implementation of legislation. 
Actually, there are few policies that are easier to implement than a change to a 
pension system. There are several reasons for this. Granting pensions is a very passive 
activity, once the pension of an individual has been calculated it remains fairly stable and it is 
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adjusted in accordance with the indexation mechanisms in place.36 Contrary to means-tested 
social benefits, little discretionary power is in the hands of the ‘street-level bureaucrats’ 
(Lipsky, 1980) implementing the policies. Other social policies, such as social assistance and 
unemployment insurance have strict eligibility rules increasing the workload of a case and 
resulting in a re-evaluation of each case.37 Individuals can also become unemployed or rely 
on social assistance more than once in a lifetime. Usually, the number of intermediaries 
between the government and the pensioners are either nil or amount to one (as in the cases of 
the pension “caisses” in France and the national social insurance office in Sweden – in both 
of these cases they only apply the laws passed by the government) and the administrators do 
not experience a big change in their functions when a reform occurs, unless the government 
seeks to drastically reform its scheme and the way it is administered. Most people 
interviewed were actually quite puzzled by questions related to implementation and 
responded by citing examples from other social policies. Marsh and Rhodes (1992) maintain 
that “the bulk of the case studies show that policy networks exist to routinize relationships; 
they promote continuity and stability”. The lack of interdependence reduces significantly the 
power of the relationships between the actors involved in the pension debate. In most cases, 
actors are involved when a proposal to alter a pension system is made.  
 Second, the exchange of resources is close to nil. Even though non-governmental 
agents are involved in the pension debate, the technical expertise in this field is usually 
provided by the state like the Bureau Fédéral du Plan in Belgium and Riksforsakringsverket 
in Sweden.  These agencies tend to rely on other governmental agencies or department in the 
formulation of their analysis, and rarely call on external resources. In a corporatist fashion, 
the government could negotiate with unions (as employers tend to be favourable to pension 
reforms) to ensure social peace. However, such framework would be only applicable to 
corporatist countries. Third, the rules of the game exist within the process of pension reform. 
They are, however, the outcome of earlier political battles and the institutionalization of 
social policies. Routine contacts and active participation by various organizations were not 
responsible for such “encadrement”. 
 Fourth, the number of actors has been somewhat limited in the reform process. 
However, this restriction has been imposed by the government or by the governmental 
institutions already in place, not by a coalition present within a network. In all four countries 
                                                 
36 Or in many cases, by unilateral decisions of the government, which can raise benefits more than the inflation 
in some countries as in France. 
37 Such problematic are only present for poor pensioners who must rely on means-tested benefits.  
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studied, the government has had quite a free hand in selecting the people involved in the 
process. The extreme form of this can be found with the Juppé reform in France; less than 10 
people were actually made aware that a pension reform was looming. Fifth, good personal 
relationships exist in virtually all countries studied. Most social partners and civil servants 
know their counterparts as they meet for various meetings or committees related to pensions. 
This does not imply that they share a similar philosophy or ideology on the problem at hand. 
The extent to which these frequent contact decreases the different viewpoints share by them 
is up for debate. 
 Finally, public pension is a sector in itself. It is not disaggregated into many sub-
sectors. Even in the case of France, which has a high degree of fragmentation in its system, 
each regime shares similar difficulties and they are all based on the principles of payg.38 
Therefore, a different type of expertise is not necessary for each regime. Besides, reforming 
public pensions is a very salient issue and can hardly be assessed as a technical matter that 
could be managed by a network of specialists with relatively little government interference. 
One of the reasons why pensions are so difficult to reform is that it affects a large number of 
citizens.  
 
The resurgence of corporatism? 
Previously, corporatism had been linked with generous welfare states, and the 
literature on this subject is quite extensive. The so-called social democratic model is highly 
influenced by the corporatist literature. Even though Korpi (1983) does not agree that a 
corporatist arrangement is static, and thus varies overtime, he claims that the tripartite 
agreement among labour, employer, and the state benefits wage earners.  The generosity of 
the Swedish welfare state arises from this structural arrangement and the political control of 
the Social Democrats. Many researchers have emphasized the positive effects on the welfare 
state resulting from this kind of coalition (Shalev, 1983; Cameron, 1984; Esping-Andersen, 
1990; and Huber et al., 1993).39 Other authors such as Cameron (1978) and Katzenstein 
(1985) have emphasized the economic openness and vulnerability of small states, which have 
favoured the creation of corporatist arrangements. Regardless of the political parties in 
                                                 
38 One noticeable exception would be the employers of the civil service, whose pensions is financed via the state 
budget. 
39 Even though many of these scholars have been considered to be more ‘labourists’ than corporatists because 
they de-emphasise the role of employers in the structure, the role of the state remain quite similar for both 
groups of theorists. 
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power, small states have introduced generous benefits to protect their citizens against the high 
economic insecurity experienced by them. 
 In the case of corporatist countries, the role of its social partners40 is expected to be 
highly influential. Further, a corporatist state with a left-wing government should result in the 
maintenance of current programs (Mishra, 1990). However, the importance of unions and the 
power of the left have been on decline in many of the so-called corporatist countries without 
major alterations to social policies. Pierson (1996) claims that “there is very little evidence 
that this decline has had a fundamental impact on welfare states” (150).  
Pierson’s assessment has been challenged by the works of Pichot (1998), Reynaud 
(2000), Rhodes (1998; 2001), and Ebbinghaus and Hassel (2000), and, to a lesser extent, 
Bonolli (2000), where they demonstrate that governments might actually be more inclined to 
seek the participation of social partners in times of retrenchment than in time of expansion. 
However, their contributions shy away from the traditional conception of corporatism by 
underlining that referring to these ‘new’ agreements as social pacts. They are actually 
considered to be efficient in the Southern European countries where corporatism has 
traditionally been considered low. For example, in his edited volume ‘Social dialogue and 
pension reform’, Reynaud (2000) claims that social dialogue was key to pension reform in all 
of his case studies.  
Both Pichot (1998) and Rhodes (1998; 2001) have stressed the importance of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in encouraging resurgence in the social dialogue 
especially in the countries facing the biggest mountain in terms of its criteria (Belgium, Italy, 
Spain, and Portugal). The search for the lesser evil of solution and external vulnerabilities are 
considered to the two prime reasons behind their re-emergence (Rhodes, 1998: 195). Puzzling 
is the fact that many of these social pacts are being implemented in countries that have not 
been traditionally considered ‘corporatists’ and the state plays an important role in them. 
Rhodes’ competitive corporatism, and possible European third way (2001: 194), is dissimilar 
from the traditional corporatism because it stresses “competitiveness and macro-economic 
stability and employment creation and redistribution, but down play the ‘equity’ function of 
more traditional, ‘golden age’ forms of corporatism (1998: 2000). Ebbinghaus and Hassel 
(2000) delimits this enthusiasm by underlining that social pacts are unlikely to work where 
                                                 
40 An interesting point worth noting is that social partners does not really have an equivalent in Swedish. 
Employers and employees tend to be referred to by the term ‘arbetsmarknadspartners’ meaning labour market 
partner. 
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the interests of the social partners cannot really be enhanced and where they are unlikely to 
play a role in the regulation of the labour market such as in France. 
Schludi (2002) emphasises the importance of unions in the politics of pensions where 
cuts are now the rule rather than the exception. He argues that the support of unions can 
reduce the size of the parliamentary majority required since the opposition will have more 
difficulties in putting blame on the government. Inversely, politicians may seek a broad 
support across various political parties to neutralize the impact of unions, which cannot find 
electoral alternatives (20).  Despite a (much needed) move away from Tsebelis’ (1995; 1999) 
conception of veto players via the inclusion of unions as an intrinsic part of the process, 
Schludi’s model does not fully capture other informal aspects such as the institutionalization 
of relationships between unions and government. The non-collaboration of French unions has 
probably more to do with its historical relationship with the state rather than the (expected) 
failure of the government to reach a broad agreement. Politicians in countries like Sweden, 
Austria and Germany do not encounter such difficulties. 
 
Hypothesis n2b:  A political party advocating stark changes in pension programme will face 
a reduction of political support. 
Hypothesis n2c: Based on Ross’ (2000a) critique of Pierson, left wing governments might 
have more facilities to introduce a pension reform since they benefits from the ‘Nixon-goes-
to-China effect’ while right wing parties are likely to have ‘Nixon’s disease’.  
 
 52
 
 
 
 
2 – France: Still a ”Société Bloquée”? 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter discusses the institutionalization of pensions and its impact on the reform 
of this policy in France. The management of public pensions today seems quite similar to the 
one elaborated at the end of World War II. The social partners were highly involved in the 
elaboration of pension policies and plaid a key role in its implementation. However, this 
involvement did not happen overnight, but was the result of a long series of conflicts and 
policy failures that led the state and social partners to co-operate to establish the foundation 
of a viable pension policy, both in terms of generosity and finance. 50 years later, this trend is 
being altered with the state playing a strong, but challenged role. This section is divided into 
two broad sections. The first one analyses the historical development of pension policies. It is 
further divided into pre and post WWII. The second section studies the reforms sought and 
introduced while taken into account the institutionalization of actors based on the theoretical 
framework presented in the previous chapter. As such, it will first discuss the type of 
management found in each countries and then analyse the role of each actors within in, 
during successful and failed attempts to reform. 
 As expected by the theoretical framework introduced in chapter 1, the participation of 
social partners has proven to be essential to the passage of pension reforms even though this 
consultation is far from being comparable to that experienced in other countries where the 
state is not so dominant. However, their inclusion has limited the scope of pension reforms 
for both socialist and non-socialist governments. After meeting with the social partners in the 
spring of 1993, Balladur introduced a reform later in the summer knowing that moderate 
unions were going to be supportive (silent) on this action. The Juppé government tried to 
achieve similar results with public sector employees and faced a strong reaction in December 
1995 forcing him to retrieve his pension proposal.  
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Historical Development – Pre-World War II 
 Despite the difficulties faced by public pension programmes in the pre-World War II 
era in virtually all industrialised countries, it remains important to review their development 
for three key reasons. First, the new schemes developed after the Second World War 
originated from those established earlier. The means to guarantee social protection was the 
key variable that was altered. Coverage was extended to a larger segment of the population 
even though the occupational distinctions among the different types of workers have 
remained in one form or another unchanged. Second, and related to the first element, the 
failure of voluntary plans and fully funded mandatory schemes are the main reasons why 
policy makers adopted pay-as-you-go schemes. European countries were faced with a 
poverished elderly population and needed to improve their faith now, thus eliminating the 
fully funded option. Actually, many of them were already facing severe poverty because of 
the financial difficulties resulting from the 1929 crash. Finally, many of the debates 
surrounding pension reforms have many similarities with those associated with the 
establishment of pension schemes. The most striking case is the opposition of French civil 
servants to fully funded schemes in the 1700s and 1800s despite the advocacy of a broad 
coalition of experts. 
France represents a picture of programme stability when compared to the other three 
cases. The old-age pension schemes developed in 1910 and 1945 have remained virtually 
unchanged (Baldwin, 1990b: 165- 180; Chamberlayne, 1992: 307-8). Contrary to most West 
European countries, France did not introduce a major pension reform following the end of 
World War II. All attempts to significantly alter the old pension schemes were stopped by 
middle class occupational groups in the 1950s. The incapacity of the state to implement its 
plan led to a strong increase in contractual supplementary pension schemes shaping the 
pension system into some sort of labyrinth. Another major trade union protest in the early 
1970s was followed by minor changes, which raised the basic levels guaranteed for the aged 
unemployed. Old-age insurance was extended to individuals non-covered by existing regimes 
in the mid 1970s, thus granting benefits to every citizen. Finally, in 1981, Mitterand opted to 
raise significantly the basic levels and later reduced the pensionable age to 60. 
Public pensions actually have a rich and ‘eclectic’ history in France, which is partly 
the reason why they have been so difficult to merge. The very first social security scheme 
was elaborated under Louis XIV! Sailors were granted insurance for those injured or 
handicapped as a result of their duties in 1673. Pensions became a right in 1709. The idea of a 
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national retirement office/fund administered by the state was first launched in 1767 
(Thiveaud, 1997: 23). 
 
State employees obtain pension rights… 
Considering the weight traditionally attached to public administration when it comes 
to French politics, it comes as no surprise that one of the first large scale public pension 
schemes were elaborated for civil servants. Prior to the revolution of 1789, pensions were 
granted as a favour to few civil servants on a discretionary basis. The legislation of 1790 
would replace this system by one granting pensions for civil servants whose long dedication 
and services are considered significant. This piece of legislation opened the door to the 
ideology of pensions as a social right for civil servants. Still today, civil servants cite the 
1790 legislation as the one that gave them the right to a pension. Interestingly, this legislation 
has faced divergent interpretations. Numerous instances such as the Conseil d’Etat in 1811 
had claimed that pensions were not universal but a reward which could only be granted after 
careful examination of each individual cases. Further, the law of 1790 did not halt the 
emergence of small pension funds for various departments and the state did not have the 
economic capacity to grant pensions to all its civil servants. Nonetheless, within the public 
bureaucracy the right to pension slowly became part of its culture.  
In 1853, a new legislation ratified the right to pension and marked the victory of the 
bureaucrats over politicians. Despite all the expertise in favour of a fully funded system, as 
already implemented on a voluntary basis in the private sector in 1850, the civil servants 
fought and obtained a system financed on a pay-as-you-go basis with the financial support of 
the state. Pensions for civil servants became part of the general budget. No institutions to deal 
with civil servant pensions were created (a fact that remains even today)! All contributions 
from the civil servants go directly into the state revunes as part of other taxation. In order to 
have a pension, an employee would have to work for 30 years41 and could retire at 60 (Friot, 
1995; Drago and de Forges, 2000). This new right became part of the definition of being a 
civil servant. It is found explicitly in the bill on its status presented in the legislative Chamber 
in 1909, which defines civil servant as: 
“all those qualified as agent or assistant agent working 
permanently within a public sevice of the State, compensated 
by a monthly pay or by the allocation of bonuses and leading 
                                                 
41 For “services actifs” (active service), 25 years was considered sufficient to obtain a pension (Drago and de 
Forges, 2000: 104-5). 
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to the eventual benefit of a retirement pension (cited in Friot, 
1995: 50 – author translation)”.42 
  
The implementation of this new piece of legislation represented a real puzzle for 
policy makers as it forced the amalgamation and cancellation of the pension plans that existed 
among the various public departments. Further, some categories of employees actually 
obtained lesser benefits as a result. The actual birth of this legislation was long and often 
difficult (Drago and de Forges, 2000). Despite these difficulties, the key achievement of this 
legislation was that pensions for civil servants began to be conceptualized as a continuous 
wage and not insurance.43  
The 19th century would also result in the emergence of ‘special’ pension schemes for 
other state workers employed by public entities such as the Banque of France (1806), the 
Comédie Francaise (1812), and the Imprimerie Nationale (1824). The distinctive nature of 
these public schemes, as well as some private schemes established by companies who later 
became public such as the SNCF, still remain today. As such they are considered as a class of 
their own when it comes to social insurance. In general blue-collar workers did not join the 
civil servant plan, but rather obtained their own with specific rules and benefits such as an 
earlier retirement age. These came as a result of strong union pressure within this sector 
(Dumons and Pollet, 1994: 371). 
The 1853 legislation faced only one minor alteration prior to WWII and it ocurred in 
1924 when legislators became confronted with the depreciation of the Franc. First, a bill was 
introduced to reduce the number of years considered into the calculation of a pension from 
the last six, to the last three. Second, and much more important for the future, another bill 
changed the indexation of pensions from price to the salaries of civil servants. Current retired 
civil servants thus gained from the real wage increases of its active colleagues. Adding to this 
financial benefit, this change strengthened the conception of civil servant pensions as a 
continuous wage and not as an insurance based on previous contributions or savings (Friot, 
1995: 54).  
 
                                                 
42 “tous ceux qui, en qualité d’agents ou de sous-agents, occupent dans un service public de l’État un emploi 
permanent, rémunéré par un traitement mensuel ou par l’allocation de remises et ouvrant droit au bénéfice 
éventuel d’une pension de retraite”. 
43 This is clearly stated by Thuillier, “les rédacteurs de la loi de 1853 ne se sont pas placés du point de vue d’un 
contract d’assurance. La pension est une sorte de traitement continué au fonctionnaire après sa retraite, s’il 
remplit les conditions réglementaires” (1990 – cited in Friot, 1994: 80).  
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So do workers in the private sector. 
With regards to private workers, the principle of individualism, which was strongly 
entrenched following the 1789 revolution, and constant conflict between various social 
classes are two of the key reasons why France introduced social security later than its 
European counterpart. Losing the war against Germany in 1871 also meant that the social 
advancements of its neighbour were met with some indifference and were not really part of 
any discussion as it was the case elsewhere in Europé (Saint-Jours, 1982). 
The state slowly became involved in providing some forms of protection for its 
elderly. Following the revolution, many proposals came to light, but were shelved by the 
government due to stark economic difficulties. Finally, the government established a 
committee to create a national pension fund administered by the state similar to those found 
in Belgium and the UK. However, the revolution of 1848 halted the passage of this 
legislation. The project was not abandoned, however, and in 1850 the “Caisse de retraites 
pour la vieillesse” was created. This institution functioned on a voluntary basis and 
guaranteed the placement of its contributories. Their interest rate made a popular financial 
placement, but was of little interest among blue-collar workers (Dumons and Pollet, 1994; 
Thiveaud, 1997). Guillemard (1986) underlines that old-age represented the risk, which was 
most inadequate for voluntary saving, particularly among the blue-collars. The long term 
vision necessary for such undertaking between the first contributions and retirement44 and the 
high number of members required to gather sufficient reserves are probably two of the main 
reasons favouring a switch from a policy of foresight to an insurance policy (35). This 
institution became the “Caisse national des retraites pour la vieillesse” (CNRV) in 1886 
switching its focus toward life insurance.  
Due to the lack of effective state action most forms of insurance actually came from 
the private market, charitable organisations and the family. Friendly societies (mutuelles) 
arose to fulfil the need for old-age insurance. These non-lucrative voluntary organisations 
provided social insurance for their members. Due to their working class origins, the friendly 
societies faced opposition from the state. As a result, they had to operate illegally for many 
years before becoming recognised in 1852 when the state recognized it needed them in order 
to implement a social policy. Employers also introduced some forms of insurance for 
employees involved in a high-risk position. Following some bankruptcies and the 
mismanagement of employees’ contributions by certain firms resulting in the loss of earlier 
                                                 
44 Collecting a pension was in itself highly uncertain considering the life expectancy of blue collar workers. 
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contributions made by employees, the state opted to legislate private options in 1890 for the 
mining and railway industries (Saint-Jours, 1982: 104). Further, preventing the active 
intervention of the state was the lack of support from both labour and the Socialist party did 
not consider pensions to be a ‘critical’ element during the 1890s (Ashford, 1986: 183). In 
fact, it was not even a major preoccupation within the labour market (Guillemard, 1986: 39).  
By the end of the 1800s and beginning of the 1900s, France had a highly fragmented 
pensions system in which three kinds of alternatives competed with each other. First, based 
on a paternalistic notion, employers sought to internalise social benefits within their 
companies. These schemes had the objectives of minimising labour mobility, reinforcing the 
vertical relationship between employers and labourer, and instituting higher fidelity on the 
part of the employees towards the enterprise. Second, socialists, alongside the CGT, sought to 
take away the powers of the employers and the friendly societies and place them in the hands 
of the beneficiaries, the employees. The ideal version would be an old-age insurance for blue-
workers financed by the state and employers but administered by the workers. It was 
conceived that such a programme could enhance the autonomy of the blue-workers. Finally, 
the friendly societies were still a force to reckon with as no state alternatives proved 
sufficient to replace them. Not surprisingly these three types of social insurance had diverse 
support. The Conservatives and Catholics supported the employers’ system, the socialists 
supported the workers’ scheme and the friendly societies gathered their support from liberals 
and moderate republicans (Pollet and Renard, 1996; see also Guillemard, 1986: 35-58). 
Starting in the 1890s social policies gain proeminence via the creation of the ‘conseil 
du travail’ a commission that included 72 members (experts, union and employer 
representatives, and parlementarians). Dumons and Pollet (1994) refers to this commission as 
a “social parliament” because of the high number of social policies and views discussed. 
Pensions never became a real topic of discussion but the ‘office du travail’ (labour office) 
made many statistical studies of the German and Austrian pension plan, one study of the 
Australian and New Zealand plan, and another on the pension funds established by French 
employers. These works and discussions came at a time when it was clear that voluntary 
options proved unsufficient to resolve poverty among the elderly. Many of these actors in 
both the ‘conseil du travail’ and ‘office du travail’ would play a key role in the creation and 
implementation of the Labor Ministry in 1906, which would be important in defending the 
upcoming pension legislation (365-6).  
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Following a long struggle to unite various socialist factions45 and build a coalition 
favouring old-age pension, the first legislation was introduced in 1910. Despite labour’s 
preference for a non-contributory scheme financed via taxation, the new pension system 
consisted of a mandatory earning-related scheme where employees’ contributions had to be 
matched by employers.46 The scheme was financed via transfers (payg) and capitalisation 
(Saint-Jours, 1982: 118; Thiveaud, 1997). All working individuals (male or female47) earning 
less than 3000 Francs a year employed in industry, commerce, liberal professions, 
agriculture, and domestic services were covered as well as civil servants who were not 
already eligible for the civil or military pensions. One reason behind the 3000 Francs plateau 
was that the government did not want to compete and challenge the friendly societies.48 The 
minister of labour and a ‘superior council’49 were selected to administer the new public 
pension scheme. The retirement age was set at 65 and was lowered to 60 in 1912 following 
strong pressures from the labour movement, which claimed that the previous legislation only 
granted ‘a pension for the dead’ since many workers were unlikely to live until then (Perkins, 
1910; see also Renard, 1995: 98; Guillemard, 1986: 44). The 1910 legislation also included 
an escape clause where employees could select other recognized pension funds such as the 
CNRV (Thiveaud, 1997). 
The support behind the 1910 legislation would soon disappear and result in its 
dismissal during the implementation process, paving the way for discussions on another 
pension system. First, workers disapproved of the contribution card, which reminded them of 
old police workers’ identity card and certain employers abstained from deducting 
contributions. Second, the inflation, which ravaged France after W.W.I meant a huge loss 
                                                 
45 The extreme left considered that social insurance was a way to pacify the workers by granting them less than 
their due, another group claimed that workers should not pay for what should already be theirs. Finally, a 
socialist faction viewed this piece of legislation as a promising first step (Baldwin, 1990a: 105). As underlined 
by Saint-Jours (1982), the French socialists were divided into three main camps with very distinct conception of 
the state. First, the reformists sought to decentralise the government. Second, the revolutionary movement based 
on Marx and Hengel sought to take over the state. Finally, anarchist viewed the state as the main obstacle to the 
emancipation of workers and should therefore be eliminated. The labour movement only became united in 1905, 
which is comparatively late (101-3). Actually, blue-collar organizations were actually opposed to this scheme 
and led to its dismissal when it was first introduced in 1901 (Guillemard, 1986: 42).  
46 Whether or not contributions should be made mandatory resulted in a stark debate. Interestingly, the Belgian 
subsidisation of the friendly societies (which were voluntary organisation) was chosen as a model for the 
elaboration of a French pension system by a Commission appointed by the Senate. It was argued that this option 
would result in a lesser financial burden on the state. Eventually, a majority within the commission and the 
Senate sided with the Chamber of Deputies and supported the mandatory feature (Perkin, 1910: 568). 
47 Although both sexes were included in this legislation, contributions and benefits differed. 
48 Friendly societies had grown from 1.4 million members in 1890 to 3.75 millions in 1905 with a very large 
share of its membership confined to the middle class. The number of members would peak at 5.3 million in 
1914 (Saint-Jours, 1982: 115).  
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since ‘contributions paid in gold francs were converted to pensions paid in devalued 
currency’, thus requiring legislation to increase pension benefits (Saint-Jours, 1982: 118). 
Third, there was a low level of confidence in the new institution created in 1910 resulting in 
many insured workers opting for the CNRV, which was highly trusted (Thiveaud, 1997). 
Fourth, the retirement income that one could obtain after 30 years of contributions was only 
slightly higher than the social assistance for the elderly adopted in 1905, which required no 
contributions.50 Fifth, the administrative needs to implement and promote the legislation were 
not met by the government. More than 850 positions were expected as part of a new central 
office, but only 59 civil servants were hired and dispatched as a division with the Ministry of 
Labour in 1911 (Dumons and Pollet, 1994: 397). Finally, a court judgement removed the 
mandatory aspects of the new regime. Instead of reaching 7 millions contributors as hoped by 
the legislators, only 1.6 millions were actually contributing. By 1930 only 15 to 20% of the 
aged were covered by a pension from this regime (Guillemard, 1986: 55; Ambler, 1991: 7). 
The law on social insurance, based on Bismarckian principle, was adopted in 1920 
However, due to intense opposition, it was shelved until 1930. This time the labour 
movement would plead in favour by actively seeking its adoption. France’s new pension 
system was based on “German” principle for workers in industry and commerce who earned 
below a certain income. Pension benefits were granted to individual from age 60 and required 
30 years of contributions for a full pension amounting to roughly 40% of average earnings. A 
key element of this new system related to the administration of pensions. Workers could 
choose the organisation of their choice as long as they provided coverage for all social 
insurance. This resulted in an increase of such organisation by friendly societies, employers, 
unions, and even religious groups. Their number would eventually reach 727 (Saint-Jours, 
1982). 
Employers also supported this new legislation for two key reasons. First, the fear of 
an expansive and intrusive role of the state was pushed aside because of the numerous 
pension funds/schemes (caisses) and friendly societies. This fear was further decreased when 
it was decided not to amalgam various social risks under one plan. Second, the contributions 
of employers were minimal leaving the employees to fend for themselves (Guillemard, 1986: 
56-7). 
                                                                                                                                                        
49 This council included senators, deputies, councillors of state, societies for mutual help, savings banks, 
employers, employees, and the institute of actuaries (Perkins, 1910: 567). 
50 This new form of assistance represented a clear break from traditional means-test policies with the key criteria 
being age and not revenues (even though citizens had to demonstrate that their income felt below a certain 
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Besides strengthening the eclectic nature of social insurance organisation, another 
side effect of the 1930 legislation was that it strengthened the occupational differentiation 
among the schemes. Individuals earning more than 15 000 francs per annum51 were not 
covered by the state scheme, thus creating a void for higher earning workers. This social void 
was filled via supplementary pension schemes, which were negotiated between the employers 
and the unions as part of sectoral wage bargaining. This episode is quite important 
historically because it marked a break through in the relationship between the social partners, 
which had traditionally been confrontational. Further, this new coalition would later proved 
to be a major obstacle in the creation of a universal and state run pension system following 
WWII and helped entrenched the stereotype that the state was mostly concerned with the less 
fortunate in terms of social policy (Pollet and Renard, 1996).  
 At this point, it is worth bringing back our comparative lenses to analyse why it took 
France so long to adopt a mandatory universal scheme similar to the one implemented in 
Germany more than 40 years prior. In a comparative perspective France is a laggard when it 
comes to the instauration of its first public pension schemes as most industrial countries 
implemented theirs at the end of the 19th century and during the first decade of the 20th.  Four 
mains reasons can be found to comprehend such a lag in the adoption of this policy. First, 
Bismarck sought to extend social insurance as a way to facilitate state building. In France, 
education rather than other traditional social policies was used to strengthen the state. It was 
actually a leader in the field of elementary education (Ambler, 1991: 21).  
 Second, based on the work of De Swaan, Ambler (1991) states that key is the strength 
of small entrepreneurs and landholders, “the primary class enemy of the welfare state”(7). 
They were strongly represented politically, especially in the Senate, an institution dominated 
by rural and agrarian interests. In such a context, the need to establish a pension system was 
not strong as many workers also sought to become self-employed and had strong ties to the 
countryside.52 Even after life long career in the industrial sector became more common, the 
mentality of obtaining a pension did not take root for a long period. In his comparative study 
of European countries, Stearns states that “retirement was completely alien to working class 
                                                                                                                                                        
level). A key reason behind this change in mentality was that the governments sought to reduce the powers of 
the Catholic Church, which had had an important role in the social sector (Renard, 1995).  
51 18 000 in the cities with more than 200 000 inhabitants or 25 000 francs for those heading a family (Pollet and 
Renard, 1996). 
52 Guillemard (1986) states that most industrial workers from the early 19th century quit their function at the age 
of 30-35 to become farmer, self-employed, or trader. Employment in the industrial sector was considered as a 
step towards gaining status as an independent worker. However, such practise change by the mid-1900s as 
employers sought to retain their labour. It is in this context that employers implemented some forms of social 
insurance for its labour force (36-52). 
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cultures” in France (Stearns, 1976 cited in Guillemard, 1986: 40). Such beliefs were also 
entrenched in a strong tradition of liberalism and individualism that expected little action 
from the state (Baldwin, 1990a: 102-04). The opposition to mandatory insurance was strong 
and long lasting leading the state to follow up on voluntary programs rather than seeking to 
institute a mandatory program while neighbouring countries were doing the opposite.  
 Third, the industrialization thesis is of little relevance to understand the French case. 
Germany and Britain were more urban and industrial than France at this period, but Germany 
obtained its pension system when its industrialization began. It is the increase in the number 
of wage earners in the early 20th century that led to a broad support for a mandatory public 
pension scheme. During the same period, the number of industrial workers actually declined 
by close to 50% (Ambler, 1991: 7-9). Further, as indicated by the name of the pension 
program of 1910, the agricultural sector remained strong despite increasing urbanization of 
the population, but plaid a role in obtaining a mandatory public pension program. 
 Fourth, as demonstrated in this historical overview, the Left had been sharply divided 
and a consensus would only emerge after WWII. It was this division, alongside the 
opposition of the liberals, that helped to destroy the consensus behind the 1910 legislation 
(Guillemard, 1986: 55).  
 As France headed towards WWII, most of its aged still relied on public assistance and 
continuing working life. Guillemard (1986) estimates that roughly 25% of the population had 
retirement income while a similar proportion relied on public assistance (57). Further, as the 
state engagement remained limited in terms of scope and domain, with little financial and 
policy engagement, private/occupational initiatives were able to anchor themselves strongly 
within this policy domain. Major attempts to modernize social programs and alter this 
situation would come following WWII. Civil servants, on the other hand, were able to obtain 
a generous and extensive protection for their old age early on, which was later attached to 
their job description as a benefit to their life-long commitment as servant of the state. 
 
Historical Development - Post-World War II 
In the case of both Belgium and France, the public pension structure established after 
World War II are still pretty much in place today and shape the current political debate. The 
key distinction between the two is not the outcome of the reforms sought by the various 
political actors, but rather how much they sought to change pre-existing professional 
categorization. France probably had the most ambitious reform of all industrialised countries 
by seeking to universalize pensions into a unique program (Baldwin, 1990). Belgium’s 
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ambition were never that far reaching as political actors sought to create uniform rules within 
the various categories of workers. A key reason behind this divergence in objectives is that 
the strength of the Belgian left never obtained the kind of power the French left had following 
WWII as the right was not associated with the occupiers in Belgium (check). As stated by J.-
D. Reynaud in the case of France, “social security was not necessarily established against the 
wishes of the employers, but rather in their absence”.53 
 
Seeking A new start…dealing with old conflicts. 
Following W.W.II, a new political landscape appeared. The left and unions became 
much stronger due to their participation in the resistance, while the right and employers were 
greeted with high level of suspicions for their ‘collaboration’ with the occupier and the Vichy 
government. The employers were also quite disorganised and it would take them a year to 
build a national association (CNPF)54 to represent their interests. The right was thus forced 
into a defensive position. This new ‘rapport de force’ can be seen by looking at the 
composition of the new parliamentary assembly. The socialists and communists held a 
majority for the first year, with the latter being the largest party in the legislature. Both parties 
co-operated with the MRP55, which was also associated with the resistance. Working class 
interests also made its way into the administration (Guillemard, 1986: 60; Join-Lambert, 
1997: 443). 
The honeymoon would not last, however. The Fourth Republic would produce weak 
governments without any durable coalitions. The failure of the governmental apparatus would 
generate a window of opportunity for civil servants to come to the forefront of debates on 
social policy by taking initiatives and leaderships. 
The government sought to universalise social risks and combine them into one roof. 
Social security was viewed as a vehicule by which the state could legitimise and establish a 
social order (Guillemard, 1986: 61-2). To achieve this objective, the Larocque Plan (named 
after the civil servant behind it) proposed to unify the eclectic collection of institutions and 
occupational schemes. The reform, if approved, was to be implemented into two stages. First, 
middle class workers would join the social security system of blue collars. Second, all 
economically active individuals were to unite in a single plan. The insured and the state 
would manage the new regime. There was a strong polarisation on this question. On one 
                                                 
53 “La sécurité sociale s’est faite sinon contre patronat, du moins, en son absence”. Cited in Guillemard (1986: 
60). 
54 Conseil National du Patronnat Francais.  
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hand, a coalition regrouping the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and the CGT56 
favoured unification and centralisation. This group sought to extend coverage to the whole 
population, which would have benefited those with weak coverage or no coverage at all. On 
the other hand, the MRP, the CFTC,57 the friendly societies (mutuelles) and self-employed 
workers opposed this plan preferring the fragmentation of plans since they would be the ones 
paying extra for the extension of the new pooled risk that would include the blue-collar 
workers (Saint-Jours, 1982; Guillemard, 1986; Baldwin, 1990a). 
With regards to pensions, the Larocque Plan also advocated a payg system with no 
capitalisation to be financed mainly by contributions from both employers and employees. A 
payg system was favoured due to the negative experience with capitalisation in the 1920s and 
1930s where the real value of contributions shrank as a result of high inflation (Baldwin, 
1990: 162; Bozec and Mays, 2000: 374). A payg system was actually already in place by the 
default when the Vichy government opted to use the capitalized savings of the 1930 pension 
system alongside new contributions to pay current elderly (Guillemard, 1986: 64). High 
levels of tax evasion and possible conflicts between those who made previous contributions 
and those who did not, made the adoption of a state financed system unrealistic (Baldwin, 
1990a: 159-61). Further, there was a lack of faith in the state with regards to administering 
social security. Its interventions were associated with means-tested benefits, stigmatising its 
recipients and making the state an unpopular social agent. There was a fear that benefits may 
fluctuate in line with the state budget (Pollet and Renard, 1996; Join-Lambert, 1997: 443- 4; 
Palier, 2000: 4).  
A key aspect, which has strong consequences today as the state seeks to reduce its 
financial expenditure, was the institutionalization of the social security. To borrow the words 
of Ashford (1986), the french social security system was built “outside the state”. In a 
mutualist tradition, the unions received the responsability to manage social security and this 
administrative control was one of their key social requests.58 Boards member were to be 
                                                                                                                                                        
55 Mouvement Républicain Populaire, a centre-right party. 
56 Confédération génerale du travail, the blue collar union. It became the strongest union after WWII and has 
had historically strong ties with the Communist Party. 
57 Confédération francaise des travailleurs chrétiens. Throughout this debate, its role would be quite neglected as 
it was seeking to preserve the “pluralisme syndicale”, which was threatened by the powerful rise of the CGT and 
its eventual dominant position within the boards of social security (Guillemard, 1986: 73-4). 
58 When it comes to the organisational structure of social security, the unions’ point of view was adopted despite 
the strong opposition from the employers. The employers objected and claimed that they also should be included 
into the management board. Because of the fear associated with a possible opposition to social security –a large 
segment of the elderly population was living in extreme poverty-, most conflicts actually focused on the 
organizational structure of social security. Empoyers’ wishes would be answered when De Gaulle suspended the 
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elected among workers. This independence from the state was created to ensure that the state 
bureaucracy would not gain control over social security institutions.59 A clear division of 
responsibility was attained. On one hand, the main responsibility of the state would be to 
support national solidarity, meaning to provide assistance and help those unable to protect 
themselves sufficiently via social insurance. On the other hand, social partners came to be 
responsible for social insurance. This distinction is strongly entrenched in the debates 
surrounding social policies in France and is still supported by all social partners, was a major 
element of discussion during the attempts to reform pensions in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. 
Throughout the elaboration of social security, the CGT stood behind the Laroque 
Plan, which included many of its proposals.  This union proved to be the keenest supporter of 
the plan. The CGT would come to identify strongly with social security calling it a ‘child of 
the CGT’ during the celebration marking the 30th anniversary of social security. The role of 
the CGT, the largest union in the aftermath of the war, would prove to be crucial in the 
institutionalization of social security as its militants literaly implemented and instituted the 
administrative organs necessary for the functioning of social security. This was made 
possible because of their electoral success giving them a majority within the administrative 
boards of many social security institutions (Guillemard, 1986: 68-75).60 
The political battle ensuing from the Larocque Plan resulted in a highly fragmented 
system combined with low benefits for the general pension regime. An ordinance creating the 
general regime is adopted on 19 October 1945, mandating all workers in the private sectors 
with the exception of farmers. It is further announced that the special pension schemes 
granted to public servants are maintained on a temporary basis.61 In the hopes of convincing 
other groups to join the general regime, the ordinance would be complemented by legislation 
adopted in May 1946 extending social security to all citizens.  This legislation did not include 
any starting date, as details needed to be negotiated. The government did not wait, however, 
                                                                                                                                                        
managerial elections while forcing an equal representation of employees and employers in the boards 
administration social security 1967 (Guillemard, 1986: 67-70). 
59 In the words of Pierre Larocque, this was done as a mean “d’éviter tout rique d’étatisme bureaucratique” 
(cited in Guillemard, 1986: 66). 
60 Pierre Laroque wrote in 1955 that “jusqu’aux premières élections de 1947, la CGT a eu la majorité absolue 
dans presque tous les conseils d’administration. Ses représentants formaient des groups très dynamique et 
efficaces. Ils ont joué un rôle prépondérant dans la mise en place de l’organisation nouvelle, qui leur doit 
beaucoup” (cited in Guillemard, 1986: 74). 
61 A decree of 8 June 1946 sought to alter the current pension schemes of public servant into a supplementary 
scheme while integrating them into the general scheme. This solution was envisaged as to ensure that civil 
servants would not lose their special status (Saint-Jours, 1982: 129).  
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and set 1 January 1947 as the starting date for the new regime, which was to be extended to 
the rest of the population (Saint-Jours, 1982: 126).  
A middle class coalition composed of workers/management (cadres), many regrouped 
within the newly created CGC,62 and the self-employed would stop the universalisation of 
public pensions in France. They would eventually gather support from the employers’ 
association (CNPF),63 the CFTC,64 and various groups opposed to the socialist-communist 
majority. The leadership of the employers would eventually lead to the creation of a different 
pension regime for management in March 1947 (Guillemard, 1986: 84). 
Eventually, management joined the general pension scheme but obtained extremely 
favourable conditions within it. All income above the wage ceiling for the general plan was 
not considered. This was a key element since the removal of the ceiling would have implied 
that they would have received less in the general scheme than in their previous scheme. They 
could supplement their pensions by investing into a supplementary pension plans, thus 
generating similar benefits as before the reform and avoided financing the extra contributions 
associated by adding worker’s insurance into a common regime. They were also given the 
opportunity to make retroactive contributions in depreciated currency to earn entitlements for 
the period 1930-47. The self-employed negotiated a complete withdrawal from the general 
regime following the work of the Surleau Commission designed to clarify their situation 
within the new system.65 They questioned the principle of solidarity enunciated in the plan 
since civil servants were excluded and claimed that it imposed an unfair burden on them. The 
hopes of a universal regime were halted when a 1948 law instituted four separate regimes for 
the self-employed along occupational lines.66 Resulting from the failed attempt to integrate 
the self-employed to create a universal pension plan, the pension schemes of farmers, artists 
and trade and industrial entrepreneurs turned out to be quite similar to the general scheme. 
Members of the liberal professions, however, were left alone (Baldwin, 1990a: 170-2). 
                                                 
62 Confédération générale des cadres. 
63 The creation of a supplementary pension regime was sought by employers for three main reasons. First, it 
could introduce the insurance method of its choice instead of having it imposed on them as it was the case with 
the régime général. Second, they could regain powers within the administration of pension régimes and could 
gain a better control over the social gains of the employees. Finally, they were opposed to any universal plan for 
social security and by creating this régime, they seriously challenged this governmental objective (Guillemard, 
1986: 85). 
64 They were actually losing many engineers to the CGC (Guillemard, 1986: 84). 
65 Contrary to the situation prevailing in other countries following the war, the self-employed represented a 
strong political force as 20% of workers belonged to this category. In contrast, only 5.8% of workers were self-
employed in the UK (Baldwin 1990b: 260). 
66 These four occupational schemes based on different set of rules for benefits and contributions were liberal 
professions, industrial and commerce independents, artists, and agriculture (Baldwin, 1990a: 177). Contrary to 
the other three occupational schemes, the pension scheme for farmers would be adopted in 1952. 
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As a result, the general scheme ended up only guaranteeing a minimum. Thus 
employees turned towards employers to extend the scope and domain of supplementary 
benefits (Guillemard, 1986: 99).67 The first supplementary pension scheme was instituted by 
the liberal professions in 1947 (AGIRC), other such schemes would be created in the 1950s68 
due to the poor levels of benefits found in the various mandatory plans. They would 
eventually be regrouped into one institution (ARRCO) in 1961. By this date, all workers 
belonged to a supplementary scheme (Baldwin, 1990a). Both organisations have 
encompassed a multitude of different supplementary pensions along occupational lines. The 
AGIRC and ARRCO have been legally non-profit private organisations, but have been 
considered somewhat to be public institutions due to their ‘mission d’intérêt général’ (general 
interest function). The strength of these two organisations have grown significantly, as the 
government introduced legislation in 1972 making participation into supplementary schemes 
mandatory.69 
It is worth visiting the occupational conflicts surrounding the French pension 
development. Baldwin (1990a) underlines the importance of occupational alignment for the 
expansion of social insurance. France actually is the poster child of this argument with the 
“cadres” stopping the universalisation of public pensions. However, the key elements that 
have allowed them to do such action was the governmental decision to keep people earning 
more than 15 000 francs out of the public scheme in 1930. It was this decision that forced 
them to organise, seek alternative options and define them as a group. It would have been 
difficult for the coalition behind the supplementary pension scheme to succeed without the 
breakthrough elaboration of supplementary schemes in 1930.  
Further, as stated by Guillemard (1986), whose analysis focuses on the conflicts 
between unions and employers with a passive state playing to the tune of the relative strength 
of these players,70 the unions and the left in general began to lose strength in 1946-7. The 
socialist-communist coalition was no longer able to gather a majority in Parliament while 
                                                 
67 Employers had three main reasons to support the extension of supplementary schemes. First, they could use 
negotiations on pensions to negotiate salaries, which they had no control over. Second, it allowed them to free 
their older workers, whom were considered unproductive. Finally, supplementary schemes provided employers 
with another mean to create divisions within the labour movement by favoring the CFTC and the CGT-FO while 
marginilizing the CGT (Guillemard, 1986: 104).  
68 For example, a special scheme was introduced for supervisory staff in the metal industry in 1953 and one for 
all Renault employees in 1955 (Saint-Jours, 1982: 130-1). 
69 By then only few occupations did not have supplementary pension schemes, and few remained outside 
ARRCO (Saint-Jours, 1982: 138). This is still true today since only three major organisations are not members 
of either ARRCO or AGIRC: Ircantec (for employees acting as agent for the public sector without being civil 
servant), CRPNAC (civil aviation employees), and CGRCE (savings office/bank employees). 
70 Clearly a by-product of the weak Fourth Republic. 
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internal conflicts within both the CGT and later on within the CFTC would fragment the 
union movement. The relationship among them would then become extremely competitive 
with the CGT losing ground. This development froze the action of social security institutions, 
and put unions on the defensive protecting earned rights while being unable to acquire new 
ones (95).  
With regards to civil servant, the word temporary became more and more permanent 
as their special regimes remained unaltered by this wave of reform. The integration of their 
schemes with the general regime was never really pursued for two main reasons. First, the 
pension schemes within the public service had been divided along socio-occupational71 or 
structural lines and have a longer history than the ones present in the private sectors. It was 
much more difficult to reform strongly entrenched and implemented plans like the pensions 
schemes in the public sector than the ones found in the private sector, which had been 
recently implemented and hurt significantly by inflation. Second, retirement has been defined 
differently in the public sector than in the private. Retirement is defined as a continuation of 
active life implying that public servants receive benefits tied to their professional status at the 
time of retirement. This special status had been granted earlier to attract employees into the 
public sectors (Bozec and Mays, 2000). Integrating the schemes of public servant with the 
ones found in the private would have meant a significant loss of benefits and, possibly, the 
loss of this special status.72 Thus, public pension schemes were not incorporated into a 
broader system including private workers.  
The Larocque Plan proved to be too ambitious, especially once compared to other 
plans proposed in Europe during this period. Larocque had “revolutionary ideas” in mind but 
was forced to compromise during the debate following the 1945 ordinance (Ashford, 1986: 
251). The redistribution effect from the most privileged occupational groups to the less 
privileged was too visible to succeed (Baldwin, 1990a).73 This episode in the development of 
public pensions resulted in a centralization of benefits and contributions for those enrolled in 
                                                 
71 After World War II, there were 160 pension schemes for public servants, this number has fallen to 100 (Bozec 
and Mays, 2000: 375). 
72 According to Saint-Jours (1982), many of the special benefits granted to public servants became available to 
workers in the private sector via the growth of supplementary schemes and a decreased in the benefits granted to 
civil servants (130). 
73 Further, for those unfamiliar with French politics, it should be reminded that governments in the Fourth 
Republic consisted of large coalitions and were short lived due to strong ideological differences and weak party 
discipline. This resulted in a difficult environment for reformers since proposals had to be negotiated with a 
multitude of actors. The ineffectiveness of governments in pursuing a course of action would clearly come to 
light as the conflict in Algeria intensified, resulting in the demise of the Fourth Republic. 
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the general regime and an independent decentralised management, which still prevails today 
(Saint-Jours, 1982).  
The 1960s were a decade of administrative change as the first governments of the Fifth 
Republic sought to increase the powers of the state and employers within the system of social 
security.  A law in 1960 increased the power of the state over the administrative council in 
charge of public pensions in the private sector. The candidate for elections had to meet three 
criteria: 1) be chosen from a list pre-established by the ministry of social affairs; 2) 80% of 
the candidates had to come from the newly created Centre national d’études supérieures de la 
Sécurité social; and 3) each new director had to receive the approval of the ministry before 
beginning his/her term (Join-Lambert, 1997: 450-1). In the same vein, other legislations were 
introduced in 1967. The national social security office was divided into three offices, 
corresponding to different risks (sickness, old age, and family). A central agency (ACOSS)74 
was created to recover social security contributions and was accorded the legal status of 
public corporation. Further, a reform instituting the concept of parity between employers and 
employees was introduced in the management boards of social security to strengthen the 
position of employers, which were a minority. The management of each board would consist 
of representatives of unions and employers’ association each receiving 50% of the seats. 
Representative would no longer be elected but rather nominated by each organisation (Saint-
Jours, 1982: 132-3). 
The 1970s are regarded as the final stage in the universalisation of the French pension 
system, a goal sought since the end of W.W.II. The French government passed a law in 1974 
seeking to provide social protection to all of its citizens by 1978. As underlined by Baldwin 
(1990a), universalism would be achieved by the back door. First, the self-employed who had 
strongly advocated separate schemes in the post-war era became strong supporters of a 
universal regime due to their sharp economic declined. Wage earners represented by the Left, 
on the other hand, opposed universalisation since they would have been the ones financing 
the inclusion of the self-employed. To resolve the difficulties of self-employed without 
alienating wage earners, the Centre-Right governments introduced laws seeking to save the 
independent regimes without digging into the funds of the general regime. A reform was first 
introduced in 1972 and it aimed at aligning the rules and benefits of self-employed regimes, 
with the exception of the one for liberal professions, with the general regime. State subsidies 
were also introduced to help alleviate demographic imbalances within the independent 
                                                 
74 Agence centrale des organismes de sécurité sociale. 
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regime (Baldwin, 1990a: 248-68). These objectives were pushed further in 1974, when the 
government introduced an inter-regime mechanism resulting in monetary transfers between 
schemes to alleviate demographic and socio-economic difficulties experienced by some 
schemes like the ones for farmers and minors (Bonelli, 2000: 127). This went further than the 
1972 laws since it implied that state subsidies granted to the general regime would also be 
used to finance imbalances in the independent regime. Nonetheless, it is important to note 
that the government promised that the amount transferred to the self-employed regime would 
not exceed the amount received in state subsidies (Baldwin, 1990a: 285-6).  
Second, coverage was extended to individuals that were still not enrolled in an old-
age pension scheme by requiring them to contribute to the general regime (prisoners, some 
artists, clergyman, housewife under specific circumstances, etc.) (Saint-Jours, 1982: 135; 
Charpin, 1999). Finally, following the parliamentary and presidential victory of the Socialists 
in 1981, Mitterand opted to raise significantly basic levels making the French system more 
universal and less stigmatized. One of the important modifications introduced by the 
Mitterand government was the reduction of the retirement age from 65 to 60, which had 
much more to do with redefining employment policies than improving pensions (Guillemard, 
1986: 315). This new policy was favoured by both unions, who were seeking to improve 
pensions and started to advocate retirement at 60 in the 1950s, and employers, who were 
seeking to replace ‘ineffective’ and costly older workers. As stated in chapter 1, the country 
was faced with high unemployment and the cost of maintaining workers on unemployment 
insurance were actually higher than putting them on retirement (Rein and Friedman, 1998: 
63). 
Despite the universal coverage provided by social security, which is quite an 
achievement considering that only 50% of all workers were covered after World War II, unity 
is far from achieved as there are disparate levels of benefits among groups (Charpin, 1999). 
Table 2.1 provides a sketch of the French public pension system, which has remained fairly 
stable despite the reforms of the 1990s. 
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Table 2.1 Overview of the French Pensions System.75 
Wage Earners Basic Regime Mandatory Supplementary Regime 
Workers from the industrial, 
trade and service sectors 
ARRCO 
Cadres from the industrial, 
trade and service sectors 
ARRCO AGIRC 
Agents that are not considered 
state employees 
Ircantec 
2 millions contributors and 1,3 
million retirees. 
Other enterprise wage earners 
with a special status 
Régime général – General scheme 
(divided into various schemes: 
Cnav, Cram, Crav, CGSS). 
 
This scheme includes close to 15 
millions workers and 9,6 millions 
retirees. 
Various schemes (CNRCC (CCI), 
Crepa, CRPCCMPA, CRPNPAC 
etc… 
45 000 contributors and 25 retirees. 
Civil servants and wage earners 
from governmental 
organisations 
Special regimes for civil servants 
4,7 millions contributors and 3,4 millions retirees. 
Agricultural workers MSA 
650 000 contributors and 2,2 
millions retirees. 
ARRCO 
15 millions contributors and 9 
millions retirees. 
Cadres in agriculture MSA ARRCO Agirc 3 /1.6 
millions 
Independents (Self-Employed)   
Agriculture MSA 
750 000 contributors and 2 millions 
retirees. 
Non-mandatory schemes 
Artists CANCAVA – 482 000 contributors and 684 000 retirees. 
Trade and Industry Organic 
607 000 contributors and 908 000 
retirees. 
Non-mandatory schemes. 
Liberal Professions CNAPVL 418 000 contributors and 144 000 retirees. 
CNBF (lawyers) 31 000 contributors and 8 000 retirees. 
Religious Professions Cavimac 24 000 contributors and 70 000 
retirees. 
Source: ARRCO (found at the CNAV web site: www.cnav.fr, site visited on October 17, 2001). 
 
 
Theorizing Pension Reform within the French Context 
The importance of the state in France  
 In discussing the concept of policy style, Richardsson et al (1982) summarize France’s 
as being “a policy system characterised by secrecy, limited consultation, immobilism, and 
stagnation most of the time, and an assertive government and abrupt and radical change some 
of the time” (1). In the background of this picture lays the state. The French state is 
considered to be strong enough to overrule interest groups in the pursuit of the national 
interest (Krasner, 1976). As underlined by Merrien (1991), interest groups such as unions, are 
only admitted into the policy-making process to the extent that they fit into a state logic, 
under which case they become a segment of representation for the national interest. It is, 
afterall, the state that decides which members are representative. 
                                                 
75 A means-tested pension is also available for those earning below a specific amount. 
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“In the French case, this conceptualisation is pushed to limits since 
the state not only is the principal actor in the social life, but it 
considers that its mission is to take control directly of the main 
interests of the nation against the wishes of private interests, which 
are viewed as seeking to impose individualism to defeat 
universalism”(Merrien, 1991: 283).76 
   
 Indicative of the strong powers granted to the state, the cabinet of the Prime Minister, 
and the Prime Minister himself/herself play a key role on this issue. The reasons behind this 
centralization of power are multiple. First, many elements related to public pensions can only 
be changed by an executive decree signed by the Prime Minister, and endorsed by the 
President. These powers are established in the Constitution of the Fifth Republic as a mean to 
reduce the power of the legislature. Second, public pensions have been considered to be a 
very sensitive and important issue. Retirement at age 60, granted by the Socialist in 1982 is 
considered to be a social conquest and very few politicians seek to challenge it directly. Five 
years before the Juppé plan and the mass demonstrations that followed in December 1995, 
the Prime Minister of the time, Rocard, had stated reforming public pensions is an issue that 
can force the resignation of any government. Further, many analysis related to pension 
reform have been performed by the Commissariat Général au Plan (CGP), an institution in 
charge of French planning that is placed under the responsability of the Prime Minister. It has 
plaid a leading role in gathering expertise and diagnosis on the public pension system. 
 The influence of the Minister of Social Affairs is not considered to be too strong when 
it comes to this issue even though the ministry is officially in charge of this issue. A Minister 
must obtain the green light from Matignon prior to any discussion with the social partners, 
and the later will contact Matignon to verify that they did. Thus, the role of any individual 
ministry is extremely constrained (Quermonne, 1991: 44). 
 France has often been referred to as a semi-presidential or semi-parliamentary system 
(Duverger, 1980) because of its mixture of parliamentary and presidential features. France 
has a split executive having both a Prime Minister and a President. When both come from the 
same party or a similar coalition, the later exercises a dominant role. On the other hand, when 
they come from different parties or coalition, the Prime Minister exercises the key powers on 
domestic issues while the President’s influence is mostly confined to foreign issues. Thus, 
                                                 
76 “Dans le cas francais, cette conception est poussée à l’extrême puisque non seulement l’État se veut un acteur 
principal de la vie sociale, mais qu’il considère en outre que sa mission implique la prise en charge directe des 
intérêts principaux de la nation face aux intérêts privés toujours suspects de vouloir faire trimpher le particulier 
au détriment de l’universel” 
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this distinction plays an important role for anyone studying ‘grey areas’ such as the EU 
because it is difficult to distinguish it as a domestic or external issue. However, public 
pension is strongly rooted as a domestic issue and co-habitation does not have a strong 
impact in this debate. In the past five years, Chirac has not been able to force Jospin to follow 
his own way in this debate.  The only actions Chirac has been able to undertake has been to 
criticize the lack of action by the Socialist government. Nonetheless, a co-habitation 
government can impact the debate in the measure that the Prime Minister is seeking election 
as President. This reason was explicitely stated by Chirac in 1987 following a commission on 
reform social security: “any risky measure will be excluded prior to the elections”  (Le 
Monde, October 24 1987).   
 In his article on pension reforms, Vail (1999) uses the notion of France as a strong state 
to underline the complexity of activiting a retrenchment policy because it is very difficult to 
avoid blame. The executive is strong,  visable, and highly centralized. It is, therefore, difficult 
to diffuse blame as it is the case in the United States where the President can blame the 
legislature and vice versa because it has a legitimate and powerful influence in the decision-
making apparatus (Pierson and Wiever, 1993). 
 When to it comes to translating these powers in the case of old-age pensions, it is 
difficult to support the position of a strong state. By advocating the virtue of private savings 
and supporting the mutualités (friendly societies) for a longer period than most 
democracies,77 the state never succeeded in exercising the kind of powers described above by 
Krasner (1976) and Merrien (1991). Its attempt to universalise social security under one 
scheme failed in 1945, partly because of its earlier actions. The fact that the first mandatory 
pension scheme occurred in 1930 gave more time for private alternatives to establish 
themselves. Further, by excluding those earning more than 3000 Francs, this legislation 
strengthened private options and the organization of well off workers, which had to establish 
their own plan. 
  
The social partners 
 France does not have a strong consensual history among its social partners that can be 
compared to Belgium or Sweden. The stance towards employers had been quite antagonistic 
after WWII, in part due to their collaboration with the occupier. Class and religion became 
two major cleavages that led to the division of the CGT and the CFTC resulting in the 
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creation of two new unions (FO78 and CFDT79 respectively) besides these two. Management 
(cadres) obtained its own unions in the late 1940s in the CFE-CGC.80 These five unions have 
competed for members and social elections (when they arose) throughout the past 50 years, 
and have been the ones considered to be representative by the state. They are consulted 
regularly for many policy issues, such as pension. These consultations tend to be formalized 
via the Conseil économique et social, the consultation institution for any government seeking 
to test the political waters of any proposal. This institution can also be employed for a social 
partner to push one of their proposals in the forefront of the political debate as it was done by 
Chotard in 1988 for pensions. 
 The membership within the unions is also quite diverse. Not only they have ideological 
and professional differences, but they are also separated along public/private sector and by 
the number of elderly they have as members. The CGT used to be the biggest union in 
France, but it split in two at the onset of the cold-war over the type of Communism it would 
support. CGT threw its support behind the Soviet régime, while the runaway group CGT-FO 
put its trust behind democratic communist parties. The CFTC also experienced a split in two 
over the place of religion within the union. Today, the CFTC is a christian democrat union, 
which advocates and promotes actively family and church values. Its runaway counterpart, 
the CFDT is a non-religious union and has put a strong emphasis on seeking agreements with 
the employers and the government. Finally, the CFE-CGC represents mostly  white collar 
workers. None of the French unions are linked to political parties, at least not in the same 
way LO supports the Swedish democrats. They have, however, informal links with the 
political elites. For example, many members of the CGT are also members of the Communist 
party. Another important cleavage that is worth emphasising here due to the nature of the 
French pension system is the proportion of members within the unions that belong to either 
the public sector or the private sector. FO and CGT have most of their members in the public 
sector. Somewhat similar to Italy, many unions also include a high number of members that 
are retired. 
 Contrary to Sweden, the French unions are quite decentralized and it does happen that a 
sector or a branch disobey the positions spelled out by the executive office. For example, the 
railway workers of the CFDT were clearly at odds with the executive following the 
                                                                                                                                                        
77 To this effect, it is worth noting that the Larocque Plan was presented as an extension of the mutualités 
(Ashford, 1991). 
78 Force-Ouvrière. 
79 Confédération Francaise Démocratique des Travailleurs. 
80 Confédération Francaise de l’Encadrement – Confédération Général des Cadres. 
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introduction of the Juppé plan. Despite the support granted to the plan by Notat (President), 
they were quick to join other unions to protest the measures. Further, the actions of sectoral 
branches may vary greatly from the confederal positions. This was clearly demonstrated by 
the creation of a capitalized pillar to complement the régime général and the mandatory 
supplementary pension schemes (AGIRC and ARRCO) in the insurance sector, which was 
supported by CFDT, CFTC, and even the strongest opponent to funded options, the 
Communist CGT (Le Monde, 3 February 1995). 
 The main employer association, MEDEF (previously CNPF), has become increasingly 
vocal on the question of reforming the public pension system. Due to the historical mentioned 
above, the employers had not traditionally had a strong and confrontational public profile. It 
used to be seeking compromises with the unions on most questions. This philosophy has been 
strongly altered since the instauration of a new leadership in 1997. MEDEF’s approach is 
now much more confrontational. Indicative of the change, its members have been out in the 
street protesting the enactment of the 35-hour week in October 1999 (Economist, 22 January 
2000), and it pulled out of the social security administrative councils claiming that they have 
no real powers.    
 If a person were to base solely its analysis of the relationships among the social partners 
on public speeches and press releases they would be baffled. In many instances, the tone is 
uncompromising and clearly antagonistic, especially for FO and CGT. One can be left with 
the impression that the social partners are preparing themselves to join a fighting tournament 
rather than seeking to work together. Because of the competitive nature of the union map in 
France, one cannot leave the appearance of appearing soft on social issues that are closely 
related to workers’ rights. During the period studied, the term surenchère (overbiding) is 
often cited to describe the position of certain unions, as they seek to offer more than their 
competitor. When it comes to reforming the public pension system, this takes often the form 
of refuting the analysis of experts, and denouncing that the remedy is too stark, challenging 
earned social rights. Despite this competitive environment, social partners have found a 
“paradoxical” way of co-existing: 
”…unemployment insurance is perhaps the most dramatic illustration 
of free riding in French policymaking. The three major unions, which 
represent no more than a fifth of French workers, monopolize the 
negotiations with the CNPF while the Communist unions accept the 
benefits while boycotting the procedures and condemning the results. 
All these paradoxes happily coexist because social insurance is 
defined to include all forms of social risk whether or not it lies within 
the formal state system" (Ashford, 1991: 35-6). 
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These patterns exist as well for the pension sector. For example, despite FO’s refusal to 
accept and support the new “convention d’objectifs et de gestion” (5 year plan negotiated 
between social partners and government concerning the management objectives) because it 
was part of the Juppé plan, it participates in its implementation.   
These trends are also quite obvious during the negotiations related to the mandatory 
supplementary schemes (AGIRC and ARRCO). The CGT virtually never gives its support at 
the national level, with FO, CFDT, CFTC, and the CGC negotiating with the employers. 
Recently, FO have been more reticent than the other three to sign in with the employer. 
Compared with FO and CGT, the CFDT has had a more conciliatory tone, and has been more 
willing to negotiate with the employers. This position has been somewhat difficult to 
maintain in the face of the less compromising stance by the CGT and FO.   
 It is also important to state that as a single organization, none of them have a veto 
power. There must be a broad majority within a board of representative, in the case of 
pension within the CNAV, for a proposal to be endorsed. It is quite rare that conflicts arise 
when it comes to the implementation of the laws set by the government.81 However, these 
conflicts are more likely to be present during the negotiations within the mandatory 
supplementary pension schemes AGIRC and ARRCO. For example, the latest agreement 
among the social partners was signed in February 2001, and was endorsed by the employers, 
the CFDT, the CFTC, and the CFE-CGC. Nonetheless, the agreement applies to all 
employees. If a social partner does not consider a majority to be broad enough, it can appeal 
the decision to the Conseil d’État. This procedure is rarely employed. 
 The most important resources unions have, remain their mobilization strength, which 
was expressed so clearly in December 1995. Work stoppage by the SNCF and RATP, which 
represent around 75% of all strikes in France, can shutdown Paris. 
  
The (uneasy) relationship between the state and the social partners. 
 The interaction between the unions, employers and the state is quite particular in France 
when compared to other European nation. On most indices of corporatism, France usually 
ranks at the bottom. With only 10% of the workforce belonging to a union, this is hardly 
surprising.  
 The mutualist tradition has resulted in the trade unions and employers not being 
completely integrated in the state apparatus leading to a peculiar relationship between the 
                                                 
81 This is partly the result of the lack of power granted to the administrative council.  
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state and the social partners especially in the case of old-age insurance and the institutions 
associated with the Sécu. Indicative of this strange relationship, the various ‘caisses’ cannot 
be clearly defined has neither private nor public and its top management actually consists of 
state employees, while most of its staff are private workers. These responsabilities were 
clearly defined in 1945 and in favour of the social partners. As underlined by Ashford (1986) 
social security was built ‘outside the state’.  However, they never materialised as the state 
took more responsabilities as the needs to reform the system grew. The power of unions 
reached a peak following WWII, and they have been on the defensive ever since (Guillemard, 
1986). Starting with intense conflicts within the unions, the re-birth of employers as 
legitimate actors, and the arrival of De Gaulle, the state has gradually established itself as the 
most important actor, setting the legislation to be followed by the various ‘caisses’ (schemes). 
This intrusion into the mutualist tradition where workers (and employers) are expected to run 
their own scheme, has been constantly contested by social partners, however. 
 The state cannot ignore the social partners as the various ‘caisses’ are formally 
managed by them. Social partners, in particular the CGT, were key actors in establishing and 
implementing the new system after the war, resulting in a strong legitimation within it. The 
debate between insurance and solidarity has existed ever since the creation of the Sécu, and 
constantly reappears the when pension reform is on the political agenda. This debate is also a 
reflection of a conflict between the state and social partners over the control of old-age 
insurance. The social partners would like to have full managerial powers over old-age 
insurance, like they do with the supplementary pension schemes ARRCO and AGIRC. 
Despite all the reports stating that a division between solidarity and insurance cannot be 
materialised in practice, this has remained a main axe of discussion and conflict between the 
government and the social partners. The profound attachment to the formal powers, which 
grant little space for decisions that have policy implications, results from the legitimacy that 
it grants to the social partners. It places the social partners at the centre of social policy 
(Rosanvallon, 1995: 81). 
 Interestingly, even the population is split on the subject. During a last ditch effort by the 
Socialist government of Bérégovoy (1992-3) to reform pensions, the Minister of Social 
Affairs (Teulade) commissioned a survey, which included two questions on the management 
of public pensions. The public was clearly split between the social partners and the state. One 
question asked who do you trust the most to manage the pension system. 35% of individuals 
answered the state, 34% the social partners and 23% private insurance companies. Further, 
45% of the respondents stated that the government should managed the whole system while 
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51% stated that it should only concern itself with national solidarity (non-contributive 
benefits). 
  
Bureaucracy 
 The institutionalisation of public pensions is clearly another point challenging the 
strong state thesis. The French bureaucracy never had a strong foothold in this policy domain. 
It has also lacked the prestige and means to attract good graduates. Actually, many of the 
comments related to the French bureaucracy on this subject, echo the critiques of the British 
bureaucracy made by Heclo (1974) in his seminal book Modern Social Policies in Britain 
and Sweden, where he attributes the lack of expertise with the minimalist pension system 
obtained by the UK.  
 First, the traditional arena of strength for pension policies usually lie within the 
Ministry of Social Affairs or an (independent) agency attached to it. In the French case, the 
Ministry usually acts as a representative on various public boards related to pension such as 
the CNRACL.82 It is also responsible for the preparation and implementation of social 
policies. This is quite different from its Swedish counterpart, which gives the later 
responsibilities to external agencies, Riksförsäkringsverket (RFV) for pensions. However, the 
Ministry seems to be lacking resources to perform its mandate properly, which is much more 
complex than many industrialised country because of the fragmentation of the pension 
system. As underlined by Bichot (1999), the “statistical department of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs does not have the means to study seriously all aspects of la sécu”. The same author 
would later add, “impact studies, attached to a bill are at a distressing level. Feasibility 
studies shine by their absence” (18).83 The reasons behind this situation are diverse and 
include a bureaucratic tradition that has emphasised legal aspects and the reliance on the 
‘caisses’ for the implementation of its policies. The later are managed by the social partners 
and are semi-private entities, as they are not controlled by the government to the same extent 
as RFV for example. Its employees, with the exception of the top management filled with 
Enarques, are private sector workers. 
 As a result, various governments have relied on a multitude of experts to write their 
reports. None of them has been as active as the Commissariat Général au Plan (CGP). The 
Plan has focused four key reports since the mid 1980s and has been the locus of pension 
                                                 
82 Caisse Nationale de Retraites des Agents des Collectivités Locales. 
83 “ les études d’impact qui doivent accompagner les projets de loi sont d’un niveau affligeant. Les études de 
faisabilité brillent par leur absence”. 
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expertise for the publication of other reports as well.84 There has also been strong reliance on 
the Direction de la prévision, a department within the Finance Ministry specialising in 
forecasting, and the Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE). As 
underlined so clearly in a study by Guillemard (1980), ‘external’ reliance can produce useless 
information to understand the situation of elderly. The INSEE systematically ceased to 
categorize individuals according to their professional status once they reach retirement, which 
is extremely misleading considering the disparities among the pension reforms. Guillemard 
goes as far as stating that INSEE is producing ignorance on the subject.85 Thus, no one knows 
what the average pension of for each socio-professional group was. More than 10 years later, 
a journalist at le Monde expressed its amazement that no expert really know what is the 
average pension of a blue-collar worker and that up to 1988 no one even tried to know it (Le 
Monde, 16 March 1993).86  
 The non-reform activities of the régimes spéciaux (civil servants, SNCF, RATP…). 
Prior to the work done by the Conseil d’Orientation des Retraites (COR) relatively little was 
known about them. Most reports had suggested vague measures without proper analysis, 
making it difficult for politicians to take a stance on these schemes. The Balladur cabinet 
finally opted to tackle the subject, and it took a year to launch a series of studies on the public 
sector régimes. It is extremely difficult to advocate a reform when no one can demonstrate a 
deficit, or an analysis of the situation. The deficit of the private sectors regimes, on the other 
hand, were well documented and published on numerous occasions in the newspapers.  
 Second, when it comes to hiring and forming experts, France’s track record is also quite 
disappointing. The grande école devoted to social security, Centre national d’études 
supérieures de sécurité sociale (CNESSS), is the only one lacking laboratories and research 
centres (Bichot, 1999). Even more worriesome is the fact that the Ministry of Social Affairs 
                                                 
84 This does not mean that the Ministry of Social Affairs, and its bureaucrats are totally excluded. During the 
redaction of L’avenir de nos retraites (ie. Charpin report) in 1998-99, Charpin consulted many offices with the 
Social Ministry (especially the Direction de la Sécurité Sociale- DSS). Nonetheless, it is worth stating that 
documents and notes written by  the DSS had to be validated by the Cabinet prior to their release. The same 
process was in place for the work of the conseil d’orientation des retraites (COR). 
85 Her critique was strong and blunt: “On voit, par cet exemple, combien ce que les empiristes naïfs appellent 
des ‘données’ engage de présupposés théoriques sous-jacents, contribuant corrélativement à produire 
l’ignorance systématique de certains processus sociaux (Guillemard, 1980, 83-4). 
86  He began his article by discussing all the uncertainty and worriness regarding the possible reforms, and how 
people are going to manage the reforms. “Alors, innocemment, j’ai demandé combien touche par mois le retraité 
moyen,  l’ancien ouvrier, le ‘col blanc’, le petit cadre, le cadre sup…Révélation: on n’en sait rien. Un de mes 
copains, très spécialisé,  m’a même dit ‘C’est le secret le mieux gardé qui soit. Jusqu’à 1988, on n’avait même 
pas essayé de savoir. Maintenant on commence à s’en préoccupper, mais c’est du coton’ (…) Certes, on glose à 
perte de vue sur la nécéssité de rallonger les années de cotisations, sur les économies que – globalement – on 
pourrait faire en versant moins aux futurs retraités, et…on ne sait même pas ce que recoivent pour vivre ceux 
qui, là, maintenant, sont en retraite. Ca laisse rêveur” (Le Monde, 16 March 1993). 
 79
fails to attract good énaques. As underlined by Jolbert (1981), “within the civil 
administration, social ministries are almost always the last choices. Between 1963 and 1969, 
94% of the students ranked among the last 28 when they leave ENA (as part of a theoretical 
graduation of 100 students) have been affected to the Ministry of Social Affairs, Agriculture 
or Anciens Combattants” (author translation). These ministries also have the highest number 
of people without a graduate degree (253). Further, in stark contrast with Sweden (see 
Rothstein, 1996; Lindqvist, 1990), unions have never pushed and promoted its members to 
‘capture’ the state or to join the bureaucracy to advance its social goals. This is partly as a 
result of their positions, which emphasised that old-age insurance should be their 
responsability. Their trust in the state has historically been negligeable, except for a few years 
following WWII. The common procedure of hiring énarquiste has also provided a strong 
barriers to achieve a stronger inclusion of union partisans within the bureaucracy. 
 Despite these critiques, it would be false to conclude that France lacks experts to fulfill 
to guide its government. Experts from the various organizations (ministries, departments, and 
other governmental organizations) know each other very well and are end up working on 
virtually every report that is being produced, with very few exceptions such as the Teulade 
report.  
 
Reforming Pensions within the French Social Administration 
 A Belgian cabinet member best described the process of pension reform in his country 
by stating that changes occur “à petits pas” (by little steps). Despite the further complexity of 
dealing with coalition governments in Belgian, the same statement applies to France. As it 
will be seen in the upcoming pages, there is a consensus among the politicians that reform(s) 
of the pension system is deemed necessary. The key difference between the Right and the 
Left lies in their attitude towards private options as a mean to complement the current 
pension system. Even within the social partners, this consensus seems to exist, albeit to a 
lower level. When interrogated on the subject in private, few dismiss that a pension reform 
needs to be done.87 Contrary to their political counterpart, however, what needs to be done is 
not too consensual. The fragmentation of the labour movement coupled with the 
fragmentation of the pension system make retrenchment quite difficult for politicians. 
  
                                                 
87 This fact has been stated on numerous occasions in various articles of Le Monde (1990-2002) and during the 
interviews conducted with the social partners. The key exception is the CGT that claims that benefits should be 
maintained and the financing should come from the profit earned by private companies and economic growth.  
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Vieillir Solidaire 
 Three years after granting a full pension at 60 years old, the Socialist Prime Minister, 
Laurent Fabius, mandated the CGP to create a commission to on the “solidarity between 
generations in the face of demographic changes” in 1985 (Ruellan, 1993: 911). A key part of 
the commission was to tackle the future of the pension system. Despite a favourable 
demographic balance, old-age insurance was already in deficit. To this effect, the mission had 
a very ambitious agenda, as it was asked to analyse the impact of population ageing on 
virtually all factors related to the pension system. Then based on these prognostic, it was 
asked to provide possible solutions. The types of solutions that could be envisaged ranged 
from parametric reforms (eg. changing the contribution rate) to institutional reforms to 
preserve old-age insurance. The commission was asked to sketch the main lines of the 
pension system for the 21st century!88 
 The Tabah report,89 Vieillir Solidaire, presented an alarming statement with regards to 
the future of the current pension system for reasons similar to those presented in the first 
chapter. It rejected switching to a fully funded system, as the various pension régimes 
actually provided a satisfying income replacement. A switch to a fully funded or partially 
funded scheme would not resolve the sharing of resources between the generations, which it 
considered to be the key challenges in the years to come. The commission advocated 
immediate action to preserve the financial equilibrium of the pension system, which can not 
be cured only with a strong growth in employment. The commission rejected increasing the 
retirement age, as long as unemployment among the elderly remained strong (France then had 
the lowest participation rates of people 55+ in all of Europe) and added that any measure 
going in that direction would have to be progressive and uniform. They presented three 
suggestions. First, the mandatory contribution period should be increased from 37,5 years to 
40. Second, a progressive retirement from the age 60 should be instituted where workers 
could continue to work part-time while receiving a partial pension. Third, retirement prior to 
                                                 
88 “La Commission…analysera l’évolution à long terme des différentes composantes de l’équilibre financier de 
l’assurance vieillesse. Sur la base de ces projections, il appartiendra à la Commission de tracer les grandes lignes 
du système de retraite du 21è siècle, et de fixer le cadre général dans lequel devront s,inscrire les mesures à 
prendre; elle étudiera comment le déséquilibre croissant devra être comblé par des modifications des cotisations 
et des pensions, les instruments d’actions possibles étant entre autres, l’âge de la liquidation, le mode de calcul 
des pensions, les taux de liquidation et de revalorisation. Les évolutions démographiques risquant en outre, de 
rendre plus fragiles les solidarités mises en jeu dans le cadre de l’organisation institutionelle actuelle, la 
commission proposera les voies propres à garantir la pérennité de l’assurance vieillesse et s’interrogera en 
particulier sur l’évolution souhaitable des champs d’intervention des différentes institutions: régimes de base, 
caisses de retraites complémentaire, État, mutuelles, institutions privées de prévoyance…” (Vieillir Solidaire, 
1986: 6). 
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60 years old ought to be reserved for those who really perform a tiresome, difficult job. The 
latter point was directed towards many régimes spéciaux where the retirement age vary 
between 40 and 60. For exemple, many SNCF employees can retire at 55 with full benefits 
even though they never board a train.90 
 Underlining the fact that elderly have similar resources as the working population and 
that pensions continue to rise faster than wages,91 the commission proposed three measures to 
stop this trend. First, a system by points, similar to the one in place for the supplementary 
régimes ARRCO and AGIRC, would ensure that the revenues of the elderly grow at a pace 
similar to the workers and would strengthen the link between contributions and benefits. The 
contributive and insurance aspects would then dominate. Simply put, what you get is 
dependent on what you pay and the value of each contribution is also dependent on insurance 
factors such as life expectancy. Concretely, this implies that someone could stop working at 
age 60 after 37,5 years and his pension would reflect the length of his contribution and the 
average salary he had during his working career. Another individual retiring at 60 
experincing a similar career, but with a duration of 40 years, would obtain a higher pension. 
Under the system that was in place, both of these individuals could receive the same pension 
because the years beyond the contribution requirement result in no extra benefits.92  
 Second, non-contributory advantages such as rights earned but unpaid by the 
unemployed, should be considered part of the national solidarity. They should therefore be 
financed by general taxation and be made more restrictive by the state. Finally, the adoption 
of these measures would greatly improve the financial state of the pension system, but an 
increase in the contribution rate would still be necessary. These measures ensured a 
strengthening of the link between contributions and benefits. 
 
Commission d’évaluation et de sauvegarde de l’assurance vieillesse 
 Commissioned by the Socialist, the Tabah report would end up being submitted in June 
1986 to the new government of Jacques Chirac, whose coalition won the election of March 
1986. Rather than building from this report, the Minister of Social Affairs, Philippe Séguin, 
mandated Pierre Schopflin (inspecteur général des affaires sociales) to head a somewhat 
similar commission to present propositions to secure the financial security of the pension 
                                                                                                                                                        
89 Named after the Chair of the Commission. It is a common practice in France to label a commission according 
to the name of its chair instead of the actual name given to it. 
90 Those working in the trains are entitled to leave at 50. 
91 For exemple the commission stresses that for the régime général, the average pension has increased by a total 
of 6,7% while salaries grew by only 3,8% during the period 1970-1978.   
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system up to the years 2000-2005 based on the work performed by the CGP. Another key aim 
of this commission was to test the political waters by including the social partners and the 
caisses representatives. Thus, the Commission d’évaluation et de sauvegarde de l’assurance 
vieillesse (aka Mission Schopflin) had the potential to generate a consensus on possible 
reforms to the old-age insurance. As a result, however, its proposals were far less reaching 
than the ones introduced by the Tabah report. The opinion of the social partners were mixed 
and only the CGT was opposed to the totality of the report. 
 The report was presented at the end of March 1987 and four key points were debated to 
preserve the current system. First, full pension benefits should be granted at 60 but the 
authorities encouraged the government to make the necessary arrangement for an “adaptation 
progressive et équilibré” (a progressive and even implementation). The movement towards 
retirement should be more continuous rather than represent a break. Second, there should be a 
clearer distinction between the contributive and non-contributive aspects, with alternative 
financing being found for the later. Third, the indexation of pensions should be made 
according to an indicator relying on the evolution of consumer prices and salaries. Finally, 
there was a division within the commission on a proposal to extend the wage of reference for 
the calculation of a pension from the best 10 years to a higher number of years. 
 Thus, like its predecessor, this commission advocated a greater link between the 
contributions and benefits, a clearer distinction between the solidaristic and insurance aspects 
of old-age insurance, and alternative financing solutions for the former. These key points had 
a key place in the political debate up to the Balladur reform in 1993 because it was strongly 
supported by a vast majority of the social partners. They had hoped that a clearer separation 
between the solidarity and insurance aspects could grant them more powers in the 
management of public pensions by reducing the role of the state to that of ensuring national 
solidarity. 
  
États généraux de la Sécurité sociale 
 The ink of the Schopflin report was not even dry when Séguin annonced the creation of 
the “comité des sages des États généraux de la sécurité sociale” established to analyse and 
proposed options to reform and sustain the social security system in May 1987. This included 
health, unemployment, family allowances, and pensions as the whole system was generating 
important deficits. The directive for public pensions was to find ways to ensure the 
                                                                                                                                                        
92 That is unless these extra years become part of the 10 best years of the working career. 
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sustainability of the pension régimes by seeking, among alternatives, new ways to ease the 
transition from the active life to retirement. This committee included high profile experts 
such as Pierre Larocque, known as the father of social security in France. 
 The report of the comité des sages was presented in October 1987. In the span of five 
months, the committee more than 6 000 letters, most of which addressed to the departments, 
many of which were visited by the members of the committee. More than 8000 people 
participated during the work of the committee. In terms of solutions, the committee proposed 
eight avenues. First, the payg system should remain, as it is still safer than a fully funded 
scheme and a switch to such system would imply that the younger generation would have to 
contribute for two pensions, theirs and the one of their elderly. Second, the evolution of the 
average pension must follow the progression of the average net salary, and not grow faster as 
it has been the case. Third, the retirement age should be progressively raised from 60. In 
order to achieve this objective, they suggest an increase in the replacement rate for those who 
wished to work beyond 60 and/or beyond the number of periods required to obtain a full 
pension. As underlined by Ruellan (1993), this marked the first time where the entitlement to 
a full pension at 60 was challenged (913).  
 Fourth, the link between contributions and benefits needs to be strengthened. The report 
was highly critical of certain non-contributory benefits such as granting the equivalent of a 
full contribution period (4 months) to those who only worked 200 hours. It proposed a 
tightening of these rules and alternative sources of financing for this kind of benefits. Further, 
as in the Schopflin report, the committee also suggested to increase the wage of reference 
from the 10 best years to 20 or 25 years and beyond 6 months for civil servants. Fifth, the 
member of the committees were also favourable to a move towards creating a point system as 
long as it did not challenge the overall structure of the system, mainly maintain a distinction 
between the basic and supplementary régimes. This option was viewed as an interesting path 
to harmonize the various pension régimes. Sixth, it is essential that pension rights should be 
harmonized. In the short run, a real and unique régime for civil servants and military personal 
should be constructed. Seventh, the passage into retirement should be made progressively and 
this should be encouraged. Finally, the committee members underlined that many mothers at 
home were still not receiving an adequate pension. 
 Further, in a section on the financing of social security, the report underlines that the 
financial relations between the state and the various social régimes need to be clarified. The 
idea of a general and proportional tax to help alleviate the deficit of the social security system 
is also suggested. The later idea enjoyed broad support among politicians from both side of 
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the political spectrum (Juppé and Séguin- RPR; Rocard and Strauss-Kahn -–PS) and among 
the social partners (CFDT, CGC, CNPF). 
 Days prior to the official publication of the report, the Minister of social affairs 
(Philippe Séguin) immediately set meetings with the social partners to discuss the avenues 
retained by the governments. All social partners were in agreement with the terms of the 
problems, with the exception of the CGT. The pre-release enthusiasm would be short lived, 
however, when Chirac stated that “any risky measure will be excluded prior to the elections” 
the following week (Le Monde, 24 October 1987). Thus, the consensual strength of the report 
was never really tested and, like many French workers, this report became retired 
prematurely. 
 
Failed consensus with the Conseil Économique et Social 
  The work on pensions continued following the Presidential and legislative elections of 
1988, both won by the Socialists. The political waters of a reform were to be tested via a 
proposal on the social security system presented to the Conseil Économique et Social (CES)93 
presented by Yvon Chotard, President of the CNPF. The section on pensions proposed to 
transform the régime général into a point system like the ones used for the mandatory 
supplementary pension schemes (AGIRC and ARRCO). CGT and FO opposed such 
alterations claiming that it would result in challenging the whole retirement system. The 
CFDT partially supported the idea, but required guarantees on the evolution of pensions and a 
debate on all retirement schemes, including the ones of the public sector. The CFDT, CGC, 
artisans,  liberal professions and the CNPF would eventually support the overall report. 
However, the notice would fail to gather a majority. Nonetheless, a strong consensus was 
achieved within the social partners to clarify the responsibilities of the state and the social 
partners within the régime général. The CGT being the only organisation refusing to support 
this motion.  
 
Commission protection sociale 
 Few months later, in December 1988, the “Commission protection sociale” within the 
CGP would present its first notice to the government for the upcoming Xth plan. This 
commission presided by Teulade included representatives from various administrations, the 
                                                 
93 This institution is roughly the equivalent of the CGP for the social partner without its expertise. It has been 
used to institutionalise the social partners within the state apparatus and is often used to build consensus among 
them. 
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social partners, and experts, many of which were actively involved during the Commission 
des sages in 1987. The most definite positions related to public pensions. The final report 
would be presented in June 198994 and proposed very similar solutions as the ones presented 
by the comité des sages. It proposed a package of five measures. First, an increase in the 
contribution rates between 3 and 6%, the raise being dependent on the employment situation. 
Second, the indexation should be based on net salaries. Third, the settlement of pensions to be 
based on net, and not gross salaries. This measure would thus consider the contributions 
made by current workers. Fourth, instead of calculating pensions based on the best 10 years, 
it should be increased progressively, in the span of 15 years, to the best 25 years. Finally, still 
within a 15 year period, the commission proposed to increase the contributory period from 
150 quarters (37,5 years) to 165 quarters (41,25 years) to obtain a full pension (CGP, 1989: 
47-8). Interestingly, these options were not favoured in December 1988 when a preliminary 
notice was presented to the government because of the high unemployment rate present. Both 
FO and CGT opposed all these points on the grounds that they represent cutbacks and not 
appropriate in a period of high unemployment. Moderate support was granted by the other 
unions (CFDT, CFTC and CFE-CGC) while employer associations were more positive 
(CGPME and CNPF). 
 The report by the commission was very important in the debate because it tackled 
options that were highly present in the public debate. First, the Chotard proposal of moving 
towards a point system was simulated for the régime général by the CNAV. This measure had 
also been mentioned by the Tabah commission and the Comité des sages. It was the first time, 
however, that this option was studied closely. The simulation considered the average salary 
of the entire career instead of the best 10 in calculation pensions and the contribution 
requirement of 37,5 years removed as the total number of years became the principle axe of 
validation.  
 This solution was dismissed by the commission on the grounds that similar savings 
could be made with its proposal and that it raised the reliance on the minimum vieillesse, the 
means-tested income replacement program for those who receive too insufficient retirement 
income. The main reason behind this outcome is the rule where the average salary is based on 
the best 10 years of a career instead of the average of a lifetime, which ‘erases’ the difficult 
years of a working career (CGP, 1989: 49). This system was criticized by FO and CGT as a 
mean to establish cutbacks, and were, therefore, opposed to its implementation regardless of 
                                                 
94 “Réflexions de la commission de la protection sociale du 10ième plan sur le ‘besoin de financement’ à 
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the technical issues. Still, the attachment to the point system remained strong within some 
social partners (CFTC, CGPME and CNPF). The catholic union (CFTC) claimed that this 
system is easier to manage and more equitable than the current arrangement (CGP; 1989: 
163). 
 Second, the commission was highly critical of seeking to differentiate between 
solidaristic and insurance aspects. The clarification between the contributive and non-
contributive aspects of public pensions was endorsed warmly by social partners, who saw this 
measure as a mean to increase their power within the system, and supported in three previous 
reports (Tabah, Schopflin and les sages). This stance proved to be quite controversial with the 
social partners after careful analysis by the Commission. The commission stated that the 
difference between these aspects is problematic in theory and in practice. Distinguishing 
between the contributions paid by an individual employed and those paid by the state for 
diverse reasons (unemployment, sickness and minimum vieillesse) is relatively easy. 
However, this suppose that the current system pre-supposed a proportional relation between 
the contributions and the benefits. This was (and still is) clearly not the case. For example, is 
the fact that the 10 best years are considered instead of the working career for the calculation 
of the average salary for pension rights a non-contributive or a contributive benefit? The 
commission further claimed that putting this distinction in practice would result in extreme 
difficulties. Based on the lack of a possible consensus on the definition of what is 
contributive and the difficulties of implementing such a distinction, this option was rejected. 
Nonetheless, the commission stated that this reflection should be pursued in order to improve 
the knowledge of the system (CGP, 1989: 50-52). Many social partners criticized the 
commission for not pursuing this discussion further or rejecting the possibility that a 
distinction may be possible (CFDT, CFTC, and CNPF). CFTC claimed that it was actually 
easy to differentiate the non-contributive and contributive rights, and that the financing for 
the former should not come from the workers (CGP, 1989: 164). FO, however, supported the 
stance of the commission on this particular point. 
 Third, the commission asked for an harmonized policy for all basic régimes (général, 
public and spéciaux). It claimed that most conclusions made here for the régime général also 
apply to other basic pension schemes (civil servants and spéciaux). However, no concrete 
proposals were presented because of a lack of data available (CGP, 1989: 50)!95 This lack of 
                                                                                                                                                        
l’horizon 2005” 
95 “La Commission n’a pas disposer pour ces régimes de données statistiques et prévisionelles analogues à celles 
fournies pour le régime général”. 
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information on these régimes would actually prove important in the decision-making process 
of reforming public pensions, as we will see in the upcoming pages. This was strongly 
criticized by many social partners (CFDT, CFE-CGC, CGPME, and CNPF), which 
underlined the detailed proposals for the régime général while avoiding any kind of 
suggestions for the other basic régimes. 
 A key ommission was also raised by the social partners. They were quite critical that 
the commission refused to tackle an important point of the États généraux, that is the lack of 
the clarification between the state and social partners for the management of public pensions. 
FO actually stated that “many of the problems facing the social security system come from 
the excessive supervision of the state” (CGP, 1989: 192).  
 One of the few political comments on the report came from the Minister of Solidarity, 
Claude Evin, who stated that the government needed to alter benefits and raise contributions. 
The government would remain silent for nearly a full year on the topic of pension reforms, 
which can be understood by the lack of feasible coalition to move the debate forward. Its 
main interaction with the social partners focused on the amount the government would grant 
to them to help alleviate the costs for the mandatory supplementary régimes resulting from 
the governmental decision to decrease the retirement age to 60 in 1983. During the 
negotiations and the struggle between the social partners and the government, the CFDT 
requested the elaboration of a white book (livre blanc) that would analyse the entire pension 
system. 
  
Le Livre Blanc 
 During a parliamentary session in mid-June 1990, the Minister of Solidarity, Claude 
Evin, announced that the government was currently working on a livre blanc on pensions, 
which would be released in early 1991. Few weeks later, a special issue of the INSEE with an 
alarmist tone, brought back the issue of pension reform into the political agenda. The study 
directed by Denis Kessler, now the vice-President of the Medef, stated that contributions 
would have to be raised to 40% in the worst case scenario (from 16,3%) by the year 2040 if 
nothing is done. Kessler advocated immediate reforms and proposed three solutions: 1) 
increase the contributions; 2) decrease the benefits; 3) increase the retirement age. He stated 
that France is somewhat late in reforming its system compared to its European neighbours. 
The most controversial issue was its advocacy for the necessity to revert back to funded 
solutions to resolve the difficulties faced by the payg system. The Minister of Economy 
(Pierre Bérégovoy) would respond by stating that funded options represent coming back 100 
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years in the past to an individualist way similar to “la Cigale et la Fourmi”. Six months later, 
however, he declared that he did not exclude introducing a funded component to the pension 
system generating a debate between the two options for the following months. The debate 
continued for several weeks despite the reassurances made publicly by Evin (Minister of 
Health and Solidarity) that the government was not considering private options (Le Monde, 5 
January 1990)! The Prime Minister would re-confirm this position one month prior to the 
publication of the livre blanc.  
 At the end of April 1991, the government released the much awaited document. As it 
repeated on many occasions prior to its publications, the government restated that the aim of 
the book is to lay down agreeable data, perspectives and solutions on the future of public 
pensions. The Livre Blanc represented the culmination of the reports presented since 1985 
(Ruellan, 1993: 913). The key difference with the previous reports was that it came from the 
government, which sought to prepare the table for a reform. The preface was written by the 
Prime Minister himself, Michel Rocard.  
 In his preface, few solutions are clearly taken off the political tables, all of which would 
have implied large structural changes. First, he rejected funded solutions stating that they do 
not resolve the demographic challenge that lies ahead. Second, he stated that creation of a 
universal pension scheme had not been an option for decades and that the government ought 
to practice solidarity measures between the various régimes. He further underlined that the 
advantages of the public sector régimes vis-à-vis its private sector counterpart had much 
more to do with the age of retirement and other fringe benefits than with the amount granted 
by them. Finally, as in the report of the Commission protection sociale, the idea of 
distinguishing between the contributive and non-contributive aspects of the régime général 
was dismissed due to the efforts required to implement such a plan and because it did not 
address its financial problems. Other suggestions such as creating a uniform pension system 
financed by taxation and building a point system were disregarded by the Prime Minister for 
similar reasons (Livre Blanc, 1991: 10-17).  
 Another innovation of the Livre Blanc came from the fact that public sector schemes 
were analysed and discussed much more than the previous reports. Nonetheless, it remained 
clear that the expertise on these schemes lagged behind that of the régime général and few 
domains, such as indexation, were discussed by analysing only the régime général. This point 
was obvious when it came the time to evaluate and propose options to reform the public 
schemes.  
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 Any options challenging the right to retire at 60 was formally excluded as an option. 
Nonetheless, the Prime Minister wrote that it ought to be reminded that a right is not the same 
as an obligation and that this right can be perceived as more appropriate for those who began 
their working career at an early age (Livre Blanc, 1991: 17). 
 In order to gather a series of acceptable propositions, the government announced the 
creation of a new mission presided by Robert Cottave, a former FO secretary to study the 
propositions made by the Livre Blanc and those offered by the social partners.96 The Prime 
Minister, Michel Rocard, also announced a parliamentary debate on the subject in the 
upcoming months. The livre blanc would end up being sold throughout France as a pocket 
book in another effort to raise awareness on this issue. 
 The content of the Livre Blanc and its themes presented options that had already been 
studied and proposed earlier. All measures were to be introduced in the very near future and 
progressively over the next 15 years. First, it considered increasing the number of 
contribution periods required to obtain a full pension. It suggested to raise the number of 
years required from 37,5 to 41 or 42 years by adding a quarter per generation. The document 
argued at length that this measure did not challenge the option to retire at 60 stating that 
many retirees fulfill this condition now and those beginning their career early will reach this 
requirement. They further stressed that people can retire at 60 even though they are not 
eligible for full benefits. In this case, the rate of their pension is diminished. 
 Second, it considered increasing the period of reference for the calculation of a full time 
pension from the best 10 years to the best 25 years of a career. This measure was seen as a 
way to raise the contributivity of the system. This measure represented a key argument 
against the proponents of the point system since it increased the contributivity of the system 
significantly without any structural change. The impact of a similar option for the civil 
servant scheme was briefly considered, extending the period under consideration from the 
last 6 months to the last 15 months. The report stated that the salaries of civil servants are 
quite fixed, and thus this measure would not result in any changes. On this topic, it concluded 
that using much longer period of references ought not to be done without analysing other 
                                                 
96 The creation of this mission was also stated in the preface of the Livre Blanc. This choice of Cottave as 
President can be viewed as politically interesting. In effect, obtaining the support of FO would greatly enhanced 
the chances of the government to enact a reform. The chances of obtaining the support of the CGT being nil, 
getting FO on board with other unions and the employers would be broad enought to ensure the passage of a 
reform. 
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aspects related to the status of the civil servants and other elements that are not considered as 
part of their wages (ie. primes).97 
 Third, the report studied various modes of indexation (two types of net salaries 
indexation, and one on price). It remained quite negative on maintaining the indexation on 
salaries while not being too resolved on strictly indexing on prices.  
 The last section of the report emphasised policies no related to the public pension 
system, but which have quite an impact on it. These measures included the need to care better 
for the elderly, the need to encourage savings, and the need to favour a better integration of 
older workers within companies.  
 The report suscitated many reactions from both social partners and politicians. All 
social partners, with the exception of the CGT took a cautious approach vis-à-vis the Livre 
Blanc. This can be understood partly because it set up the table for future propositions, which 
had to be elaborated with them as part of the Mission Cottave. The CGT claimed that these 
measures represent an attack “on of the greatest social conquest of the 20th century”. FO was 
satisfied that the report dismissed the idea of moving towards a funded system and expressed 
concerns for those who have many breaks in their career and the unemployed. CFE-CGC, 
CFTC and CNPF approved of the document as an important starting point for the debate. The 
CFDT did the same while restating its commitment to the indexation of pensions based on 
salaries, not prices (Le Monde 26 April 1991). The journalist covering social security issues 
of Le Monde wrote that in private unions acknowledged the extent of the problem but that the 
positions of the two radicals, FO and CGT, seriously constrains them (Le Monde 17 April 
1991).  
 The opposition criticized the government of not taking definite actions on the subject 
and doubted that it would take any actions so close to the legislative election. Balladur (RPR) 
called for immediate reforms and a partial role for a funded system (Le Monde 25 April 
1991). Indicative of the importance of the Parliament in French politics and the troubles faced 
by the government, its only representative for the parliamentary debate on May 14 1991 
would be the Minister of Social Affairs (Evin)! Few days later Rocard announced his 
resignation as Prime Minister. 
 
                                                 
97 As a way to avoid the rigidity of the salary structure, the government established “les primes”. These are kind 
of permanent bonuses that are added to a salary but that do not generate social rights such as pension benefits. 
This measure was used, for example, to attract engineers into the public service. The government could not 
match the wages offered by the private sector since it would have had to raise the wage of all workers within the 
same category, it therefore offered them the standard wage and les primes. 
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Mission Cottave or moving away from the Livre Blanc  
 The momentum to reform pensions in both public and private sectors would soon come 
to an halt. On mid-May, the new Prime Minister, Edith Cresson, reduced the scope of the 
reform process by stating in her general policy document that: 
  
“the (pension) debate concerns first and foremost the régime général. 
The régimes spéciaux are not like the others. We will not question 
their specificity” (Le Monde May 24 1991). 
 
With these simple words, proposals to reform the régime spéciaux were off the table and the 
Mission Cottave became more restrictive. The main goal of the Mission was to generate 
politically acceptable propositions that could be investigated further by the government. 
Thus, this implied that the propositions would be acceptable to a strong majority of the social 
partners. 
 The hearings began in June 1991 and its report was submitted to the new Minister of 
Social Affairs, Jean-Louis Bianco, in January 1992. Instead of complementing the Livre 
blanc, the report pretty much threw it to the recycling bin. Increasing the length of the 
contribution period from 37,5 to 40 years was the only measure derived from the Livre 
blanc.98 The report rejected any increase to the reference salary to calculate public pensions, 
which rely on the best 10 years of a working life, and advocated that pensions be indexed on 
net salaries.  
 It promoted new measures such as better benefits for the raising of children and the 
creation of an institute devoted to monitoring pensions. It was proposed to increase the 
widow’s pension from 52% to 60% of the partner’s pension as a mean to improve the equity 
of the system. Further, the report dismissed any reforms to public sector schemes. On top of 
these new measures, a central point of the report was the need to clarify the financing of 
pensions between the social partners and the state. This led back to dividing the contributive 
and non-contributive aspects, the later to be finance via a new value added tax or income tax. 
Unsurprisingly, the reactions of the unions were quite positive this time, as the report met 
most of their demands (Ruellan, 1993: 914; Bonolli, 2000: 136). 
 Days prior to the public release of the Cottave report in January 1992, the government 
then mandated Bernard Brunhes, a consultant and former counsellor at Matignon, to conduct 
another round of consultation to analyse the opportunities to introduce a reform. A key goal 
                                                 
98 And the later advocated 41 or 42 years not 40. 
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was to get the pulse of the social partners on some of the ideas presented in the Cottave 
report. 
 The content of his proposals were supposed to remain private, but its content found 
itself on the public sphere rapidly and were even published in Le Monde. It proposed to 
increase the number of years required to obtain a full pension from 37,5 to 40 years starting 
in January 1993. The average salary used to calculate the pension would remain based on the 
best 10 years. In exchange for this support, the government would re-establish “paritarisme” 
within the Conseil National d’Assurance Vieillesse and grant them its board to fix the rate of 
contribution and the indexation of public pensions. Further, the rate of the widow’s pension 
would increase from 52% of the partner’s previous pension to 60%, adding 1% every year 
(Ruellan, 1991: 914; Le Monde 25 March 1991). The Cresson government never had the 
opportunity to pursue these recommendations as the Prime Minister resigned few weeks later 
following a crushing defeat of the Socialists in the regional elections. 
 The poor support for the Socialists and the proximity of the legislative elections 
suggested the status quo with regards to pension reforms. These doubts seemed to be 
confirmed when the representative from FO stated after his first visit at Matignon that “the 
file on pension will certainly not be resolved by the end of the year” (Le Monde 25 April, 
1992). However, in November of that year, the government would end up suggesting what 
would turn out to be a series of measures, had they been adapted, would have fundamentally 
changed the structure of public pensions.  
 With the popularity of the Socialists reaching all time lows, the Bérégovoy government 
made a last ditch efforts to reform the pension system. Following its predecessor, this third 
socialist government since the elections of 1988, left the régimes spéciaux off the table. 
Whether it really wanted to make a big coup to improve its electoral chances, or to leave a 
poison pill for the following government is up for discussion, but the ensuing debate clearly 
underlined the political feasibility and the wishes of the social partners for a pension reform. 
 The government proposed, in November 1992, to create a fond de solidarité social to 
finance what corresponds to the non-contributive benefits attached to national solidarity. This 
was viewed as a first step towards presenting further reforms. The fond would be financed via 
general taxation. The social partners were lukewarm about this project. The only interested 
party seemed to be the CFDT who also stressed that the government pay for the contributions 
of the unemployed (Le Monde, 26 November 1992). The bill was presented in Parliament in 
December, but the Socialists could not gather a majority. The Communists considered the 
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governmental proposal as a way toward a two-tiered system and the Right claimed that it was 
just pure cosmetic (Bonoli, 2000: 137). 
 Unfazed, the government came back with a new plan in January 1993 even though the 
parliament was not planning to be in session prior to the elections. It proposed to privatize 
banks and insurance companies, and use 100 billion Francs from these sales to create a fund 
to finance the upcoming deficits of the old-age pension between the years 2005-2020. The 
government claims that this measure could ensure 20 billions Francs on a yearly basis starting 
in 2005. The government suggested to ensure the financing of the non-contributive aspects 
and leave the management of the contributive aspects to the social partners. In exchange, they 
would accept to increase the contribution period from 37,5 years to 40 years. Following this 
announcement, the social partners were invited to Matignon to discuss its feasibility. At the 
same time, the government announced that 20 billions Francs, 15 of which would come from 
the upcoming budget (ie. after the elections), would be taken from the state budget to reduce 
the social security deficit.  
 These announcements provoked stark reactions even within the Socialist Party. There 
were clear divisions with regards to the privatization of public assets and increasing the 
length of contributions. The Prime Minister would add water to his glass of wine the 
following day by stating that the 100 billion Francs could come from other sources99 and that 
the decision to increase the length of contributions to 40 years would depend on the social 
partners. 
 Following few meetings with the social partners, the government took the project off 
the table in February. There was a broad consensus among the social partners to see an 
increase in their managerial role within the CNAV, but the government never made concrete 
proposals as to what they would be. There was an overall support for this plan, but all 
acknowledged the political timing of such proposal. CFTC and CFDT refused to continue the 
discussions without an extra parliamentary session, which the government opted not to do. 
Eventually, the CNPF would retrieve its support citing extreme confusion (Le Monde 18 
January, 1993). A big meeting with the social partners was held on the 15th of February 
where no conclusions were presented on the key elements of a possible agreement, the 
management of the CNAV and increasing the length of contribution. The Prime Minister did 
not ask any of the social partners to engage themselves formally on any aspects of his 
                                                 
99 Actually in an academic financial journal, the Minister of Economy (Evin) would write in March that an 
increase in cotisation of 0,2 could generate the 100 billions Francs. These conclusions would not be lost by the 
Balladur government.  
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proposal. As stated by Le Monde, “the social partners probably felt like they were assisting at 
the reading of a political will by a government at the end of its course" (Le Monde, 17 
February 1993). 
 Following eight years of discussions, no reform project was clearly on the table. The 
work from the various commissions demonstrate a large consensus on the key points (see 
table 2.2). Everyone, with few exceptions, acknowledged that something had to be done, but 
no one was willing to blink first. The only element the government could obtain with its 
negotiations with the social partners was an increase in the contributory period in exchange 
for more control over the CNAV and funds to finance the non-contributive aspects of old-age 
insurance. These are measures that would have hardly been sufficient to resolve the 
upcoming financial problems of the pension system. Further, it was still unclear how these 
responsabilities would have restructured. The social partners were not too warmly in favour 
of the government’s scheme, since it would have implied that they would have been the ones 
to introduce the unpopular and necessary reforms to the public pension schemes. For the 
government, this could have been the best blame avoidance strategy, as it would have 
avoided any responsibility for the reforms. 
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Table 2.2: Official French Reports on the Future of Public Pensions And Proposals 
Rapport (Date of
Publication). 
> age > 10 to best 
20-25 
Price indexation > 
contributions? 
Funded 
part? 
Others (ie. Harmonisation) 
1985 - Vieillir Solidaire Yes, but
conditioned by
employment. 
Nothing but 
open b/
support point 
system 
c 
 Yes, but limited 
risk generational 
conflict. 
No, only 
solution is 
voluntary 
options.  
Better sharing between non-contr. And contr. aspects; 
and between regimes. Strengthen contr. aspects. 
System by pts would help. 
Financing must be enlarged (esp. for non-contr.). 
Reforms must be progressive. 
1986 - Commission
d’évaluation et de
sauvegarde de
l’assurance vieillesse 
More 
progressive but
keep a minimal
age 
  Mix system
based on price 
and salaries 
  Strengthen rules for non-contr. advantages and increase 
the sources of financing (also in general). 
Strengthen the contributory aspects. 
1987 - Rapport du
Comité des Sages  
Yes, inevitable Yes, 10 to 20 
or 25. 
Must seek to 
link with net 
salaries. 
  No, PAYG
still best. 
 Strengthen the contributory aspects of the system. 
Instauration of system by pts would be good and could 
favour harmonisation – should still remain neutral on the 
architecture of the system. 
Harmonisation of the regimes. 
1988 - Commission
protection sociale,
presided by Teulade,
Xth Plan. 
10 to 25
progressively 
in 15 years. 
 Link with net 
salaries.  
Liquidation 
based on net 
salary. 
Increase periods 
from 150 to 165 
quarters for full 
pension 
 Simulation of transfer to point system – similar effects 
can be reached with both systems. 
Reject (on philosophical and practical grounds) of 
separating contr. and non-contr. aspects of pensions. 
1991 - Livre Blanc des
Retraites with preface
by Michel Rocard,
Prime Minister. 
10 to 25
progressively 
(1 yr by 
generation) 
 Price with
special pt
linking it with 
growth. 
 
 
Increase periods 
from 150 to 168 
quarters (1 q 
generation) 
Rejection Reject shift to system by pts. 
Reject construction of a single pension regime. 
Reject separation b/w contr. And non-contr. aspects. 
Claim need to promote employment of elderly workers. 
Improve other social needs. 
1992 – Mission
Retraites predised by
Cottave 
Reject move
from 10 to 
25. 
 On Net salary. 
Index to be 
negotiate b/w 
state and social 
p. 
Increase period 
from 150 to 160 
starting in 1996. 
 Financing via income tax of non-contr. advantages. 
Propose the creation of l’observatoire des retraites. 
Divided on granting strong managerial powers to the 
social partners.  
 
1992 – Mission
Bruhnes 
Reject move
from 10 to 
25. 
Increase period
from 150 to 160 
starting in 1993. 
 Increase in managerial power for social partners. Social 
partners would fix contributions and indexations. 
Non-contributives aspects financed by the CSG. 
Widow’s pension to increase from 52% to 60% of 
decease’s pension. 
Creation of l’observatoire des retraites. 
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Balladur Does the Unthinkable…He Introduces a Pension Reform… and Survives. 
 The Right won an overwhelming victory in April 1993 by obtaining 81,8% of all seats in 
the National Assembly. Fearful of facing the same faith as in the Presidential election of 1988, 
Chirac opted not to be in the running to be Prime Minister and this responsibility was granted to 
Edouard Balladur. The government would be very cautious in its approach fearing that it could 
harm their chances of re-claiming the Presidency. Many controversial measures were actually 
abandoned by the government for this reason (Bonoli, 2000: 138). 
 Nonetheless, the government would waste no time to address the issue of pension reform, 
and it would be one of the priorities of the Balladur cabinet for the first few months. Most social 
security accounts continued to have large deficits, and there was a sense of urgency that 
something needed to be done to stop the ‘bleeding’. Further, studies began to stress that, on 
average, the elderly had a higher standard of living than those in the labour market. An 
interministerial committee would be created following the election. A social meeting with the 
social partners was then convened in April to discuss various issues, including pensions. As 
stated in Le Monde, the social partners seemed to be surprise with how clear the intentions of the 
government seemed to be (April 23). Other meetings would follow in May between the new 
Minister of Social Affairs (Simone Veil) and the social partners. Vail (1999) argues that Balladur 
was seeking to give the illusion of seeking to create a consensus and that unions were not being 
dupe by this. Blondel, leader of FO, stated that “in a soft, mild way, the Prime Minister is trying 
to impose an austerity plan on us” (Le Monde, 8 May 1993, cited in Vail, 1999: 321).  
 Balladur presented his proposals in mid-May 93. He announced that all measures would 
apply strictly to the régime général and would be based on the Livre Blanc written by the Rocard 
government in 1991. By stating clearly that the government was opting to follow the guidelines 
and suggestions from the Livre Blanc, which was written by a Socialist government, it muzzled 
the Left (Vail, 1999). However, it must be added that the Left was in complete disarray 
following the 1993 election and the suicide of Bérégovoy. The Socialists were, therefore, unable 
to muster a strong opposition. 
 The measures announced by Balladur in May 1993 consisted of increasing the CSG100 
instituted by Rocard to finance a fonds de solidarité set up to finance the non-contributive 
aspects of social security (la solidarité) and to service the cumulated debt of the régime général. 
                                                 
100 Contribution sociale généralisée – a tax of 1,1% on all income introduced by Rocard.  
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Balladur also indicated that he would launch negotiations with the unions concerning an increase 
in the length of the contribution period to obtain a pension from 37,5 years to 40, and an increase 
in the calculation of the base salary from the best 10 to the best 25 years. Based on these 
negotiations, decrees would then be executed (Le Monde, 12 May 1993). 
 
Here comes the reform…  
 The fonds de solidarité vieillesse (FSV) would come to life in early June to finance 
solidarity measures for the régime général, which would be financed by the increase in the CSG 
(from 1,1% to 2,4%) and a new tax on alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages. A fraction of 
contributions would also be re-directed in this fund (Ruellan, 1993: 917). This plan had long 
been supported by unions, which demanded a clearer separation between contributive and non-
contributive aspects of the régime général. This recognized the role of social partners in the 
management of social security, and can be considered as part of a non-confrontational stance vis-
à-vis the unions (Bonoli, 2000: 138). Even though, this measure did nothing to reduce the costs 
of pensions, it nonetheless provided new sources of financing. Few days later, social partners 
were convened and met with the Minister of Social Affairs in June (Simone Veil) and were then 
received individually by Balladur at the end of the month. The outcome of these meetings 
received strong public reactions from the three main unions (FO, CGT, CFDT), who claimed that 
there were no real consultations (Vail, 1999: 321).  
 The government would go ahead with other aspects of its plan and introduced the first 
retrenchment measures on pensions. First, along with the legislation creating the FSV, the 
government included a legislation indexing pensions on price, a measure that would have to be 
renewed in five years by decree.101 This put in law a practise that had been occuring since 1987 
(Ruellan, 1993: 919). A decree (no 93-1023) adopted later (August 27), would set an increase in 
the amount granted to pensioners based on the expected inflation (average price increase 
excluding tobacco products). Any discrepencies between the expected and real inflation would 
be corrected the following year. 
 Second, two other measures would be inaugurated via Decree no. 93-1024 (August, 27). 
The length of the contribution required in order to obtain a full pension was increased from 150 
quarters (37,5 years) to 160 quarters (40 years) progressively starting in 1994. The reform is to 
                                                 
101 Which the Socialists did in 1998. 
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be implemented over a period of 10 years, by adding a quarter every year until 2003. The other 
measure tackled the period under which the pension is calculated, which was based under the 10 
best years. The number of years was increased to 25 very progressively, by adding a year starting 
in 1994 for the next 15 years (or until 2008).  
 Contrary to many expectations, the reform did not generate a big backlash against the 
government or a strong negative reaction from the social partners, besides the CGT who could 
not mobilize its members, however.102 Like that, the feared pension reform passed without much 
opposition. This was a far cry from Rocard’s statement that this issue “peut faire sauter un 
gouvernement” (could brake a government) in 1991. 
 
Explaining the reform 
  Various explanation have been given with regards to the passage of this reform (Ruellan, 
1993; Vail, 1999; Bonoli, 2000). Vail (1999) underlined that obfuscation strategies can be really 
difficult to achieve in a strong state such as France because of the high concentration of power its 
executive enjoys. Nonetheless, he claims that Balladur sought to give the illusion of a 
consultation effort among the unions, which failed. Nonetheless, his reform succeeded because 
he was able to split the unions (public/private split), mute the Left by adopting their Livre Blanc, 
and by granting a concession to them (FSV). The split within the unions ensured that the 
mobilization failed as public sector employees had no real reasons to protest (321), and could 
represent a strategy of division on the part of the government (Pierson, 1994: 22-3). Bonoli 
(2000) underlines that the government opted for a tit-for-tat strategy by granting a long standing 
request while imposing retrenchment measures. He also states that co-habitation helped to reduce 
the visibility of the executive on this front (147-8).  
 Let’s tackle these arguments. First, the most popular theory on the exclusion of the public 
sector is that this strategy would split the unions, and ensure that the more unionized public 
sector workers would not be provoked (Vail, 1999: 321). This argument is far too simple, and 
does not take into account the knowledge available at that time. Yes, part of the government’s 
strategy was to reform the régime général first, which would have then put pressure to reform to 
other régimes (Author Interview, ex-member of the Balladur Cabinet, 13 December 2001), and 
                                                 
102 As stated by Le Monde, “Les syndicats les plus réalistes n’ont soulevé que de timides objections de fond, alors 
que la CGT n’est pas parvenue à mobiliser ses troupes” (30 août, 1993). 
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minimise the resistance from unions. However, this decision was also dictated by the expertise 
available at that time. As so clearly demonstrated by the numerous commissions on the subject, 
relatively little was known on the régimes spéciaux. No commission went beyond advocating 
that similar measures as the ones in the private sector could be taken. Moreover, these 
commissions did not specify clearly what these would be. The Livre Blanc represented a possible 
exception, but it actually specified that increasing the period of contribution in the public sector 
would have a negligible impact because of the rigid nature of wages. Nonetheless, these 
conclusions were based on extending the contribution period from 6 to 18 months, and no 
analysis was required to make this sort of statement due to the rigidity of wages in the public 
sector.  
 Everyone was aware that, on paper, many benefits granted to those covered by the régimes 
spéciaux seem more generous than those received by the régime général. Afterall, these 
individuals have a lower retirement age, a better indexation, and lower contribution period, etc… 
However, it was also known that these schemes are quite diverse in terms of rules and benefits, 
and that a portion of their wages are not considered (primes). Nonetheless, it was not known how 
these schemes would fare in the future, how much pensioners in these schemes were earning, 
and, more importantly, what kind of measures would ease the financial pressures for the 
upcoming years. There were broad indications on all of the above, but nothing comparable to 
what was done for the private sector scheme. There was no headlines stating the deficit of the 
régime spéciaux (especially for civil servants who have no real régime) that could be as clear as 
those presented for the régime général. Gathering the proper data, then seeking to incorporate 
this discussion with that of the private sector would have taken a long time. A member of the 
Balladur Cabinet took over a year, just to gather the proper data and obtained reports on the 
subject (Author interview, ex-member Balladur Cabinet, 13 December 2001). Creating a new 
commission or study group to consider these aspects would have only delayed further the 
introduction of a reform. It was in this context that the decision was taken to go ahead with the 
reform proposal for the régime général.  
 With regards to the position of unions and the failed mobilization, a caveat is in order. 
Vail’s reliance on these public statements hides the other face of the coin. As stated earlier, there 
can be a great divergence between the public statement put by unions and what really goes on. 
This particular case is a strong example of that, and there is strong evidence to question Vail’s 
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argument that the government sought to give the impression of consultations without really 
conducting any. First, Bonoli (2000) states clearly that the government engaged in serious 
negotiations with the social partners, and they were involved in the process. An interview he 
conducted with an official within the Ministry of Social Affairs, supports this view. 
“The government took a deliberately, and unusual, non-confrontational stance 
with the trade unions and the final content of the reform was decided only after 
intense negotiations with the trade unions” (Bonoli, 2000: 138). 
  
Second, an ex-member of the Balladur cabinet stated that all social partners were in agreement 
that something needed to be done. He claimed that everyone knew what needed to be done, and 
supported the proposed reform. FO did not protest, while the CFDT and CGC were encouraging 
on the subject. The main point of contention was price indexation (author interview, Cabinet 
Balladur, 13 December 2001). Finally, Le Monde repeated on few occasions that all social 
partners in private acknowledged the need for a reform.103 Therefore, the ‘real’ opposition to the 
measures presented by Balladur was not as strong as perceived in the public debate. Adding to 
this argument is Ruellan (1993), who claims that there had been a constant overestimation of the 
political costs associated with a possible reform (915). Therefore, it seems that the political risks 
have been grossly exaggerated. 
 Nonetheless, it is clear that the negotiations cannot be considered to be a concerted effort, 
or a social pact. However, it should be reminded that such agreements are rare in France (Bonoli, 
2000: 148). Further, as underlined earlier, it is not uncommon for unions to oppose a measure 
and then participate in its implementation or accept it in practice. 
 It is also difficult to accept the argument that co-habitation forced the Balladur government 
to negotiate with the unions because of a split executive (Bonoli, 2000: 147). Even though many 
policy sectors or areas are dubious with regards to the responsability of the President or the 
Prime Minister (EU, Foreign Affairs, Corsica…), social affairs have always been considered to 
be the responsibility of the President when his party has control of the legislative assembly and 
the Prime Minister during a co-habitation. It is also very unclear as to how a co-habitation could 
force the Prime Minister to negotiate with the unions. The only visible way under which a 
                                                 
103 For exemple in its edition of April 17, 1991 on the release of the Livre Blanc it is stated that “leurs dirigeants 
(unions) admetten en privé, que les problèmes sont réels mais que la surenchère des plus ‘durs’ – entendre FO et la 
CGT – voire l’état d’esprit de leurs propres adhérents les incitent, pour le moment, à dégager en 
touche”…Following the Balladur reform, the author would state that “Les syndicats les plus réalistes n’ont soulevé 
que de timides objections de fond, alors que la CGT n’est pas parvenu à mobiliser ses troupes” (August, 29 1993).  
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President can influence the debate is by publicly criticizing the actions of the government on this 
subject. As we will see later, this was a strategy employed on numerous occasions by Chirac on 
the Jospin government, and resulted in no action from the government.  
 Another popular argument, especially in union circle, can be called the surprise effect 
because the decrees were pronounced while French workers were on holiday. As a result, unions 
were unable to mount logistically an opposition to these measures. For those interested in this 
sort of argument, it could be stated that the structural reforms introduced by De Gaulle in 1967 
were also adopted during the holidays. More interesting, Pompidou’s social counsellor at the 
time was…Édouar Balladur.104 However, this argument neglects the fact that these measures had 
been on the agenda for nearly 8 years, and that the government had put them on the table in early 
May. Further, the most drastic measure concerned price indexation and it was passed in July 
1993. Unions were fully aware that a price indexation would result in a significant decrease of 
the real value of pensions. The CFDT, for example, had many articles devoted to these issues 
within its publications. It was also evident that other measures were about to follow; yet there 
were not strong reactions from the unions. 
 Clearly, it should be considered that unions believed that something needed to be done, but 
could not publicly accept to play the role of second violin and be in a position to be perceived as 
accepting cuts to their members. 
 Rarely mentioned as part of the failed opposition to the government’s plan, is the 
progressivity of the decrees. Adding one quarter per year over a period of 10 years and adding 
one year per year to the period under which the average salary is calculated gave the appearance 
of a small sacrifice. As stated by the former social counsellor of Balladur, “one quarter per year, 
that does not upset people” (author interview, Cabinet Balladur, 13 December 2001). These 
measures can be considered as part of a strategy of ‘diminishing traceability’ as it postponed the 
burden of the cutbacks over a long period of time (Pierson, 1994: 21-2). 
 
Impact of the reform 
 Nearly 10 years later, it is much easier to assess the impact of the Balladur reform. 
Interestingly, we can compare the expected and actual impact of the measures adopted, even 
though they are still being implemented as the extension of the contribution will finish in 2003 
                                                 
104 The Secretary of State for Social Affairs was Jacques Chirac! 
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and the increase in the reference salary will be completed in 2008. Two ways of calculating the 
impact of these measures is to measure how much they would reduce the financial burden on the 
régime, or by how much they reduce a possible raise in the contribution rate that would be 
necessary to maintain the system. The second possible way is to analyse what will happen to the 
pensioners (ie. by how much their pensions will be reduced). From the Livre Blanc, the measures 
introduced by Balladur corresponded more or less to option F (see table 2.3). Without any 
measures the amounts of Francs necessary to restore the financial equilibrium of the régime 
général would be 186,6 Billions of Francs in the year 2010, or a need to increase contributions 
rates by 7,8 points. The Balladur measures would generate between 144,3 and 192,8 billions of 
Francs, as figures for the extension of the contribution period from 37,5 years to 40 instead of 42 
were not available. This figure is near the total amount required to finance the upcoming needs 
of the régime and would imply that an increase in the contribution rates would not be necessary 
or would be minimal. A caveat here is in order, the Livre Blanc assumed an increase in the real 
salaries of 2% yearly. This has been criticized as the average yearly growth of salaries between 
the period 1980-89 was 1,2%. Nonetheless, it was 2% over the 1973-89 period (Hamayon, 1991: 
323). 
 
Table 2.3: Scenario from the Livre Blanc 
F) 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Besoin de financement tendanciel 34,6 67,3 105,5 186,6 
Mesures communes de rationalisation -2,0 -4,7 -7,1 -10,1 
Increase the length of contribution by 
one quarter per year from 37,5 years to 
42 years. 
-8,5 -15,8 -26,7 -48,4 
Increase from 10 to 25 yrs for the 
reference period 
-1,4 -5,4 -13,7 -28,5 
Indexation based on prices -18,6 -42,6 -72,8 -115,8 
Besoin de financement non couvert 4,3 -1,1 -14,5 -14,3 
Points de cotisations cumulés. 0,3 -0,05 -0,7 -0,6 
Source: Le Livre Blanc (CGP, 1991). 
 
 Subsequent studies such as the one conducted by the CGP in 1995 (Perspectives à long 
terme des retraites) have shown that the Livre Blanc had underestimated the financial needs to 
maintain the equilibrium of the régime général. It claimed that despite the Balladur reforms, new 
measures were necessary. The equivalent of 1,1 contribution point would be necessary for 2000, 
2,4 in 2010 and 4,3 in 2015, the later two being equivalent to 59 and 107 billion Francs 
 
respectively. Albeit stating lower financial requirements, the conseil d’orientation des retraites 
(COR) predicts needs in the range of 22,6 and 31,7 billions of Francs for 2010.  
 The key measure here is the price indexation of pensions, instead of gross salaries. Using a 
study from the CNAV, Ruellan (1993: 921), underline the financial importance of this measure 
(see Table 2.4). Price indexation is the equivalent of reducing 5 points in the contribution rate in 
both favourable and unfavourable economic scenario, had the system continued to be indexed 
according to gross salaries.  
 
Table 2.4: Effect of price indexation on the financial needs of the régime général 
 Favorable Economic 
Growth 
Unfavorable Economic Growth 
 1995 2000 2005 2010  1995 2000 2005 2010 
No Reform: 
Financial Needs 
in Contribution 
Points 
2,21 3,95 5,39 8,23  2,39 5,19 7,89 12,45 
Balladur Reform 
but salary 
indexation 
(contribution 
points). 
2,16 3, 49 4,30 6,25  2,35 4,70 6,67 10,13 
Balladur Reform 
(contribution 
points) 
1,74 2,02 2,00 2,73  2,06 3,64 4,87 7,26 
Favourable – assumes that the number of salaried employees will grow by 1% until 2010 and that average 
yearly real wage growth will be 1,5%. Défavorable – assumes no growth in the size of the workforce and 
a 1% increase in wages. Source: Ruellan, 1993. 
  
 Despite the efficiency in resolving financial needs up to year 2010, the Balladur measures 
are not sufficient in the longer run. This was underlined clearly by recent reports on the subject. 
According to the COR, the deficit of the régime could reach up to 325,5 billions of Francs (49,6 
Euros) in the worst case scenario (260,6 – 39,7 Euros - in the best case scenario) by 2040 (COR, 
2001: Annex 8).105 
 None of these tables and numbers, however, indicates what have been the impact of the 
Balladur reforms on (current) and future pensioners. The increase in the length of the 
contributivity period from 37,5 years to 40 years has been negligible in the short term, and at the 
                                                 
105 By 2020 the financial needs would reach 99,5 billions of Francs (15,2 billions of Euros) in the worst case 
scenario and 71,7 billions of Francs in the best case scenario (10,9 billions of Euros) (COR, 2001: Annex 8). 
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time it was estimated that more than 60% of the new pensioners already had contributed 40 
years.106 The Minister of Social Affairs also claimed that only 3000 people out of 550 000 would 
feel the effect of the reform in 1994 (Le Monde, 30 August 1993).  
 Nonetheless, this reform has long term consequences for those who have experienced the 
more turbulent economic times following the oil crises. As seen in Chapter 1, France has had one 
of the lowest employment rates among those above the age of 55. As of 1990, 65% of pension 
requests for the régime général came from individuals that were not economically active 
(Ruellan, 1993: 924). This was the main critique of FO, which pointed out the high number of 
individuals ‘pushed’ into early retirement and that asking them to bear a longer contributory 
period was quite contradictory (Le Monde, 1 September 1993). The long term consequences of 
this measure is likely to favour labour activity beyond the age of 60 for the upcoming 
generations in order to gain a full pension. Someone would have to enter the labour market at age 
20 and work without interruption until age 60.107 Considering the high inactivity rate of many 
youth and the lengthening of education, the prospects of choosing between a pension at a 
reduced rate or a longer working career will be more common in the years to come. Leaving 
prior to 40 years of contribution can be quite unattractive as an individual is penalized for both 
the rate (which slips by 1,25% for every quarter below, with a minimum rate of 25%) and 
duration (calculated as a fraction of the total period).108 Pelé (1998) claims that the reform could 
result in more than 30% of people retiring beyond the age of 60. 
 The effect of the second measure seeks to reinforce the contributivity in the regime by 
having the extended the reference period under which the average salary is calculated from 10 to 
25 years. Even though it should have a bigger impact on those with precarious jobs, it also 
affects those with stable career as earlier parts of the career would also be considered. With the 
contribution ceiling also being a factor (it has not been indexed properly over the years), Ruellan 
(1993) demonstrates that both white-collars and blue-collar workers faced a proportional 
                                                 
106 According to a study by the CNAV in 1992, 66% of men and 40% of women had more than 40 years of 
contributions at the time to collect their first pensions. 77% of men and 51,5% of women had more than 37,5 years 
of contributions (cited in Ruellan, 1993: 919).  
107 Unless this individuals can claim non-contributive benefits (ie. unemployment, sickness…). 
108 The pension is calculated as follow: P = Avg. Sal. x  R x D/160 as of 2003. R is the rate (50% for a full career, 
but it is reduced for incomplete careers) and D is the duration of contribution in quarters. Thus, someone who works 
38 years instead of 40 obtains a R of .4 and D/160 = 152/160. Thus, with an average wage of 1000 Euros, the person 
with a full career obtains a pension of 500 Euros. The individual with a career of 38 years with the same average 
wage obtains a pension of 380 Euros, or 76% of the pensions received by the individual that received the full rate. 
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reduction in their replacement rate (922).109 Thus, this measure is more likely to affect those with 
an ascending or interrupted career. 
 The most consequential measure, and the one most criticized by unions, is switching from 
an indexation on gross salaries to a price indexation. As seen earlier, this switch results in a sharp 
reduction in old-age pension expenses, but it also does the same for pensioners. It has a strong 
cumulated effect because pension contributions made early in someone’s career are price 
indexed for the remainder of the career, instead of following the evolution of wages. 
 Hamayon (1991) produced a study on the Livre Blanc using two economic projections (A- 
2% annual increase in salaries as in the Livre Blanc, and B - 1% annual increase in salaries). For 
the first ten years of his simulation (1990-2000), he claims that the replacement rate decreases 
from 50% to 45% in simulation A, and by 2% with simulation B. However, the main finding is 
that, relative to gross salaries, pensions continue to decrease in value during someone’s career. 
Thus, after 19 years of retirement (value obtained based on life expectancy), the replacement 
value of a pension worth 50% in 1990 dips to 34% according to simulation A. The situation 
worsen for someone who begins retirement in year 2000 since his/her contributions have been 
indexed on prices for 10 years and, as a result, the replacement rate relative to gross salaries is at 
45% during the first year. 
 Thus, contrary to the claims of various governments that current pensioners would not be 
affected, they are currently experiencing a relative reduction in their pensions vis-à-vis gross 
wages. 
 The latest figures provided by the COR suggests a similar pattern. Assuming that 2000 is 
the year of reference, the relative amount of a the average pension is expected to decline by 26% 
vis-à-vis the average gross salary (COR, 2001: Annex 8). These figures do not even take into 
account the period 1987-2000, which was also price indexed. According to FO, wages grew at an 
annual average of 0.4% higher than price during the 1987-97 period. Assuming a base salary and 
pension of 100, salaries had reached 104,08 by 1997 while pensions remained at 100 (FO, 2000). 
Juppé Enters Smoothly, Awoke the Sleeping Giant, and Hit a Train! 
“One man’s unfair privilege is simply 
another man’s acquired social 
benefits” Finance Minister, Jean 
Arthuis in an unguarded moment on 
“They are totally out of touch with the 
times. This will end up in the street with 
a kick in the butt” Jean-Louis Borloo 
(RL), deputy in the hallways after the 
                                                 
109 From 50,3% to 45,7% for those at the SMIC, and from 23,44% to 21,26% for those at the ceiling both a reduction 
of 9,3%. 
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Juppé’s attack on unfair privileges 
enjoyed by civil servants (Economist, 
21 November 1995). 
annoncement of the Juppé Plan (Le 
Monde 21 December 1995). 
 
 Following the Presidential election of Chirac in May 1995, Alain Juppé was appointed to 
the position of Prime Minister. He was a former Foreign Affairs Minister and a staunch supporter 
of Chirac. It is worth noting that the end of co-habitation has resulted in something similar to a 
change of government, with Chirac being firmly in control even though the political coalition 
remained the same. The Balladur team was replaced by one more favorable to Chirac. The 
fragmented nature of French politics, with a loose party discipline, is to blame for this. Some 
Ministers of the UDF-RPR coalition returned, but the whole Cabinet at Matignon was replaced.  
 During his Presidential campaign, Chirac’s main theme was to repair the ‘social fracture’ 
that France is experiencing. His campaign was surprisingly geared towards the Left, partly as a 
result of the presence of Balladur in the campaign who was advocating austerity measures to 
restore growth. Chirac claimed the opposite, economic growth would generate enough revenues 
to avoid welfare cuts (Bonolli, 2000: 142). The nomination of Juppé was actually quite welcome 
at the time, he had the reputation of being highly appreciated by the civil servants of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, where he served under Balladur, and of being a fine diplomat (Le Monde, 14 
December 1995). 
 After more than seven months following the Presidential election, the economic situation 
would soon worsen further creating more public deficits. France would be forced out of the 
European Monetary System in September and its currency would face attacks by speculators, 
while financial markets would replace their Francs for hard currencies. During the month of 
October, there were serious doubts that France would be able to join the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). Concerns were voiced publicly by German policy-makers (Pitruzzello, 1997). 
 Pension reform return to the forefront of the political debate at the end of August 1995. 
The Minister of Economy and Finance, Alain Madelin, questioned the fairness of the pension 
scheme for civil servants who have to work 37,5 years instead of 40 to claim a full time 
pension.110 Few days later, Juppé announces that a major reform of the social security system 
was being studied by the government. He claims, however, that the consultation will be broader 
                                                 
110 Madelin would resign few days later. His key proposal, a major fiscal reform, had been put off the agenda by 
Juppé and he voiced many criticism on the lack of action taken by the government to restore the economy. He was a 
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and more intense than the one performed by Balladur and Rocard, which would be followed by 
quick decisions. He also stated that the French are not equal when facing retirement (Le Monde, 
31 August 1995). 
 In early September, Juppé met the social partners and re-affirmed the ‘unfairness’ of the 
length of contribution period for civil servants (Le Monde, 6 September 1995). A report 
requested to the CGP by Balladur, updating the forecast performed in the Livre Blanc taking into 
account the 1993 reforms, was published at the end of the month (Report Briet). It claimed that 
the situation was worst than what was stated in the Livre Blanc. For example, it claimed that the 
equivalent of 2,4 points of contribution would require to maintain the financial equilibrium of the 
régime général (see Table 3.6) while the Livre Blanc claimed this deficit to be non-existent. It 
was also quite critical of the disparities that were found between the régime général and the 
régimes spéciaux, which probably provided the basis of Juppé’s statements on fairness. The 
report had been ready since May, but the government opted to delay its official publication.  
 Contrary to the Livre Blanc, much more attention was devoted to analyzing the régimes 
spéciaux. It generated various simulation assuming that these régimes fonctioned on the same 
basis as the régime général, meaning on contributions. It showed that measures were still 
required in the private sector, but that the financial situation of the régime spéciaux was more 
critical. It stated that more than 20 points of contribution or 80 billion of Francs would be 
necessary to achieve the financial situation found in 1993.111 The régime for the local and 
hospital employees (CNRACL) faced a similar faith, as the financial needs would reach the 
equivalent of 30,8 points of contributions (see Table 2.5). With regards to the CNRACL, it is 
worth noting that it had generated surpluses for many years, which were used to reduce the 
deficits of other régimes as part of the ‘demographic compensation’ measures adopted in the 
1970s. Further, it is a regime that is expecting to face a drastic change in its demographic 
composition moving from 3,3 contributors for 1 pensioners in 1998 to 1,1 contributors for 1 
                                                                                                                                                             
key member of the neo-liberal wing, which was more in line with the Balladur faction and the UDF than with the 
Chirac faction. Le Monde talks of  “limogeage” (dismissal) (Le Monde, 31 August 1995). 
111 Since the civil servants régime does not have a ‘caisse’ (fund/administration), the CGP claim 1993 to be year 0 
and the figures presented in Table 2.5 demonstrate the kind of increase in contributions points that would be 
required by civil servants to maintain the financial stability of the régime. These figures also assume that the 
contribution/state financing remains constant throughout the period. Since there is no régime for civil servants the 
state collects the contributions of its employees and adds the necessary amount. Thus, pensions for civil servants 
seem much more like a continuous wage in its financial books. 
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pensioner in 2040 (Charpin, 1999). Thus, by assuming that 1993 is year 0 worsens the ‘true’ 
situation of this scheme. 
 
Table 2.5: Financing need of the various régimes. 
  1993 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Régime Général Financing Need 
In contribution pts
25,2 
1,7 
9,5 
0,6 
18,4 
1,1 
17,9 
0,9 
55,5 
2,4 
107 
4,3 
Fonctionnaires civils Financing Need 
In contribution pts
0 
- 
3,8 
1,3 
16,5 
5,5 
34,2 
10,7 
56 
15,9 
80,2 
20,6 
CNRACL Financing Need 
In contribution pts
0 
- 
2,8 
1,7 
13,6 
7,8 
31,4 
16,7 
49,5 
23,8 
70,8 
30,8 
SNCF* Financing Need 
In contribution pts
0 
- 
0,1 
0,6 
0,2 
0,9 
0,3 
1,2 
0,4 
1,8 
0,7 
3,4 
ARRCO Financing Need 
In contribution pts
-4,3 
- 
2,8 
0,2 
-5,7 
- 
-9 
- 
-5,6 
0 
22,9 
0,9 
AGIRC Financing Need 
In contribution pts
2,7 
1,0 
0,9 
0,3 
3,5 
1,1 
5,7 
1,5 
10,8 
2,5 
25,2 
5,2 
Exploitants 
Agricoles 
Financing Need - 4,1 5,6 2,2 1,6 2 
Besoin de financement en milliards de Francs. For the régime spéciaux, it is assumed that 1993 is in equilibrium. 
Source: Perspectives à long terme des retraites (CGP, 1995). 
 
 In the meantime, the seven major public sector unions (CFDT, CGT, FO, CGC, UNSA,112 
CFTC and FSU113) were able to present a common front against the freezing of their salaries for 
the next year and the threats made to their social benefits. The strike of October 10 proved to be 
a success for the unions. All seven leaders marched together. Such a common action had not 
occurred since 1978. The unions proclaimed war on the government (Pitruzzello, 1997). 
Nonetheless, the government continued its work on reforming social security with both Chirac 
and Juppé stating that the measures will soon be known. In the meantime, unions are divided 
with regards to having another strike. Many of them want to see if the government will seek to 
reform the régimes spéciaux, as the government was rumoured to seek an increase in the 
contribution period for the régimes spéciaux from 37,5 years to 40 like the régime général (FT, 1 
November 1995). 
 The upcoming events would produce the largest public manifestations since 1968, 
paralysing Paris for weeks. On November 12, the government announced that the régimes 
spéciaux are quite particular and that these must be examined prior to implementing a reform. 
                                                 
112 Union nationale des syndicats autonomes (active mostly in the public sector). 
113 Fédération syndicale unitaire. 
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Following a meeting with Chirac, Blondel (FO) said that the momentum to reform pensions in 
the public service “s’estompe” (coming to a halt). The government was expected to make a 
formal announcement that it would be consulting the social partners in the upcoming 3 to 6 
months to find a solution (Le Monde, 13 November). According to Bonoli (2000), unions were 
informed on a non-official basis that pension reform had been left off the agenda (143). 
 On November 15, Juppé presented its reform plan to the Assemblée Nationale. In terms of 
scale, it represented the most drastic agenda since the creation of social security in 1945. It 
tackled health, family and pension, addressed the financial needs of the system, and increased the 
role of the State in the system. The health sector was reform drastically as it became a universal 
scheme to be financed by both contributions and taxation (CSG), with the financing 
progressively relying on the later. The various health régimes would become one universal 
régime. A new tax was levied to finance the accumulating debt of 250 billions Francs from the 
social security system (RDS),114 while retired people and the unemployed faced an increase in 
their contributions for health insurance. Family benefits were to be frozen in 1996 and would 
begin to be partially counted as income for taxation purposes. Finally, it proposed the 
introduction of a constitutional change permitting the Parliament to vote on the social security 
budget.  
 With regards to pensions, the Juppé plan advocated pension reforms for the régimes 
spéciaux by extending the length of required contributions for a full time pension from 37,5 
years to 40 years and by creating a ‘caisse’ (fund/administration) like the one currently in place 
for local civil employees and hospital workers (CNRACL) for civil servants in order to increase 
the transparency of its system. The exact measures necessary to implement these objectives were 
left to a special commission, which was expected to submit its final report within four months. 
 According to le Monde (21 December 1995), Juppé decided to include pensions into his 
plan the night before its presentation to the Parliament in order to ensure that the Balladur faction 
would support it. However, according to a former Cabinet member of Balladur responsible for 
social affairs, the Juppé cabinet never reached them or asked him for his opinion. He was 
consulted for the first time in December, stating that it was not politically clever to add such a 
pension reforms on top of the reform on health insurance (Author interview, 13 December). That 
                                                 
114 RDS stands for Remboursement de la dette de la Sécurité sociale and amounts to 0,5% of all income for a period 
of 13 years to erase the cumulated debt of social security. 
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being said, many members of the Balladur faction and of the UDF were considered to be more 
neo-liberal than the Chirac faction and other RPR members. Thus, it remains possible that Juppé 
added this element to strengthen their support to his plan. Still, this thesis can be easily supported 
when a government has a small majority of seats in the Parliament, but in this case more than 
80% of the seats belonged to the right! 
 The whole process was extremely secret. According to Bouget (1998), several ministers 
were not even informed of the Juppé plan. He claims that only four social advisors and high-
level civil servants, the Prime Minister, and the President had been involved in its preparation 
(168). Ministers within its own cabinet would later complain about the secretive tendencies of 
the Prime Minister and his cabinet. Few ministers thought about resigning complaining that their 
role is limited to “explain the decisions taken without them” (Le Monde, 14 December 1995). 
The CFDT was the only union really consulted, few days prior to the announcement in the 
Parliament, and its leader, Nicole Notat, was not made aware of the pension reforms and the 
introduction of a new tax to finance the deficit of the social security system (Vail, 1999: 323).  
 The common front that was present in October would collapse soon after the 
announcement of the Juppé plan. The CFDT broke ranks by granting its support to the general 
guidelines of the plan. Other unions such as FO and CGT were highly critical of this stance. 
Blondel (FO) proposed that Notat (CFDT) should change job as she “seems to be talking like a 
Minister” (Le Monde, 17 November 1995). The critics of the CFDT would not be limited to 
other unions, however. Many members and regional representatives within the CFDT protested 
vehemently, especially railway workers. FO, which had held the presidency of the main health 
insurance scheme and has a membership composed mostly of civil servants, was strongly 
opposed to it and ask for its immediate removal. The CGT expressed a similar attitude. Strikes 
by civil servants were scheduled for November 24.115 They would eventually find a common 
point, pension reform. The CFDT remained in favour of the health insurance reform. 
 The Socialist party would be slow to react. The party was internally divided because some 
of the propositions presented in the Juppé Plan had actually been sought by previous socialist 
                                                 
115 The strike was originally planned for the 28th, by FO and the CGT, which the CFDT did not plan to attend. 
However, following the annoncement of the Juppé plan, the CGT and other unions (including the CFDT) decided to 
have it on the 24th making it a day of defence for social security. FO decided to stick to the 28th. Unions in the 
private sector decided not to participate in the strike efforts. 
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government. Jospin would find a rallying point by focusing their criticism on the method 
employed by the Juppé government (Bonoli, 2000: 145). 
 On November 23, the railway workers went on strike. Besides their opposition to the Juppé 
plan, unions were opposed to the new plan for the SNCF, which advocated an internal 
reorganisation of its structure and a re-organisation of local transportation to improve its 
deficiting operation. The following day, Paris subway workers would join them. It would soon 
spread out to other civil servants, and even students. By December 5th, hundreds of thousands 
people marched in Paris against the measures. The day would feature a handshake between 
Blondel (FO) and Viannet (CGT), unions that split over their communist allegiance. This close 
co-operation had not been since then. Both maintain that the Juppé plan had to be abandoned and 
call on all workers (public and private) to join the movement.  
 Early on, a survey showed support for the Juppé plan. 51% claimed that the government 
should not scrap the social security reform while 41% believed otherwise. Private sectors 
workers remained out of the strike movement. Even private sectors workers within the CGT 
were not strongly answering the call of their leader to join the strike efforts (Le Monde, 7 
December 1995). This represented the only positive outcome for the government, with the 
support of the financial market (Pitruzzello, 1997). 
 On December 5th, Juppé defended his government against a vote of non-confidence in 
Parliament and made a televised address. He annonced that he was willing to meet and counsult 
the social partners on the subject of pension reforms. The Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, 
Barrot, was to meet the social partners in the following days to study the implementation of the 
refoms, and the forms of consultation that would be adopted. He also stated that the existence of 
the régime spéciaux were not in question, but that something needed to be done to preserve them. 
Nonetheless, he maintained that the reforms were necessary for the economic health of the 
country, and that he was not about to retrieve them. Finally, Juppé announced the creation of the 
commission Le Vert to study the régime spéciaux and start discussion with the social partners 
(Le Monde, 7 December 1995). He refrained from mentioning any increase in the length of 
contributions from 37,5 years to 40 years in the mission letter. However, it mentioned that 
increasing the age of retirement was not out of question, but that the commission will need to 
consider the hardship of certain jobs and the various working conditions faced by the civil 
servants (Le Monde, 11 December 1995). 
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 This intervention would not appease the unions. FO and CGT underlined that the word 
negotiation was carefully avoided by employing the word consultation, and claimed that the 
government had not made any progress. The unions for teachers (FEN116 and FSU) refused to 
support any increase in the length of contributions for a full time pension, and remained opposed 
to the plan. They would join the movement on December 7. On the other hand, the CFDT, CFTC 
and CFE-CGC stated that Juppé’s speech represented an opening and that discussion with social 
partners should take place immediately. The CNPF supported the government efforts and the 
decision to tackle social security and the régimes spéciaux separatly (Le Monde, 7 December 
1995). Its leader would claim that the Juppé Plan is “fundamental for the country” (Le Monde, 8 
December 1995). 
 The social movement continue to progress, and remain strong even in the local 
communities. On the 7th of December, the Minister of Civil Service, Perben, announced that it is 
now out of question to create a ‘caisse’ (fund/administration) for their pension regime. Juppé 
made another public address on the 10th  proposing a social summit. With regards to the reform 
of the régime spéciaux, Juppé surrendered. In the adress he stated that: 
“I have read here and there that we are putting in question the existence of the 
régimes spéciaux. It is out of question to dismantle them…to align them with the 
régime général…It is also out of question for the SNCF and RATP conductors to 
put in question their retirement age of 50 years old, which is justified by the 
peculiar duties that are performed by these employees. It is out of question to 
alter the way pensions are calculated…I have never stated that either of these 
aspects would be in question” (Le Monde, 12 December 1995 – author 
translation).117 
 
He would then follow by stating that the aim of the Commission Le Vert were ‘not well 
understood’ and opted to suspend it. The work of the Commission lasted 5 days! Few unions 
were consulted, but it was boycotted by the key unions behind the protest movement: CGT, FO 
and FSU. 
 Earlier during the day, a manifestation in favour of the government by those using public 
services would gather only 1000 people. Surveys had demonstrated that people were supporting 
more and more the strikers, while growing increasingly oppose to the Juppé government (Le 
Monde, 12 December 1995). Juppé’s address would not succeed in turning the tides in his 
                                                 
116 Fédération de l’Éducation Nationale – part of UNSA. 
117 Unions acknowledged that they received a letter from Juppé the following morning stating that reforming public 
sector pensions was off the agenda. 
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favour, as on the 12th of December the movement reached its climax with between 1 to 2 
millions individuals in the streets across France asking for his resignation and the abolition of his 
plan. Juppé agreed to meet the union leaders on an individual basis. Still, the unions were not 
satisfied with their meeting and more than 1 million workers were on strike on the 16th of 
December.  
 The strike would end with unions adopting new positions, leading to break in their alliance. 
The railway workers of the CFDT opted to end the strike while the ones represented by the CGT 
decided to participate in public demonstrations rather than continuing the strike movement. To 
appease railway workers, Juppé had appointed a socialist manager to devise a new reform plan 
for the SNCF (Pittruzzelo, 1997).  
 
Explaining the failure of the Juppé Plan 
 Even though the reforms to the régime spéciaux proposed by Juppé failed, it is important to 
stress that the other points were adopted. Reforms to the health system were considered to be the 
most urgent with a deficit, which nearly doubled that of the pension system. The reforms to the 
family benefits were maintained. Further, the new sources of revenues were all adopted (RDS, 
increase in the CSG, increase in health contributions for unemployed and elderly). Finally, the 
role of the parliament increased substantially within the financing of Social Security. These new 
powers imply a greater supervisory role for this institution, which had historically been consulted 
after the implementation of the budget by the social partners (Mekhantar, 1996: 37). 
 The confrontational approach of Juppé marked a clear break with the strategy adopted by 
previous governments whether or not they were from the Right or the Left. Vail (1999) presents 
the welfare reforms of 1995 as a case of ‘welfare Bonapartism’ (322)!  He claimed that Balladur 
was able to pass his reform because he gave the appearance of consultation with the unions, 
while the confrontational approach of Juppé clearly lacked this aspect.  
 Other possible explanations have tended to underline the role of railways workers, the 
promises by Chirac, and the strength of the unions in the public sector. First, the Juppé plan came 
at a time when the government was negotiating with the unions a new plan for the SNCF, which 
was losing a substantial amount of money yearly. These negotiations were quite difficult and the 
railways unions even asked for the removal of the plan proposed by the government during the 
events of the strike. The government eventually appointed a Socialist negotiator to draw up a 
 114
new plan (Pittruzello, 1997). Tackling both a restructuration of the railways company and a 
change to their pension plan were politically dangerous when one considers that the SNCF and 
RATP have accounted for roughly 80% of all strikes in recent years. Thus, mobilizing these 
workers was probably easier than with other sectors, and they have the capacity of shutting down 
Paris. Most accounts claim that it took 4 to 5 hours from suburban population to reach Paris 
during the strike. Further, retirement has been one of the major benefits found in these two 
enterprises. Despite their early retirement age, they tend to earn less per month than other civil 
servants (97 300francs vs. 130 000), and the SNCF and RATP, albeit their structural benefits, do 
not represent too large a financial commitment because they are small régimes (Le Monde, 12 
December 1995).   
 Second, as underlined by Bonoli (2000), the unions obtained the general support of the 
French population because many of them felt that Chirac had renegated the general theme of his 
campaign, restoring the ‘social fracture’. An opinion poll conducted after the announcement of 
the Juppé Plan demonstrated that 68% felt that it represented a broken promise from the 
President (147). Third, it has been pointed out that the unionization rate of the public service is 
substantially higher than that of the private sector. However, had this element been a factor, 
Juppé’s strategy would have been different. As stated by Bonoli (2000), “a stronger labour 
movement in the public sector, if anything, should have pushed the government to seek 
agreement with the unions” (146). The government sought to create a division between the 
private sector workers and public sector workers by emphasizing the unjust treatment the later 
have when it comes to retirement. Juppé kept on mentioning that the French are not equal when 
facing retirement. This strategy implies that the government did not believe that the private 
sector was at a disadvantage when it came to seeking approval of this decision. 
 Based on the theoretical chapter presented earlier, I shall propose another argument. The 
socialists opted to rally its supporters by maintaining that the government had adopted a reform 
without consultation. After all, few people were consulted and the Plan came up as a big surprise 
even for people within the government at the time. There was something more behind the protest 
movement and the fearlessness under which unions undertook the protest. They viewed 
themselves as legitimate actors in the process, and ought to be consulted for such undertaken. 
Yet, this clearly was not the case here. From the Balladur reform, we know that finding a 
compromise and the cooperation of the CGT is nearly impossible in practice, ensuring that FO 
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will not protest too vehemently is possible. FO had traditionally been more open towards 
negotiations between employees, employers, and government (Bouget, 1998: 169). In both cases, 
CFDT was on board and accepted more or less the measures taken by the government. However, 
in this case, the government launched a frontal assault on FO, and challenged the legitimacy of 
social partners by increasing the power of the state on social security. FO had been chairing the 
presidency of health insurance for most of the recent years and was clearly attached to this 
position and most of its members are civil servants. Understandably, FO was opposed to the 
reform and felt compel to protest strongly. The Juppé plan generated a common front due to its 
‘attack’ on public sector pensions, launched without strong consultation or commissions on the 
subject, but also because it reversed the previous trends that had been established between the 
government and the social partners on the management responsibilities of social security. The 
government of Bérégovoy, in particular, and Balladur both sought to increase the distinction 
between the solidaristic role of the state, and the insurancial role of the social partners. 
Bérégovoy was even willing to leave them ‘real’ managerial responsabilities in his plan. Balladur 
did not go this far, but granted a request of the unions by ensuring a source of financing for non-
contributive aspects of the scheme. This in turn, opened the door to a possible increase in the 
responsibility granted to the social partners. The Juppé Plan reversed this slide by increasing the 
role of the Parliament and by entering the implementation field, a reserved domain of the social 
partners, by asking them to negotiate with the government a mission plan. Thus, instead of 
leaning towards separating or clarifying the responsibilities of both government and social 
partners, the government increased its role and expended the managerial dilemma of social 
security. 
 
Impact of the Juppé reform 
 Even though the reform of the régime spéciaux failed, the adoption of an extra tax (RDS) 
to finance the debt incurred by social security and the introduction of the Parliament as a new 
player in the system remained. First, the new tax has added extra revenues into the system and 
implies that the government formally accepts the debt responsibilities of these régimes. This had 
already been acknowledged in practice, but it became institutionalized with the creation of the 
Caisse d’amortissement de la dette sociale (CADES), an institution responsible for the 
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reimbursement of the cumulated debt of social security.118 Second, the Parliament became 
involved in the financing of social security by being asked to vote yearly the law on the 
financing of social security. Historically, the role of the Parliament had been extremely weak, 
with social security budget featuring as an annex (known as Les Jaunes) to the state budget. 
 Even the implementation of governmental legislation is now under the scrutiny of the state 
as the CNAV must negotiate with the government for a four year plan called the “convention 
d’objectifs et de gestion entre l’Etat et la CNAV”. The document must be approved by both the 
state and the administrative council of the CNAV. This document is a plan that includes 
managerial objectives related to the régime général. FO has refused to support this undertaking, 
but nonetheless participates in the implementation of the plan.  
 Thus, the Juppé Plan contributes to the on-going dispute between the social partners and 
the state on the management of social security. On one hand, critics can underline that the 
government has stepped up to the forefront to ensure the viability of the system by paying its 
deficit, and taking unpopular decisions to save the system while social partners, unions in 
particular, have promoted a defence of the system without too much consideration for the 
financial implications of such measures. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the 
government seek to expand its role in the administration of the régime général. On the other 
hand, the social partners have demonstrated that they have been able to take ‘appropriate’ 
measures and greater flexibility than the government when it came to the mandatory 
supplementary régimes (AGIRC and ARRCO). Both of these régimes have been reformed in 
1994, 1996 and 2001. Further, with the possible exception of the CGT, unions have been 
advocated certain measures to contain the costs of pensions and have accepted, mostly in private, 
the necessity to adapt the system.  
 Ironically, the more neo-liberal Édourd Balladur had proposed one day prior to the 
presentation of the Juppé Plan to separate further the insurance and assistance domain while 
promoting private insurance (Bouget, 1998: 169). The first measure would have surely gathered 
more support among the social partners than the Juppé Plan and followed the lines of the late 
Bérégovoy. 
 
Private sector truckers obtain retirement at 55! 
                                                 
118 Its ressources come mainly from the RDS. 
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 In late November 1996, truck drivers would strike for 12 days paralysing many French 
roads, ports and the supply of petrol. Their key demands centred on higher pay, shorter hours, 
retirement at 55 instead of 60 and better sickness benefits. The intervention of the government to 
stop the conflict would result in the government granting full pension rights for workers in the 
private sector at age 55.  The concessions gained by the truck drivers had been estimated at over 
1 billion French Francs a year ($190 millions at that time), with pensions bearing most of the 
weight. These concessions would soon spark new demands from other workers, such as bus 
drivers in Toulouse (Economist, 7 December 1996, 48). Not only was the government unable to 
reform pensions in the public sector, it was now beginning to grant earlier retirement benefits for 
certain categories of workers in the private sector. 
 
Thomas Law 
 During his presidential campaign, Chirac proposed to create pension funds for private 
workers119 who wish to add to their pensions. It would complement both the basic and mandatory 
supplementary régimes. This idea was widely endorsed by liberals within the government (ie. 
UDF and Balladur faction). It would have effectively created a capitalized third pillar in 
encouraging individuals to seek private alternative to complement their pensions.  
 Emerging from a deputy in the Parliament (Thomas, UDF), a rarity in France, it would 
soon gather enough support to be considered by the government. Thomas hoped for a fiscal 
stimulus reaching 10% in income tax deduction and restricting these investment to the receipt of 
monthly payment once retired. The final version prepared by the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance included fiscal incentive up to 5% and the possibility to retrieve up to 20% of the 
accumulated capital upon retirement. The project would be highly criticized by the Left who 
viewed this bill as unjust and as institutionalizing a two-speed pension system (Le Monde 23 
November 1996). The final bill included many restrictions and ended up even gathering criticism 
from the banking industry.120  
                                                 
119 Public sector workers already had such plan (PREFON et CRIF) granting them supplementary benefits for their 
retirement, which is financed via voluntary contributions that are capitalised. Independent workers obtained a 
similar opportunity with the Madelin law adopted in 1994. These options also include some fiscal incentives. 
120 The Secretary General of the French Banking Association stated that there were “so many restrictions put here or 
there by different ministries concerned that retirement savings risk failing their objective” (Financial Times, 6 
January 1997). 
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 The bill was adopted on March 25, 1997 but was never implement as the publication of the 
required decrees coincided with a change in government. The Jospin government would then 
tabled the bill, and then repeal it in 2001 (Palier, 2001). This law was opposed by the unions 
because it jeopardized the financing of the régime général121 and did not offer any role to the 
social partners (Sauviat, 28 December 1998).122 
  Hoping for a renewed mandate, Chirac called a snap election in May 1997, 10 month ahead 
of schedule, in an effort to increase the legitimacy of his government. After the first round, it 
became clear that the Right was heading towards a defeat, and in a last ditch effort Juppé 
announced that he would resign from his position of Prime Minister regardless of the outcome. 
The Left, which had been crushed in the 1993 elections, would end up coming on top.  
 
Jospin Consults, But Does Not Reform 
“There is only one impossible option: do nothing” Prime 
Minister Lionel Jospin following the official reception of 
the Charpin Report in 1999. 
 
 With regards to pensions, the five year mandate of the Jospin government will be 
remembered as one of many consultations, but no reform. Fearful of the consequences of a 
reform, vividly demonstrated by the Juppé plan, the government would revert to a negotiated 
approach in the hopes of achieving a compromise with the social partners. 
During the early months of its mandate, it became clear that the government would 
continue implementing the measures taken by Juppé that survived the events of 
November/December 1995. The CSG was raised from 3,4% to 7,5% while health insurance 
contributions were decreased from 5,5% to 0,75%. This change in taxation (and social insurance 
funding) were adopted as part of the law on the financing of social security, which was one of 
the decrees adopted by the Juppé government. The bill also included an extension of the RDS 
until 2004, which was supposed to cease to exist in 1999. FO would protest against the action of 
the government claiming that it was pursuing the measures taken by Juppé (Concialdi, 28 
november 1997; Bilous, 2 December 1997). 
                                                 
121 The unions claimed that the fiscal benefits granted to stimulate savings would cause a lost of 17 to 18 billions of 
Francs for the payg system (Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1997). 
122 Without too much publicity, the Socialists introduced their own version, referred to as the Fabius Law, in 
February 2001.  
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Along with the financing bill, Jospin introduced the Fonds de réserve de retraite, a 
collective capitalized fund managed by the state to smoothen the upcoming financial difficulties 
caused by the demographic changes. First proposed by Bérégovoy in 1991, the objective of the 
fund is to obtain 1000 billions of Francs by year 2020, which would be collected from 
privatization of national assets, excess of the Fonds de solidarité vieillesse, cell phone licenses 
(the so-called 3rd generation), and other undisclosed sources. The government has fetched far less 
than it had hoped for, and the fund has only accumulated 43 billion Francs up to now (Express, 
22 November 2001). 
 
Charpin Report 
In 1998, the government asked the director of the CGP (Charpin) to establish a diagnosis 
on the (future) financial situation of all pension régimes, which would be shared as much as 
possible by the social partners and the managers of the various régimes. The note written by the 
Prime Minister underlined that the Livre Blanc of Rocard in 1991 was essential for the 
government to reach the reform of 1993, as it underscored the necessity to make adjustments to 
the pension system. Charpin was well known in government circles. He had previously been a 
ministerial advisor when the Socialists where in power in the 1980s, and he was a cousellor at 
the headquarter of the Socialist Party under Jospin in 1984 (Libération, 22 March 1999).  
 As requested in the mission statement, Charpin established a consultation commission, 
which included the social partners, a pensioner representative, state representatives from five 
ministries,123 and managers from the various pension schemes. 11 meetings were conducted 
between October 1998 and March 1999.    
L’avenir de nos retraites, also known as the Charpin report, presented a bleak future for the 
French pension system. First, it stated that the demographic balance of most schemes would shift 
dramatically, with most schemes facing the prospect of having less than 1 contributor to finance 
1 pensioner! Second, based on macro-economic projections made by the Direction de la 
prévision (Ministry of Finance), the report claimed that the financial needs of the whole pension 
system would reach 290 billions Francs in 2020 rising further to 700 billions in 2040 if no 
                                                 
123 Agriculture and Fisheries, Economy, Finance and Industry, Employment and Solidarity, Equipment, Transport 
and Housing,  and Public service, state reform and decentralisation. This high number is partly the result of the 
specificities of certain régimes. For exemple, the Ministries of Agriculture and Fisheries is viewed as a legitimate 
actor because farmers have their own pension régime.  
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reforms are introduced (See Table 2.6).124 Assuming an unemployment rate of 6%, the scheme 
for civil servant would need 255 billions of Francs, or a raise of 33,5 contribution points in 2040 
to have a financial equilibrium similar to the one experienced in 1998. The régime général would 
require 380 billions of Francs, or slightly less than 10 contributions points to be financially 
stable. 
Based on the (future) financial difficulties of the French pension system, Charpin 
advocated proposals that were similar to the ones unsuccessfully implemented by Juppé and 
concluded that “the diagnosis found in this report demonstrate that a global reform of the 
retirement system is necessary” (Charpin, 1999: 144). To this effect, he advocated many policy 
options, many of which were very controversial. First, Charpin proposed to increase the length of 
the contribution period to 42,5 years to obtain a full time pension prior to age 65. He stated that 
raising the retirement age was justified because of a longer life expectancy, better health 
conditions for those above the age of 60, and a later entry into the labour market. Charpin 
emphasised that this increase should apply to both private and public sector, so that workers in 
these schemes would need to contribute for 42,5 years to obtain a full pension.  
 
Table 2.6: Number of supplementary contribution points required to reach financial 
equilibrium for selected schemes. 
Régime  Unemployment 3% Unemployment 6% Unemployment 9% 
 1998 2020 2040 2020 2040 2020 2040 
CNAV 0,1 3,3 8,6 4,3 9,8 5,5 11,2 
Civil 
Servants* 
0 21,3 29,7 24,7 33,5 26,4 40,9 
CNRACL -9,2 14,3 25,9 16,7 28,9 16,7 28,9 
RATP 40,3 NA NA 49,8 46,3 49,8 46,3 
SNCF 73,6 NA NA 56,1 49 56,1 49 
Farmers 21,8 NA NA 18 18,4 18 18,4 
Source: Jean-Michel Charpin (1999). L’avenir de nos Retraites (Paris: CGP). As in the projections made for the 
Briet report, the civil servant scheme is assumed to be functioning like other scheme. It is assumed that the scheme 
is financially stable in 1998. 
 
Second, he rejected the unification of the pension schemes, but maintained that it was 
imperative to adopt common principles and that ‘unjustified’ differences be avoided. Charpin 
                                                 
124 These figures assume an unemployment rate of 6%. Citing a study from INSEE, Charpin claimed that a decrease 
in the active population does not necessarely translate into a lower unemployment rate. Thus, in order to achieve an 
unemployment rate of either 3% or 6%, an active employment policy would have to be undertaken (Charpin, 1999: 
Chapter 5). 
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was actually critical of the lack of reforms to the public sector schemes, and underlined that these 
schemes needed to be reformed as well (Charpin, 1999: 15).125 
Third, the report advocated the introduction of more individual choices in the retirement 
phase and to attenuate the rigidities of the borders between the different phases of life. This point 
was later echoed in another commission report, published in September, stressing the need to 
make retirement into a more progressive process.126 
Fourth, Charpin suggested that periodical adjustments be made into the pension system in a 
negotiated fashion between the government and the social partners respecting the objectives of 
solidarity and universality. He further proposed the creation of a steering device that would 
periodically, every three years, conduct long-term projections and would propose the 
government, social partners, retirement associations, and pension schemes measures that could 
be adopted to ensure the future of the pension system. The government would later pick up this 
idea after it became clear that its effort to reform the civil servant pension scheme would result in 
a strong opposition from the unions.  
Finally, the report endorsed the creation of collective funded reserve to ensure a smooth 
passage into the demographically difficult years. It, thus, provided support for the governmental 
decision to create such a reserve in 1998 (Fonds de Réserve de Retraite). 
The conclusions of the report pleased none of the social partners. On one hand, MEDEF127 
claimed the report did not go far enough in terms of proposed action and strongly emphasised the 
burden that represent the public sector scheme where government’s contributions, in many cases, 
surpassed 50% compared to an average contributions of 15%. They underlined that the public 
sector schemes have not been reformed yet and that measures similar to the ones adopted for the 
régime général had to be introduced (Charpin, 1999: 256).128 In a press communiqué, MEDEF 
claimed that the deficit in public sector scheme was three times the size of private sector scheme 
emphasizing that the state as employer needed to introduce reforms (MEDEF, 26 July 1999). The 
Vice President, Denis Kessler, also indicated that a longer contribution period would be required 
                                                 
125 “Recent reforms have only concerned the régime général and the mandatory supplementary schemes in the 
private sector. It is necessary that the upcoming adjustments are applied not only for the private sector régimes, but 
also to public sector régimes” (Charpin, 1999: 15 – author translation). 
126 Taddei, Dominique (2000). Retraites choisies et progressives (Paris: Documentation française). 
127 It is worth noting that the MEDEF changed President in 1997, and has adopted a more confrontational strategy 
with the other social partners and the government. 
128 They also stated that employee’s contributions in the public sector averaged 7,85% while they average 10,35% in 
the private sector (Charpin, 1999: 256). 
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and that “we must end the illusion of retirement at 60 years old” (Libération, 22 March 1999). 
The creation of the Fonds de réserve de retraite was criticized for being inappropriate at a time 
when the government is experiencing deficits. 
On the other hand, there was a large consensus among the unions that increase the length 
of contributions was inappropriate when there is high unemployment among the youth, and the 
older workers are pushed into early retirement. Most of them also criticized the alarmist tone of 
the report, which is not conducive to a proper debate and pedagogy. These were, however, the 
sole points in common among them. The CGT argued that the solutions proposed by Charpin 
were too drastic and inappropriate. The CGT viewed the current social system as an acquis, 
which should not be challenged. A raise in employment should be sought in order to alleviate the 
pension crisis, not an increase in the length of contribution. They also proposed to increase the 
contributions of employers by including profits, other non-wage earnings, and financial gains 
(Charpin, 1999: 235-7). 
FO challenged the economic assumption made in this report and refused to accept an 
increase in the length of contribution. It stated that promoting this sole measure as a way to save 
the payg system is “pathetic” and “provocative” (Charpin, 1999, 238). They advocated a return 
to 37,5 years for private workers. Their main axe of predilection centered on increasing the 
sources of revenues to finance the increasing costs of public pensions. They advocated to 
strengthen the Fonds de réserve de retraite, tax stock market income, increase the contribution 
rate for overtime hours, and use part of the revenues from the privatization of public companies. 
It remained committed to avoid any changes to the régimes spéciaux, a position that was also 
shared by other public sector unions such as FSU and UNSA, and the CGT. 
CFDT had a very different opinion on the report. It actually supported the conclusion of 
the Charpin report and stressed that an improvement in employment would not fully resolve the 
needs to sustain the pension system. It further stated that periodical meetings are necessary to 
adjust the parameters of the system based on the economic, social, and demographic context. 
Nonetheless, it added that the employment situation of the youth and the tendency to exclude 
employees above 55 from the labour market should be addressed before serious discussion on a 
pension reform take place. More specifically, CFDT proposed, among its policy choices, to 
increase the contributive aspects of all basic pension schemes, base retirement age on the length 
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of contribution, take into account all salaries, introduce a better indexation of pensions, and 
strengthen the Fonds de Reserve pour les Retraites. 
The CFTC acknowledged the challenges facing the pension system, but criticized the 
“dramatisation” of the debate. Like FO and CGT, they wish a return to a contribution period of 
37,5 years. They proposed a debate and a new family policy that would consider the professional 
and working life to increase the birth rate. Other proposals included the creation of private 
pension funds at the sectoral level and a certain convergence between the public sector and 
private sector schemes. The CGC advocated an alignment of all schemes, and more individual 
choices in the system. It proposed to alter the contributions of employers by shifting the burden 
from salaries to sales. It claimed that the prices of goods would remain the same, but this option 
would render French companies more competitive as it would result in a relative decrease in 
wages while increasing the prices of foreign goods. 
Following the official release of the report on April 29, the government announced that a 
second round of consultation led by the Minister of Employment (Martine Aubry) would soon 
begin. The government engaged itself to focus on three key principles: consolidate the payg 
system, reconstructe a full employment society, and reform pensions progressively. The strategy 
of the government consisted of negotiated and consult the social partners one scheme at a time 
and, present a plan by the end of the year (Le Monde 28 & 29 April 1999). Aubry met the social 
partners in the Fall of 1999. The CFDT mentioned a meeting with her stating that it was more a 
discussion than a consultation about reform proposals (CFDT, 1999). 
 
Counter-expertise challenges the conclusions of previous commissions 
Few weeks following the publication of the Charpin report, the Fondation Copernic 
published a volume challenging the diagnosis and proposals made by Charpin.129 The first 
edition was actually called “contre-rapport Charpin”! The Foundation is composed of union 
leaders, economists, and sociologists, supported by 600 members, opposed to “la pensée 
unique” (the single vision proposed by neo-liberals) and was one of many groups of this kind 
created in the aftermath of the social protest of December 1995 (Le Monde, 24 May 1999). 
These individuals recognized that such a movement would be difficult to re-create and opted to 
‘attack’ the expertise surrounding the proposals of governmental commissions. They do not 
                                                 
129 Fondation Copernic (1999). “Les retraites au péril du libéralisme” (Paris: Èditions Sylleps). 
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reject that importance of the demographic change that is occurring. The Fondation Copernic 
does, however, contest the financial and economical implications of such change.  
Their main argument has been that recent reforms (and proposals) have led to a reduction 
in the value of people’s pensions and that only workers are bearing the burden of the 
demographic change. First, they have argued that the old-age dependency ratio (60+/20-60) is 
not as important as the active/inactive ratio. The former is not revealing as many individuals are 
not currently in the job market, thus not contributing to public pensions. They argue that 
unemployment rates would decrease because of the high number of individuals moving on into 
retirement. Thus, the active/inactive ratio would not face a drastic change similar to the old-age 
dependency ratio. 
The foundation also challenges the solutions that have been proposed by Charpin, MEDEF, 
and the government (Left and Right). They are highly critical of pension funds, price indexation, 
and increasing the length of contribution.130 According to the foundation, these measures leads to 
a reduction in the level of pensions attributed and could result in a return to poverty for the 
elderly.  
Finally, they argue that economic growth could be the saviour of the public pension system 
and that raising contribution rates in this context would not be harmful to the economy and 
would not be too demanding for workers. They minimise the importance of rising contribution 
by stating that current workers have experienced a high rise in their contribution rates over the 
years, which have been offset by the gains in productivity and wages. Interestingly, another 
official report following these lines would be published few months later. 
The question of old-age pensions found its way to the Conseil économique et social. The 
council includes social partners and various experts and is considered to be the 
consultative/corporatist institution of the state. The government and social partners usually test 
the political waters by submitting proposals to this institution. René Teulade presented a report in 
January 2000 on the future of pensions schemes leading to a vote on its adoption (the results are 
included in table 2.7). The main lines of the report had already been presented for a Socialist 
Committee (see Taddei, 1999: 77). The Teulade report challenged the conclusions of the Charpin 
                                                 
130 With regards to the length of contribution, the foundation cites a study by the CNAV demonstrating that 60% of 
pension applicants are not-employed.  
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report and clearly sided with unions131 over the employers by arguing in favour of higher growth 
and employment as a solution to the pension crisis. The report stated that an annual growth rate 
of 3,5% annually would be enough to stabilize the current pension expenditure/GDP ratio 
without having to increase the length of contribution. This growth rate would also allow a return 
to an indexation of pensions on salaries. In contrast, the Charpin report had assumed an average 
growth rate of 1,7% annually in the long term. 
Thus, in order to resolve the upcoming financial difficulties of the French pension 
system, the report advocated mostly measures that would improve the growth rate. First, it 
advocated a better understanding of the passage to retirement and an end to current practices, 
which favour early-retirement. Second, the report urged the government to undertake active 
policies to improve the employment rate to reduce the impact of a reduction in the number of 
individual below the age of retirement. Teulade also proposed the creation of a watchdog 
national centre for pensions, seeking complementary sources of financing along with 
strengthening the Fonds de réserve de retraite, and to guarantee a fair replacement rate for 
pensions (Teulade, 2000: 25). 
As demonstrated by Table 3,8, the social ‘partners’ were clearly divided on the report. 
MEDEF was so outraged that it attempted to pass a motion (that was defeated 45-125) to make 
changes, which, according to them, could have led to a consensus. Private sector employers 
presented seven objections: 1) the ‘irrealist’ view that a high growth rate would resolve 
everything; 2) the neglect to consider the lengthening of life expectancy; 3) the lack of reform 
projects for the régime spéciaux; 4) the lack of analysis on the costs and financial resources 
required to re-instate pensions indexed on salaries; 5) the lack of discussion on the linkeage 
between retirement age and actuary neutrality; 6) the refusal to discuss private savings options; 
and 7) the creation of a new institution. Employers would conclude by stating that “this notice is 
negative, dangerous, and misleading. It questions the pedagogical work that has been done in the 
past 10 years” (Teulade, 2000: 63). Following the final adoption of the report, MEDEF stated 
that it would no longer participate in the pension discussion (Le Monde, 12 janvier 2000), which 
it did following its general assembly on January 18 (Economist, 22 January 2000).  
CFDT was the only union, which did not support the report by opting to abstain. It 
supported measures such as indexing pensions on salaries, ensuring that enough resources are 
                                                 
131 With the exception of the CFDT, which abstained (see reasons below). 
 126
injected into the Fonds de réserve des retraites, and increasing the number of individual choice 
with regards to the length of a working career. However, CFDT was highly critical of the 
economic assumptions that were made in the report and the lack of discussions on narrowing the 
gap between the régime général and the régime spéciaux (Teulade, 2000: 53-5). 
 
Table 2.7: Rapport Teulade. Support and Opposition to the Conclusions of the Conseil Economique et Social 
Group Pour Contre Abstention 
Groupe de l’agriculture 3 12 11 
Groupe de l’artisanat 8   
Groupe des associations 5   
Groupe de la CFE-CGC 6   
Groupe de la CFTC 6   
Groupe de la CGT 16   
Groupe de la CGT-FO 15   
Groupe de la cooperation 7  2 
Groupe de l’outre-mer 1   
Groupe de l’UNSA 3   
Groupe de la mutualite 3   
Groupe des personnalites qualifiees 25 11 1 
Groupe des Francais etablis hors de 
France de l’epargne et du logement 
2 1  
Groupe des entreprises privees  25  
Groupe des professions liberales  3  
Groupe de l’UNAF  10  
Groupe de la CFDT           16 
Groupe des enterprises publiques             9 
TOTAL 100 62         39 
Each cells represents the numbers of people within the group that had voting rights on this report. 
  
 CFTC and CFE-CGC supported the report mainly on the basis that it did not put in 
question the payg system, and that it considered the importance of seeking a progressive 
transition into retirement. Both CGT and FO were highly supportive of the report because it 
matched closely their respective positions. First, it did not threaten the régimes spéciaux. Second, 
it advocated a return to an indexation based on salaries instead of prices. Third, it opposed 
increasing the length of the contribution period. FO actually restated that it was still seeking to 
return to 37,5 years of contributions for private sector workers. 
 Interestingly, the Teulade report was also highly criticized by experts working in the 
field. Contrary to Charpin and other studies commissioned by the government, none of the 
bureaucrats usually affected to their elaboration were consulted, let alone, participated in its 
production. Those I met were actually quick to point out that the projections included calculation 
mistakes and distanced themselves from its conclusions (Author interviews, December 2001). 
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For example the French economist Florence Legros recently pointed out that Teulade ignored 
that an increase in salary also implies an increase in future pension payments because workers 
contribute more. Thus, higher the growth rate, higher the pension will be (L’Express, 19 April 
2002). 
  
The government decides to continue the consultation… 
 After many delays, the Jospin government announced the he would like to negotiate a 
pension pact with the social partners in March 2000. Jospin insisted on the principles of 
consensus citing the Juppé approach as one to avoid. In terms of policy objectives, he plead for 
an increase in the length of the contribution period for civil servants, but offered to consider a 
part or the totality of the primes and the difficulty associated with certain professions such as the 
caring personal in hospitals. Jospin further reiterated that the specificities of the régimes spéciaux 
would not be put in question (Le Monde, 22 March 2000).132 Observers were quick to point out 
that the tone of Jospin’s speech implied that he had already move into electoral mode by 
minimising the “sacrifice needed to fund pensions, and put(ing) further reform until after the 
2002 elections”, a measure he justified on higher than expected growth and employment 
performances (Financial Times, 23 March 2000).  
 Despite the willingness of the government to negotiate, FO, CGT and FSU were quick to 
condemn the position of the government. FO and FSU refused to make any concessions on the 
pension code and CGT stated that a negotiation cannot occur if unions must first accept a 
lengthening of the contribution period. As a result, all three called a strike for the end of March. 
CFDT, CFE-CGC and CFTC, on the other hand, supported the gesture made by the government. 
 The Jospin government altered its approach one month later by instituting the Conseil 
d’Orientation des Retraites (COR) following the suggestions of Charpin and Teulade on the 
need to create a steering institution for pensions. Three main objectives were granted to Yannick 
Moreau, the President. First, the COR had to paint a picture of the financial situation of the 
various pension schemes considering the evolution of social, demographic and economic 
conditions. Second, it was mandated to propose a series of measures to ensure the financial 
viability of the pension system in the long-run. Finally, the COR was asked to seek to maintain 
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the coherence of the payg system while ensuring solidarity between the schemes and equity 
among generations. The COR was asked to submit a report every two years analysing the current 
situations of the pension schemes while proposing measures to ensure their long-term financial 
equilibrium. 33 members were appointed to the Commission, with close to half coming from 
social partners (16). Indicative of the increasing role of the Parliament in pensions, 3 senators 
and 3 parliamentarians were also selected. The remaining seats were granted to public officials 
(4), experts (4), pensioners (1), and the national family association (1). MEDEF refused to 
participate claiming that Charpin had already accomplished this task, and would participate only 
when the government will engage reforms (Le Monde, 29 Mai 2000). The creation of the COR 
iced the issue of pension reform prior to the Presidential and legislative elections of 2002. 
 The Jospin government faced a challenge from its Communist ally in Parliament two 
weeks prior to the official release of the first COR report. The Communist party deposited a bill 
to grant full pension benefits to those who have already met 40 years of contribution. This bill 
proposal had strong support even within the Socialists. Afraid of the consequences of a possible 
vote in Parliament, the Minister of Employment (Guigou) would invoke article 40 of the 
Constitution, which forbids parliamentarians to propose measures that would result in a decrease 
in public resources or an increase in its expenses. This action would be highly criticised by 
Communists and some Socialist deputies (Le Monde, 28 November 2001). 
 In early December, Yannick Moreau would publicly present the first COR report to 
Jospin. In a televised address Jospin declared on the urgency of resolving the pension issue: “We 
have time ahead of us, ten to fifteen years” and it will be tackled in the early days of the next 
legislature (Le Monde, 6 December 2001). The future state of affairs painted by the report 
closely matched the one made by Charpin. According to most experts, the most important 
conclusion of the COR was the dismissal of the Teulade report and the assessment that 
something needs to be done (Author interviews, December 2001). With regards to policy action, 
the report emphasized three main points. First, it mentioned that a change of mentality with 
regards to older workers must be instituted to increase their participation rates. Second, it 
claimed that the population needed to reassured with regards to the replacement rate of their 
future pensions. It underlined that the replacement rates was about to decrease from an average 
                                                                                                                                                             
132 Jospin would later propose some measures for the private sector on April 28, which were not actively pursued 
with the exception of the COR. He advocated reducing the penality (currently at 10%) for those who do not have the 
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of 78% to 64% in 2040, but proposed no solutions. Third, it advocated increasing the length of 
the contribution period for civil servants in exchange of including the primes and more flexibility 
for departure into retirement. It did not tackle other régimes spéciaux such as the SNCF and 
RATP. Overall, the report suggested that the government adopt multiple measures to respond to 
the upcming social, economic and demographic changes (Le Monde, 7 December 2001; COR, 
2001). 
 Despite its challenge on the public sector, the publication of the report was welcomed by 
most social partners who were quick to point out that a return to 37,5 years of contribution in the 
private sector would only cost 0,3% of GDP. Further, it addressed the decrease in the relative 
amount received by pensioners vis-à-vis workers. Key was that, despite projections similar to 
Charpin, its tone was much less alarmist.  
 
Conclusion 
 The French case fits nicely into the typology presented in Chapter 1 even though the 
responsibility of public pensions is still a source of contention between the state and the social 
partners. Although the state enacts the laws and parameters of the pension system, with the 
possible exception of the mandatory supplementary regimes (ARRCO and AGIRC), this 
responsibility is not fully accepted by the social partners who retain the control of administrative 
councils of the various pension régimes. This relationship results in the state not being trusted as 
an institution, and a bureaucratization of pensions that shies away from what is thought of the 
French bureaucracy. It seems ill equipped to tackle the subject of pension reform. It does not 
have a ‘neutral’ institution such as RFV in Sweden, which is also thought of seeking to protect 
its system. Thus, its proposals and expertise is much more valued. In France, the actions of the 
state are simply not trusted by the unions, which views any attempts to institute a committee or 
commission as a way to secure retrenchment. The counter-expertise attack comes from the fact 
that the CGP is not a pension institution, but a political office of the Prime Minister. This results 
in the creation of commissions after commissions to seek some sort of consensus. 
 If pension reforms were evaluated in terms of the number of reports on the subject rather 
than its actual impact on the system, France would be the runaway leader of all OECD countries. 
From 1985 to 2001, no less than 13 reports were submitted! Close to one every year. Despite all 
                                                                                                                                                             
required length of contribution when they reach retirement, improve the replacement rates, and create the COR. 
 130
this knowledge, the French government has not resolved pension problems beyond the year 
2005/2010 where the demographic imbalances are expected to weight heavily. Bonoli (2000) 
argues that two key reasons lay behind the “commissioning” of public pensions. First, many of 
those were designed “to test the political feasibility” of specific proposals the government had in 
mind, which were most often developed prior by the Commissariat Général au Plan (CGP). 
Second, these commissions create the general impression that the government is doing 
something to resolve the difficulties faced by the pension system. 
 The long-term impact of the Balladur reform is quite substantial, nonetheless. The 
legislation of the price indexation, a measure first established in the late 1980s, is a near invisible 
measure that generates important savings for the government. The other measures are less 
drastic, but still provide incentives for future older workers to increase the length of their career. 
The benefits of such measure go beyond a simple reduction in costs. By encouraging individuals 
to work longer, the government delays the payment of one’s pension while collecting further 
revenues from work. Key for the efficacy of this measure, however, is the promotion of 
employment among elderly worker.  
 It is important to notice that the social partners did not react strongly to the Balladur 
reform. They had been consulted in the spring by Balladur and his cabinet, which eased the 
passage of legislation. This method was in sharp contrast to the one used by Juppé, whose 
pension proposals took everyone by surprise. Even the moderate CFDT eventually supported the 
CGT and FO despite its support for the general guidelines of the reforms because the pension 
reform did not include any consultations. 
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3 – Belgium: Seeking to Adapt in a Crumbling 
Consensual World. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
A common question I received while in Sweden was something along the lines of: “Why 
study Belgium, nothing has really been done with regards to pensions there?” Even though 
Belgian politicians would probably seek to challenge this assertion, in a comparative perspective, 
Belgium probably fits best Pierson’s (1998) picture of an immobile elephant. This is exactly why 
Belgium is studied in this dissertation. In order to analyse properly pension reforms, it is 
important to study those who have instituted programmatic changes (UK and Sweden) with those 
who have sought to alter the parameters (France and Belgium).  
 Belgium is also a great case because it has many similarities with both France and 
Sweden. The fragmentation of its pension system is partly the result of French occupation prior 
to Belgium’s independence. Due to its proximity, Belgium has been influenced by (and has 
influenced) France’s pension system. It is therefore not that surprising that the historical 
development of each system shares many attributes. Thus, the difficulties of reforming numerous 
schemes at once are similar to France and, based on Tsebelis (1999), are expected to be 
accentuated because of large governmental coalitions. Belgium has also a lot in common with 
Sweden. The generosity of its welfare state has often been compared with its Nordic counterpart. 
Esping-Andersen’s pension de-commodification index ranked Belgium second among 
industrialised countries right after Sweden and ahead of other Scandinavian countries (Esping-
Andersen, 1990: 50). Like Sweden, Belgium has also been considered to be a highly corporatist 
country with a small economy vulnerable to world markets (Katzenstein, 1986). 
This section is divided into three broad sections. First, an historical review is presented 
that will help the reader understand the interactions between the social partners and the state and 
 132
the historical institutional functionality of the pension system. The second section introduces the 
main elements, as presented in Chapter 1, that require analysis in order to theorize the Belgian 
case. Finally, a review of attempts and successes in pension reforms during the period 1990-2002 
are presented in the last section. 
For this case, a caveat is in order. Literature on the subject has been difficult to 
gather.133 Few studies on pension reforms have been published and they tend to describe 
the reform process in a very general way. Combined with a tradition of political secrecy, it 
has been hard to gather old public documents as well.134 This is in stark contrast to 
Sweden’s high openness where most analysis behind individual elements of the pension 
reform process can be found easily. The language capabilities of the author are also to be 
blamed since it can function in only one part of the country, and leads to a reliance on 
French sources. 
 
Historical Development 
Belgium’s public pension system had faced many changes prior to the main reform of 
1968, which remains the basis of the current pension system. As a result of French occupation, 
prior to Belgium’s independence, civil servants were granted a special status, which still exists 
today. For private sector workers, the Belgian pension system experienced a try out period with 
voluntary organisations, later subsidising them. These arrangements would later be replaced by 
mandatory occupational schemes for specific groups of workers. Following the Social Pact of 
1944, the generosity and administrative structure for each occupational plan improved 
significantly. In 1968, a major reform was introduced merging previous disparate occupational 
schemes for private sector workers into one big scheme managed by a central organisation 
including the social partners. 
Civil servants were the first to be covered by a public pension. The French law of 1790, 
which took effect in Belgium in 1794 following its annexion, introduced the principles of a 
                                                 
133 At least one author seemed to share my frustrations: “For over thirty years I have been monitoring the social 
security system of this country. I have often been disappointed by the lack of openness, the absence of data, the 
rigidity of the joint positions of the interested parties, the sclerosis at the level of secondary objectives and 
conservatism where this should not be expected” (Dillemans, 1993: 212).   
134 Even the librarians at the University of Leuven were left disappointed in their inability to help me! 
 133
special status for civil servants with regards to pensions.135 Due compensation was required as a 
duty for the services rendered to the states by civil servants. In 1844, 13 years after gaining 
independence, these principles were put into Belgian law and it was stated that pensions were to 
be fully financed by the Treasury (MASSPE, 2000: 12). 
In the case of employees in the private sector, social risks were confined to families or 
charities such as ’Maisons civiles de Dieu’ and ’Bureau de Bienfesance’. However, following the 
industrial revolution these agencies were unable to meet the social needs of the new industrial 
workers. Voluntary associations, known as ’mutuelles’ (later transformed into ’mutualités’- 
friendly societies), emerged in the mid 1800s and contributing workers were entitled to 
protection against social risks such as unemployment, old age and accident (MASSPE, 2000). 
The state also created the ’Caisse générale de retraite’ in 1850 where voluntary private 
contributions for retirement were guaranteed by the state (ONP, 2000). These benefits remained 
modest and the state was not financially involved in any of these undertakings. 
The first mandatory insurance scheme introduced by the Belgian government was the 
legislation of 1844, which covered all seamen navigating under a Belgian flag. The role of the 
state was important in launching this scheme as it subsidised its first 10 years (ONP, 2000; 
MASSPE, 2000). Despite its modest scope, the introduction of this regime proved to be quite 
important since it represented the model for subsequent occupational pension schemes 
introduced by the government.  
Following social unrest in the 1880 peaking with national strikes in 1886, the Belgian 
government began to intervene more actively in social affairs. The state decided in 1891 to 
allocate a part of its budget to subsidise certain friendly societies (ONP, 2000; MASSPE, 
1998)136 and officially recognised them so that they could start receiving public support in 1894. 
During this period, the Catholic Conservative government continuously gave legislative and 
financial advantages, in the form of subsidies, to the catholic friendly societies in the hopes of 
weakening the socialists and their friendly societies. The alliance between the conservative and 
catholic worker’s movement was a response to the growing socialist movement, which had anti-
                                                 
135 It is worthwhile noting that other social benefits such as sickness insurance were not granted prior to the first 
world war (MASSPE, 2000: 11). 
136 These contributions would become mandatory by law on May 10, 1900 (ONP, 2000). 
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bourgeois and anti-clerical views.137 Contrary to many other European nations, non-skilled 
workers were polarized between catholic and socialist movements, which often had opposite 
views with regards to social insurance. The Catholics, heavily influenced by the church, 
advocated voluntary forms of associations encouraging workers to take responsibilities for their 
own pensions and was far more sensible to private property and harmony between social classes 
than Socialists. The Socialists, on the other hand, encouraged the involvement of the state in 
granting and administrating social rights to workers and had a more belligerent attitude towards 
employers (Vanthemsche, 1994: 18-22). Five national groupings of friendly societies would 
emerge at the beginning of the 20th century based on ideological/social orientations (MASSPE, 
2000: 4-5). 138 
Subsequent to the failure of the 1900 pension reform, where the voluntary option was 
extended to all individuals, the state expanded the mandatory social insurance to various 
occupational groups based on the scheme designed for seaman. The 1900 reform resulted in a 
high number of registered workers in the friendly societies, but their savings were clearly 
insufficient to guarantee a proper pension. As a result, support for mandatory options became 
nearly unanimous. Mandatory social insurance became a reality for minors in 1911. A pension 
was granted following 30 years of labour at the mine. In 1912-14, pensions became part of the 
Catholic government goal of introducing mandatory social insurance. However, the Socialists, 
who had the control of the Ministry of Industry and Work, would stop these objectives by 
instituting their own plans for pensions. The claimed that mandatory pension insurance did not 
make sense since most workers did not live up to their retirement age, thus they opposed the 
‘pension for the dead’. They wanted to introduce a non-contributory pension financed by the 
state (general taxation). A short-lived compromise was reached in 1920, when a ‘free’ means-
tested pension for all Belgians was introduced. This precedent could have paved the way for a 
larger role for the state and a more encompassing old-age pension system. Instead, it was 
abandoned following the defeat of the Socialists at the next election, ending their participation in 
the government (Vanthemsche, 1994: 30-2).  
                                                 
137 Despite this policy of favouritism, the socialist mutualités had a membership of 31 000 by 1886, a number similar 
to the catholic mutualités (32 046 members + 4 260 honorary members) (A. Jauniaux, 1930 – cited from 
Vanthemsche, 1994: 18). 
138 These five groupings are (year of formation in brackets): Allience nationales des mutualités chrétiennes (1906), 
Union nationale des mutualités neutres (1908), Union nationale des mutualités socialistes (1913), Union nationale 
des mutualités libérales de Belgique, et Union des mutualités libres et professionnelles (1920) (MASSPE, 2000: 5). 
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The inter-war period came to be remembered as one that included a close co-operation 
between the unions and the state. This close co-operation brought key advantages to the unions. 
The most obvious benefit was the responsibility of organizing the unemployment benefit system, 
which led to a stark increase in membership following the economic recession of the 1930s. 
Unions would establish strong political links in line with the pillarization of the country.139 The 
main socialist union was actually part of the Socialist Party (Parti Ouvrier Belge) and even had 
few MPs. Once the Socialist Party entered the cabinet, direct access to the cabinet was granted to 
the Socialist trade union. The Christian trade union movement was also becoming more 
politicized even though its link to the Party was more filtered. Contrary to the French union 
movement, “neither socialist nor Catholic unions had objections to this integration of trade 
unionism and state” (Luyten and Hemmerijckx, 2000: 208-11). 
Pension legislation was introduced in 1924 and 1925 and would have big consequences in 
the future, even though the new schemes would eventually become futile following the 
depreciation of the Belgian currency (ONP, 2000). First, the principle of mandatory social 
insurance became firmly entrenched as the main social policy tool for old-age pensions. Second, 
differentiation of benefits occurred as blue-collar workers (1924 law) obtained a system based on 
the scheme developed for minors in 1911 with lower contributions and benefits than white-collar 
workers (1925 law) (Vanthemsche, 1994: 32). The reforms extended the coverage of old-age 
insurance on the basis of an individualised account, a technique similar to the one found in the 
private sector, where accumulated capital and interest would flourish and be redistributed once 
the individual reached retirement age or, in the event of a sudden death, granted to the widow 
(MSSPE, 2000: 6; ONP, 2000: 28-9). These new pension schemes would face many difficulties 
in the 1930s because of its emphasis on capitalization, resulting in many headaches for the 
government (Vanthemsche, 1994: 33).  
During W.W.II, a blue print for a social agreement was negotiated between high-level civil 
servants, employers and the two largest unions (CSC and CGTB140). It was adopted by the 
government virtually ‘as-is’ in 1944 and it quickly came to be known as the Social Pact. Besides 
laying the foundation for a long period of social peace,141 the concept of solidarity was 
                                                 
139 See next section.  
140 Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens and Confédération générale du Travail de Belgique. 
141 The social pact institutionalised industrial relations by defining ”the procedures of collective bargaining, the type 
of demands to be raised and how these could be supported by possible action” (Hancke, 1991). 
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consecrated by labour and capital. The Social Pact led to key changes in the Belgian welfare 
state: expansion of mandatory social assurance (unemployment, sickness, invalidity, pension) for 
all workers, increase in social benefits, creation of the ‘Office nationale de sécurité sociale’ to 
collect the contributions, and co-management of social security (MASSPE, 1998).142 Although a 
broad coverage of social risk was established, the various insurance schemes were legislated 
separately without any co-ordination. The section on social security involved few discussions 
and was based on a text developed by the Minister of Employment and Social Welfare, Achille 
van Acker, who was involved in the later stages of discussions.  
Another plan had been drafted during the war by a special commission set to study post-
war problems, based on the principles of universalism found in the Beveridge report. However, it 
did not find much support with unions as it implied that they would lose the control over 
unemployment insurance, which had been one of the main vehicles to attract membership 
(Pasture, 1993: 696).143 Beside, the social agreement had the key advantage of being agreed by 
all major social actors, a rarity, and required little effort on the part of the government. The big 
reform advocated by the social pact would never materialised as subsequent committees failed to 
seek consensus among the main parties. As stated by Vanthemsche (1994), there was equilibrium 
of power among ideological groups and classes to allow a global reform of social security, which 
would have renegated many hard-fought compromises (113).  
While there was a broad consensus that a major pension reform was long overdue due to 
the meagre benefits received by pensioners, the solution was difficult to achieve. In the 
meantime, the multi-party government instituted a pension complement in 1945 financed via 
general taxation. Thus, this reform opened to the door to a pay-as-you-go (payg) system where 
current workers financed part of the public pensions. Following the introduction of this reform, 
there was a long debate between those advocating payg and fully funded systems. The Christian 
Democratic government would provide an answer to this debate by introducing a new pension 
system in 1953 for blue-collar workers, where it abandoned definitively funded components for a 
system relying on payg. Benefits were granted on the basis of the cost of living, the type of 
                                                 
142 It is important to note that the social pact covered only workers in the private sectors and not civil servants and 
’independent’ (self-employed). 
143 According to Vanthemsche (1994), a third group worked on this issue during the war and consisted of members 
from the Centre Belge d’Études et de Documentation (CBED) and the Groupement d’Études Économiques (GEE). 
They sought to create a new social insurance system, which would be mandatory only for those that are 
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profession, and the amount of contributions made by the individual.  A full pension was 
allocated for a 45-year career for men, and 40 for women. Individuals with shorter career 
received a pension based on the number of years they contributed to the system (Vanthemsche, 
1994; ONP, 2000). 144  
Modifications to the 1953 legislation were made in 1954 and 1955, following the 
replacement of the Christian Democrat minister by a Socialist, and included such elements as an 
increase in the amount of the pension and compensation for recognised inactivity (sickness, 
unemployment, strike, etc.). Legislation in 1957, based on similar principles than the 1953 
legislation,145 replace the 1945 pension scheme for non-manual workers. Although their 
contributions and, thus, benefits remained higher than blue-collar workers, the operationalisation 
of its scheme was similar to the blue-collar scheme. Sailors and minors also received new 
pension systems in 1956 and 1958. Pension benefits were increased for non-manual and manual 
workers in 1962 (ONP, 2000).  The changes made to the 1953 scheme were part of an on-going 
battle between the Socialists who viewed social protection as a “public service,” and the 
Christian Democrats who sought to keep the government’s role to a minimum. As pensions 
became an electoral issue these differences narrowed,146 as both parties attempted to demonstrate 
that they provide leadership by addressing this issue. It is in this context that pension benefits 
were raised 16 consecutive times between 1945 and 1962 (Vanthemsche, 1994: 166)! 
Legislation in 1966 and a royal decree in 1967 instituted the actual pension regime for 
private workers. Based on the principle of solidarity a single regime of old-age insurance was 
built for all types of employees in the private sectors (blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, 
minors and sailors). Some elements of the 1953 legislation remained. For example, the 
retirement age stayed the same (65 for men and 60 for women) and the length of career for a full 
pension remained at 45 for men and 40 for women.  Early retirement was introduced; individuals 
could retire five years earlier with a 5% penalty for each year. Individuals could receive pension 
                                                                                                                                                             
economically weak. Further, they advocated a professionalisation of social insurance schemes, where each 
occupational group would have its distinct social insurance (50-1). 
144 For example, if a woman had a 37-year career, she would receive 37/40th of a full pension. 
145 The main difference is related to financing, where a part of the contributions are still capitalized because most 
intellectual workers still preferred a funded system (ONP, 2000: 31).  However, the capitalized part was kept to a 
minimum (Vanthemsche, 1994: 168). 
146 In 1949, the Christian-socialists presented a bill that was copied from a socialist proposal. They were caught 
because they skipped a line while copying the text, making it incomprehensible (Vanthemsche, 1994: 163). 
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points for the period between their 20th birthday and the end of 1945 if they could demonstrate 
that they had worked continuously between 1946 and their retirement date.  
Minimal changes have occurred since this legislation such as a modification of the 
calculation for obtaining a full time pension (1976), transfer and merger of administrative 
agencies (1981, 1987), alterations of the rules and index adjustments concerning the amount 
received by individuals. One of the key transformations occurred in the early 1980s when the 
government substantially increased the pension minimum, which had been historically low 
compared to other developed countries (Palme, 1990: 58).  
It is worth noticing that most of these changes have resulted in an increase in the 
generosity of public pensions. This period can, therefore, be referred to as a period of expansion. 
Table 3.1 provides a sketch of the Belgian public pension system. 
 
Table 3.1: The Belgian Pension System.147 
Type of Worker Basic Regime 
Wage earners Régime des travailleurs salariés 
Civil Servant Régime des travailleurs du secteur 
public 
Self Employed (Independent) Régime des travailleurs indépendants 
Note: Despite legislation merging various schemes within each of the regime, slight differences still exist due to 
transition periods. 
 
Theorizing Pension Reform within the Belgian Context 
A “pillarized” world? 
At first glance, Lijphart’s (1968) typology of political systems seems to apply 
extremely well to Belgium. The consociational democracy category, originally conceived 
as a Dutch peculiarity, fits Belgium well. However, the political culture and society is not 
only fragmented along religious and class lines, but along language as well. Complicating 
matters is that the language divisions are territorially defined politically (Flanders and 
Wallonia). Since the late 1960s, following the events at Leuven, “federal” elections occur 
with parties seeking to earn seats within either Flanders or Wallonia, but not both. There 
                                                 
147 A means-tested pension is available to those not earning a sufficient amount. This amount is quite generous in a 
comparative perspective. 
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are no federal parties that present candidate in all of Belgium in a way similar to Canada’s 
major political parties.  
According to Lijphart’s typology, the political stability of Belgium is the result of 
“coalescent” elites, representing groups in a hierarchical manner, that have been able to 
suppress the creation of popular movement against their leadership. The lack of interaction 
among the difference groups in the populace further strengthened the power of the political 
elites. This is a consequence of the “pillarization” of the country into different sociological 
worlds along socio-economic lines: 
“At the birth of Belgium, we experienced the development, surrounding 
the traditional political parties, of what we call sociological worlds. As 
evident in the Christian as in the Socialist world, and to a lesser extent in 
the Liberal world, political parties have been complemented by all kinds of 
organisations of similar ideological leaning that accompany the members 
of these groupings from the cradle to the grave. Schools with ideological 
colour, youth movements, formation associations, unions, friendly 
societies, coffee places, holiday resorts, women associations, retirement 
associations, insurance, banks, etc. answer to all needs for the members of 
the same group. This is what we call “pillarization”. Moreover, these 
organisations, built as pillars, exercise an important influence on the 
electorate both in terms of ideology and electoral support. These 
sociological worlds introduce some sort of apartheid in the Belgian society, 
meaning that members almost never interact with members of other 
sociological world. The control that the political leaders were able to 
develop on this basis allowed them to mobilise or demobilise whenever 
necessary as part of their political strategy. In exchange for their loyalty, 
the members of different groupings could obtain all sorts of advantages 
from their leaders. Jobs, social housing, breach of certain rules, … were 
granted with preferential treatment to the members of the grouping” 
(Swyngedouw, 1998: 53 – author translation; see also Seiler, 1999: 44-51). 
 
Thus, Belgium’s consensual democracy has also been termed the “armed peace” because 
of the difficulties for any political group to circumvent the pillarization of the country. The 
French Socialists and the Flemish Christian democrats have such important grounding in 
their respective region that it is very difficult to govern against their interests 
(Swyngedouw, 1998: 54). Partly as a result of pillarization, political system contains a high 
level of secrecy where major decisions tend to be negotiated behind closed doors.  
This political arrangement has been strongly challenged since the mid 1970s, 
especially at the grass roots. New parties successfully entered the political arena, and 
voters began to switch parties between elections (idid, 54-5). Despite a level of corruption 
similar to Italy, Belgium did not experience a “clean hands” movement because judges 
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depend on political parties for their promotion. Thus, it would take the murders of children 
and the poor handling of the “Dutroux affair” to provoke a stark reaction of the populace 
against the pillar system (Seiler, 1999). As stated by Delwit et al (1999) what were 
common transactions between the political and industrial world 10 years ago are now 
considered as acts of corruption (10-11). Other events such as the “Chicken gate” resulted 
in a backlash against the Christian Democrats during the election of 1999 sending them to 
the opposition benches for the first time since WWII. 
Van Den Brande (1967 cf. Van Den Bulck, 1992) has contested this political 
picture of Belgium. He claims that the political stability of the country has nothing to do 
with the special skills of its elites, but is rather the result of cross-cutting cleavages that 
lead to a certain equilibrium. For example, socialist workers from Wallonia will often co-
operate with socialist workers from Flanders but also with catholic workers from Wallonia. 
“This prevents the total and permanent mobilization of an organisation along a single line 
of conflict” (Pijnenburg, 1984 cited in Van Den Bulck, 1992: 35).  
 
The state with a small s. 
Regardless of the true causes behind the political stability of Belgium, the end 
result is a stark contrast to France’s political culture where the state has sought to trump 
groups and organizations. The conception of a strong state is absent in Belgium. The place 
of the state is much closer to what Rothstein’s (1991) calls the “lagom” version found in 
Sweden (see discussion in chapter 5), and it could be argued that it is even weaker. Due to 
the high number of cleavages, there is a strong need for consensus in order to maintain the 
unity of the state. A strong state would probably be a recipe for its dismantlement. The 
Belgian state was conceived to be a minimal state and never sought a radical 
transformation:  
“Built as an imposed aggregation from the fusion of city-states, the Belgian 
state has never received strong substance, or any strong administrative 
apparatus. At the beginning, when the bourgeoisie sought only a minimal 
state, it was a deliberate choice. Later on, at the time of a Social state, the 
strength of the public sphere improved. But it never replaced the organised 
segments of the society. The later being strongly structure, the political life 
at the centre could only confine itself to the role of mediator between them, 
while not infiltrating their organisations. No political force wished a 
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centralisation of public authority, similar to the one experienced in France 
in the Third Republic” (Delwit et al., 1999: 7-8).148 
 
Attempts to import the French model have been made, but never lasted very long in 
their original form. For example, it is no coincidence that the French conception of the 
bureau du plan resulted in a single plan (1971-76) when it was applied in similar forms in 
Belgium. It was very difficult to find a compromise for long-term state planning and the 
centrifugal force of the Plan was not welcomed. Thus, the Belgian Plan eventually became 
an expertise office to study the impact of major public policies without pushing too 
strongly its own options. It is now a mediating device for the social partners, since it 
provides an external and neutral expertise. It has now much more in common with the 
Dutch planning agency and the Direction de la prevision within the French Ministry of 
Finance than with the Commissariat Général du Plan in France.149 
With such a conception of the state, it does not come as a surprise that the Belgian 
civil service does not have the tradition or the prestige of its French neighbour. As stated 
by a former Minister of Finance, “we simply do not have, as in France, civil servants who 
identify themselves to the state emporium since the French state and France represent 
something and in Belgium this makes us laugh”.150 The bureaucratic elites are not trained 
and formed at a Belgian ENAP, but rather from disparate institutions strongly anchored in 
regional and/or confessional settings (Delwit et al. 1999: 9). This outcome goes hand in 
hand with a strong experience of pillarization.  
Still in contrast to France, it is not conceivable to apply the concept of majority rule 
in Belgium. This political acknowledgement is clearly underlined by Huyse (1980): “If in a 
country like ours one political family imposes its will unilaterally, the result is a serious 
crisis putting the system itself in jeopardy” (cited in Van Den Bulck, 1992: 36). The 
decentralisation of Belgium and the splitting of political parties in the late 1960s have 
further reduced this possibility. Since the strength of political parties are different within 
each of the regions and that a coalition can only be formed with parties of a similar 
                                                 
148 These choices were made despite an obvious fascination by the Belgian elites of the late 16th and 17th Century, 
who were at the time francophone, for the state created in France (Seiler, 1999: 28).   
149 Interview, M. Englert, 24 May 2002.  
150 Interview, Jeans-Jacques Viseur, 21 May 2002.  
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colour,151 it would be unlikely to have a government that has less than four parties. The 
current “rainbow” coalition consists of 6 political parties (Green, Socialists and Liberals). 
 
Table 3.2 Political Control over the Ministry of Social Affairs and Pensions since 1982. 
Government Coalition Position Name Politica
l Party 
Martens V         1981-85  
(CVP, PSC, PRL, PVV) 
Minister of Social Affairs 
State Secretary for Pensions 
Jean-Luc Dehaene 
Pierre Mainil 
CVP 
PSC 
Martens VI       1985-87 
(CVP, PSC, PRL, PVV) 
Minister of Social Affairs 
State Secretary for Pensions 
Jean-Luc Dehaene 
Pierre Mainil 
CVP 
PSC 
Martens VII           1987 
(CVP, PSC, PRL, PVV) 
Minister of Social Affairs 
State Secretary for Pensions 
Jean-Luc Dehaene 
Pierre Mainil 
CVP 
PSC 
Martens VIII     1988-91 
(CVP, PSC, PS, SP, 
VU).  
Minister of Social Affairs 
Minister of Pensions 
Philippe Busquin 
Alain Van der 
Biest 
PS 
PS 
Martens IX       1991-92 
(CVP, PSC, PS, SP) 
Minister of Social Affairs 
Minister of Pensions 
Philippe Busquin 
Gilbert Mottard 
PS 
PS 
Dehaene I         1992-95 
(CVP, PSC, PS, SP) 
Minister of Social Affairs 
Minister of Pensions 
Philippe 
Moureaux 
Freddy Willockx* 
Marcel Colla* 
PS 
SP 
SP 
Dehaene II          1995-
99 
(CVP, PSC, PS, SP) 
Minister of Social Affairs 
Minister of Public Health 
and Pensions 
Magda de Galan 
Marcel Colla** 
PS 
SP 
 
Verhofstadt I       1999- Minister of Pensions and 
Social Affairs 
Frank 
Vandenbroucke 
SP 
Source: CRISP (www.crisp.be). *Colla replaced Willockx on July 18, 1994. ** Colla was forced to resign in 
the spring of 1999 less than two weeks prior to the election.  
 
 
Radical policy options tend to be eliminated rapidly since they must obtain broad 
support among coalition partners. Key in Belgium is the Déclaration gouvernementale, 
which traces the objectives and aim of the coalition government. It is negotiated among the 
coalition partners prior to the formation of the government. Any strong deviation from it 
tends to be difficult since it requires a new round of negotiations within the coalition. 
                                                 
151 For example, the Socialists have tended to be quite strong in the French part while the Christian Democrats and 
Liberals have had better success in the Flemish part. Interestingly, Witte (1992) argues that the French socialist 
supported the idea of a federal Belgium to increase its power within Wallonia and promote socialists idea 
independent of Flanders, which would in turn increase its importance at the national level (96-7). It is an unwritten 
rule to have the sister party join in the government. This means that the French socialists do not join a government 
without their Flemish counterpart. 
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When the Prime Minister holds serious discussions with the social partners, he is 
not alone like its French counterpart, but rather with the representatives of the other 
political parties within the government, who tend to hold key ministries (kerncabinet). 
Another important aspect tends to reduce further the possibility of swift changes in 
Belgium. Coalition partners have traditional guarded territories and seek to protect them by 
securing the ministerial position attached to them. The current government is very 
transparent to this effect. Broadly speaking, the liberals are in charge of finances, the 
socialists of social affairs and the Greens of environment and transports. The Socialists (PS 
& SP) have actually had the control over the Ministry of Pensions and the Ministry of 
Social Affairs without any interruptions since 1988 (see table 3.2). Any pension reform 
without a strong endorsement from the socialists is therefore unlikely. It is worthwhile 
noting that the concept of picket fence applies here since the executive of each ministries is 
filled with experts and political attachés associated closely to the party. The party in charge 
of an individual ministry has strong powers in the design and elaboration of projects as 
long as it follows the déclaration gouvernementale. The other parties are kept in touch with 
the evolution of projects and have a final say when a proposal is presented to the 
ministerial cabinet.  
 
 
Social partners 
Like Sweden, Belgium has been considered as a good case of neo-corporatism (see 
for example Katzenstein, 1985). Prior to World War II, it was difficult to conceive that 
both employers and unions could be co-operating. Their relationship was far from 
harmonious. The employers refused concerted efforts and the Socialist union, with roughly 
75% of all union members, responded with a strong strike effort to gain recognition and 
start negotiations with them. The union pressured the government, which included the 
Socialist Party (Parti Ouvrier Belge) to institute special committees to establish collective 
labour agreements. The employers decided, reluctantly, to get involved in tri-partite 
negotiations because it was the ‘policy of the lesser evil’. Despite the intervention of the 
state, the decision making process was quite antagonistic and required often the presence of 
both Labour Minister and Prime Minister (Luyten and Hemmerijckx, 2000: 208-209).  
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The point of departure in establishing a constructive social dialogue is the so-called 
Social Pact of 1944, which was secretly negotiated among the moderate wings of both 
employers and employees during the German occupation.152 It sought to harmonize the 
relationship between both actors while securing an extension of social insurance. 
Ironically, once the war over, the Social Pact would not be ratified by either unions or 
employers. It was nothing more than a “declaration of principle”. Nonetheless, there has 
been a strong consensus among social scientists that the main lines of the Social Pact “were 
followed after the war with very little discussion” (Pasture, 1993: 695-6; see also 
Vanthemsche, 1994: 43-74). This “Basic Compromise” was similar to other post war 
settlement reached throughout Western Europe. It included three key principles. First, 
unions and employers agreed on what is negotiable (wages, working conditions, etc.) and 
non-negotiable (business operation such as investment and rationalization of production). 
Second, growth was to be shared among both capitalists and labour. Third, there was an 
explicit engagement to favour consensual decisions and strategies (Hancke, 1991).  
Union membership is quite high and covers 60% of the labour force.153 Following 
the discussion on pillarization, it comes as no surprise that the union movement is divided 
into three federations. However, union membership did not evolve as a result of the pillar 
but because of what the unions offered to their members (Pasture, 1993: 709). Contrary to 
the political parties, the three major unions and the main employer association have 
remained federal, and have so far resisted the pressures to decentralise in ways similar to 
the political parties.  
The Fédération générale des travailleurs Belges (FGTB) is the socialist union and 
has a membership of 1,2 millions. 22,3% of its members comes from the public sector. In 
line with the political dominance of the PS in Wallonia, it has stronger roots there than in 
Flanders. It has close ties with both socialist parties (PS and SP), even though it is 
officially independent from political parties. 
The Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens (CSC) is the biggest union in Belgium 
with a membership of more than 1,5 millions. It is stronger in Flanders than in Wallonia, 
                                                 
152  According to Vanthemsche (1994), the participation of the president of the CSC (Henri Pauwels) did not mean 
he had the full support of its organisation. The union was actually going through a very difficult internal crisis and 
many members had participated in the labour union put in place by the occupier (56).  
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and has had a close relationship with the Christian Democratic Party (PSC and CVP), even 
though it has not been historically as closed and formalised as the relationship between the 
socialist union and socialist parties. Despite strong historical differences with the FGTB, 
their relationship is now much more co-operative and they do not operate in a very 
competitive environment similar to the one experienced by unions in France for example. 
This common front began to be developed in the 1960s, and even resulted in an attempt to 
merge (Pasture, 1993: 709). 
The Centrale Générale des Syndicats Libéraux de Belgique (CGSLB) regroups 220 
000 members, with 25% of them working in the public sector. Historically, it has had a 
more limited role than the other two, and it took some time before it became accepted as a 
genuine partner. It has no link with political parties that are comparable to those 
established by the other two unions. 
The main employer association is the Fédération des Entreprises de Belgique 
(FEB), which regroups more than 30 000 small, medium and large enterprises. Like unions 
it is divided into various federations. It is worth underlining that the FEB has maintained 
the social dialogue, meaning that it has not adopted the antagonistic tone of the French 
MEDEF and has not threatened to leave social institutions, such as the Office National des 
Pensions (ONP), that it manages co-jointly with the unions.   
 
The relationship between social partners and the state. 
Despite a formal institutionalization that is similar to France, where benefits are 
divided along wage-earners, civil servants, and self-employed lines, the relationship 
between the state and the social partners has more in common with Sweden than France. 
A key explanation lies in the formulation of the state. The concept of the state was 
never strongly developed and it has not historically been perceived as a threat by unions. 
On the contrary, unions turned to the state to expand their power and social benefits for 
their members. As underlined by Alaluf (1999), social protection progressively began to 
take shape with minimum level of intervention from the state (219). This has left a strong 
policy space for social partners and other private organisations such as the friendly 
                                                                                                                                                             
153 It is worth stating that as in France, unions have included pensioners within their organisation although to a much 
lesser extent. From the data gathered this figures does not exceed 10% in all cases. 
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societies (mutualités), which are still managing health insurance. The historian 
Vanthemsche reaches similar conclusions in his study of the evolution of social security in 
Belgium: 
“A question…must be asked about the old debate concerning the 
respective role of the state and private associations. We have seen that in 
Belgium (maybe more than anywhere else in Europe) private organizations 
have played a crucial role not only in the creation, but also in the 
functioning of the current social security system. Trade unions, friendly 
societies of all kind, employer’s caisses, etc. have created the various 
social insurances and have been integrated within a general system of 
protection established in 1944. Of course, these private initiatives have 
slowly changed form and, as a consequence, of nature: they have been 
transformed in semi-public organisations…The semi-officialisation of the 
private initiatives (for example, those taken by unions or employers) 
allowed to reduce the likelihood of conflict…the co-management takes 
here all of its importance: it implied that this ‘ceasefire’ between workers 
and employers, which we just mentioned. This co-management also had 
the effect of keeping the state at bay since the majority of social partners at 
the time continued to have doubts about it. Despite the semi-officialisation 
of private initiatives, Belgian social security never became étatiste” 
(Vanthemsche, 1994: 192-3 – emphasis added; author translation).154  
 
This self-found peace is one of the reasons why the government did not push for 
alternatives to the Social Pact of 1944. It is imperative to stress that the war had taken away 
the unemployment founds accumulated by the unions and the instauration of single union 
(UTMI)155 by the occupier eroded the strength of both Catholic and Socialist union. The 
Social Pact can also be viewed as a way to re-establish their power as well, but this also 
resulted in an opportunity for the state to increase its powers on social security.   
Vanthemsche (1994) discusses the doubts that social partners had towards the state 
following WWII in an earlier section in his book. Both employers and Catholics sought to 
ensure a limited role for the political authority within the system. For the employers, co-
management ensured that it would have a strong voice in social security. For the Catholics, 
an increased role on the part of the state could have marginalized Catholics organizations, 
an important tool to maintain the place of religion within the society. The socialists were 
divided into two broad camps. The first camp, which had strong support within the 
Socialist union, was in favour of co-managing social security, which would have ensured 
                                                 
154 As a matter of academic honesty towards Vanthemsche, it must noted that he added a footnote following its 
statement comparing Belgium to other European countries stating that a comparative study would be required to 
confirm this (Vanthemsche, 1994: 192 fn. 3).  
155 Union des Travailleurs Manuels et Intellectuels.  
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that workers have a say in the management of social programmes. Even though, this group 
would have preferred to manage without the employers, their inclusion could result in the 
extension of other benefits. The second group was mostly a political wing and hoped to 
establish the notion of “public services” where rights would be universal and would not be 
related to income, class, gender or race. The Socialist Minister of Labour and Social 
Affairs, Léon-Eli Troclet, defended strongly this notion of public service within the 
government (93-99). Thus, this wing of the socialist party was closely seeking what 
Esping-Andersen (1990) calls “de-commodification”, that means the institution of social 
benefits independent from the market. 
It is important to stress that no one feared that a state à la française could develop 
and control social security on its own. The major opponents to an increased role of the state 
were the employers. This can be partly attributed to the inclusion of the Socialist Party 
within the government in the early 1920s, which resulted in measures benefiting the unions 
and promoting collective agreements.  This line of reasoning implies that the employers 
considered the state to be a weak actor, which could come into the hands of hostile 
interests such as the Socialists. The fact that some socialist politicians were seeking to 
implement the notion of public service adds support to this hypothesis. As in Sweden, the 
“political” socialists seemed to believe that capturing the state was feasible (see Chapter 5; 
Rothstein, 1996). The pragmatic view of the union, combined with the near impossibility 
to achieve political control without the Christian “pillar” sealed the faith of this option.  
                                                
156
The state remained fairly absent from areas that were negotiated by the social 
partners (labour market and social security) until 1981 when a Christian-Liberal coalition 
would enter fields traditionally left to the social partners such as altering labour markets 
rules and unemployment insurance. The role of social partners has diminished somewhat, 
but it has not been replaced by the state. Rather, the state has become another partner in a 
new social relationship. “During the past decade the government thus changed from a 
relatively silent third party to a full-fledged, authoritative bargaining partner” (Hancke, 
1991).  
 
156 Prior to WWII, unions did not mind getting closer to the states since they were obtaining the control of social 
insurance and were actually using this power to boost their membership. This was particularly true of the Catholic 
unions and unemployment insurance. Nonetheless, it benefited the socialists as well, and ensured that social 
protection became the realm of social partners and not the state.  
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Even today, the government must act with caution when seeking to reform pensions 
and consult social partners on a regular basis to secure their endorsement. As stated on 
numerous occasions in interviews, acting à la Juppé, or even à la Balladur, is simply not an 
option the government has. Government proposals in the social field require a long period 
of consultation with the social partners and moves by little step (à petit pas). A more 
pessimist view, supporting the view that the state acts more like a referee than as an 
independent actor, claims that Belgian policy making is actually more containing conflict 
rather than solving problems. Thus, it removes “any responsibility for the outcome as far as 
possible from the centre of power and government” (Van Den Bulck, 1992: 52). 
Beside the co-management of social security, unions have used another route to 
enter into the political arena: the pillars. Even though the importance of the pillars has been 
decreasing (see above), they remain an important point of entry into the business of 
government. As it will be demonstrated in the analysis of pension reform, when 
divergences occur among unions, they do not hesitate to rely to the political party of the 
same pillar in order to increase their political strength. Nonetheless, unions have been 
rather successful in maintaining a common front these past 40 years, and such tactics 
usually occur at an early stage in the negotiation process, as a way to test the political pulse 
of a proposal and promote it.157 
 
Bureaucracy 
Besides, of course, the cabinet of the Pension Ministry, three key bureaucratic 
actors have been active during the pension reform process: The Office National des 
Pensions (ONP), the Bureau fédéral du Plan (BFP), and to a lesser extent, the Belgian 
Central Bank (BNB). 
The ONP is much more similar to the French CNAV (see Chapter 2) than the 
Swedish RFV (see Chapter 4). It conducts the general administration of public pensions for 
the pensions of salaried workers and the guaranteed minimum pension. The management 
board consists of social representatives (14),158 one government official and one delegate 
from the Ministry of Finance (ONP, 1999: 4). The role of the government is quite limited 
                                                 
157 For a discussion on whether pillarization and neo-corporatism goes hand in hand in Belgium, see Van Den Bulck 
(1992).  
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in this board reflecting the fact that contributions are mostly paid by employers and 
employees, resulting in a legitimisation of their participation in decisions regarding 
pensions. The administration of the pension fund is quite consensual since the board 
implements existing legislations. The ONP is not officially involved in the political process 
of pension reforms but nevertheless exercise an expertise role since it administers the 
public pension scheme. As in France, its director-general is quite neutral. It would be 
difficult for a DG to enter the political arena since it would most likely interfered with the 
point of views of board and its role of an impartial representative of the organisation. The 
Ministry of Finance is in charge of the pension scheme for public servants. 
The second key actor is the BFP. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, its role is 
mostly confined to the production of expertise and does not share many characteristics with 
its French counterpart. Nonetheless, its role in the pension reform is quite important since 
the government has mandated Le Plan as the main public office for the elaboration of 
figures related to the Belgian pension system. Interestingly, its figures have been criticized, 
not for being too pessimistic, but rather for being too optimistic. It has sought to reassure 
the population that the Belgian pension system was going to be viable in the future 
pointing towards the reduction of the debt, as freeing new revenues. 
The third bureaucratic actor is the Central Bank, which has had a limited and 
indirect role in the pension reform. It has acted as an institutional balance to the Plan, a 
function that would be fulfilled by Finance Ministries in most industrialised countries. It 
has pointed out that some of the assumptions made by the plan are quite optimistic and that 
the maintenance of the current system will need to address the relative decline of pensions 
vis-à-vis wage earners because of its indexation on prices. The Central Bank is not a strong 
public actor because of the possible reaction it could receive from the market. Most of its 
influence is channelled via the Budget and Finance Ministries behind closed doors. It has 
gained ‘official’ recognition and was involved as a junior partner with the Plan in the 
elaboration of the Belgian expertise for the EU’s Working Group on Ageing within 
Ecofin.159   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
158 7 members represent the employers and 7 members represent the workers (3 CSC, 3 FGTB, 1 CGSLB). 
159 Interestingly, DGII has also asked the Plan to adopt less optimistic assumptions.  
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Federalism 
“La Flandre, vache à lait de la Belgique, allaite la 
Wallonie” – Van Hecke, President of the CVP in a 
speech in December 1995. 
 
Before tackling pension reform attempts in Belgium, it is necessary to discuss 
whether or not federalism has had an impact on these discussions. The main theoretical 
framework could be dismissed on the basis that Belgium is a biased case, and that its 
relative inactivity in pension reform has more to do with a federal structure leading to a 
decision trap (Scharpf, 1988), than different types of veto players.  
Prior to 1988, Belgium had been a unitary state. For most of its independence, it 
had been dominated culturally and economically by the French part of the country. 
However, the combined effect of a strong industrial decline in the French part and a sharp 
increase in economic growth in Flanders, has challenged the French dominance within 
Belgium. Support for decentralisation gained momentum in both regions during the 1960s 
and 1970s paving to way for a federal state (See Witte, 1992; Lentzen, 1998).  
Key in terms of comparison is the fact that social security still operates at the 
federal level, meaning that all Belgians are faced with the same rules and regulations 
regardless of domicile. Belgium was thus chosen despite its federal structure because it did 
not seem to matter in the case of pensions. A series of interviews in May 2000 added 
support to this choice. However, a careful review of newspaper articles and interviews in 
2002 challenge this position.  Thus, both views are briefly analysed here.  
On one hand, it must be stated that social security has been the object of conflicts 
between both regions. Large transfers (2,5 billions of Euros) are being made by Flanders to 
Wallonia every year, resulting in north-south tensions. Based on these numbers, a Flemish 
regional newspaper would put on its headline: “Every year a Flemish family buys the 
equivalent of a car to a French family”. Despite these provoking titles and perceptions, 
studies have demonstrated that the differences are the results of socio-economic conditions, 
and not culture or race (Vaes, 1998: 174).160  
                                                 
160 As underlined by Vaes (1998), these transfers were highly publicized and were used to promote a false stereotype 
of the Flemish people being hard working and economically responsible while the French were being considered as 
lazy and wasteful. Subsequent studies have demonstrated that these differences are mostly the result of Wallonia’s 
past experience with heavy industries. Its population is old, less healthy, and voided of employment. With its high 
employment rate, Flanders pays more contributions.  
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Obviously, the French political parties are all unanimous to maintain the federal 
nature of social security, with the Socialists being the less intransigent. A key argument 
brought forward is that social security is one of the only remaining programmes that holds 
the country together.161 The picture is slightly more complex and nuance in Flanders, even 
though all parties support the idea of regionalizing at least one branch of social security. 
The VLD has proposed a stronger reliance on the private sector, a policy that would benefit 
the Flemish region since it would still result in less transfer to the French regions. This 
party tends to be the most nationalistic of the three “democratic” parties, which is not 
surprising because it sought to fuse with the nationalistic Volksunie in the hopes of 
breaking the electoral dominance of the CVP.162 The Christian Democrats (CVP) have 
supported the creation of a new system splitting social security into a contribution-based 
system for pensions and unemployment while supporting a tax based system for family 
allocations and health. This proposal was criticized strongly by the French parties, 
especially the socialists, as being a way to favour the splitting of social security because it 
would be easier to transfer health and family allocations once it is based on income tax. 
The SP has been the most quiet on this issue, but has favoured certain capitalized options 
to complement existing programmes. The extreme right Vlaams Blook, and VU seek to 
severe most, if not all, ties with the south, thus favouring a Flemish only social security. 
These differences in opinion are accentuated by the fact that each political party 
have a regional, and not a national, base. Even though Flanders has a lot of economic 
resources, the instauration of more advanced social programmes at the regional level 
cannot be created because it is a federal jurisdiction. Promoting them at the federal level is 
not a popular choice since it implies few returns for the region due to its stronger economy. 
This strategy can function within a national electorate, but in a regional setting it would 
backfire. Thus, the parties tend to support policies favouring private options, introducing a 
ceiling on federal expenditure with the possibility to complement in other ways, and 
strengthening/increasing the role of the regions in social matters.  
                                                 
161 This argument is similar to the one advanced in Canada for the defence of national health care standards. 
162 The strategy was to change name from the PVV to the VLD adopting a more neo-liberal tone and seek to 
integrate the Flemish nationalists. It failed to fuse with the Volksunie (VU), but still attracted important VU 
politicians such as the former president of the party (Swyngedouw, 1998: 50).  
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As a result of these economic differences between the North and the South, policies 
that result in “visible” transfers tend to be avoided. Thus, policies have been enacted 
making “traceability” more difficult in order to ensure that neither French nor Flemish 
parties can be seemed as being on the losing end. A clear example would be the so-called 
gestion globale introduced in the mid 1990s, which fuses all social contributions into a big 
fund that is then redistributed among all programs. Thus, for example, the excess in family 
allocations decreases the financial deficit of health insurance. Further, making wages more 
competitive via a reduction of social contributions cannot be achieved since a stronger 
reliance on state resources is blocked by Flemish demands to regionalize social security 
(Alaluf, 1999). 
Another consequence is that new social needs tend to remain on ice. The north 
seeks to include them in a regional perspective, while the south wants to incorporate it in a 
federal programme. A clear example has been the discussion to create another pillar of the 
social security system for dependant elderly, which could be financed via social 
contributions. The north has been opposed to this extension and has sought to make it a 
regional policy area.  
On the other hand, there are also many reasons to believe that regional differences 
do not matter in the case of pensions. First, as stated above, social security remains a 
federal jurisdiction without any role for the regions. For example, pensions for the private 
sector are administered by the Office National des Pensions, which has its central office in 
Bruxelles (Tour du Midi) and has regional offices throughout the country.  
Second, contrary to health insurance and family allocations, pension is simply not 
mentioned as a policy sector that could be divided regionally by the main political actors. 
The reasons for this are quite simple and are related to the fact that pensions are linked to 
contributions,163 thus higher wages result in higher pensions. Wages have been higher in 
Flanders for quite some time, meaning that the most expensive pensions will be there. 
Since the 1985, the differences between the average of French pensions, higher due to the 
retirement of workers with long careers in the heavy industries, and Flemish pensions have 
been declining rapidly (Le Soir, 6 January 1995). Peeters (1996) confirms this trend in a 
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study comparing the evolution in the three Belgian regions (see table 3.3).164 Even if one 
takes into account non-contributive elements, such as the granting of pension rights for 
period in unemployment based on the previous salary even though no contributions is 
made, there is no clear winner or loser here. The high unemployment rate in Wallonia is 
compensated by the stronger utilization by the Flemish people of early-retirement schemes 
considered to be a mixture of unemployment insurance and employer compensation.165  
 
Table 3.3 Regional share of pension expenditure (in %). 
 Bruxelles Flanders Wallonia 
 1976 1990 1976 1990 1976 1990 
Total 13,3 11,1 49,6 54,5 37,1 34,4 
Private Sector 12,0 10,8 51,7 55,7 36,2 33,5 
Public Sector 16,6 11,8 44,0 51,8 39,4 36,4 
Pensionable 
Individuals 
(%) 
12,9 11,1 52,6 55,4 34,5 33,5 
Source: Peeters, Paul (1996). “Les pensions légales: la peur, bonne ou mauvaise conseillère?” Reflets & 
Perpectives de la vie économique 35. 
 
Therefore, it is not surprising to find that most pressure to de-centralized social security has 
been mostly confined to health and family allocation (see CSC plan in the discussion 
below) and not pensions. 
 
A Pension Reform is necessary? The ECJ Gives a Push and Willockx Sets the 
Table…Then Leaves. 
The Pension Minister, Willockx, puts pension reform on his agenda… 
Belgium is facing a strong ageing problem compared to other EU countries 
especially when we consider the active/inactive ratio (see appendix C). Despite strong 
                                                                                                                                                             
163 Even though the real link between benefits and contributions is weak, the perception remains strongly anchored. 
Contributions have been preferred to general taxation as a policy tool since they result in less visible transfers 
between the regions. 
164 Due to its special status within the country, Bruxelles is considered as a region of its own.  
165 Whether or not pension was part of the debate on the regionalisation of social security was a question asked to 
everyone interviewed. A vast majority of people interviewed presented the argument sketched in this paragraph (two 
cabinet members within the Ministry of Pensions, unions, experts with Bureau federal du Plan and the Central 
Bank, French liberal representatives, and a member of the PSC).  
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pressures to reform, the debate would only begin in the late 1980s. This is somewhat later 
than the other three countries studied in this dissertation. One reason could be that the 
Belgian pension system was exactly what the French employers were dreaming of, at least 
when it came to private sector workers! The length of contribution required for a full time 
pension was already at 45 years for men,166 7,5 years more than France, pension were 
indexed to prices and not wages, and the retirement age was 65 years old for men and 60 
for women. Even the 1999 Charpin report did not advocate measures that would make the 
French system similar to the Belgian one. Increasing the length of contribution for a full 
time pension to 42 years was considered quite radical, let alone 45. Thus, the Belgian 
pension system for workers in the private sectors did not seem, relative to France, in dire 
need of painful reform for the future. Nonetheless, it took close to 10 years to make minor 
adjustments to improve its future sustainability, and the government used an unexpected 
help from the ECJ. 
Many of the French critics against the lengthening of contribution period beyond 40 
years could study what has been done in Belgium to add support to their claims. To 
counteract the negative effects of having a long contribution period for a full time pension, 
many non-contributive aspects have been instituted these past decades reducing 
significantly the link between contributions and benefits, and adding costs. This is one of 
the reasons why the government has sought to reform it even though its system does not 
seem to require any action on paper. 
During the summer of 1988, at the request of the Pension Secretary of State, the 
BFP was asked to present information with regards to the future of the pension system. 
Less than a year later, the BFP would be assigned to prepare projections for the future of 
the whole social security. This was requested to provide a guiding light in a current 
legislative debate over the possible introduction of a lower retirement age. An official 
document was presented in May 1990, 167 most of the year had been used to gather data and 
create the basis of the simulation model (MALTESE) that would be used in future years. 
This preliminary document analysed the social security system and stated that with an 
annual growth rate of 2,25% pension expenditure would rise from 6.8% of GNP in 1987 to 
                                                 
166 It was 40 for women.  
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11,8% in 2040.168 The share of pension expenditure within the social security system was 
expected to rise from 36% to above 50% regardless of the scenarios. 
The timing of these projections coincided with the Belgian government seeking to 
adapt a 1979 European directive (CEE 79/7) on the equality of treatment between men and 
women. The EC began to tackle its link with pension in the early 1990s, and asked 
Belgium to change the discriminatory treatment of its pension system in the private sector 
(Le Soir, 6 January 1995). So, the main question became whether or not men were going to 
be offered retirement at 60 or whether women would be forced to retire at 65. Thus in 
1990, Belgium instituted a system of flexible retirement age. Men were granted the option 
to retire at 60, without any additional penalty other than the calculation of the pension was 
still based on 45 years. Thus, someone working 40 years and retiring at 60 received a 
pension with the calculation rule of 40/45.169 Women’s scheme was left unaltered.  
Belgium obtained its first big public gathering to discuss the future of pensions in 
the so-called roundtable organized by the Minister of Pensions, Freddy Willockx (SP) in 
1992-3. It included the social partners, pensioners’ organisations, and various experts. For 
this occasion, he BFP prepared new projections in May 1993, which are summarized in 
Table 4.3. Various options for the future were discussed, and the difference of treatment 
between men and women resurfaced when the ECJ ruled against the adjustments made by 
Belgium in 1990 on July 1st 1993. Basically, it claimed that discrimination remained 
because a men working 40 years and choosing to retire at 60 would obtain a pension based 
on the ratio 40/45 while a women would obtain it on a 40/40 basis. It stated that the new 
measures had to go beyond granting the opportunity of retiring at the same age, by 
                                                                                                                                                             
167 Une exploration à long terme de la Sécurité sociale (1987-2040): Comment l’avenir se présente-t-il et comment 
le politique peut-il s’y preparer? (BFP, 1990). 
168 6,7% in 2000, 7,3% in 2010, 9,1% in 2020, and 11,1 in 2030.  The overall picture for the whole social security 
was more optimistic, with expected expenditure peaking requiring an extra 4,4% of GNP in 2040. These projections 
were solely based on the pension system for wage earners and self-employed. The pension system for civil servants 
was not analysed.  
169 This option, in fact, represented the amalgamation of two previous early retirement schemes. The first option, 
extremely advantageous, was to retire at 60 where 5 years of careers were granted without any contributions. So, a 
man retiring at 60 with a career of 40 years obtained a pension similar to a men retiring at 65 with a career of 45 
years (for women 55/35 same as 60/40). This option was only available to those employed in enterprises committed 
to hire a young workers to replace the early-retired individual. The second option was voluntary and consisted to 
take its pension earlier with a penalty of 5% for every year prior to 65. Thus, someone who retired at 60 with a 
career of 40 years obtained a pension based on its average wage multiplied by the coefficient 40/45 and a penalty of 
25%. Those working in small companies unable to replace an individual by a young worker and those unemployed 
took this option. Due to the disparity in both regimes, it was difficult to justify maintaining them.     
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including the same method of calculation for pensions. Further discussion followed within 
the roundtable, but no concrete compromise came out of it. Nonetheless, the roundtable 
allowed Willockx to comprehend the types of reforms that would be accepted by the social 
partners. 
The pension roundtable occurred while broader discussions seeking to reform the 
entire social security system were taking place. In July 1993, the government proposed to 
re-create a new Social Pact that it termed Global Pact. The main objectives were to 
negotiate with the social partners a big agreement on employment, competitiveness and 
financing of social security (Arcq and Chatelain, 1994: 57). It was the intention of the 
government to make substantial savings to reduce significantly the deficit of the whole 
system in the medium term to facilitate its incorporation into the budget in order to meet 
the convergence criteria of Maastricht. A deficit of 110 billions BF (2,8 billions Euros) was 
expected for 1996 and the new measures were aimed at achieving no deficit by that year. 
With regards to social security, the Global Plan sought to achieve five objective: 1) make 
its financing more favourable to employment; 2) redefine its basic principles; 3) reform its 
structure; 4) ensure the financial equilibrium of the system; 5) revise certain spending 
mechanisms (Reman, 1994: 132).  
 
Table 3.4 Preliminary Projections from the Bureau Fédéral du Plan presented during 
the Roundtable in 1993. Expenditure in % of GDP. 
 1991 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
1. Early Retirement 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 
2. Public Sector 3,1 3,9 4,2 4,6 5,1 5,2 5,2 
3. General Scheme 6,6 7,1 7,4 9,0 10,6 11,1 10,8 
(wage earners only) (5,6) (6,3) (6,7) (8,1) (9,6) (10,8) (9,7) 
Total 10,5 11,6 12,1 13,9 16 16,5 16,2 
Source : Une exploration préliminaire des perspectives financières à très long terme de la Sécurité sociale 
(1991-2050) (BFP, 1993). 
 
A committee of experts, the “Verplaetse Group”, was set up in early August 1993 
with the objectives of making propositions by the end of September. On October 20, the 
day after the public submission of the report, the Prime Minister (Dehaene) presented a 
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series of issues to be negotiated coming from both the report and the government to the 
social partners. He asked the social partners to give their opinion on the whole package 
rapidly. FGTB refused right away, while the CSC accepted to negotiate. Four days later, 
Dehaene stated that the negotiations failed and the government would work alone. A series 
of strike then followed. The overall lifting of social security did not occur and the 
government opted to raise new revenues via taxes on alcohol and tobacco, and energy. A 
restructuration plan of social security was included, but only as a wish. The Global Plan 
presented by the government included a proposition to merge all social security receipts 
and expenditure under the same roof. This implied, for example, that the excess of family 
allocations could be used to finance the deficit in health insurance and so on. “Global 
Management” (gestion globale) would be adopted in early 1994 (Arcq and Chatelain, 
1994: 57-62). 
 
…but fails to enact a reform. 
As a result of the ECJ ruling, legal actions against the Belgian government became 
frequent by men asking their pensions to be counted according to 40 years of career instead 
of 45.170 Willocks decided to press ahead with its project of reform, which circulated in 
January 1994. Originating from the roundtable, the reform project aimed to increase the 
retirement age of women (along with the length of contributions for a full pension) in line 
with that of men by the year 2006, eliminate the revalorization of pension contributions 
given between 1955 and 1974, and reform non-contributive elements of the pension 
system. The proposal was confined strictly to wage earners in the private sectors and the 
self-employed. 20 billions of BF were expected in savings via the implementation of these 
measures. Adjusting the ECJ ruling in the other direction, meaning reducing the retirement 
age and length of the contribution period of men in line with that of women was never 
seriously considered because it would have cost an additional 140 billions of BF (Le Soir, 
6 January 1995). 
The negotiations of the Willockx Plan did not go smoothly, even though the 
manoeuvring space was quite limited. First, various women associations, including those 
 158
from the governing parties (PS, SP, CVP, PSC), were very critical of the impact such a 
reform would have on women since their pensions are already much lower than that of men 
(see Table 3.5), and would result in a future decrease of 11%. Most of them also asked 
Willockx to introduce the reform at the latest date possible, which turned out to be 2020.171 
The French Christian-Democrat women argued that due to the precarious career paths of 
women, many of them would be dependent on derived rights (such as pensions because of 
marriage),172 which would go against the objective of achieving more individual rights in 
the social security system (Le Soir, 19 January 1994). The French socialist women pointed 
out that the only women receiving a comparable pension to men where widows regardless 
of whether or not they had worked (Le Soir, 16 February 1994). The Equal Opportunity 
Office between Men and Women was also critical of the reform project underlining that it 
did take into account the realities of the labour market.173 Numbers published in Le Soir in 
1996, provide strong support for this critic. As of 1993, only 16% of women had a 
complete career by the time of retirement, and 76% did not even have 35 years of 
employment (Le Soir, 10 September 1996). The wave of protest led Willockx to delay the 
official introduction of its plan. 
 
Table 3.5 Average Monthly Pensions for Men and Women in 1992 (in BF).174 
 Married Single 
Women 11.586 17.902 
Men 19.469 21.902 
Source: Le Soir, 16 February 1994. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
170 An article in Le Soir, stated that 13 court rulings had pleaded against the 45 years criteria and that 65 men had 
also brought forwards judicial requests that their pensions be calculated on the basis of a 40 years working career 
instead of 45 (Le Soir, 6 January 1995).  
171 This date was obtained because employers are not allowed to discriminate since 1975, thus a 45 years career from 
1975 ends up being 2020.  
172 For example, a housewife or a married worker can obtain pension rights from her husband (75% of its pensions) 
instead of those she earned if it is more advantageous. 
173 Bureau du Conseil de l’Égalité des Chances entre hommes et femmes.  
174 Married implies that both in the couple are still alive and living together while living alone means that only one 
person is alive. The large difference for women results from the fact that many rights are transferred from the men to 
the women once the former is deceased.   
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Willockx intentions were not strictly confined to the private sector. In mid-May 
1994, the media got a hold of a project circulating within the cabinet of various ministries 
to reform the pension scheme of civil servants. Exactly as in France, who as an occupier in 
the 1800s transmitted its system, pension for civil servants is considered a differed wage 
and an integral part of the status of being a civil servant. In Belgium, however, less 
importance was attached to the status, for reasons stated in the preceding sections. The 
reasoning behind higher pensions is the compensation for the lack of good salaries in the 
public sector. It is now debatable whether or not current public service wages are lower 
than in the private, but it was not the case when most of the hiring occurred in the 1970s. 
As a way to stimulate employment, the government took over the role of the private sector 
by hiring a lot of the unemployed. The wages offered were below market level, but the 
generous pension was used as a carrot to lure individuals into the public sector. For the 
employer, this strategy ensured that more individuals could be hire at an affordable price 
and it was easier to promise future wages than to give them right away. It is the retirement 
en masse of those workers in the upcoming years that is creating worries for the 
government. Thus, even though the opposition to any reform into public servant scheme 
was similar in both France and Belgium, the roots of the opposition are different. 
As in France, the conditions and benefits of the public sector scheme are more 
advantageous than those found in the private sector. Each year gives the right to 1/60th 
(tantièmes)175 of the reference salary in one’s career, usually the last one, with a 
replacement ceiling of 75%. Differences exist within the civil service, but mostly relates to 
the number of tantièmes required to obtain a full time pension. The most privileged 
positions with regards to these criteria are university professors and the magistrate whose 
pensions are accorded on the basis of only 30 tantièmes.176 The most advantageous element 
of the civil servant pension system remains its indexation mechanism. Contrary to the 
system valid in the private sector, pensioners in the public sector scheme see their pensions 
indexed in line with the evolution of wages in the public sector. In Belgium this is referred 
to as péréquation. Thus, if civil servants obtain a wage increase of 3%, pensions increase 
                                                 
175 The basic calculation for a pension in the public service is 1/60 x reference salary x number of years of service. 
1/60 is the so-called tantième. 
176 Other professions that need a lower tantième than 60 include teachers, postmen, custom agents, railway workers, 
etc.  
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by 3%. This is by far the most expansive element of the whole system, and the one that 
governments have sought to alter. The Global Plan commanded measures to reduce the 
financial weight of civil servant pensions, which accounts for 17% of the state budget 
excluding the servicing of the debt, by 750 millions of BF (Le Soir, 19 July 1994). 
The end result is a stark difference between the average monthly pension received 
by wage earners (20 145 BF) and those self-employed (11 788 BF) vis-à-vis state 
employees (54 931 BF) (Le Soir, 4 January 1995). More importantly, as seen in the French 
chapter, the replacement rate of private sector pensioners decreases overtime relative to the 
average wage because it is price indexed while it remains stable for public sector 
employees. It is worth underlining, however, that civil servants do not have access to the 
second pillar, which comprises pensions negotiated within a collective agreement or an 
enterprise. Nonetheless, these have not been widespread and are not easily accessible to 
many workers. Only 1/3 of all wage earners participate in them.177 Another way to stress 
their size is to compare assets. The private pension funds represent 10% of GDP while 
pension rights represent more than 250% (Pestieau and Stijins, 1997: 6).   
Willockx proposals for the pension of civil servants sought to alter two key 
elements. First, it aimed to delay the effect of péréquation by imposing an annual ceiling of 
1%. Thus, if wages were to increase by 3% in year x, pensioners would receive an 
incremental increase of their pensions (1% in years, x, y and z), which would enter into 
force on the 1st of July instead of the 1st of January. The second element would eliminate 
the preferential tantième treatment received in some sector of the civil service so that 
everyone would have 60 tantièmes. The ceiling of the widow’s pension and an inclusion of 
any years worked in the private sector were two other elements being considered (Le Soir, 
19 May 1994). 
The reactions of the unions were immediate and negative. Both representatives of 
the public sector sections of the main unions (FGTB and CSC) expressed their disapproval, 
but maintained that consultations within their union would be required. The most optimist 
reaction came from Hervé Decuyer (CCSP – CSC), who mentioned: “personally, I am of 
course against it. There are only negative elements. That being said, we have to see where 
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we are coming from. During the roundtable, when the Global Plan was released, more 
radical measures were mentioned” (Le Soir, 20 May 1994 – author translation). Willockx, 
for his part, expressed regrets that his plan came public so early in the process (ibid). The 
discussion of the proposal within the Cabinet was delayed, and the project was then 
shelved following the opposition within the government, coming especially from the 
Minister of Justice, Melchior Wathelet (PSC).178 Melchior faced strong lobbying pressure 
by the Magistrate to reject the Willockx proposal (Le Soir, 5 January 1995).179  
A month later, the whole reform process was disturbed significantly when Willockx 
announced that he would leave the government to lead the Flemish Socialist at the 
upcoming European elections. He claimed, however, that he would be able to present its 
project to reform the pensions of the private sector, which had previously been announced 
for January. Willockx left for Strasbourg in July without any reform project being officially 
presented. 
 
Colla replaces Willockx, Delaying the Reform Further…But Obtains Some “Success”. 
Following the departure of Willockx to the European Parliament, Colla (SP) was 
appointed Minister of Pensions on July 18, 1994. All projects would be shelved until the 
federal elections of 1995. During his first year as Minister, Colla actually implemented 
measures to generate alternative revenues such as a solidarity contribution of 2% for high 
pensions (more than 40 000 BF for those living alone), and a tax of 9% on energy (4 
January 1995). 
Reforming social security was a key point during the electoral campaign of 1995. A 
major cause was the strong neo-liberal attitude adopted by the Flemish Liberals (VLD), 
which was partly supported by the French Liberals (PRL).180 The VLD congress of March 
                                                                                                                                                             
177 One restriction for example is that workers who move to another company cannot bring their pensions with them. 
This was a tactic used by employers to ensure that workers would remain faithful to the company. Willockx 
presented a project to make pensions movable prior to his departure, which was adopted later on.  
178 Melchior was no junior Minister. He was one of the three Vice Prime Ministers and he was also responsible for 
economic affairs.  
179 Reducing the tantièmes or harmonizing them would have hurt them a lot because many members of the 
Magistrate have a tantième of 1/30, the passage to 1/60 would mean a 50% reduction in their pensions. 
180 A key difference was that the French liberals promised to guarantee the value of current pensions. They proposed 
the creation of a minimal pension financed via general taxation complemented by a funded scheme (Le Soir, 12 
December 1994). Its rhetoric remained less “brutal” and neo-liberal than its Flemish counterpart. The PRL would 
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1994 had resulted in a new programme to reform the social security system, and it became 
a key element of its electoral campaign at both regional and federal levels. Inspired by the 
pension funds of its Dutch neighbour, the VLD proposed to introduce a new system that 
would include both funded and payg elements. Claiming that current contributions, set at 
19%, for the pension system would need to reach 29% in the future, the Flemish Liberals 
advocated to raise the contribution rate to 24%, of which 5% would be invested in pension 
funds. They claim that the funded component would eventually generate enough savings to 
reduce the payg part to 15% within 20 years, freezing contribution rates at 20%. Further, 
they proposed to increase the minimum pension by 6 000 BF a month and extend the 
second pillar via funded schemes financed by employers. Then in order to please the 
nationalist wing of the party, its President, Verhofstadt, stressed that the Francophones had 
the choice between his option or the regionalization of social security (21 March 1994).181  
This neo-liberal tone reached another level during the election campaign with 
posters featuring an elderly woman under the slogan “Pension Funds will disappear in 5 
years”!182 Despite a slight improvement on the electoral result from the PVV era,183 the 
liberal ancestor to the VLD, the election of 1995 was viewed as a defeat because of the 
great support it had in the polls prior to the elections. The president of the party, 
Verhofstadt, resigned soon after the election.  
The social security proposal of the party was simply not accepted and trusted 
among the population. As stated by an anonymous member of the party, “Guy was 
considered as the one who would tear down pensions” (Le Soir, 28 November 1995 – 
author translation). Ironically, the implementation of this programme would have been 
quite difficult since both the association of insurance (UPEA) and the Belgian association 
of pension funds (ABFP) expressed their attachment to the first pillar and restated that their 
role was to complement it, not replace it.184  
                                                                                                                                                             
eventually abandoned its reform plans of the social security in October 1996 citing studies from BFP claiming that 
pensions are sustainable in the future (Le Soir, 28 October 1996). 
181 The president of the French Socialists, Philippe Busquin, later responded that Verhofstadt’s options represented 
“a choice between the pest or the cholera”.   
182 Pension funds do not even exist within the pension system, which relies exclusively on redistributive aspects.  
183 The PVV received 12% of the votes in the 1991 election, while the VLD counting also on the support of large 
segments of the VU gathered 13,1%. That was 4% less than the CVP, which it had led in the polls for a large period 
of time prior to the elections.   
184 Interview, Gauthier Robyns, 29 May 2000; Interview, Mr. Brasseur, 5 June 2000; Le Soir 22 February 1994.  
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The Socialist and Christian-Democrats gathered enough support to build a new 
government. The déclaration gouvernementale presented on June 28, 1995 was not too 
precise on the subject of pensions despite the reform attempts made by the previous 
government. As it did in the déclaration gouvernementale of 1992, the government 
stressed the importance of reducing to debt drastically to sustain the payment of pensions 
beyond 2010. In a comparative perspective, Belgium’s focus on debt reduction and pension 
sustainability matches Sweden’s obsession of linking savings and pensions (see chapter 5).  
In its declaration, the government further announced that the pensions system will 
be supported and that it will be modernized in line with new familial realities, the evolution 
of the labour market, and adapted to reduce the financial consequences of population 
ageing. The media also stated that an objective of the government would be to control the 
expenditure dynamic of the pension scheme for public servants (Le Soir, 19 June 1995). 
Two other elements related to pensions were mentioned. First, the government promised to 
ensure that low pensioners receive a fairer part of the increased standard of living. Second, 
it stated that it would seek to promote the second pillar of the pension system by 
encouraging employees and employers to consider its importance following the new legal 
framework.  
Few months following the introduction of the new government, it was evident that 
Belgium would do the necessary adjustments to enter into EMU. Belgium like Italy was 
one of the countries whose participation was followed by a big question mark. There was a 
strong commitment from the government and existing institutional powers were re-
enforced (see Hallerberg, 1999). Social security reform re-appeared strongly as a necessary 
element to reach the convergence criteria of Maastricht.  
Willockx proposal for the private sector resurfaced and obtained the same kind of 
reactions as those expressed a year ago. The women association within the Flemish 
Christian Democrat party restated their worries about the new reform and asked a real 
effort from the government to equalize the professional opportunities if it opts to continue 
with its reform project (Le Soir, 23 June 1995). In November 1995, following contacts 
with the social partners at the top level, Colla announced that the reform for private sector 
workers and self-employed would be carried out by the end of the year. He also pushed for 
 164
the creation of collective pension funds to create a strong second pillar (15 November 
1995). 
It soon became apparent that the support of public sector unions would be much 
more difficult. Rumours circulated that Colla had proposed something different and more 
radical than Willockx. The péréquation would be maintained for low salaries and the 
preferential treatment received by certain groups of civil servants (ie. lower tantièmes) 
would be abolished. He further sought to calculate pensions according to the whole career 
instead of the last five years. These measures would have meant a certain harmonisation 
with pensions granted in the private sector (Le Soir, November 15 1995). The unions were 
unfazed by Colla’s initiatives. As underlined in the newspapers and during interviews with 
both social partners and a cabinet member from the Ministry of Pensions, the only way to 
describe the negotiation is by referring to the word “blockage”. The public service unions 
simply refused to negotiate a reduction in their pensions.185 The general strike movement in 
France would halt public discussions on this subject resulting into the addition of the initial 
phrase “we are not going to act à la Juppé” into the speeches of politicians. 
Broader discussions to reform the whole social security intensified during the fall 
and winter, as the government announced a big reform of the whole social security system 
for 1996. A proposal from the CSC gathered most of the attention and became the source 
of regional tensions because it sought to separate social security into two distinct pillars, 
one financed via general taxation (health and family allocations) and another one via 
contributions (unemployment and pensions). Its proposal obtained the support of nine 
social security experts and university professors (one francophone and eight flemish) in 
December 1995. They supported the project as a good stumbling block to secure a new 
Social Pact (Le Soir, 23 December 1995). The CVP offered its support to this plan seeing it 
as a way to improve the competitiveness of Belgium via reduced labour costs for 
employers. A common socialist front (FGTB, PS, SP) opposed it fearing that it could open 
the way to a regionalisation of the system.186 These fears reach new heights when the 
President of the CVP claims that “la Flandre vache à lait de la Belgique, allaite la 
Wallonie” (Le Soir, 20 December 1995). The Socialist front affirmed on numerous 
                                                 
185 Interview, M. Willems, 22 May 2002; Interview, Josette Duchesne, 21 May 2002; Le Soir, 10 November 1995.  
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occasions that a national system is necessary to maintain the insurance nature and 
solidarity of the system. Fearing another round of negative reactions, both Liberal parties 
opted for silence, awaiting the presentation of a governmental plan. The FEB supported 
any proposition that would feature a reduction in its social contributions and seek 200 
billions FB in reduction (Le Soir, 23 December 1995).  
In the hopes of reaching a consensus with the government and the FGTB, the CSC 
announced in January 1996 that it withdrew its project to create two pillars within the 
whole social security system. This position opened the door for a common front with the 
FGTB agreeing for alternative sources of financing as long as reductions in contributions 
be matched with binding employment target (Le Soir, 2 February 1996). 
Discussions to reform the pensions of private sector workers resumed in May 1996. 
As part of the three broad laws that would allow Belgium to enter EMU, it was announced 
that a pension reform would be included and that it is the action engendering the strongest 
reactions (Le Soir, 19 May 1996). Based on the reactions found in the newspaper, the 
stumbling-blocks seemed to be with the FGTB and the PS. In the FGTB, internal conflicts 
over pension reform paralysed the search of a common position to this effect. Led by the 
Walloon regional federation,187 women, and public servants, a group refused to move 
beyond the 40 years for women.188 A more pragmatic group led by the Flemish federation 
supported negotiations towards lengthening of the contribution period as long as the 
government ensured a decent pensions to all women. The final compromise ended up being 
that the FGTB would refuse any lengthening of contributions for women if they are not 
compensated for the unfair treatment they receive in the labour market (Le Soir, 30 May 
1996; 8 June 1996; 18 June 1996; 19 June 1996). 
The leadership of the French Socialist Party experienced difficulties in seeking 
support from its grass roots for an extension of the contribution period for women. The 
                                                                                                                                                             
186 Fearing that it could not convince the CSC to adopt a common platform, the FGTB invited the socialist leaders 
from both regions to obtain a broad agreement on this issue (Le Soir, 28 November 1995). 
187 It also objected to a reconsideration of the positive adjustments made to contributions made between 1955-74 by 
previous government, and altering the way to calculate non-contributive periods.   
188 Based on figures from BFP, this group argued that reducing men’s career to 40 years would only cost 32,8 
billions of BF in 2030 the worst year of the papy-boom. The PS would object to these figures citing an evaluation of 
the ONP stating costs of 28,2 billions already in 2001 (Le Soir, 18 June 1996). The difference in figures was 
probably due to the fact that Le Plan probably added expected savings from other social security programs such as 
early-retirement, mostly financed by unemployment insurance, while the ONP solely focused on pensions. 
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women association within the party asked for the removal of all points related to the 
acceptance by the PS of the pension reform (Le Soir, 18 June 1996). To attenuate the 
critics, the party leadership promised during the congress to ensure that: the transition 
period would be long, the reform would consider the differences between men and women 
at the end of a career, and it would seek to raise the minimal pension (Le Soir, 1 July 
1996). 
It is worthwhile to stress that the protest movement was not confined within these 
two organisations. First, the CSC adopted a compromise line where it was willing to accept 
a new pension system based where a full pension would be based on 42 or 43 years. 
However, it also asked for improvements in the current system. It wanted an improvement 
of small and minimum pensions, a better consideration of low salaries, and part-time wage 
earners. Second, the Parliamentary committee dealing with the equality between men and 
women189 unanimously190 voted against any generalization of pensions based on a 40 year 
career, but raised serious question on the solution seeking to align everybody on a 45 year 
career. The committee pointed out that such action needed to evaluate the increased costs 
for other sectors of social security such as unemployment and the negative effects on 
women’s pensions (Le Soir, 26 June 1996). 
As a result of this opposition, Colla’s official proposal was delayed further. He was 
so discouraged that he even presented a new solution coming straight out of a hat. Colla 
suggested similar to the life income principle (see Chapter 5), where every year worked 
would give pensions points. Those working part-time or unemployed would receive an 
amount of points equivalent to the minimum pension. The individual could then choose 
when to retire. He asked the FBP to study this further and stated that he would present this 
idea to the cabinet at their next meeting (Le Soir, 22 June 1996; 24 June 1996). This idea 
was pretty much dead on departure since it even failed to gather support from its own 
party. It was never mentioned again, a sign that his colleagues in the government were not 
too supportive. Whether or not it was a good idea was a moot point. The major problem 
would have been the length of time necessary to gather enough expertise on the new 
                                                 
189 Comité d’avis pour l’émancipation sociale.  
190 With the exception of the Extreme Right and VU.  
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system and, more importantly, the time required for each political actor to study the 
proposal resulting in another round of negotiations.  
The momentum towards the introduction of the pension reforms in both private and 
public sector increased in the fall of 1996. Working with the hypothesis elaborated by the 
BFP, a brainstorming group including experts from various ministries worked on various 
scenarios in September 1996 (Le Soir, 10 September 1996).191 According to the Belgian 
state radio and television (RTBF), a one shot operation delaying progressively the payment 
pensions within the public sector is among the alternatives considered for the public sector 
(Le Soir, 25 September 1996). Unions continued to be consulted, but their opposition to the 
reforms, especially the one in the public sectors, did not seem to decline. As a 
precautionary measure, more than 1 500 civil servants, from the three major unions, 
pledging to defend their pensions gathered in front of Val Duchesne, where the Council of 
Ministers was meeting.  (Le Soir, 14 September 1996). 
 
After nearly 3 years of delay, the “inequalities” between men and women are erased. 
Faced with continuous pressure not to alter the pensions of civil servants, the 
government abandoned plans to reform them. The government officially announced the 
introduction of a reform, first proposed by Willockx in late 1993, at the end of September. 
It is clearly stamped by numerous compromises, and comprises five elements. First, 
women will be required to have 45 years of contributions in order to have a full pension, 
but this new requirement is implemented over a long transition period of 13 years.192 
Women would need to contribute 41 years for a full time pension, adding an extra year of 
contribution every three years to reach 45 in 2009. Second, the flexibility to retire between 
60 and 65 remain under the same “penalty”,193 but the minimum number of years in 
contributions required is gradually increased from 20 to 35 (2 years per year until 2005). 
Third, pensions were revalorized during the period 1955-74 by a coefficient of 1,036 (or 
3,6%). This coefficient is removed gradually to be eliminated in 2005 (.004 per year). 
                                                 
191 This type of meeting is called in “kern” meaning a restraint cabinet.  
192 Earlier government proposals suggested an implementation period lasting until 2006.  
193 For example, someone who stops working at 62 with a career of 43 years would obtain a pension reflecting his 
average wage x 60% x 43/45 and not 45/45 as do individuals with a complete career. This system remains more 
advantageous than the actuarial mechanism put into the new Swedish pension system (see Chapter 5). 
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Fourth, the government introduced a minimal pension right for each year of career. 
In order to obtain this benefit, an employee has to be employed for at least of 15 in a job at 
a minimum of 1/3 time, which can include period under unemployment. Thus, someone 
having a part-time or broken career can receive a pension based on a full time career at the 
minimum wage. Finally, for non-active periods considered to be part of a redistribution of 
work, pension points are granted as a mean of compensation. The value of the assimilated 
period could be doubled or even tripled for the education of a child below the age of six. 
The final two measures have a direct impact on women, who tend to have more precarious 
positions than men. They can be viewed as a way to lessen the pain of an increase in the 
length of contribution. 
It is important to stress what did not end up being in the pension reform. The key 
element being a reconsideration of the non-contributive benefits granted for sickness and 
unemployment for example. Willockx had proposed earlier to reduce the level of 
compensation so that “fictive” points would be granted on the basis of the average wage 
instead of the wage of the previous year (see Le Soir, 27 January 1994). The early 
retirement scheme was also not altered, with the exception that women would have to wait 
for an additional period of time to obtain it. A similar reform was introduced for the self-
employed.  
The responses to the reform were quite positive with the exception of the Liberal 
opposition who claimed that Colla’s proposal was not really a reform, but only an 
adjustment to put women’s pensions in line with men’s (Le Soir, 2 October 1996). 
Probably fearful of the backlash their previous position caused within the populace, their 
critics remained moderate. Due to implementation delays, the reform would be enacted six 
months later, July 1st 1997 instead of January 1st. Highly problematic was the co-ordination 
of the reform with early retirement schemes partly financed by the employers, and the 
granting of pension rights to part-time workers (Le Soir, 3 January 1997). A manifestation 
against the way the government instituted the calculation of the minimum right for 
pensions occurred in February 1997. Other demands included a better indexation of 
pensions and a solution for the transitional problems caused by to early retirement schemes 
by increasing the age of retirement for women (Le Soir, 7 February 1997).  
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Consequences of the 1996 Pension Reform: Real Savings? 
Contrary to expectations, the pension reform did not provoke stark changes within 
the system and doubts were even raised that it did not really produce any savings. To 
enlighten us on this subject, the BFP produced a special planning paper on the effects of 
the new reform entitled La réforme des pensions: Une nouvelle generation et un nouveau 
contrat (BFP, 1997).194 Interestingly, the author of the report, Festjens, analyzed the effects 
of the reform on both individuals (table 3.6) and the state budget (3.7). The projections 
performed by Festjens assume an annual growth rate of 2,25%, stable long term interest 
rates of 4%, and an unemployment rate of 5%.195  
As seen in table 3.6, the individual effects of the new reform are quite negligible. 
Most individuals will lose less than 1% in the value of their pensions. The long-term 
effects are almost nil, if not positive. Most of the negative effect of the lengthening in 
contributions affecting women are compensated by the institution of the minimum pension 
right for individual career years falling below the minimum wage. In the worst-case 
scenario, a 1% reduction in pension is observed for non-married women pensioners in 
2010. The main savings measure is the elimination of the revalorization granted during the 
1955-74 and not the increase in the length of contribution for women. 
The macro data presented in table 3.7 underline that the pension reform actually 
introduces a new burden to other social security programmes such as unemployment, 
invalidity, and early retirement. By the year 2007, more than 20 billions BF will be 
required by these programmes as a result of the reform. This is a direct consequence of the 
fact that many women between the age of 60 and 65 will most likely end up being 
unemployed or in early retirement programmes. As seen in Chapter 1, Belgium’s activity 
rates among older workers (55+) are the lowest in Europe and many older workers find 
themselves into long-term unemployment or early retirement schemes. This is a practice 
that was considered acceptable for most of the 1970s and 1980s. Even though it was 
criticized heavily in the 1990s, no sharp decrease was experienced and social partners 
continue to reject any change. Thus, despite pension savings of 33,8 billions in 2007, the 
                                                 
194 The pension reform:  A new generation and a new contract. 
195 Other assumptions include: an increase in fertility rate from 1.55 in 1995 to 1.75 in 2010, to remain constant 
afterwards; an increase in life expectancy; a decline in the net migration from 10.638 in 1996 to 2.897 in 2050 
(probably caused by a decline in the population due to ageing rather than a reduction in immigration). 
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state budget will end up being reduced by 16,3 billions of BF (appr. 6,5 billions Euros) 
once other social security programmes are taken into account. The reduction in pension 
expenditure for other programmes occurs because many women have mix career. When the 
career is longer in the private sector, the points from the other regimes are transferred into 
it (Festjens, 1997: 75). 
 
Table 3.6 Impact of the Pension Reform as a % of Net Salaries 
(1) increase in the contribution length for women; (2) elimination of the revalorization for 1955-74; (3) 
introduction of the minimum pension right per year of career. 
Type of Pension 2005 2010 2030 2050 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Head of Household 0,1 -1,2 0,6 0,1 -1,4 0,8 0 -,1 0,5 0 0 0,2 
Men (single) 0 -,6 0,3 0 -,7 0,4 0 -,2 0,4 0 0 0,2 
Women (single) -1 -,4 0,7 -1,4 -,7 1,1 -,3 -,2 1,4 -,5 0 0,9 
Married Men -,2 -,9 0,4 -,2 -,9 0,5 -,2 -,1 0,3 -,1 0 0,1 
Married Women -,2 -,4 0,5 -,1 -,6 0,8 1,1 0 0,9 0,8 0 0,6 
Couple -,3 -1,3 0,9 -,3 -1,5 1,3 0,9 -,1 1,2 0,7 0 0,8 
Average Pension 0,5 -,7 0,4 0,9 -,8 0,6 0,8 -,2 0,6 0,5 0 0,3 
Source: M.J. Festjens (1997). La réforme des pensions: Une nouvelle generation et un nouveau contrat 
(Planning Paper 82, BFP). Page 71. 
 
Table 3.7 also demonstrates that two elements of the reform were cost saving while 
the third main element of the reform results in further expenditure. The element generating 
the most savings remain the increase in the contributory period for women, which is set to 
generate 33,7 billions of BF in savings. Ironically, the introduction of minimum pension 
right per career year results in higher costs for men than women even though it was granted 
as a compensation measure for the later group.  
Based on her analysis, Festjens comes to the conclusion that the group that will 
suffer the most from the reform are women with a stable career. They are unlikely to obtain 
minimum pension rights because they do not have career breaks or precarious positions, 
thus they face the full effect of the reform without any pillows. Those women are likely to 
lose 9 to 11% of their pensions when they decide to retire at 60 (Festjens, 1997: 75). 
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Table 3.7 Supplementary Savings (-) or Expenditure (+) resulting from the Pension 
Reform of 1996. Wage-earners’ scheme only.* 
In Billions of BF.  As a % of GDP.  
1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2020 2030 2040 
Wage Earners’ 
Pension Scheme 
– Total (a+b+c) 
-3,8 -11,7 -23,5 -36,8 -,447 -,373 -,238 -.189 
Men -0,1 -1,0 -2,2 -2,5 -,018 +0,32 +,062 +,043 
Women -3,7 -10,7 -21,4 -34,3 -,429 -,405 -,299 -232 
a) Equalization 
into 45th 
-3,7 -9,9 -19,7 -31,7 -,401 -,403 -,335 -,277 
Men +0,2 +0,7 +1,3 +2,0 +,023 +,027 +,026 +,020 
Women -3,9 -10,6 -21,0 -33,7 -,424 -,430 -,361 -,297 
b)Reduced 
Revalorization 
-1,1 -5,2 -10,2 -14,6 -,152 -,118 -,050 -,002 
Men -0,8 -3,7 -7,1 -9,7 -,095 -,056 -,016 -,001 
Women -0,3 -1,5 -3,1 -4,9 -,057 -,062 -,034 -,001 
c) Minimum 
Right per year of 
career 
+1 +3,4 +6,3 +9,5 +,106 +,148 +,147 +,090 
Men +0,5 +2,0 +3,6 +5,2 +,054 +0,61 +,052 +,024 
Women +0,5 +1,4 +2,7 +4,3 +,052 +0,87 +,096 +,066 
Other Pension 
Schemes 
-0.3 -0,8 -1,7 -3 -045 -,060 -,056 -,037 
Invalidity +0,5 +1,4 +2,5 +3,7 +,045 +,046 +,042 +,031 
Unemployment +1,3 +4,1 +8,4 +14,1 +,176 +,187 +,157 +,120 
Early Retirement +0,8 +1,8 +3,3 +5,6 -,076 +,100 +,094 +,068 
Other expenses - - - -0,2 -,003 -,008 -,003 -,001 
Total Impact of 
the Reform 
-1,5 -5,1 -10,9 -16,3 -,198 -,108 -,004 -,008 
Source: M.J. Festjens (1997). La réforme des pensions: Une nouvelle generation et un nouveau contrat 
(Planning Paper 82, BFP). Page 74.  
 
 
While interpreting and analyzing these projections, a caveat is in order. The total 
savings might actually be less positive than what was projected by the Plan. Considering 
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the recent development in the Belgian economy, both growth rate and unemployment must 
be considered as optimist. The average growth for the period 1990-2000 was of 2% due to 
strong growth in the second half of the 1990s. Had the plan used similar macroeconomic 
hypothesis as the Economic Policy Committee (where the growth rate is expected to be of 
2,5% from 2002 to 2011, 1,8% between 2011 and 2021, and 1,2% thereafter), the savings 
would have been reduced further. Purely in terms of savings, growth is the key element in a 
pension system that is price indexed because the revenues increase in real term while 
expenses increases only in terms of new adherents to the system but not as a result of the 
evolution of pensions, which remain frozen in real term. As experienced in Sweden during 
the early 1980s, negative growth with high inflation can result in the pensioners being 
better off than the wage earners. As we will see in the conclusion, a strong growth rate also 
results in difficulties.  
 
Can Belgium Succeed Where Juppé Failed? 
Willockx was the first minister to consider seriously reforming public pensions, but 
retrieved its proposal because of strong pressure from civil servants, more particularly from 
the Magistrate. Colla had high hopes early on, but the French reaction to the Juppé plan 
made him reconsider. Contrary to France, most civil servants are unionized in Belgium. 
The introduction of the pension reform in the private sector re-launched discussions to do 
the same in the public sector. The third attempt would be as successful as the previous two. 
When the pension reform for the private sector was made official, politicians all 
made comments stating that actions was also necessary in the public sector. This was, after 
all, the sector in which pensions were expected to grow fastest due to their indexation on 
wages instead of prices. The retirement of the numerous agents hired in the 1970s was 
causing strong headaches to the government. At a time where budget constraint was the 
norm, pension expenditures in the public sector were expected to double within 20 years.  
The head of the PSC group, Jacques Lefèvre, mentioned that he regrets “the lack of 
measures for public sector pensions” (Le Soir, 2 October 1996). Key leaders of the other 
three political parties in the coalition, Dehaene (CVP), Vande Lanotte (SP), and Busquin 
(PS) confirmed on numerous occasions their wishes to reform the pension system within 
the public service. A political consensus existed on this issue. All parties recognized that 
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the basic agreement of lower wages and higher pensions could not be altered in principle. 
This implied that current pensions and those forthcoming in the near future could not be 
touched. However, they argued that a reform including a long transition period ought to be 
considered because of the changing conditions found within the civil service. State 
employees now have similar wages as those in the private sector, the value of job security 
is worth significantly more than 30 years ago, and the length of retirement has increased as 
well (Le Soir, 8 October 1996). The main objective for the government was still delaying 
or reducing the effect of the so-called péréquation (Interview, Willems, 22 May 2002). 
With discussions surrounding a reform, public servants ensured that the 
government understood the readiness of the opposition. Sponsored by the three major 
unions, a strike of more than 14 000 people paralysed Bruxelles for few hours at the end of 
January. A key request was the respect of their status and their pensions (Le Soir, 30 
January 1997).  
Pension reform discussions disappeared for about six months. Two newspapers, 
L’Écho and the Standaard, surprised by announcing that the government was close to 
adopting a reform in the summer of 1997. L’Écho claimed that the péréquation would no 
longer by automatic and that the tantièmes would be increased by 4 for all civil servants 
(Le Soir, 7 June 1997). The Standaard referred to a reform project similar to the one 
advocated by Willockx. The péréquation would have a ceiling of 1% per year, and an 
increase in the number of tantièmes would be encouraged via the granting of bonuses (Le 
Soir, 17 June 1997). 
These rumours were strongly denied by the Minister of Pensions and his cabinet. 
Colla even considered “farfelue” (batty) the idea of increasing all tantièmes by 4, 
mentioning that such options had not even been studied. Cabinet members maintained that 
inter-ministerial discussions had not yet begun (Le Soir, 7 June 1997). To weather the 
storm, the Prime Minister called a press conference few days after an inter-ministerial 
meeting devoted to the issue. Dehaene claimed that reforming public sector pensions was a 
part of the déclaration gouvernementale, but that his government was strongly committed 
to the process of negotiation with the unions. Finally, he rejected all questions concerning 
the rumours initiated by the media since no precise scenario was being considered by the 
government (Le Soir, 20 June 1997). 
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The tone of the unions was uncompromising. First, the liberal union (SFLP – 
branch of CGSLB) stated that touching the péréquation and increasing the tantièmes would 
amount to a declaration of war (Le Soir, 7 June 1997). Second, the FSCSP (branch of CSC) 
decided to adopt a wait and see attitude while the CGSP (branch of FGTB) announced 
warning measures (Le Soir, 20 June 1997), which it did the following two weeks. 
A frustrated Colla would make a final pledge in early 1998 to convince the 
opposition to alter their stance. In an interview, he said that: 
“My file has been ready for months. I have ideas, proposals. Up to now, it 
has not been politically feasible to implement them…It is possible that 
those who do not want a reform could avoid it during this parliamentary 
mandate. Will it be a victory? No. The problem will remain on the political 
agenda. I ask “solennellement” the political leaders, my friends in the 
union movement, and to all civil servants to reflect well on this. It is in 
their interest that this reform happens as soon as possible. Even if we vote 
in a year, I am ready to make a reform that is socially acceptable and that 
guarantees the uniqueness of the public servant scheme” (Le Soir, 7 
January 1998). 
 
Failing in his last attempt, Colla redirected his energy to his other main portfolio, Public 
Health. This turned to be more devastating than his pension work, as he ended up being 
one of the two main political figures implicated in the scandal of the contaminated chicken, 
the “chickengate”. He was forced to resign in early June 1999. 
Following the elections of June 1999, Frank Vandenbroucke (SP) became the new 
Minister of Pensions. Freshly arrived from a political exile in Oxford where he obtained a 
PhD in Social Science, he opted for a successful course of action: inaction. He would refer 
the issue to those who negotiate wages (Le Soir, 14 September 1999). This implies seeking 
to moderate the increase in the salaries of public employees, which in turn moderates the 
increase in the pension paid by the Ministry of Finance. This “new” strategy also has the 
support of the government. Pension reform in the public sector did not even feature in the 
déclaration gouvernementale of 1999!196 
 
The implications of the non-reform in the public sector. 
The failures of the previous governments to reform the pension scheme of civil 
servants do not imply a full retreat for the current government. In fact, sneaky solutions 
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have been used to reduce the possible effect of a sharp increase in the number retired civil 
servants. First, many new agents are hired on a contractual basis, which puts them into the 
wage-earner pension schemes. This also has the negative effect of disavowing the tenure 
traditionally associated with the civil service.  
Second, Vandenbroucke referred to the other solution, which is the cost-
containment of wages. Lower wage increases result in lower pension increases. As in 
private investments, compounded wages play an important part of one’s pensions. Slow 
increase early on, can result in good savings thirty years down the road. This was in effect 
the aim of the Willockx proposal. Nonetheless, this tactic cannot function unilaterally, as 
the government must negotiate wages with the unions. When projections were released in 
the mid-1990s, unions were quick to point out that wages were not evolving as quickly as 
claimed in governmental studies. However, it must be pointed out that a key reason behind 
the wage increase of civil servant is that its members are now more educated and have a 
better formation, thus a better wage and better wage increases affecting the whole average 
for the civil service. This is one of the reasons why newspapers and analysts contest the 
validity that wages in the public service are lower than in the private service. This is in 
sharp contrast to most of the hiring made in the 1970s, which included many blue-collars 
or low skilled individuals with lower wages than those offered in the private sector. Via 
péréquation, these individuals end up benefiting from the higher skills of their children. 
Third, another sneaky way to reduce the burden of civil servant pensions is to 
reduce the rate of hiring. The ultimate tool would be to replace civil servant, not when they 
retire but when they are deceased. Of course, this is not a strategy employed by the 
government, but a stronger reliance is being made onto the private sector, thus reducing the 
payroll of the state. 
A fourth option exists, and has been employed by the government. It is introducing 
new taxes on pensions. Since 1st January 1995, the so-called solidarity contribution affects 
pensions above 44 163 BF at a progressive varying from 0,5% to 2%.197 This measure 
concerns mostly pensions obtain by civil servants since their average pensions is much 
more generous than the ones obtained in the private sector via the first pillar (54 931 BF vs. 
                                                                                                                                                             
196 In an interview, Vandenbroucke claimed that it was an easy point to negotiate with the Liberals, who had been 
strong advocate of a pension reform within the public sector (Le Soir, 14 September 1999). 
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20 145 BF) (Le Soir, 4 January 1995). As a way to sell this new tax as a way to introduce 
an intra-generational solidarity, Colla had included all pension contributions made to a 
second pillar and invested in collective pension funds retroactive to 1981 as taxable 
income. Following numerous court cases, in which the ONP sought to delete the 
reimbursement of collected contributions, all amount obtained via the second pillar was 
eliminated from consideration. Thus, by the end of the 1990s a large proportion of the 
pension inflicted by the solidarity contribution were in the public sector.   
None of these options are really viable in the long term, however. They may reduce 
the effect of the upcoming pensioners in the civil service, but cannot really alter it. A 
further increase in any of the four options will likely result in a strong opposition from the 
concerned groups. 
Lastly, one might question the union solidarity due the vast divergence in treatment 
that exists within the public and private sector. These divergences were pushed aside 
rapidly in France when studies demonstrated that the differences between the two regimes 
were not as wide as first thought (see Chapter 1 and 3). When questions arose concerning 
the inequalities between the public and private sectors, the representative interviewed 
within the central federation all politely referred me to their public sector federation. As the 
saying goes, there is a lot to be learnt from a dog that does not bark at night. In all 
likelihood, these conflicts are probably resolved within the executive of each 
confederation, as they do not figure as public conflicts within them. 
 
Complements or the Future Core of the Pension System? The Zilverfunds and The 
Second Pillar. 
Following the 1999 election, pension reforms returned to the agenda of the 
government. However, contrary to their predecessors, none of the measures proposed to 
retrench any of the pension schemes. The new government took three key measures. First, 
it established the creation of a demographic fund, referred to as Zilverfunds (Silver funds). 
Second, the government established a legal base alongside fiscal incentives to promote the 
development of the second pillar via the creation of group insurance or pension funds at the 
company or sectoral level. Finally, the minimum pension was increased substantially in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
197 That is for a single pensions, for a couple it affects pensions with a pension above 55 204 BF. 
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spring of 2000. This last section discusses the first two measures, as they are likely to have 
a strong influence in the future. 
 
Zilverfunds – myth or reality? 
Colla had proposed the creation of a demographic fund in December 1994, but that 
was rejected by the government because such funds ever survived an economic recession 
and that a high level of debt and the creation of savings did not go hand and hand. The idea 
resurfaced during the electoral campaign with both PSC and PRL endorsing the idea. 
Following a study made the BFP claiming that public funds would be made 
available in the upcoming years, the Minister of Budget, Johan Vande Lanotte (SP), 
proposed to create a Zilverfunds to prepare the state for the consequences of population 
ageing starting in 2030. It had already been stated on numerous occasions that new credits 
would be available with the reduction of the debt. This belief has gone a step further since 
its entrance into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The lower interest rate found 
within the Euro zone has allowed Belgium to shrink its public debt and interest payments 
on its debt, leaving budgetary room for pensions. Vande Lanotte’s plan would make use of 
the public funds made available by the reduction of the public debt, starting with 25 
billions BF up to the year 2002. Annually, this figure would reach 220 billions in BF in 
2013, this amount would be invested annually thereafter until 2030 (L’Écho, 11 May 
2000).  
Broad support was found within and outside the government. The Prime Minister, 
Verhofstadt (VLD) stated that such projects were within the realm of the déclaration 
gouvernementale. The PS, the FGTB, and the Greens supported the principle and claimed 
that it was a step in the right direction, but requested more details. The CSC came out 
strongly in favour of the plan giving a “gold medal” to the Minister (Le Soir, 12 May 
2000).   
Like any spending plans, the Ministry of Finance was quick to critic the idea of its 
colleague. Didier Reynards (PRL) had one main question: “How to justify to the EU 10 
000 billions of debt and a reserve of 4 700 billions on the side?” He also had a 
philosophical objection related to the self-employed, who are poorly covered by the state 
system. The creation of the Zilverfunds implies a new form of financing for the pension 
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system via the introduction of a large sum of public money. This measure would not be fair 
to the self-employed because the funds would serve mostly the wage-earners (Le Soir, 17 
May 2000). Following the visit of the Pension Minister, Vandenbroucke, at the 
headquarters of the PRL at the end of June, the party gave its support to the idea (Le Soir, 
27 June 2000). The President of the VLD, Karel de Gucht, echoed similar doubts (Le Soir, 
20 May 2000). The Zilverfunds was adopted at the end of 2001. Consisting of government 
bonds, the end result is not different than having the debt reduced further. 
 
A second pillar… 
Clearly present in the déclaration gouvernementale was the creation of a second 
pillar that could be accessible to all wage earners. Thus, it came as no surprise when it was 
announced that the “Vandenbroucke Plan” was adopted without opposition by the Council 
of Ministers in January 2001. Contrary to many industrialised countries, this pillar was 
underdeveloped in Belgium, and was most often instituted according to the will of the 
employer benefiting mostly management. Thus, a key objective of the reform was to 
“democratize’ this pillar. The objective was to ensure that it became an item of negotiation 
in the collective agreements of all branches at the sectoral level. In order to ensure the 
support of the social partners, they were granted the responsibility of managing the funds 
themselves. This was an important point for the unions, since the previous system gave a 
quasi free hand to the employer. Sold as a means to ensure a pension that would not result 
in large discrepancy between the final wage and the first pension, and not a replacement of 
the first pillar, its importance may increase significantly in the future if proper indexation is 
not granted to pensioners. 
 
Conclusion 
In line with the typology presented in Chapter 1, Belgium has had the most 
difficulties in introducing a pension reform. Like France, it could not generate a pension 
reform in the public sector. Its consultation strategy with the unions did not bear fruit, and 
the fear of a wave of protest à la Juppé constrained the government to avoid this route. 
Political opposition within the government (PS?) probably had something to do with this 
inaction as well. Contrary to France, where both main parties have been stating that a 
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pension reform within the public sector would be occurring following the election of 2002, 
the Belgian coalition government made the opposite promise: Pensions in the public sector 
will not be touched.  
In the private sector, the Balladur reform occurred rapidly and without too much 
hesitation by the government. To do something far less drastic, the Belgian government 
needed an ECJ directive and three years of consultation resolving its dilemma with the 
court, while generating very limited savings. More problematic is the fact that numerous 
non-contributive elements remain strongly anchored in the system. Thus, the 45 year career 
required to obtain a full pension is more of a myth than reality. The link between 
contributions and benefits is extremely weak. 
Despite this aspect, the BFP has made numerous statements stating that the future 
of the pension system is safe, as it will not cost too much to maintain it. This statement, 
however, hides another reality: the lack of benefits for future pensioners relative to 
pensioners. As presented in table 3.8, the relative value of pensions is expected to decline 
sharply due to its indexation on prices. When compared to France, not only is Belgium 
paying a high price for its pension system, but it is also not receiving a great return on it. 
From this table it is clear that future governments will make adjustments because a 
replacement rate nearing 20% would not be socially acceptable.  
 
Table 3.8 Average Pension as a % of the Average Net Salaries.*  
Type of Pension 1995 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Head of Household 40,6 42,8 43,4 40,8 37,1 33,6 30,4 
Men (single) 29,6 29,9 29,4 28,1 26,1 23,7 21,5 
Women (single) 23,4 24,2 25,3 24,9 23,5 21,9 20,5 
Married Men 25 26,7 27,7 26,2 23,7 21,4 19,4 
Married Women 15,6 16,5 17,5 17,4 16,4 15,5 14,8 
Couple 40,7 43,2 45,2 43,6 40,1 36,9 34,2 
Average Pension 28,7 29,5 29,8 28,8 26,7 24,5 22,4 
Source: M.J. Festjens (1997). La réforme des pensions: Une nouvelle generation et un nouveau contrat 
(Planning Paper 82, BFP). Page 71. *Does not consider the 1996 reform. 
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Therefore, it becomes really difficult to believe the new Pension Minister when he 
claims that the creation of the second pillar will only act as an extra. Based on table 3.8, its 
future vocation might be double fold: save the first pillar and act as an extra. Belgium’s 
pension system ranks 12th in the EU for the replacement rate of its system, and the financial 
contribution of the state has continuously declined since the early 1980s (Montagne, 2000: 
2), meaning a stronger reliance on contributions. The problem is many periods are 
assimilated, meaning that benefits are granted without any contributions. Since the 
government is not subsidizing those as much as it should, contributions fulfill this function 
as well. The end result is a very low replacement rate.  
 The political difficulties to introduce the reform are supported by the typology presented in 
chapter 2. The combination of a large number of veto players within a governmental coalition 
associated with a large number of veto points in its social security structure have resulted in a 
position very close to the status quo. 
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4 – Sweden: Many Actors … and A Big Reform. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The Swedish system of old-age pensions is imbued with social democratic values 
which reflect the hegemonic domination of the Left in the post World War II period. 
Although most observers link the actual system with the Social Democratic Party, the 
introduction of the first form of assistance to the elderly was actually introduced by the 
Liberals, a centre/right-wing party. The introduction of the ATP198 pension system in the 
late 1950s aimed to “equalize the pension status of all wage earners” (Esping-Andersen, 
1985: 108). It is not surprising, therefore, that the principal philosophy and rule attached to 
the Swedish system is considered to be universalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Rothstein 
1998). The ATP struggle was actually a key political issue in the late 1950s leading to 
sharp conflicts among the political parties and labour market partners resulting in two 
elections and a referendum on the subject. However, once a plan was legislated, it 
remained extremely stable until the pension reform of 1998, which was the result of a five-
party agreement. The compromise survived a change of government and internal dissent 
within the Social Democratic Party (SAP). 
The Swedish case meets the expectation of the theoretical framework presented in 
chapter 1. The pension program, which is mainly financed and administered by the state, 
was reformed without strong interference from the unions and employers. The five political 
parties behind the reform were able to negotiate without the intervention of these two 
important political actors, who were left with a final product. This resulted in a drastic 
change in the pension system where all parameters are being altered. It is argued in this 
                                                 
198 Allmänstjäntepension (universal earnings related pension). 
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chapter that parliamentarians were able to do that despite the high influence attributed to 
unions because of the large role confined to the state in this policy sector. 
 
Historical Overview – Pre World War II Period.  
As in Belgium and France, assistance to the elderly who were unable to work came 
from the family and voluntary associations. The importance of the latter never grew to the 
same extent as the other two continental countries because Sweden was a late 
"industrialiser", as it remained mainly agrarian until the beginning of the 20th century. 
The first proposal to introduce old-age pensions came from two liberals, Westin 
and Hedin, who pushed for an investigation of social insurance following its appearance in 
Germany. Hedin saw the creation of social insurance covering workers as a way to stop 
social discontent and emigration, which had reached an all time high of 42 000 in 1880. He 
even claimed that a universal pension program should be considered.  He believed that the 
introduction of social insurance could create a form of loyalty to the state (Höjer, 1952: 40-
1). Further, he claimed that old-age insurance was a general movement across Europe, 
citing the occurrence of such legislation in France (caisse de prévoyance) and Denmark. 
Hedin was also highly critical of Bismarck (Berggren and Nilsson, 1965: 210-1).199 These 
pressures resulted in a commission in 1884, which presented its findings five years later. 
The majority opinion advocated a universal scheme, but failed to gather broad support 
leading to its defeat without ever reaching the Riksdag (Heclo, 1974: 179-183).  
Following the German adoption of old-age insurance in 1889, the momentum for a 
public pensions system intensified. Some politicians thought that this type of insurance 
could also be adopted in Sweden to stop the growing support for the Social Democrats and 
bring social peace. This resulted into two proposals based on Bismarckian principles and 
sketched by a professor of mathematics, Lindstedt, whose skills had been used for earlier 
public commissions.200 The first proposal (1895) had very little support leading to the 
creation of a new version few years later (1898). It was elaborated according to the 
comments received by those opposing the first proposal. These proposals were not 
                                                 
199 Hedin was known to be an expert on the French Revolution and a Francophile. He did not like the Bismarckian 
approach to social insurance, and was thought to have had little influence on his parliamentary motions (Berggren 
and Nilsson, 1965: 214-6).  
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universal, as they targeted workers like the German law. This time, it reached the floors of 
the Riksdag, but was defeated in the First Chamber after being accepted in the Second.  
Key behind the rejection of this proposal was the strength and opposition of farmers 
during that period. The establishment of a pension system in the late 1800s was not 
politically and socially as pressing as it was in Germany and Britain because these two 
countries were already becoming very industrial at the time while Sweden was still mainly 
agrarian.201 As a consequence, the political power of the farmers in Sweden was still strong 
enough to reject a pension system favouring industrial workers (Williamson and Pampel, 
1993: 68-9). They acted as a ‘narrowly focused interest group’ and were unable to come up 
with a strong proposal of their own (Baldwin, 1990a: 83-8). Other politicians from the 
right criticized the proposals for deviating from self-help while the left criticized them for 
providing less generous benefits than the Hedin proposal (Höjer, 1952: 42-3). 
Support for the creation of an old-age pension system continued to grow in part due 
to a group headed by a former Army captain (Raab), which actively pushed for public 
pensions to replace the inadequate poor relief for the aged. They advocated a flat pension 
based on need, which would be financed by a fix yearly mandatory contribution. Following 
the 1905 election, the joint Committee on Public Pensions endorsed Raab’s proposal, and 
sought an investigation on this matter. It gathered strong support in the Second Chamber 
but was narrowly defeated in the First (Heclo, 1974: 187-90). A group of Liberals, who 
had included pensions in their electoral agenda, then proposed a motion for a universal and 
non means-tested pension that would be financed via general taxation. There was hope that 
this proposal could gather support from the more fortunate, as they would be included in 
this social programme. They would thus receive something in return for their taxes, which 
was not the case if a means-tested programme was adopted (Baldwin, 1990: 88). The 
liberal motion never really took off and was put off the table after the government resigned 
(Heclo, 1974: 190).  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
200 It is worth noting that Lindstedt had spent time in Germany in 1888 while pension reform was being discussed 
there (Heclo, 1974: 185). 
201 In 1900, 55% of Sweden’s workforce was still employed in the agricultural sector, compared to 28% in 
manufacturing. In contrast, 46% of Britain’s workers were in manufacturing (Williamson and Pampel, 1993: 66). 
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An earnings related pension plan comes to life… 
In 1907, a Conservative government created a fourth commission, the Old Age 
Pension Commission, which resulted in the world’s first universal pension system. The 
Conservative Civil Minister, Hugo Hamilton, was a strong advocate of state pensions and 
was behind the creation of this commission. The commission worked for five years and 
presented an extensive overview of foreign pension systems, cost projections for years to 
come, and statistical tables under the leadership of Lindstedt (Heclo, 1974: 190-1). 
Discussion within the commission centred on two models of pension systems found 
elsewhere: the social insurance model based on contributions from employees and 
employers (Germany) and the means-tested model financed via general taxation where 
benefits (Denmark, New Zealand and UK). The commission was quick to reject the social 
insurance model for two main reasons. First, it was believed that the social insurance 
system created barriers between people. This was unwelcome since it was argued that 
everyone faced the same inability to work (Höjer, 1952: 75-6). Second, the German system 
would have excluded a large number of individuals because many workers were not 
employed in industries (Heclo, 1974: 191). The means-tested approach was also rejected 
since it was considered to be insufficient to alleviate the elderly out of poverty. The 
committee actually sought to free people from the poor care and associate old age as a risk 
deserving insurance (Höjer, 1952: 78). The commission proposed a combination of both 
systems, seeking universality. It adopted a mandatory social insurance scheme for all 
individuals. Contributions and benefits would be split into three categories of income to 
avoid providing meagre benefits for all. Further, to avoid double payments on the part of 
the self-employed such as farmers, financing were made by individuals and the state only  
(Baldwin, 1990: 89-90). The retirement age was set at 67, and pension benefits were to 
represent 30% of all contributions for men and 24% for women (Höjer, 1952: 76-7). 
Following the submission of the report in November 1912, three sets of external 
critiques arose and a strong internal conflict took shape within the Social Democrats. 
Economists and other members of the right denounced the proposal because it restrained 
individual choices and harmed the national economy by creating disincentives to individual 
savings. Poor law representatives claimed that the new system would only institute a new 
category of poor and discourage self-help. Petterson, a liberal parliamentarian, supported 
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their views and sought to create a broad base coalition against the proposal.202 Women 
organisations were also highly critical of the plan. They claim that in order to be universal, 
the universal system should not distinguish between men and women (Höjer, 1952: 79-83). 
These critiques were discussed in parliament, but gathered little support.203 Nonetheless, 
Hamilton, who was chairing the joint public committee on the adoption of the report for its 
approval in parliament, agreed to increase the contributions for the upper income echelon 
to ensure its approval in the First Chamber, where the conservatives had a strong majority 
(Heclo. 1974: 194). 
Even though the leader of the Social Democrats, Branting, rallied its party behind 
the report, it remained divided. Members of the party had many objections to the proposal. 
First, the executive of the party and unions were highly critical that the proposal did not 
include contributions on the part of the employers. Second, benefits were not adjusted 
according to the cost of living, meaning that industrial workers living in the city would 
receive lower benefits than farmers would in real terms (Baldwin, 1990: 91).  Third, the 
redistributive elements were weak (Heclo, 1974: 192-3). Finally, the benefits were 
considered to be quite low for the current elderly and did not target their constituency 
(Williamson and Pampel, 1993: 70). Branting, who was a member of the committee, had 
mixed emotions about the bill, but felt that this proposal was better than nothing. He 
defended it with a ‘heavy heart’ (Höjer, 1952: 85-6). 
The government adopted the proposal, with the compromise made by Hamilton, but 
increased the contributions by 1 krona. It passed easily in both houses. Full pensions were 
to be first made in 1956 following 42 years of contributions. Further, benefits granted up to 
1919, would be somewhat lower in order to ease the transition to the new system (Heclo, 
1974: 191-2). Contrary to many beliefs, the creation of the first universal pension system 
did not originate as a result of the influence or dominance of the Left. “The new departure 
                                                 
202 Speaking against his own government in Parliament, Petterson stated: “This proposal betrays political wisdom. 
The committee has obviously considered on one side, winning the support of right-wingers by freeing the employers 
from contributing in the insurance scheme, and, on the other side, pleased the social democrats by instituting the 
right of a state pension for every poor workers” (Höjer, 1952: 83 – author translation).   
203 The fact that women did not have the right to vote clearly impeded their political action and entered into the 
calculus of Straaf, the liberal Prime Minister (Höjer, 1952: 86). The government was able to minimise the opposition 
by granting a very short period of time to submit remiss (public responses to commission proposals that are later 
published) and rushed the bill into parliament. As a result, the effort to stop the bill came too late (Heclo, 1974: 
194). 
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in Swedish social policy was supported by but scarcely attributable to the advocacy of the 
Left” (Heclo, 1974: 193; see also Baldwin, 1990 and Williamson and Pampel, 1993).  
The real value of pensions declined significantly during the 1920s and 1930s, 
despite an adjustment made to the benefits in 1921. The Right attempted to shift gear 
during a brief stint in the government by creating a commission, composed mainly of 
people with right-wing views in 1923. The commission concluded that the 1913 system 
threatened the economy and that a move towards a more contributory system should be 
undertaken. The report ended up lost in space with the electoral victory of the Social 
Democrats in 1924, who refused to reduce pension supplements (Heclo, 1974: 215-7).  
Another commission was created in 1928 and would submit its final report in 1934. 
A compromise was achieved for the most important items, strongly improving its chance 
of success in the Riksdag. The 1930s resulted in a good period to improve pensions as two 
political parties sought to alleviate the old age from poverty in this period of economic 
hardship. In the 1932 election, the Liberals sought to increase old-age insurance while the 
Social Democrats campaigned on creating a folkpension (literally a people’s pension), 
which would provide people with a sufficient amount to live on. Based on the 1934 report 
from the commission, a new legislation was adopted in 1935. The reform introduced a 
means-tested supplement to low-income earners. The linkage between contributions and 
benefits was weakened, signifying an abandonment of the insurance principles found in the 
1913 reform. A folkpension (basic pension) of 100 crowns was granted to all Swedes 
above 67 as well as 10% of previous contributions. Contribution rates were also increased. 
Contrary to the multi-party agreement reached in the commission, the Social Democrats 
were unable to include a variation of pension benefits to compensate for the higher cost of 
living found in cities (Höjer, 1952: 188-9; Heclo, 1974: 219-24). 
Despite this increase, pensions were not generous enough to relieve most old-age 
people from poverty. Another proposal was presented as a matter of confidence by the 
Social Democrats in 1936, but the non-socialist majority voted it down. As a result, 
adjusting pensions on the basis of cost of living area became an electoral issue in the 
summer of 1936, and led to the first social democratic majority in the lower chamber. 
However, the Social Democrats still needed the support of one bourgeois party in the upper 
house. Thus, they created a coalition government with the Farmer’s party on the condition 
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that they accept varying pension benefits according to living areas, which it accepted. The 
Social Democrats were then able to gather enough support in the Riksdag, which approved 
its proposal in 1937 (Heclo, 1974: 225-6; Olson, 1988: 81-2). Soon thereafter, in 1938, a 
commission was created to establish a public policy to improve public pensions as many 
pensioners still had to rely on public assistance to make ends meet; its findings would 
resurface following the war and be part of the public debate. 
 
Historical Development - Post-World War II 
The Beveridge report in the UK, published in 1943, was highly discussed in 
Sweden and most parties began to promote raising the quality of life for all citizens. The 
Conservatives abandoned their old views on welfare and began advocating broader social 
programmes, which would also benefit its constituents. This meant discarding means-
tested benefits as their preferred policy option (Baldwin, 1990a: 137-8). In 1946, with a 
strong Conservative support, the Social Democratic government adopted a universal 
pension plan liberating three-quarters of pensioners from means-tested benefits. All 
citizens aged 67 and above, regardless of income, were to receive a flat rate pension 
financed via general taxation. This represented the most generous option presented by the 
commission of 1938. The Social Democrats had originally advocated a much less costly 
alternative, which would have kept means-tested benefits with a higher threshold (another 
option of the report). The Conservative backing of the most generous options triggered 
lively debates within the Social Democratic Party (SAP) and led to a change of position on 
their part. The new universal approach adopted by the Conservatives was in contrast to the 
Social Democratic policy of helping the poor. Abolishing means-tested benefits did not 
result in any gain for those currently obtaining these benefits (Baldwin, 1990a: 140-1). 
Soon after, Sweden became the first country in the world to index their pensions with the 
Consumer Price Index (Heclo, 1974: 230-1; Olsson, 1988: 82; Williamson and Pampel, 
1993: 73). 
 
The ATP struggle 
The following reform would bring one of the most adversarial political battles in 
modern Swedish history. The debate would lead to three parliamentary commissions, a 
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referendum and two elections. Never before had social policy occupied such an important 
place in politics.  
In the 1950s there was consensus that the old pension scheme needed reform to 
provide higher benefits to pensioners. Despite this common understanding, there was little 
consensus on the kind of reform that should be introduced. Superannuation (occupational 
pensions) became the dominating political question in Sweden, dividing political parties 
during the later part of the 1950s (Molin, 1965: 1).204 “The political forces were clearly set 
for a stark confrontation, a confrontation contradicting the theory of supposedly bland, 
non-ideological development of post-war social policy” (Heclo, 1974: 245-6).  
Landsorganisation (LO), the most powerful union in Sweden, had a membership 
almost exclusively composed of manual workers and proposed a mandatory occupational 
pension plan to supplement the folkpension. Civil servants, white-collar workers as well as 
a minority of blue-collar workers were receiving an occupational pension granted by their 
employers resulting in more generous pensions. However, most blue-collar workers were 
not covered by such plans and SAF, the employers’ association, was unwilling to extend 
occupational pensions to them. LO claimed that only a compulsory plan would ensure the 
coverage of all workers and pushed the Social Democrats to include this issue in their 
agenda. In 1947, the Social Democrats, under the auspices of the Commerce Ministry, 
instituted a commission composed only of the labour market partners and a few civil 
servants. This issue was considered technical and did not require political participation. 
Consensus was nowhere to be found. SAF was opposed to state involvement in this issue 
and LO continued to press the Social Democrats for legislative actions to resolve this issue. 
(Heclo, 1974: 234-6). 
Another investigating commission was created in 1951, with many returning 
members of the previous commission. This time around it also included politicians. Prior to 
the release of the report, SAF made a vain last minute effort to convince LO to adopt 
superannuation together outside the realm of the state. The report was released in 1955 and 
the majority opinion advocated the creation of a mandatory superannuation plan, 
guaranteeing an old-age pension of about 50% of the mean wage during the lifetime. 
                                                 
204 “The superannuation issue whipped to a froth the normally pacific waters of Swedish politics during the late 
1950s” (Baldwin, 1990a: 208). 
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Opposition to the report was strong within and outside the committee. The other two major 
unions, TCO and SACO, were lukewarm about the plan since they already had 
occupational pension plans and would not gain from this new state plan. Compromise to 
have their support failed. The right wing parties favoured a voluntary pension plan with an 
increase in the current state pension. SAF, business groups, and most white-collar groups 
favoured this option as well. The Farmers’ party was also in favour of a voluntary plan as 
long as the government administered the plan (Molin, 1965; Baldwin, 1990a: 212-16). The 
only common position was that folkpension ought to be increased, which was done in 1958 
(Heclo, 1974: 239). 
Following a small decrease in support after the election of 1956, the Social 
Democrats suffered their first major electoral setback in decades. A third parliamentary 
commission was created following the election, leading to another stalemate in 1957. Most 
accounts reveal that this resulted in a wake up call for both SAP and its coalition partner 
since the early 1950s, the Farmers’ party, leading to the construction of a new strategy to 
attract new voters. Both parties were losing their electoral base as the number of blue-
collar workers and farmers declined. As a result, both sought to reverse these trends. The 
Social Democrats wanted to attract more white-collar workers, while the Farmers’ party 
tried for a more centrist position. This shift in position resulted in the Social Democrats, 
with the backing of LO, making a very favourable compromise with TCO by altering the 
proposed superannuation plan during the work of the parliamentary commission. It 
proposed to shorten the number of required years for a full time pension from 40 to 30 and 
grant pension benefits on the basis of the best 15 years of the working life.  This was 
extremely favourable to white-collar workers who tend to have a long educational period 
followed by constant rising wages afterwards. This resulted in the TCO member of the 
commission to support the new superannuation plan (Molin, 1965: 196-7; Heclo, 1974: 
239-40; Baldwin, 1990a: 217-19). 
The Farmers’ party changed its name to Centre Party and sought to distance itself 
from the other two right wing parties and its coalition partner, the Social Democrats on the 
pension question. It argued for a voluntary pension scheme administered by the 
government with a more substantive increase of the folkpension. This view became clear 
when the representative on the parliamentary commission of 1956-7 criticized both right 
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and left wing parties while defending the party’s position (Molin, 1965: 194-5; Baldwin, 
1990a: 217-9). 
The Conservatives, Liberals and SAF stuck to their original position and 
emphasised that mandatory superannuation was unnecessary following the rise in the 
folkpension. Thus, they claimed, private occupational plans administered by employees 
and employers should be favoured with rules laid down by the labour market partners. As 
late as the end of 1956, these actors believed that the Centre Party would rally behind this 
position to present a common front to the social democratic option (Molin, 1965: 194). 
Unable to settle the issue, the Social Democratic government decided to call a 
referendum for October 1957. This was highly unusual as the country only experienced 
two referenda prior. Agreeing on the process of the referendum even led to intense 
conflicts among the parties (Heclo, 1974: 242). The government put forwards three options 
reflecting the views of most groups: 
1. Compulsory supplementary earnings-related pensions paid for by the employers 
and administered by the government. 
2. A voluntary supplementary plan administered by the government. 
3. A voluntary supplementary plan administered by a nongovernmental agency 
 
Option 1 received most votes with 45.8% of the ballots. Option 2 gathered 15% 
support, option 3 obtained 35,3% of the votes and 3,9% voted blank. Both Right and Left 
claimed victory. The social democratic option gathered the most support, yet a majority of 
voters supported the voluntary option. The Centre Party left the government two weeks 
after the referendum, forcing the Social Democrats into a minority government position. 
Intense negotiations followed between the political parties, with the Liberals seeking a 
compromise position. Unable to reach a compromise, the minority Social Democratic 
government presented a bill similar to option one at the end of April 1958, which was 
defeated in the Second Chamber. To resolve the issue, the government called an election 
(Heclo, 1974: 243-5; Hermansson: 1993: 318-320). 
The election focused solely on the superannuation issue, with the parties advocating 
their earlier positions. Both the Centre and Conservative Parties made gains while the 
Liberals, who put forth many compromise solutions, lost 20 seats. The Social Democratic 
Party recorded its best results since 1944 with 46% of the popular vote and gained five 
extra seats (Esaiasson, 1990: 204). More importantly, key white-collar voters gained during 
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the referendum maintained their support for the SAP (Baldwin, 1990a: 220). With a Social 
Democratic Speaker in the Riksdag, both the socialist and bourgeois bloc ended up with 
115 seats. The election did not resolve the pension conflict and there was no hope for 
reform. However, a Liberal member from a blue-collar region in Göteborg, Königsson, 
announced that he would abstain if the proposed legislation were introduced in the 
Riksdag. He stated that he would vote for the social democratic option if the alternative 
remained the conservative-centre proposal. In February 1959, a mandatory universal 
superannuation plan (ATP)205 was finally adopted in the Riksdag by one vote thus 
implementing a complementary pension system to the already existing basic pension 
(folkpension)(Molin, 1965: 190-1; Heclo, 1974: 246-7). 
The new scheme led to a reshaping of the pension system by adding a new program 
to top the existing basic pension.206 Full benefits to the ATP were attributed according to 
the best 15 earning years out of a minimal career length of 30 years. Expectations were to 
replace 60% of an individual’s average wage during retirement. Pension benefits were 
adjusted for inflation and other improvements were made according to the increase in the 
standard of living. These adjustments became "routinised" by the administration during the 
1960s (Heclo, 1974: 248). This should not be underestimated as the real value of the basic 
pension more than trebled during the period of 1949-1984 (Olson, 1988: 41). The passing 
of ATP implied a move from ensuring subsistence benefits to maintaining a decent 
standard of living. 
The Conservatives and the Centre Party promised to change the plan once elected, 
but these threats were soon pushed aside after an electoral setback in the 1960 election 
while advocating this position. The opposition to the reform eventually disappeared. The 
Social Democrats, on the other hand, recorded another electoral success and were able to 
drop the Centre Party as coalition partner (Baldwin, 1990a: 221). The superannuation 
question disappeared almost completely from partisan debates in the Riksdag during the 
1960s and its implementation went smoothly. The main contention points were related to 
the collected contributions during the 20-year transition period (Heclo, 1974: 247-9). 
                                                 
205 Allmänstjäntepension. 
206 Besides the passing of ATP, it is worth noting that income-tested municipal housing benefits were extended to 
include every regions of the country during the 1950s (Olson, 1988: 18). 
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Few changes occurred for the 30 years following the passing of ATP. Few efforts 
were also made towards this direction. Pension contributions from employees were 
completely eliminated for the basic pension in 1973, as employers agreed to pay these 
contributions in exchange for a reduced wage increase (Williamson and Pampel, 1993: 76). 
This measure meant that no direct employee contributions financed that public pension 
system. The retirement age was lowered from 67 to 65 and part-time pensions introduced 
in 1976. Other changes to the public pension system included the removal of distinctions 
based on gender and marital status, and cost-containment measures. Despite the latter, 
introduced during the difficult economic periods of the 1970s and early 1980s, evidence 
suggested that pensioners were the least affected in terms of living standard (Olson, 1988). 
Contrary to France, the Swedish pension system as of 1990 was highly centralized and 
universal (see table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1: Swedish Pension System as of 1990 
Basic Pension Earnings-Related 
Pensions 
Folkpension (granted to everyone)207  ATP 
 
 
Theorizing Public Pension Reforms in the Swedish Context 
A Social Democratic State? 
Any discussion on the strength of the Swedish welfare state tends to begin with the 
hegemonic power of the Social Democrats and their firm control of the political executive and 
the bureaucracy.208 Since the end of World War II, the Social Democrats have been in the 
government for all, but 9 years (1976-82; 1991-94)! Despite this electoral dominance, the Social 
Democrats have often had to rely on another coalition partner or a supporter (most often the 
Communist/Left party) to hold on to power resulting in an environment where compromise and 
negotiation is a central part of politics. 
The state, albeit influential, has not been considered to dominate and trump private 
interests as in France. On the contrary, it has actively sought to include private interests in the 
                                                 
207 + Housing supplements for those without sufficient resources. Administered and granted by the regional 
governments. 
208 On the later, see Lundqvist, 1990 and Rothstein, 1996.  
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decision-making apparatus. As so clearly underlined in Rothstein’s (1991 & 1992) work on this 
subject, it was the Liberals in the early 1900s that sought to increase the participation of both 
labour and employers in social affairs by including representatives of their choices into national 
boards treating social issues. Based on the competitive and unproductive climate experienced in 
both France and Germany, the state sought to involve both groups in order to “increase that 
state’s knowledge and information about many social problems entailed by the ‘labour 
question’” (Rothstein, 1991: 162).209 
The Swedish corporatist structure has been considered largely responsible for the 
generous and universal welfare system (Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1985 & 1990) and strong 
economic growth (Cameron, 1984; Katzenstein, 1985; Garrett and Lange, 1991). The co-
operation and involvement of both unions and employers with the state have been considered 
important in the elaboration of the Swedish model. Rothstein (1996) and Lindqvist (1990) go 
even further in their assessment of corporatism by claiming that private interests, in this case 
unions, actually ‘captured’ the state in certain policy sectors (see below). 
Contrary to France, pensions have not been centralized to the Prime Minister’s office. 
Commissions on pensions do not report directly to the Prime Minister and have not been under 
the direct supervision of the Prime Minister. This is largely due to institutional factors. The 
power of individual Ministers and ministries tend to be quite strong, especially if one compares 
them to France and the UK. When coalition governments prevail each individual ministries tend 
to have a certain independence from the centre. Mattson (1996), for example, has argued that 
ministries have been able to extend their resources beyond targets set by the Ministry of Finance 
in times of coalitions, a by product of the negotiations that occur within the governmental 
coalition.210 Thus, rather than relying on a cabinet member specialized on pension, as in France, 
a Swedish Prime Minister is more likely to rely on the experience and expertise of his/her 
Minister.  
In fact, one of the key aspects of Swedish governance, which tends to be neglected 
due to the (overstated) emphasis on corporatism, is its reliance and focus on expert 
commissions and parliamentary committees in the policy making process. Their 
                                                 
209 Rothstein (1991) claims that the state was not strong enough to incorporate the working class as in France and 
that it was not so weak as to prevent any form of corporatism like in Britain. It was ‘lagom’, meaning just right 
(168). 
210 Von Hagen (1992) has also ranked Sweden very poorly in terms of financial control. 
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importance can easily be seen by noticing how difficult it is to find a Swedish academic 
article that has no SOU211 citation. These reports tend to play a large role in the public 
debate on public policy. Thus, contrary to what is experienced in most Western 
democracies, the parliamentary committees of the Riksdag have a strong influence (Arter, 
1990; See also Hermansson, 1993). Parliamentarians are by no means by-standers in these 
committees. They tend to specialize in a few policy areas and are involved much earlier in 
the policy process than their European counterparts. Finally, the committee system is 
considered to be very important for a minority government, which can seek coalition 
partners for a bill and avoid a possible vote of non-confidence in Parliament (Arter, 1990: 
125-33). 
As demonstrated by Table 4.2, the main architect of the pension reform of 1998, 
Könberg, Gennser, Petersson, Wiklund/Frebran,212 Hedborg and Thalén, have been 
associated with pension committees for a long period of time. Most members who left a 
committee have done for personal or electoral reasons.213 The two committees strongly 
associated with the 1998 pension reform, the working and implementation groups have 
remained extremely similar. It is therefore not so surprising that a quick lunch with a 
Swedish expert in the field can be sufficient to gather the names of all key players. 
One of the key results of this policy structure has been a strong coherence and long-
term life and vision of policies. For example, in Taxation and Democracy, Steinmo (1993) 
clearly demonstrates that Sweden has been able to avoid the constant remaking of tax 
policies experienced by the United Kingdom following the introduction of a new 
government and the complexity of the US tax system, which cannot be reformed as a 
whole due to the constellation of power resulting in endless additions to the tax code 
reducing its fluidity. 
 
                                                 
211 Statens Offentliga Utredningar (State Public Inquiry). 
212 Wiklund retired and left his seat to Frebran. 
213 Such as retirement (for example Wiklund (kd) was replaced by Frebran (kd)), negative election results (Bergdahl 
(nd), Westerholm (fp)) or positive (most social democrats in the implementation group), ‘promotions’ (for example 
Anna Hedborg (s) was appointed as General Director of the National Social Insurance Board in 1996) or because 
his/her party refused to participate further (Ulla Hoffmann (v)).  
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Table 4.2 MP Representation in Pension Committees (1984-Present). 
MP Pensionberedningens 
betänkande (1984-90) 
Arbetsgruppen 
(1991-94) 
Genomförande 
gruppen  
(1994-Present) 
Bo Könberg (fp)* X X X 
Margit Gennser (m)  X X 
Pontus Wiklund (kd) X X  
Anna Hedborg (s)**  X X** 
Åke Petersson (c)  X X 
Doris Håvik (s) X   
Gösta Andersson (c) X   
Ingegerd Troedsson (m) X   
Ingegerd Elm (s) X   
Karin Nordlander (v) X   
Bertil Whinberg (s) X   
Barbro Westerholm (fp)*  X  
Leif Bergdahl (nd)  X  
Ingela Thalén (s)  X X*** 
Per Lennart Börjesson (v)  X  
Ulla Hoffman (v)  X  
Rose-Marie Frebran (kd)   X 
Inger-Maj Klingvall   X*** 
Maud Björnemalm (s)   X 
Arne Kjörnsberg (s)   X 
Hans Svensson (s)   X*** 
* He was the Minister of Social Affairs under the Carl Bildt government of 1991-94 and Head of the Working 
Group (penssionsarbetsgruppen). Westerholm took his seat as representative for the Liberal Party during this period. 
She is now the President of the second largest Pensioner organization (SPF). 
** She resigned in 1996 to become the General Director of the National Insurance Board, and thus remain a key 
actor in the process. 
***Rejoined the group in September 1999 replacing the tandem Klingvall/Svensson 
 
 
Bureaucracy 
The policy-making apparatus in Sweden is formally divided into two distinct 
components. First, the departments are responsible for policy planning and formulation. The 
departments are considered to be relatively small, as the total number of staff members reached 
1800 in 1991 (Pierre, 1995: 142-7; Peters, 1996: 146). In the case of pensions, the main 
responsibility for policy planning and formulation rests with the Ministry of Social Affairs. The 
Ministry of Finance can also claim a legitimate role since this issue represents a large part of 
public spending. Second, the implementation process falls within the jurisdiction of numerous 
agencies, such as Riksforsakringsverket (RFV) in the case of pension. These agencies are 
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considered to be quite independent from their respective ministries, the Constitution states that 
they are under the supervision of the government. The agencies are much larger organization 
with a total of 390 000 employees and are responsible for the daily administrative work (ibid). 
The only contacts permissible between agencies and departments are assumed to be informal 
(Pierre, 1995: 146).214 Nonetheless, the final decision on the implementation of laws and 
regulation rests on the shoulders of the Director-General of the Board (Rothstein, 1996: 80). 
In a comparative perspective, RFV performs tasks that are similar to the Office 
National des Pensions (ONP) and the various ‘caisses’ administering the various pensions 
schemes such as the Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Vieillesse (CNAV). However, there are 
substantial differences between them with regards to their independence vis-à-vis the 
government and the role of unions and employers. RFV has more independence than its 
Belgian and French counterparts. On paper both are relatively similar as they implement 
the rules and regulations decided by the government. However, the independence of the 
Director-General is stronger in the Swedish case vis-à-vis the government and the board. 
The DG can publicly voice his/her preferences, and advocate specific social policies 
without reappraisals from his/her minister. Such actions would be impossible in the French 
or Belgian case because the Director-General is constrained by the Minister of Social 
Affairs and the social partners who control the administrative council of the pension 
agencies. The French CNAV is actually a semi-public organization managed by the social 
partners and its employees are not even considered to be civil servants. In the Swedish 
case, the board is more diverse and includes other actors such as parliamentarians and 
experts, and it is part of the state apparatus meaning that its employees are civil servants. 
When asked about the status of RFV, both KG Scherman (former DG of RFV, 1982-1996) 
and Anna Hedborg (current DG, 1996-) maintained that there is no confusion: RFV is a 
state apparatus.  
In practice, both agencies and departments seek to maintain informal contacts with 
each other and, as a result, agencies do play an important role in the early stages of the 
decision-making process. First, due to the complex nature of the issues faced by elected 
officials today, the expertise and resources of agencies are needed to draft proposals. This 
                                                 
214 Pierre provides data from 1968 indicating that 63% of senior personal in departments were having informal 
contacts with central agencies ‘once a week or more frequently’. 
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situation is partly a result of the institutional structure, where departments have a limited 
number of employees. Second, the involvement of the agencies ensures a smooth 
implementation process by guaranteeing that proposed policies could be carried out. 
Finally, the agencies have a strong incentive to be active in the early stages of the policy 
formulation process since most key decisions tend to occur at this stage.215 
As the evidence presented in this section suggests, the reform of the pension system 
has followed these practices to a large extent. First, RFV produced sections of the report 
Sammanställning av remissyttranden över pensionsarbetsgruppens betänkande reformerat 
pensionssytem (SOU 1994: 20)216 and provided most of the data used by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs. This role should not be underestimated as their projections constituted the 
framework and substance for debate among the political actors. The negotiations were 
mostly based on data presented by RFV for the various alternatives being considered by the 
politicians. Second, RFV was highly active in promoting pension reforms in the 1980s and 
early 1990s as well as a solution to the problems faced by ATP. 
 
Unions and employers’ associations 
For most of the 20th century, unions and employers’ association have cooperated 
extensively following the historic agreement of Satlsjöboden in 1938 between 
Landsorganisationen (LO) and Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen (SAF) which set the 
ground rules for collective bargaining. Further, unions re-acknowledged the role of 
employers (freedom to fire and hire workers, direct and allot work) in exchange for 
recognition of the status of unions and their right to collective bargaining. The later was 
achieved in a historical agreement in 1906 but many conflicts would damage this co-
operative breakthrough in the following decades.  
More than 80% of workers in Sweden belong to one of the three largest unions: 
LO, TCO and SACO. In contrast with France and Belgium, unions do not tend to be 
divided into socio-professional or public/private lines but according to economic sectors 
(Svenska Institutet, 2001: 2).  
                                                 
215 Ibid 3, 146. 
216 Author interview, the Ministry of Social Affairs 10/00-12/00. 
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(LO) is the blue-collar union217 and has the highest membership with 2,1 million 
members. It is composed of 16 federations, the two largest regrouping the Swedish 
Municipal Workers’ Union and the Metal Workers’ Unions. Historically, it has had very 
close ties with the Social Democratic Party. On average, 70% of LO’s members tend to 
vote SAP218 and LO members were de facto SAP members until the late 1980s when 
collective membership was abandoned by the party due to pressures from all other political 
parties.219  
Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation (TCO) represents most while collar workers 
and has more than 1,2 million members. Finally, Sveriges Akademikers 
Centralorganisation (SACO) represents academics and professionals, and it has a 
membership of 500 000 members.  
At the end of 2001, the two largest employer associations, SAF and Sveriges 
Industriförbund merged into a new association called Svensk Naringsliv (SN). The new 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise have a membership approximately 48 000 small and 
medium-sized companies. SAF and LO used to set the standard for centralized wage 
bargaining until the former abandoned this procedure in 1990. Negotiations now occur at 
the economic sector level. 
 
The relationship between ‘social partners’ and the state 
First and foremost, it is important to stress that the word social partners does not 
exist in the Swedish language, and this significance goes beyond pure semantic. This 
distinction implies that unions and employers’ associations do not consider to be mandated 
beyond labour market issues and the separation of responsibilities between the government 
and labour market partners is much more defined as in Belgium and France. Bluntly put, it 
does have the Christian connotation that they have a social role for the country. As stated 
by Petersson (1991), the Saltjöbaden agreement of 1938 was made to ensure that the state 
would not get involved in the process of collective bargaining. “The basic concept was that 
                                                 
217 LO cover 85% of all blue-collar workers (Svenska Institut, 2001). 
218 www.lo.se (visited on May 9, 2002). 
219 According to Aylott (2001), it was a ‘divorce’ that was convenient for both side. On one hand, LO’s attachment 
to an unpopular Social Democratic Party was hurting its recruitment efforts in an increasing competitive 
environment. On the other hand, the Social Democrats were seeking to become more like a ‘catch all party’ (4). 
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the two sides would independently reach agreements on wages and working conditions” 
(174).  
In stark contrast to France, unions and employers’ associations are very centralized, 
highly hierarchical, and face an environment that is not so competitive relatively speaking. 
They do not have distrust for the state and have participated actively in the elaboration of 
many policies, especially those related to the labour market. The influence of LO was 
considered so strong, that its President used to be considered the most important political 
figure after the Prime Minister. This role has been declining since the 1970s, however, and 
was constrained further by the decision of employers in 1991 to withdraw from the 
administrative councils of national boards such as Riksförsäkringsverket (RFV), the 
National Social Insurance Board.  
Two important characteristic of the corporatist state in Sweden needs to be 
underlined and are crucial elements for the argument presented in this thesis that unions 
were less influential in the pension debate in Sweden as they were in France and Belgium. 
First, the state has often been the forgotten part of the triangular corporatist equation.220 For 
example, Przewoski and Wallerstein (1982) argue that state policy came from a 
compromise by both labour and capitalist interests (236, cf. Rothstein, 1996). The works of 
Korpi (1983) and Esping-Andersen (1985) challenge the conception of a triangular 
relationship by theorizing conflicts along class lines, a power class struggle, where labour 
seeks to reduce the powers of capital by seeking democratic dominance to alter the 
outcome of capitalism. The social democratic thesis of welfare clearly emphasises the 
importance of achieving strong political power. Esping-Andersen (1990) is clear on this 
point by stating that the differences between liberal and social democratic regimes lie in the 
political power of labour. “Where…labor fails to realign the nation’s political economy 
and assert dominance, the result is continuously low, or at most, moderate de-
commodification”. He further claims that the high de-commodification scores obtained by 
the Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands in the ‘Conservative’ regime is due to “the 
strong political position of the social democratic labor movements” (53).221 Thus, a key 
                                                 
220 See for example Rothstein (1991) on the importance of the state in the creation of corporatism in Sweden. He 
challenges the economical factors underlined by Katzenstein (1985).  
221 The later point was challenged by Huber and Stephens (1993) who claims that Christian democratic parties in 
Belgium and the Netherlands have performed a role similar to that of social democratic parties in Scandinavia. 
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variable is the association LO-SAP with the latter capturing the reign of government. 
Corporatism might have been important in obtaining strong economic growth, but its 
relationship with the expansion of the welfare state seems to follow another pattern. 
This point was clearly demonstrated by the ATP struggle. The two poles of the 
conflicts centred on the mandatory option proposed by the SAP-LO coalition and the 
voluntary option advocated by the bourgeois parties-employers coalition. As we will see in 
the upcoming pages, LO was successful in pushing the idea by the Social Democrats, who 
reluctantly at first endorsed the idea.222 Seeing a possibility to expand its support beyond 
blue-collar workers, the Social Democrats took control of the issue and were able to obtain 
a state controlled mandatory earnings-related pension scheme by being able to attract 
enough white-collar workers on their side. The ATP system became one of the golden 
trophies of the Social Democrats. 
The key point here is that this new pension scheme was going to be administered 
by the state. The spirit of Saltsjöbaden, where both SAF and LO sought to keep the 
government out of labour market issues, was not reproduced here. LO turned to the state, 
which had been dominated by the Social Democratic rule since 1945. It actually refused to 
SAF’s efforts to create a scheme outside of the realm of the state, which would have 
resulted in a supplementary earnings-related scheme similar to those found in France 
(AGIRC and ARRCO). The key question becomes why LO opted to trust the state? 
Rothstein’s (1996) Social Democratic State provides an answer to this question by 
bringing the control of the bureaucracy as an important variable in explaining the success 
and failures of the Social Democrats. The state is not a passive entity, and it can play an 
important political role (Birnbaum, 1988). Getting control of the political office is only one 
part of the equation.223 More challenging and equally important, is to control, or at the very 
least neutralize, the bureaucracy.  While the CGT in France was able to gather enthusiast 
supporters to implement the new social security system in the aftermath of World War II 
                                                 
222 This is the reason why this issue was first sent to the Commerce Ministry and was part of a commission that 
lacked political participation.  
223 “Even if the electoral problem has been solved, and even if corporatist macroeconomic agreements are in place, a 
social democratic government must make sure its policies are implemented by the state machinery in accordance 
with the political intentions and goals of the party. If the policy are not carried out in the way the party has intended, 
or are not implemented at all, the electorate will respond negatively no matter how clever the party’s strategy to 
incorporate different social classes has been” (Rothstein, 1996: 8). 
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(see chapter 3), they did it in a system that was built “out of the state” (Ashford, 1986).224 
LO did something similar, but it was part of the state as enthusiast recruits from the 
labour movement joined the civil service. Rothstein’s (1996) most important contributions 
remains, however, that the state is not a unified apparatus. He compared two institutions 
(labour market and education authorities) and concludes that the Social Democrats were 
able to implement their objectives in the former while failing in the later. The key reasons 
for the success of the active labour market policy were the result of an overall strong 
dedication. More specifically, it obtained a strong commitment from LO, a strong 
ideological goal, the recruitment of individuals committed to the cause rather than 
weberian style bureaucrats, and great powers (in terms of regulation and resources) to 
achieve its objectives. Key was the capacity of the Social Democratic Party to create a state 
agency that represented its values. The national labour market board “was a goal-oriented 
organization based on substantive rather than formal rationality,” which still prevailed 
within the National Education Board (171).  
Even though no studies have been made concerning the implementation of ATP in 
the 1950s, it would be difficult to argue that the Social Democrats and LO were not 
committed to this adventure considering the time and energy devoted to the issue. Like the 
Rehn-Meidner reform program, the ATP program was designed by LO and promoted 
strongly by its leaders and is “everyone’s favourite story of successful labor-initiatied 
reform” (Pontusson, 1993: 556). It is therefore not surprising that it was difficult for the 
labour movement and the social democrats to accept that ATP needed to be reformed. As 
stated by Anna Hedborg, a former Social Democrat Minister and a key player behind the 
pension reform of 1998, “it was hard and difficult for the social democratic party to accept 
the reform of the ATP system, which is sort of a gold treasure for the party” (Author 
Interview, 6 December 2000). 
There is also another reason to believe that the implementation and control of the 
ATP program was ‘social democratized’. As underlined in Chapter 1, pension policies are 
relatively easy to implement if ones opt to change the parameters of the system. Contrary 
                                                 
224 As underlined in Chapter 3, the system was built out of the state because unions did not trust the state, which was 
too dominating. “The working class has always been excluded from the state; it had immense difficulties in having 
its voice heard and always had to act conflictively” (Brinbaum, 1988: 123). Further, those in the state tended to be 
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to other social policies, they do not require another party, such as doctors, teachers, unions 
or employers, for a successful implementation. Further, it is not a policy area that requires 
a lot of personal judgment for civil servants like policeman, welfare officers and other 
‘street-level’ positions described by Lipsky (1980). As stated by a staff of France’s Caisse 
Nationale d’Assurance Vieillesse, it takes less than five days to process a retirement file 
and then most individuals receive their pensions monthly via a direct deposit into the 
individual’s account. People who have more complex files, like those who have 
contributed to more than one pension system, need an extra day or two to get their 
pensions! Thus, the specificities of pension policies make it easier for dedicated 
governments or cadre like civil servants to steer it into a ‘social democratic’ direction.  
Indicative of a possible ‘social-democratization’ of the bureaucracy, Pierre (1995) 
presents few of the many accounts provided by non-Socialists ministers about the 
“significant obstacle to policy reassessment and change” they faced once they took office. 
It was a substantial problem since many of the individuals causing obstacles were not 
political appointees, but rather tenured senior officials (150). As it will be demonstrated in 
the upcoming pages, the Ministry of Social Affairs was slow to propose solutions to 
resolve the difficulties faced by the ATP system. During my interviews, few individuals 
stated that they held a strong attachment to ATP, and it took them a while to accept that 
changes were necessary. The authority responsible for implementing pension policies, the 
National Board for Social Insurance (Riksförsäkingsverket) was also strongly committed to 
maintaining the ATP system and was much more transparent on these objectives by 
advocating measures that would not challenge the core of the system (i.e. parametric 
reforms). 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
much less enthusiastic about their placement. Most of the students coming out of ENA in the 1960s had social 
ministries as last choices. 
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Pension Reform in Sweden…A Long Process, A BIG Reform! 
Experts have come to the conclusion that with a contribution 
rate of around 10%, all possible difficulties can be overcome in 
the future– Minister of Social Affairs, Torsten Nilsson during 
the pension debate of 1959. 
 
Those seeking to criticize the ‘garbage can’ view of public administration would be hard 
pressed to find a more linear process than the pension reform process that led to the 1998 
legislation. A first commission, Pensionberedningens Betänkande, stressed the need for a 
reform and plaid an important ontological role in making various actors realise that such 
undertaking was necessary. Further, it provided an opportunity for all political actors to present 
their view and kick start a debate on the question (SOU 1990:76). Following the electoral victory 
of the Bourgeois coalition in 1991, a working group on pensions (pensionsarbetsgruppen) 
including all political parties was set up to reach a compromise on this issue. Five out of seven 
parties agreed on a sketch in late 1992, which would result in a final report presented in 1994 
(SOU 1994:20). The agreement was strong enough for the actors to renounce discussing the 
issue during the electoral campaign of 1994, and an implementation committee including many 
members from the working group would be instituted following the 1994 elections and it 
continued to work on the implementation process of the new reform. The legislation was adopted 
in 1998. 
The Swedish pension reform is very substantive as it did not limit itself to parametric 
changes, but rather instituted a whole new system which features have already been exported to 
other European countries such as Italy, Latvia and Poland.  
 
Time to reform ATP? (1982-1990) - Pensionberedningens Betänkande 
The consensus that a pension reform was required would be established during the 
1980s in Sweden. The publications of both a Riksförsakringsverket (RFV – National Insurance 
Board) in 1987 and the conclusion of a parliamentary commission presented in 1990 would 
leave no doubt that it was time for “a new war on ATP”.225 As indicated by the title of an 
article published in Veckans Affärer in 1990, it was far from obvious that a compromise would 
be achieved few years later, as the positions of each political party seemed relatively 
                                                 
225 “Dags för en ny ATP-Strid”, title of a special article written in Veckans Affärer on October 10, 1990. 
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unchanged compared to their original positions in the 1950s. This section analyzes this 
important ontological period. 
 
First warning signs and indexation difficulties. 
As part of its mandate, RFV was asked by law to publish a report every five years to 
provide a picture of the financial future of ATP and whether adjustments should be considered 
with regards to contribution levels. The 1982 report presented a bleak picture for the future of 
the ATP system. It stated that if the economic stagnation were to continue, more than 1/3 of 
individual’s wage would be required to finance the system by the year 2030.226 The conclusions 
of the report led to few debates in early 1983 in numerous newspaper articles. For example, 
Staffan Burenstam Linder, a Conservative MP, wrote a debate article227 stating, “the flagship is 
leaking” and advocated a new form of indexation that would also be based on the evolution of 
wages. He also pointed out a theme that would be brought up on numerous occasions by 
economists throughout the 1980s, that the ATP system is its worst enemy since strong wage 
increases could save the system, but that such increase was unlikely due to the disincentive in 
savings brought up by the ATP system (SvD, 13 February 1982). Sune Davidson, from the 
Finance Ministry, would write few days later that playing with the indexation mechanism to 
reduce the burden of pensions would not change the structural difficulties of the system and 
that it would be much better to acknowledge that the Swedish economy cannot carry such a 
commitment. He advocated sharp reductions in pension benefits (SvD, 20 February 1982). 
Sture Korpi and Ingemar Lindberg, both secretaries of state for the Ministry of Social Affairs in 
the social democratic government responded by pointing to the failure of the American model, 
and its emphasis on means-tested benefits. They underlined that the Swedish model was based 
on work and not handouts, thus the solution to the problems of the ATP system was to decrease 
unemployment (SvD, 24 February 1982). LO acknowledged the problem as well, but claimed 
that the prognostic presented by RFV was too pessimist, and stated that with an economic 
growth of 2 to 3%, contributions would only have to be raised from 9% to 12-13%.228 
                                                 
226 It stated that contributions rate could reach 15% by the end of the 1980s and more than 20% by the year 2000. 
227 Page 2 or 3 in most Swedish newspaper tend to include an article referred to as Debate or Burning Issues where 
political actors express their views on current political issues.  
228 With similar economic projections as RFV, LO claimed that costs would stabilize around 23% (Veckans Affärer, 
26 January 1983). 
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A key feature of this debate was related to the indexation of pensions.229 Contrary to 
France, the Swedish pension system was already indexed on prices rather than wages. Thus, the 
government had not actively sought a switch towards a pension system indexed on prices. 
Ironically, the economic crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s brought up the discussion of 
changing the indexation of pensions so that it would consider the movement of the economy 
and wages. This was precisely what the French government was seeking to get out of! The 
reason of this state of affair was related to the way the Swedish government sought to get out of 
the economic crisis. By devaluating the Swedish Krona, it led to a reduction in real wages and a 
strong inflation. Thus, while workers were faced with lower real wages, pensioners continued 
to obtain increases in their pensions. To stop this growing gap between pensioners and the 
working population, the bourgeois coalition “tricked” pensioners by not fully indexing pensions 
to price increases raising sharp criticism from pensioner’s organisations and the parties in 
opposition, the Social Democratic and Left Party. The former would use this “under 
indexation” as an electoral issue, promising to re-index properly the value of pensions. As a 
result of the indexation system, a Swedish Daily (DN) would later refer to pensioners as 
“1980s’ winners”, when statistics from the national statistical office demonstrated that the 
average pensioner experienced an increase of 650 kronar during the decade. This amount was 
more than the average wage increased (DN, 27 November 1992).230 
Another pension adjustment made by the minority government of the Centre Party was 
the introduction of payments for contributions above the ceiling in 1982.231 This measure, 
affecting high-income earners, resulted in a disguised tax since those payments did not result in 
higher benefits. It would come under intense scrutiny following a report published by the RFV 
in 1987 (see below), as this measure helped to force the consensus that a pension reform was 
necessary. Due to its redistributive nature, the Social Democrats were quite fond of this 
progressive tax and had pledged to maintain it. This stance would turn out to be one of the 
adversarial points between the SAP and the bourgeois parties, who sought to revoke this tax, 
                                                 
229 Besides the articles mentioned above, indexation was also stated as problematic in articles written by Anna 
Hedborg (LO and SAP), Olof Johansson (c) and in a piece in Veckans Affärer (26 January 1983). According to 
Burenstam Linder, even LO acknowledged the need the review the indexation structure of the ATP system (SvD, 13 
February 1982). 
230 However, a part of this increase is the result of higher pensions being attributed to new pensioners since they 
have tended to have had longer working careers and better wages than previous ones.  
231 The ATP system was based on “based amount” with the ceiling being fixed at 7,5 base amount.  
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during the negotiations in the Working Group on Pensions (pensionsarbetsgruppen) in 1991-
94. 
 
Creation of Parliamentary Committee - Pensionberedningens betänkande – and the emergence 
of the first proposals to reform pensions. 
Few days following the elections of the Social Democrats in the 1982 elections, the 
Minister of Social Affairs, Sten Andersson, announced the creation of an overview of the 
pension system.232 The system had been in operation for over 30 years and little was relatively 
known about its real impact. Further, following a meeting with both pensioner’s organisations 
and the association for the disabled the Minister announced that pensions would not be fully 
indexed as promised stating that it would be foolish to increase pensions while workers have 
been experiencing declining wages in the past seven years (DN, 3 October 1983). This decision 
was strongly criticized by the later actors and right-wing newspapers. It would take more than 
two years for the SAP to establish the committee as internal conflicts surrounding the 
indexation of pensions paralysed action (Lundberg, 2001: 14-5).233 
The committee began its work in November 1984 and included the labour market 
partners (LO, TCO, SACO-SR and SAF), other interest groups (Association for the disabled and 
Pensioner organisations), representatives from various ministries (Labour, Finance and Social 
Affairs), the National Social Insurance Board (Riksförsäkringsverket) and other experts. The 
State Secretary of the Social Affairs Minister, Sture Korpi who was known to have a strong 
interest in pension questions, chaired it. 
The mandate of this committee (pensionberedningens betänkande) was to evaluate past 
experiences with the rules of the pension system and undertake an overview of them. Eight 
particular points of study were mentioned as objects of study: 1) the indexation of pensions was 
to be analyzed based on three different alternatives: prices, wages, and a combination of the two; 
2) private options as a possible complement to the pension system; 3) the possibility of 
maintaining pension rights without increasing contribution rates too much; 4) the economic 
security of individual pensioners and community needs for service and care; 5) the calculation 
method of the ATP system; 6) elimination of the widow’s pension; 7) increase of the basic 
                                                 
232 LO was one of the actors that had been pushing for the creation of such of committee starting at the end of 1982. 
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pension to reduce the burden of the ATP system; 8) flexible retirement age and part-time 
pensions (SvD, 25 November 1984). It also stated that the main elements of the basic and earned 
pension scheme (ATP) should remain and that the basic pension level should remain independent 
of previous employment and continue to complement the ATP pension. Methods of financing 
were also not to be altered (SOU 1990:76). The work of the committee would last six years! 
During this period, many developments related to the reform of the pension system would 
occur, however. First, LO would begin to promote a proposal to ensure the future of the ATP 
system. From the mid 1980s until the early 1990s, it would promote the extension and de-
regulation of the AP-funds. The later measure would have allowed the funds to enter the stock 
market to increase its rate of return. These funds originated from the surpluses of the system. 
Prior to 1983, the amount of contributions outweighed the amount of benefits granted to 
pensioners. Contrary to most industrialized countries, the government did not take these 
surpluses and added them to its general budget.234 LO had hoped to gather 1200 billions Swedish 
Kronor by 2010, partly as a result of an increase in contribution of 4 points (Veckans Affärer, 10 
October 1990). The original purpose of the AP-funds was two folds. First, it was to compensate 
for potential lack of savings that could result as a consequence of the ATP system. Private 
savings would actually decrease substantially during the period 1950-1990 (see table 4.3). Right 
wing politicians were quick to criticize the ATP system as the one to blame for this state of 
affairs, which was among the lowest in OECD countries.235 A second function of these funds 
was to smooth over any sudden change in the ratio between contributors and pensioners. 
Unsurprisingly, the importance of each function was debated highly between the left and right 
wing parties. The left emphasizing the later function and the importance of collective savings, 
while the right continued to focus on the savings rate while re-iterating that the best solution to 
increase savings is to encourage private individual savings.236 
                                                                                                                                                             
233 Pension indexation was part of a strong conflict between the Finance Minister, Kjell Olof Feldt, who was already 
quite critical of the indexation promise, and Sten Andersson.   
234 One of the most visible examples of this behaviour remains President’s Johnson transfer of social security 
surpluses into his budget to help finance the Vietnam War. As we have seen in the French chapter, the government 
used various surpluses from the regime general to finance the schemes facing deficits in the 1970s. 
235 An economic professor, Bo Södersten, would go as far as stating the Sweden’s savings rate was more in line with 
underdeveloped countries than industrialised ones (DN, 21-22 July 1991). 
236 How to manage the AP funds became a source of political conflicts between the SAP and the bourgeois 
government. The AP funds had been invested mainly in very secured items such as bonds and it was not allowed to 
enter the stock market and buy shares, except under very strict conditions. Less than 1% of the funds were investing 
in private companies, most of which involved real estate investment to promote the construction of more apartments 
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 Table 4.3 Total net savings as a percentage of GDP. 
Years OECD 
Average 
Sweden 
1963-66 15,44 19,28 
1967-70 15,80 18,02 
1971-74 16,03 15,26 
1975-78 12,57 10,69 
1979-82 10,81 5,22 
1983-86 9,00 6,34 
1987-90 - 7,54 
Source: Sparande och investeringar I svensk ekonomi. SOU 1990: 78 (cited in Ds 1992: 89). 
 
LO’s proposal was opposed by many political actors, especially on the right. Most of all, 
SAF and the Conservative Party expressed strong opposition to the intervention of the AP funds 
in the stock market fearing more control over the private economy by the state (Affärsvärlden, 18 
May 1989). The Finance Ministry, even under a SAP government, favoured the extension of 
private rather than collective savings.237 What to do with the AP-funds would actually be at the 
forefront of debates in the weeks following the election of the Bourgeois coalition. Many debate 
articles advocated the complete elimination of the AP-funds. Bo Carlsson, an economist with 
SAF, would go further than most in an article entitled “Time to retire the whole ATP system”. 
He proposed to eliminate completely the current pension system replacing it by private savings 
built on a minimum pension financed by taxes. The current AP-funds would be used to finance 
the transition period (SvD Brännpunkt, 19 November 1991).238 
The major criticism against LO’s plan, however, was that the AP funds could not 
be sufficient to cover the revenues necessary to maintain the ATP system. Analysts pointed 
that the AP-funds could disappear quickly if nothing was changed in the system. A 
governmental report239 published in 1987 stated that the first AP-funds would begin to lose 
                                                                                                                                                             
and houses. As a result, the growth rate of the funds was below that of the placements made by private insurance 
companies. In 1974, a fourth AP funds was established, which was allowed to enter the stock market. The fifth fund, 
created in 1988, was also granted permission to buy company shares. The intervention of the AP funds in the stock 
market was strongly opposed by the bourgeois parties since they claim it represented an attack on the free economy. 
Today, there are 7 AP funds (?). 
237 This will change briefly following the resignation of Feldt, but would regain predominance with the nomination 
of Larsson to replace Asbrink. 
238 Another proposal put forward in this discussion was the use of the AP-funds as the basis of funded private 
pension accounts. See Brännpunkt (the debate page of the Conservative Daily Svenska Dagblatet). October 15, 18, 
and 29, and November 18 and 19 1991.  
239 Socialförsäkring iett ekonomiskt perspektiv, annex to LU87. 
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money starting in 1995, as the sum of contributions and interest would not cover the costs 
of benefits. An article in Svenska Dagbladet claimed that the AP funds could be totally 
emptied by 2015 if contribution rates were to remain the same (SvD, 26 September 1990). 
Thus, relaxing the rules of investment of the AP-funds could lengthen the process, but not 
stop it, and a large increase in the contribution rates would still be necessary. Whether or 
not 4 points would be sufficient was up for debate. 
The second wave of discussion surrounding the pension reform debate occurred as 
a result of the publication of ATP och dess finansiering I det medel- och långsiktiga 
perspektivet at the end of 1987 by RFV. 240 The report presented a rather grim picture for 
the future of ATP and proposed a reform. Further, for the first time it demonstrated that 
even economic growth could not save the system, as it would lead to a high number of 
individuals being above the ceiling of 7.5 basic amounts. With two percent economic 
growth it was projected that 80% of men and 66% of women would be above the ATP 
ceiling.241 In the long run, this would have made the ATP system a semi basic pension 
since most people would reach the contribution ceiling. This outcome was the result of the 
indexation structure, which was based on prices and not economic growth. Many 
projections were presented accounting for a possible increase in the ceiling based on 
economic growth to highlight the change in dynamics once the ceiling is adjusted. These 
findings made several proposals to save the ATP system, such as the one presented by LO, 
obsolete. 
As discussed in previous debates in the 1980s, RFV reiterated that slow economic 
growth combined with population ageing would require a significant increase in the 
contribution rates in order to maintain the system. This report was very important 
ontologically because it marked the beginning of a strong consensus that the ATP system 
had to be reformed.242  
RFV advocated two broad changes to the ATP system, which were related to its 
construction and operation. First, it proposed a reconsideration of the functioning of the 
                                                 
240 Riksförsäkringsverket. ATP och dess finansiering i det medel- och långsiktiga perspektivet. RFV Anser 1987: 9. 
RFV: Stockholm, 1987. 
241 With 3% growth these figures increased to 87% and 81.7% respectively (RFV, 1987: 87). 
242 Few economists and civil servants within the Ministry of Finance had raised similar concerns earlier during the 
work the Pension Commission, but were never able to convince the politicians that the old system was 
unsustainable. 
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ceiling in the calculation of pension benefits. Second, it suggested a reform of ATP rules so 
that the pension system would be more in line with economic growth. By doing so, RFV 
believed that pensions would be more in line with income and the system would be more 
stable243. It is important to note that the press release was signed by the General Director, 
KG Sherman but was not fully endorsed by the board. There was even a radio debate 
featuring Mr. Sherman and Ms. Doris Håvik (s), who was a board member, on this issue. 
Ms. Håvik was highly sceptical of the recommendations presented by the General Director 
and his employees. 
Following the press release, RFV’s General Director entered into public debates to 
raise awareness about the need to reform the ATP. The board was invited to give lecture on 
the financial status of the system and was also doing calculations based on various 
alternatives presented publicly in order to stimulate debates. For example, it generated 
some calculations regarding the costs of transferring to a fully funded system for a 
conference sponsored by Skandia.  
Based on RFV’s publication, other ideas were put on the public table by various 
experts and political figures. In Ekonomisk Debatt (Nr. 5, 1989) and Arbetet (9 July 1989), 
Stålberg, an economist specializing on pension questions at the University of Stockholm, 
advocated leaving the ATP system run its course while complementing it progressively 
with stronger occupational schemes. Her solution corresponded to a progressive movement 
towards the Line 2 of the Swedish referendum of 1957, that is a strong basic pension 
complemented by occupational schemes negotiated among the labour market partners. As 
those rely on funded components to finance pensions, this solution also had the merit of 
tackling the issue of the weak savings rate. She stated that the current system was actually 
regressive, meaning that working class workers supported the pensions of higher wage 
earners. This conclusion would also be underlined a year later in the report of the pension 
committee - pensionberedningen (SOU 1990: 76).244 Thus, raising the ceiling would not 
                                                 
243 Within the context of the current system, it proposed an increase of .5% per year during the period 1990-94 so 
that contributions would reach 13.1% by 1994 (RFV, 1987: 8). 
244 The analyses presented during the commission demonstrated that many blue-collar workers were contributing 
more than white-collar workers to the system while receiving less generous benefits. This was a non-intended 
consequence of the ATP system and it was attributed to the 15/30 years rule, which clearly advantaged white-collar 
workers such as professionals. Their career path begin at a later stage in life as they attend universities and were not 
penalized for this since they could still reach 30 years of work. Their formation result in higher wages and higher 
wage increases overtime. Blue-collar workers, in contrast, begin working at an earlier stage in life with a wage that 
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alleviate the problem and would imply more benefits to high-income earners since they are 
the ones currently above the ceiling. This was a direct consequence of the 15/30 rule where 
only 30 years of work was required with the best 15 years being considered (Stålberg, 
1989). This was made as a concession to attract TCO workers during the pension debate of 
the 1950s and it clearly worked towards their advantage since long period of studies 
resulting in jobs producing non-stagnant wages fit nicely with the 15/30 rule. 
The President of SACO (Jörgen Ullenhag) also came up with a plan of its own 
advocating the abolition of the ceiling, price indexation, and a stronger link between 
contributions and benefits. Few weeks prior to the publication of the report from the 
pension committee, Margit Gennser from the Conservative Party, criticized the discussion 
of allowing AP-funds as avoiding the real difficulties faced by the pension system. She 
argued that more capitalized options were necessary and stated that Chili could be used as 
an inspiration to reform the Swedish pension system (Sydsvenska Dagbladet, 1 October 
1990). Bo Södersten, an economics professor, would take this line of argument further in 
the summer of 1991, by advocating the creation of a fully funded scheme while criticizing 
payg in principle for not generating essential savings function. He followed up by 
mentioning that both liberals and conservatives had been too passive with regards to the 
ATP system despite its shortcomings (DN, 21-2 July 1991). Wibble and Könberg, two 
liberal deputies, would respond critically by arguing that creating a fully funded scheme 
would not be possible because of the double payment problem. Nonetheless, they 
maintained that they supported a partially funded system and policies that could help 
increase Sweden’s savings rate (DN, 10 August 1991).   
The publication of Allmän Pension (SOU 1990:76), the report from 
pensionberedningens betänkande brought up new proposals to the table, and increased the 
amount of discussion on reforming the pension system. Six members of that committee 
were interviewed and concurred that this commission was more of a fact-finding seminar 
rather than a political commission seeking to alter the pension system and it was clear from 
                                                                                                                                                             
is likely to increase as fast as white-collar workers overtime. Further, their working career tends to be longer. This 
resulted in cases where certain blue-collar workers contributed more to the system than their white-collar 
counterparts while receiving a less generous pension. In brief, poor workers were financing the public pensions of 
rich workers. 
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the very beginning that finding a political compromise would not occur. 245 All pointed out 
to the limited scope of the mission, where the ATP system could not really be altered. It 
was even stated in the introduction of the report that the aim of the commission was not to 
reach a political compromise but represented rather a first step in the process with the 
objective of pursing the discussion further in another setting.246 The committee received 
endless studies and papers related to the pension system underlining different problems and 
solutions. Thus, pensionberedningens betänkande was highly conducive to the creation of 
various reform plans. Despite its limited role, this commission would be of great 
importance since it created a strong consensus that pension reform was necessary, even 
though stark disagreements were found as to the nature of the reform and the extent under 
which is should be undertaken. 
The work of the commission re-stated the conclusions underlined by RFV in 1987. 
With low economic growth, a strong increase in the contribution rate would be required. 
An annual growth rate of 2% would be sufficient to stabilize the contribution rates (see 
table 4.4), but many individuals would eventually find themselves above the ceiling 
resulting in the ATP system becoming a basic pension.  
With regards to reforming the ATP system, no concrete option was provided, but 
three models were studied. The Model A promoted the creation of a more extensive basic 
pension by increasing its size in the system. ATP benefits would be granted for 
contributions above the amount of this new floor. Unsurprisingly, the Centre Party 
supported this option since it represented something similar to their line of argument since 
the 1950s.247 Model B was like model A with the exception that all points earned under the 
                                                 
245 The only significant decision resulting directly from this commission was the elimination of the widow’s 
pension. 
246 'Våra överväganden skall ses enbart som ett första steg i ett arbete som tar sikte på att samordna 
pensionssystemets olika beståndsdelar. De modeller som vi skisserar i betänkandet är inte färdigutvecklande. Det 
slag av omfattande förändringar av pensionssytemet so det här är fråga om bör enligt vår mening beslutas under bred 
politisk enighet och helst med instämmanded av pensionärsorganisationerna och arbetsmarknadens organisationer. 
Det har under vårt arbete visat sig inte vara möljigt att finna en lösning som tillgodoser detta önskemål och samtidigt 
kravet att den skall liga inom oförandrade kostnadsramar. Oberende härav återstår en rad frågor some måste lösas 
och som kan vara tekniskt komplicerade. Också ufrormningeng för framtiden av olika regler för intjänande av 
pension och systemet för värdesäking av pensioner kan vara av betydelse vad gäller möljigheterna att finna en 
lösning på den här aktuella problemställningen…Vi anser emerlletid att det arbete som vi har påbörjat bör drivas 
vidare I ett annat sammanhang (SOU 1990: 19). 
247 This was the closest option to Line 2 in the Swedish referendum – see above. The Centre Party member in the 
commission, Gösta Andersson, claimed that the poor and women would gain from an extended basic pension, which 
would also eliminate the need of income testing, thus reducing the administrative costs of the pension programs. He 
 213
ATP system would grant points. Thus it would not have to be above a certain amount as in 
Model A. In both models, the ceiling and other subsidies, such as the one offers to 
pensioner for housing,248 would remain. Finally, model C marked a break with the other as 
it reinforced the contributory nature of the system by decreasing the importance of the 
basic pension and eliminating the housing subsidies provided by the communes. The 
committee agreed that further work on pension reform should be performed based mostly 
on model C.249 
 
Table 4.4 Required contribution rates to maintain current basic and ATP pension 
systems with various growth rates (ATP alone in brackets). 
Year Annual Growth Rates in % of GDP 
 0% 1% 2% 3% 
1990* 23,3 23,3 23,3 23,3 
 (14,6) (13,8) (13,7) (13,6) 
1995 25,6 23,9 22,6 21,6 
 (17,4) (15,7) (13,7) (13,7) 
2005 31,7 26,4 22,4 19,3 
 (29,0) (19,6) (17,1) (14,2) 
2015 43,0 32,2 24,8 19,3 
 (33,8) (26,5) (21,0) (15,9) 
2025 47,5 32,7 23,1 16,2 
 (38,2) (29,1) (20,8) (14,2) 
Source: Pensionsberedningen (SOU 1990:76) and RFV (1987). *Discrepancy with the actual rate (20,45) at 
the time because part of the pension cost was financed via taxation and the AP-funds. 
 
The responses provided by the members of the committee underlined some of the 
many differences between the political parties, even though these were made cautiously as 
no concrete proposal was analyzed. All right wing parties stated that people should not 
have to contribute above the ceiling since they do not receive benefits for this (577-8). The 
                                                                                                                                                             
claimed that this solution would also allow for a better comprehension of pensions for the population, favour private 
savings, and result in more personal choices for pensions. Ironically, he also criticized the fact that income above the 
ceiling was collected, but resulted in no benefits even though the Centre Party introduced this policy when it was in 
government in 1982. This option was considered as one of two main alternatives to avoid the collapse of the ATP 
system – the other being a stricter earnings-related scheme - by two economists (Olsson and Schubert) who wrote a 
report (DS 1991: 27) for the expert group for the study of the public economy within the Ministry of Finance. They 
argued that the Centre party option was more conducive to savings, but nonetheless stated that a stricter earnings-
related scheme would be more appropriate since it would mark less of a break with the ATP system.  
248 As stated in the report, this subsidy is financially important for many elderly and could add up to 15 552 SEK to 
a basic pension of 43 362 SEK in 1990 (SOU 1990: 76, 15). 
249 Enligt vår uppfattning bör därvid en lösning som möjliggör en sammanslagning av folk- och 
tilläggspensionsioneringen söknas enligt de principer som ligger till grund för modelltyp C (SOU 1990: 76, 19). 
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representatives from the Conservative and Liberal Party, Troedsson and Könberg 
respectively, proposed to increase the pensionable age, the possibility to seek private 
alternatives, plans to favour house ownership to reduce the reliance on housing subsidies. 
They also advocated a stronger link between contributions and benefits (577-80). Most of 
their points of view were shared by the employer’s organization (SAF) (591-3). The Left 
representative stated the importance of housing subsidies for many poor elderly and that its 
removal would have important negative consequences for them (583-4). 
Because the Social Democratic party was chairing the working of the committee, it 
did not present any responses to the report. However, the way the objectives and aims of 
the committee were framed made it obvious that it did not seem ready to abandon the ATP 
system yet. The leadership within the Social Affairs Ministry was embracing a reform 
extending the 15/30 rule to a 20/40 rule. Such a plan was studied while the Ministry of 
Social Affairs was working towards the publication of Allmän Pension and seemed to be 
the closest position to be taken by most traditional supporters. It became clear that Korpi 
had envisioned such option with the publication of ATP i takt med framtiden (APT in line 
with the future) in 1991 (Lundberg, 2001: 17). Support for Korpi’s solution was also 
strongly anchored within the Ministry of Social Affairs (Marier, 2001: 106). 
Adding support to the (perceived) strength and popularity of this solution within 
social democratic circles, RFV actually proposed a solution to the pension dilemma with 
the political context in mind as both the Director General250 and his deputy (Gustav 
Jönsson) were on opposite sides of the political spectrum. Key elements of RFV’s proposal 
included a longer view for the AP-funds to finance future pensioners, an increase of the 
15/30 rule to a 20/40 years rule, the creation of a new index for both benefits and the 
ceiling based on economic growth, a minimum of 40 year residency in Sweden to get a 
basic pension, a reduction of part-time pensions, and an increase in the legal pensionable 
age (RFV, Anser 1991: 15). Many elements in this proposal were quite similar to the ones 
advocated by Korpi and RFV’s solution would re-surface in later pension debates within 
social democratic circles. 
                                                 
250 The Director General was appointed by the Minority Centre government of 1982. Interestingly, as a bureaucrat 
he sought to maintain the system rather than see it become like a strong basic pension, the traditional position of the 
Centre party (see Marier, 2001). 
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All labour market partners acknowledged the need to reform the ATP system. 
However, the extent to which it had to be reformed and how it should be reformed was not 
very consensual even among unions. This was quite a shift since by the late 1980s when 
many people within the unions did not really acknowledge that there was a problem with 
ATP and were actually seeking better benefits within the system. TCO, for example, hosted 
a conference during this period seeking to find ways to reduce the pensionable age. Prior to 
1987, LO held the firm belief that economic growth could save the ATP system. 
Both the financial and redistribution impacts of ATP made labour market partners 
believe that a pension reform was required, but the basis of a reformed system was not 
consensual even though some elements were. This resulted in different sets of concerns 
among them. Many of them were presented as part of the reservations at the end of the 
report from pensionberedningens betänkande. First, SACO and SAF stated that a new 
pension scheme should generate a stronger link between contributions and benefits251. 
SACO’s Chief economist and member of pensionberedningens betänkande, Jan Bröms, 
discussed this concern further in his highly influential book Ur Askan av ATP.252 The 
sketch of a new pension system was presented, which strongly reinforced the link between 
contributions and benefits by introducing the life income principle where every earnings 
count. He further advocated the elimination of contributions above the ceiling that were not 
counted for pension benefits to increase savings, a point also shared by SAF. Finally, 
Bröms also supported the continuation of a payg system and an indexation based on the 
state of the national economy, the later point was also stressed by LO and TCO. TCO’s 
representative within pensionberedningens betänkande, Ljung and Olsson, claimed that 
basic amount risked becoming a tax as more and more individuals contribute above the 
ceiling. They also maintained that a pension system must include some forms of 
redistribution between income groups and a spreading of the risks among the population.253  
                                                 
251 Allmän Pension. Socialdepartementet, SOU 1990: 76. P. 585. 
252 The publication of the book was supposed to coincide with the publication of Allmän pension. However, due to 
delays Ur Askan av ATP ended up being published earlier. Many members of pensionsarbetsgruppen have 
acknowledged that this book had been highly influential in their thinking of reforming the ATP system. Many 
experts within the Committee expressed similar views. 
253 Ibid 12, p. 589-93. 
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 Aftermath of Pensionberedningens Betänkande. 
The publication of Allmän Pension also generated further discussions in the public 
sphere, but as importantly, within the government. The ministries of Social Affairs and 
Finance were both seeking to take initiatives for the following step. 
Anna Hedborg joined the Ministry of Social Affairs as State Secretary, and led 
discussions among cabinet members from the Ministry of Finance and the office of the 
Prime Minister. LO took part in many of these discussions.254 With her nomination, the 
20/40 option began to lose momentum.255 The Ministry of Finance also started to draw 
some sketches for a possible reform, and was quite eager to do something immediately. 
Reform to the pension system would end up the budget proposition for the 1991 written by 
the Ministry of Finance. Surprisingly, it would state that “to stimulate a higher savings rate 
we ought to study the possibility of more funded options in more private and insurance 
ways than what we currently have with the AP-funds” (Proposition 1990/91: 100, p. 34),256 
which clearly went against the party line of sticking by the AP-funds. Although it is 
thought that the cabinet approved his proposition, people within the Ministry of Social 
Affairs were shocked by this statement as they felt it required more preparation. They also 
believed that this issue should not be raised during an election year.257 Following the 
election of the bourgeois parties in 1991, the new Finance Minister, Anne Wibble, would 
advance similar principles.  
 
A reform is necessary. 
Prior to the election of 1991, it was widely acknowledged, and even accepted, that a 
pension reform was in order. Nonetheless, proposals ranged from increasing contribution 
rates and facilitate capital accumulation via the AP-funds (LO) to the (partial) 
capitalization of the system (Right wing parties). In fact, there did not seem to exist large 
                                                 
254 Interview, Tore Lidbom, 21 April 2002.  
255 She claimed that she was never part of any discussion promoting this alternative to save the ATP system. She has 
believed that it implied a pure reduction in benefits and did not resolve any of the difficulties inherent in the system. 
256 “för att stimulera till ett högre sparande bör övervägas om fondering kan ske i mer individuella och 
försäkringsmässiga former än vad som nu är fallet i AP-fonderna” 
257 Interview, Anna Hedborg 6 December 2000. Adding support to the surprise hypothesis, even civil servants within 
the Ministry of Finance were surprised to see their suggestions adopted almost unaltered by the government 
(Interview, Stefan Ackerby 17 November 2000).   
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variations between the positions of political actors in the early 1990s and those held during 
the pension debate of the 1950s. No one could have predicted that, 7 years later, Sweden 
would obtain a brand new pension system based on a compromise among the five largest 
parties, and that pensions would not even become a predominant electoral question! This 
represented a sharp turn of events considering the historical politicization of this issue. 
That being said, it is worth stressing few common points beyond the need to reform 
the system among the political parties prior to the election of 1991. First, the need to 
strengthen the link between contributions and benefits was acknowledged by all actors. In a 
debate article in late 1991, Jan Bröms mentioned that the only real stance taken by 
pensionsberedningen was that a clear link between contributions and benefits should be 
present in the pension system (DN, 21 October 1991). Second, all accepted capitalized 
options, as a way to improve the savings rate and prepare for the upcoming demographic 
change. Even though the form (collective or individual) and the extent (partial or full) were 
in question, this option was not rejected right away as it was in France. Had the Swedish 
social democrats had a position similar to the French socialists, negotiations with the 
bourgeois coalition would have never started! The fact that the SAP Finance Minister 
mentioned the possibility of promoting private savings options, even though it angered 
some of his SAP colleagues, demonstrated that this option could be considered seriously in 
upcoming negotiations.    
 
The Politicians Take Over the Control of the Reform Agenda (1991-94).258 
The outcome of the 1991 elections would result in a return to power for the bourgeois 
parties after close to 10 years in the opposition. The victory was not complete, however, as it 
would have to rely on the support of the (far-right) party Ny Demokrati, which entered the 
parliament for the first time. There was a strong conviction within and among the four 
government parties (Conservative, Liberal, Centre, and Christian Democrats) to avoid a repeat of 
the turbulent coalition period of 1976-82. This aimed would be successfully achieved for the 
most part, but strong economic difficulties would persist resulting in a sharp decline in output 
unseen since the 1930s. The crises forced the government to negotiate “crisis packages” with the 
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Social Democrats, a more reliable partner than Ny Demokrati. This type of co-operation between 
both sides of the political spectrum had not been seen since World War II.  
There is no doubt that this context was favourable for the introduction of new ideas. A 
civil servant within the Ministry of Finance resumes best the situation by stating that all of a 
sudden “anything was possible, you could notice this, feel it”.259 It is worth stating that the 
Working Group on Pensions, created immediately after the elections, began its work before the 
crisis and would reach a compromise in its aftermath. Nonetheless, it had a strong influence as it 
meant freer hands for the members of the committee because other actors such as MPs, the 
Ministry of Finance, and even the media focused on immediate economic difficulties. The work 
within the committee was even slowed down as a result because two members were involved in 
the elaboration of the so-called “crisis packages”. Even when it sought to expand the discussion 
on the reform, the committee had difficulties. A sketch of a possible reform was presented in 
early September, but discussions never got off the ground. One of the key reasons being a sudden 
raise in the interest rate, which would reach 500% overnight a week or two later.  
The crisis also provided an opportunity for all Bourgeois parties and the Social 
Democratic Party to get closer and reach compromises, a rare occasion. Few weeks following the 
presentation of the political compromise on pensions, the chair of the Working Group on 
Pensions would state that “if someone was trying to find a time where parties had the possibility 
to be quite close to each other, I think people would have to go back to 1948” (Ekonomisk 
Debatt, 1994).260 The crisis further put pressure on the committee to find a solution to reassure 
the population. The previous commission had underlined the increasing financial difficulties that 
could occur if Sweden was to enter an economic recession. Thus, high level of uncertainties lied 
around the future of pensions.  
Considering the adversarial atmosphere surrounding pensions in Sweden, the crisis surely 
made it easier to reach a compromise and make this big decision. Nonetheless, it worth 
emphasizing that the crisis may have helped the process but was not the cause behind the pension 
reform. Once the crisis over, each party involved had numerous occasions to withdraw from the 
                                                                                                                                                             
258 In order to facilitate the understanding of the political compromise among the five parties and the opposition to it, 
it was decided to tackle them separately. Thus, an overview of the negotiations among the five parties is presented in 
the following two sections, which is followed by a full section on the opposition to the compromise.  
259 Interview, Stefan Ackerby 17 November 2000.  
260 “Skall man försöka hitta någon tidpunkt då partierna möljigen har stått ganska nära varandra, tror jag att man får 
gå tillbaka till 1948”. 
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agreement and no one did, even though the Social Democrats came close in 1996-97. In 
conclusion, all parties involved were quick to affirm that the pension reform has not been a crisis 
decision, but rather the continuation of a long process that began in the mid 1980s. 
 
Creation of the Working Group on Pensions 
It is in this context that the search for a solution for the pension question continued. One 
week after the formation of the government, a Working Group on Pensions 
(pensionsarbetsgruppen) was created by the new Minister of Health and Social Security, Bo 
Könberg (fp). The aim of the working group was to present a proposal to reform pensions to the 
parliament, which would make pensions “more responsive to the general state of the economy, 
strengthen the link between contributions and benefits, and encourage an increase in long-term 
saving” (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 1994: 5). In order to increase the likelihood of a 
compromise with the Social Democrats, he had based the guidelines on the budget proposition 
for 1991 (see above).261 
Könberg was no stranger to the pension debate, having been the liberal party 
representative in the previous pension commission (pensionsberegningen) from 1988. Based on 
this experienced, he was convinced that the usual way to carry a parliamentary commission 
(utredningar) could not lead to a pension compromise and sought to create another kind of 
committee.262 Thus, he opted for a mixture of parliamentary commission and platform for 
negotiation by setting up a working group. That way, he was able to create the smallest 
committee possible by only inviting political parties.263 Following the first meeting in December, 
it was decided that he was going to chair the group, something highly unusual by Swedish 
standards.264 
                                                 
261 Interview, Bo Könberg 20 November 2000. 
262 He stated his reasoning clearly during an interview granted to Göteborgs Posten in 1994. In this previous 
parliamentary commission, “we were only able to eliminate the widow’s pension even though everyone was in 
agreement that the ATP system had to be changed substantially. I thought a lot about what this could be depending 
on…We were often 30 people in the room, many of which had only one mission to defend their own organisations 
and their members” (GP, 16 May 1994 – author translation; Interview, 20 November 2000). 
263 Further, as a way to reduce further the number of players to get an agreement, he only offered two seats to the 
social democrats despite their much larger size. The Social Democrats agreed since both side understood that giving 
them three seats would have lead the Conservatives to ask for two and so on (Interview, Bo Könberg 20 November 
2000).  
264 According to Könberg, this happened only once before (Negotiations between municipalities and county councils 
for the responsibility of elderly) (Interview, 20 November 2000). 
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The labour market partners were excluded, which drew some criticism but no strong 
protest on their part.265 This was in sharp contrast to the instauration of the ATP system, where 
they were first asked to resolve this issue among themselves. Könberg was able to push them 
aside by claiming they were consulted during the previous pension commission and that it was 
now time for politicians to take their responsibilities. Even though many people interviewed 
doubted that the Social Democrats would have ever been able to exclude them, there is no 
counter factual to support or discredit this hypothesis. Their exclusion from this working group 
was part of a growing trend that they should be involved in strictly labour market matters. Since 
this reform did not involve the negotiated supplementary pension from collective agreements, 
they were unable to muster a strong political claim to be included. Demonstrating the validity of 
this reasoning, Könberg tried to do the same thing with sickness insurance but was forced to cave 
in and give them representation in the committee. 
The individual parties chose their representatives from the Working Group. Indicative of 
the seriousness of this new committee, most of them had been involved with pension questions 
previously and the parties involved sent people open to compromises.266 Whether or not the latter 
was achieved strategically or not is up for debate, but it is clear the Conservatives could have 
sent a more neo-liberal parliamentarian than Margit Gennser such as Lars Tobisson while the 
Social Democrats could have sent individuals strongly opposed to the reform of the ATP system 
like Doris Håvik267 instead of sending Anna Hedborg and Ingela Thalén. Such decision would 
have made it even more difficult to reach a consensus, and such a strategy could have been easily 
employed by any of the big parties to ensure the failure of the committee. Thus, it seems that 
they all acted in good faith with their nomination. Also important is the fact that both the 
                                                 
265 A review of the major newspapers of the period does not contain any article where their exclusion is stated as an 
issue. TCO would begin to criticize publicly its exclusion from the committee in September 1993 when it became 
clear that they could not have strong influence in changing aspects detrimental to its members. LO felt confident that 
it could retain some of its influence via the Social Democratic Party and had a high level of confidence in the two 
SAP representatives. Anna Hedborg had been highly involved with the wage-earner funds in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, and thus had a strong affiliation with them. According to her,  they (two SAP representative) “were 
very much involved in the process informing, discussing with them (LO)” (Interview, Anna Hedborg 6 December 
2000). The LO representative confirmed that they met at least once a month, on a need basis (Interview, Tore 
Lidbom 22 April 2002). 
266 The members of the Working Group on Pensions were: Bo Könberg (fp), Leif Bergdahl (nyd), Per Lennart 
Börjesson (v; until the end of 1992), Ulla Hoffmann (v; replacing Börjesson), Margit Gennser (m), Anna Hedborg 
(s), Åke Pettersson (c), Ingela Thalén (s), Barbro Westerholm (fp), and Pontus Wiklund (kd). The liberals (fp) had 
two representatives because Könberg sat as Minister/Chairman and not party representative. To find out more about 
the reasons behind the selection of the two SAP representatives, please see Lundberg, 2001: 25.   
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Minister of Health and Social Affairs and, the Minister of Finance came from the Liberal Party. 
Even though it remained a party of the right, it is much closer to the Social Democratic Party 
than the Conservatives, and has had a history of co-operation with the SAP. Newspaper reported 
on numerous occasions in December 1993, that it was considered as a possible coalition partner 
in a future government when polls demonstrated that the SAP could not carry a majority on its 
own. 
Despite these favourable conditions, there was not strong optimism from the Social 
Democrats when the Working Group was formed. The former Prime Minister and leader of the 
Social Democrats, Ingvar Carlsson, believed that the possibilities to find a consensus are as good 
as being excluded (DN, 20 November 1991). The Conservative leader and Prime Minister, Carl 
Bildt, was more optimistic claiming, “there are possibilities for a common understanding on the 
question”. He would even add, “I am fairly convinced that we will keep the ATP system, but in 
the long run it will need to be completed” (ibid).268 
 
Proceedings in the Working Group on Pensions – A fast start, followed by a stalemate and 
terminated by a race to the finish line. 
The creation of the working group rejuvenated the pension debate. Clearly present in a 
much more direct manner was the link between reforming the pension system and increasing 
savings. This connection directly led to debates about the AP-funds, including the wage-earner 
funds within it, and the role it could have for the future of the pension system. More 
interestingly, it involved individuals present in the working group.  
In a debate article, Hedborg and Thalén proposed a way to save the pension system in a 
country “with the oldest people with the world’s best pensions for the common people” (DN, 7 
December 1991). They argued in favour of maintaining the AP-funds and increase their assets by 
raising contribution rates by an extra point to build up a buffer fund for the upcoming 
demographic change. They agreed with the importance of savings but rejected claims that it had 
to be in private hands. They stressed that dismantling the AP-funds would only make the matter 
worst since it would reduce savings. Nonetheless, they left the door open to the possibility of 
breaking up the AP-funds into multiple funds where people could choose the one of their choice. 
                                                                                                                                                             
267 Håvik was a MP from Göteborg. She was the Vice-President of the Social Insurance Committee in Parliament, 
the Presidency being held by a Conservative, and a member of the RFV board – see debate with Scherman above.  
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One of the critics of funded schemes is that it leads to a further reduction in the pensions for 
women since they tend to live longer. According to them, there was no doubt that the wage 
earner funds belong to the pension system (ibid). In a subsequent article, they rejected the 20/40 
option by stating that it amounts to a simple reduction in benefits, which would hurt women most 
without tackling the basic difficulties of the system.269 They also issued a warning signal that 
funded option results in a pension level dictated by the market, and underlined the double-
payment problem (SvD, 8 May 1992). 
Margit Gennser was also quite active in promoting her solution to the pension and 
savings problem. She stated on numerous occasions that more than 50% of the Swedish 
population did not support the current ATP system upon its creation, and that individual, not 
collective, savings was necessary to promote growth. Indicative of the long bridge to cross 
between her and the Social Democrats, she wrote few articles in magazine and newspaper where 
the Thatcher reform of 1986 in Britain became her example of choice. People would have the 
choice to remain within the ATP system or not, newcomers into the labour market would have to 
select private options, and the ATP system would be disintegrated in 20 years.270 Acknowledging 
the double payment problem, she advocated a solution that would maximize personal savings 
while maintaining previous commitments.271 She mentioned Bröms’ book “Ur Askan av ATP” as 
a way to switch from a payg to a fully funded system (Gennser, 1992). 
Despite these sharp ideological differences, a compromise seemed within reach few 
months after the creation of the Working Group on Pensions. The members felt that they had 
made such strong progress that they published a document “Ett reformeratpensionssytem – 
Bakgrund, principer och skiss” in early September 1992.272 Following many seminar-like 
meetings where various experts presented their views and proposals, the committee had opted to 
                                                                                                                                                             
268 “Jag är tämligen övertygad om att vi kommer att ha kvar ATP, men på lång sikt behöver det kompletterras”. 
269 In terms of reaching an agreement, dismissing the 20/40 option was extremely important since the Conservatives 
had strongly opposed an extension of the ATP system by simply changing the parameters (see for example, SdS, 24 
January 1992; Gennser, 1992).  
270 She was explicit about this inspiration in an article written for the Taxpayers’ Association (Skattebetalarnas 
Förening) in 1991. In this article, she also proposed to create a new law that would force individuals to put aside 
21% of their income for pension purposes and that 2/3 of these contributions would have to go into an individual 
ATP system, with the rest being invested elsewhere. She also advocated transferring earlier ATP points into a 
private account and that pensions paid from individual accounts would be granted according to insurance principles. 
For more information about the British reform, please see Chapter 6. 
271 In a debate article co-written with Ivarsson, they would write as a concluding remark that “the bigger the part of 
the future pension savings that are channelled to a funded system, thus the higher the increase household savings to 
improve the necessary economic growth” (SdS, 10 January 1992 – author translation).   
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publish some of the elements under which a consensus could be established.273 It was not clearly 
defined, as it was published to generate discussions in and outside the committee and to secure a 
broad base to pursue the negotiations for a reformed pension system.274 
The 89 pages document provided a broad picture of the current future state of the pension 
system, while underlining the difficulties associated with the ATP system. It re-instated some of 
the earlier conclusions brought up by the previous committee, that is the economic instability of 
the system, the weak link between contributions and benefits, and the small savings incentive it 
gives.   
The fifth chapter presented the sketch of a possible reform. Many elements of this section 
would actually end up being part of the new legislation on pensions that would be introduced two 
years later. It proposed to maintain a pension system that is income related with a guaranteed 
basic level financed by contributions. The mandatory nature of the system was to remain 
unchanged. The key elements of the sketch are presented and developed in Table 4.5.  
Two key elements came from the sketch. First, there was the adoption the life income 
principle, where every krona contributed would count towards the calculation of an individual’s 
pension. This implied a switch from a benefit-defined to a contribution-defined system.275 As a 
result of switching to life earnings instead of using the best 15 years of employment out of 30, 
the working group introduced ways to grant pension points while individuals are unemployed, 
sick, doing military service, and child care. Second, the sketch proposed the creation of a funded 
component on top of the payg system. No specific details were provided for the later, because no 
broad political compromise had been achieved yet. However, during the public conference 
presenting the sketch, the bourgeois parties made it known that the group was studying the 
option of placing 10 to 15% of future contributions in individual funded schemes (DN, 1 
September 1992). Besides these two key elements, the working group raised the question of 
sharing pension points among married couples and proposed to change the indexation 
                                                                                                                                                             
272 “A reformed pension system: Background, aspects and sketch” (Ds 1992: 89). 
273 All people interviewed within the committee (Könberg, Hedborg, Palmer, Ackerby, Hoffmann, Gennser) 
underlined that good chemistry existed within the group and that the group was really open to suggestions and ideas 
stemming from individuals. As underlined in an article in Äffärsvärlden, ”most of them in the group had been 
department’s secretary or secretary of state and was an expert within the field...the atmosphere was an academic 
seminar. The group could resolve a problem and the members came to trust each other, listen to each other, and 
believe in each other’s word” (Äffärsvärlden, 15 November, 2000).  
274 Interview, Bo Könberg, 20 November 2000.  
275 The ATP system with its 15/30 rule and contributions above the ceiling was considered more of a taxed based 
system. Few economists claimed that 70- to 80% of the contributions amounted to a tax rather than a contribution 
(Konjonkturrådet – cited in Gennser, 1991).  
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mechanism for pensions from price to wages or something more in line with the evolution of the 
economy. 
 
Table 4.5 New Elements in the Sketch of a Reformed Pension System (Ds 1992: 89). 
Element Explanation Replace  
Life Income Principle Pension based on all earnings 
accumulated throughout one’s career. 
Strengthen the link between 
contributions and benefits. The system 
becomes contribution-based. 
Replacement rate based on amount 
contributed into the system. 
Best 15 years with a 
minimum of 30 years 
for a full pension. 
Pension equals 60% of 
average income for 
those 15 years. 
Pensionable income granted 
for child caring (4 alternatives 
presented for child caring 
points) and military service.   
These were not compensated in the 
previous system, but needs 
consideration because of the life income 
principle. 
 
Social benefits such as 
unemployment and sickness 
insurance are pensionable 
income. 
Become necessary to ensure that they 
are not too penalize as a result of the 
lifelong earnings principle. 
 
Sharing of pension points 
between married couples. 
Possibility for couples to exchange 
pension points between them based on 
insurance principles (men’s points are 
worth less than women due to life 
expectancy). 
ATP was an individual 
system. New measure 
could somewhat 
compensate for the 
widow’s pension 
abolished in 1988. 
Flexible retirement age and 
elimination of the pre-
pension. 
Possibility to retire at any time between 
the ages of 60-70. Benefits vary 
accordingly. If pre-retirement is caused 
by sickness or other reasons, the 
appropriate authorities should pay it.  
Retirement age of 65. 
Pre-pension options 
available.  
Wage indexation for pensions 
(or something along this line). 
Aim to align pensions closer to the state 
of the economy. 
Price indexation 
20 years transition period. For those aged 35 or 40 until 59. 
Someone aged 59 would have 1/20 of 
the new system and so on. 
 
Funded component Created to increase the savings rate. 
Questions raised, but details lacking. 
AP-funds partly fulfill 
this function, but 
savings rate low. 
Source: Ett reformeratpensionssytem – Bakgrund, principer och skiss (Ds 1992:89). 
 
 
The sketch would not result in a strong public debate. Several events were responsible for 
this outcome. First, as stated earlier in this section, a strong currency and economic crisis would 
hit Sweden shortly afterwards. People became much more concerned about that than a potential 
reform that would affect them many years later. Second, many of the individuals involved in the 
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process claimed that the lack of political conflicts did not make this story very appealing to the 
mass media. A quick look at pension articles written during this period partly supports this 
hypothesis. The release of the sketch was part of a day seminar on the subject with large TV and 
press coverage,276 but the interest did not rise strongly afterwards. The number of articles on 
pension reform and the working group on pensions would be far greater in the end of 1993 when 
political conflicts arose within the group and TCO came out strongly against the reform.  
Optimism was high with the Chairmen of the group. Könberg announced two months 
later that within a year the new rules might already apply (DN, 29 November 1992). However, 
1993 did not turn out to be as successful as 1992 and the pension committee reached stalemate 
on sensitive political questions, most of which were relatively unchanged from the mid-1950s. 
The economic crisis also reduced the working pace of the committee since both Könberg and 
Thalén were highly involved in the so-called crisis committee. 
Starting in late September 1993, stories began to emerge that the “ATP reform might be 
in danger” (DN, 19 September 1993) and would accentuate in the following months.277 
Following an executive meeting of the Social Democratic Party in late November, hopes of 
finding an agreement seemed rather grim. Rumours ran that there were individuals wishing to 
interrupt the commission and start anew after the election. Their hope was to exclude the 
Conservatives and seek a deal with the Liberals and Centrists after a possible election victory 
(DN, 28 November 1993). Pessimism was not strictly confined to the Social Democrats. 
According to Bo Könberg, “almost none in the government in the beginning of autumn 1993 
thought that it was possible” to reach an agreement.278 To stop these persisting rumours, the 
Working Group on Pensions would come out publicly to state that they would go into overdrive 
in the hopes of finding a compromise in late November. The members of the committee ended 
up working around the clock during the Christmas holiday and in early January to hammer a 
deal.  
 Five key issues were quite difficult to resolve, and resulted in a long period of stalemate. 
First, and foremost, was the taxation of contribution above the ceiling. As stated above, 
                                                 
276 Könberg claimed that it was one of the biggest he had ever been involved in (Interview, Bo Könberg 20 
November 2000).  
277 DN, 19 October 1993; DN 4-5, 28, and 30 November 1993.  
278 Interview, Bo Könberg 20 November 2000.  
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contributions above the ceiling began to be taxed in 1982 by the Centre government279 but did 
not give any pension points. On one hand, the Liberals, the Conservatives, and SACO 
consistently denounced this measure because it was not in line with the life income principle 
where every krona counts.280 Könberg had the backing of the government to negotiate it off. In a 
debate article he stated clearly the argument of the government: “Contributions over the ceiling 
do not result in benefits and are therefore a tax – and the two social democratic representatives 
admit that” (DN, 24 September 1993).281 The Social Democrats were opposed to the removal of 
contributions above the so-called ceiling because it represented such a good progressive tax. All 
individuals above the ceiling are, by default, high-income earners and represent a very regressive 
tax, which can be justified to pay pensions solely financed by the state (the new guaranteed 
pension, which replaced the basic pension). This was clearly one of the most difficult questions 
to resolve within the committee: 
 
“The question with what we should do with the fee over the roof was a hard 
negotiating matter up to the last hours really, I think the last two days before we 
ended. Because I had made up my mind trying to reach, to take it away 
completely, maybe in a few or couple of years but take it away. They (the social 
democrats) decided by reason that it was a way of taxing the rich that it should 
be kept completely” (Interview, Könberg, 20 November 2000). 
 
According to Wiklund, the Christian Democrat representative in the committee, he 
crafted the compromise with the support of the Centre Party that both parties meet halfway 
(Lindbom, 2001: 73). Thus, contributions remained but at a discounted rate of 9,25%. 
The second issue was closely related to first matter mentioned above since it concerned 
the indexation of the so-called ceiling. Originally, the bourgeois parties wanted to index it with 
prices, as it was the case with the ATP system. As demonstrated by RFV and economist, such an 
indexation implied that a higher number of individuals would eventually earn income above the 
ceiling. Almost all income earners could find themselves above it. The logic for the bourgeois 
parties was thus to keep a price index, remove the taxation above the ceiling to replace it with 
funded options. For the Social Democrats this option was unacceptable since it implied the 
                                                 
279 Interestingly, this measure was taken for administrative simplicity. Very few individuals had contributions above 
the ceiling then, and collecting contributions above the ceiling made it easier for employers since they did not have 
to spend time to calculate which employee was over the ceiling, and by how much.  
280 The Centre Party and Christian Democratic Party were also opposed to contributions above the ceiling but it 
attached far less importance to this issue than the other two bourgeois parties.  
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eventual transformation of the system into a large basic pension. It was thus important to create a 
ceiling that would be indexed on real wage growth. The Social Democrats ended up obtaining a 
ceiling indexed on real wages. This resulted in the safeguard of the payg component, an 
extremely important element for the Social Democrats, and this outcome paved the way for the 
creation of a funded part. 
The third issue, and one of the most important aspects of the compromise (if not the most 
important), pitted the bourgeois parties against the SAP on the creation/extension of a funded 
component in the system. The Social Democrats had defended the AP-funds, which were an 
important financial tool for the state, and a collective saving instrument.282 The early proposals 
from the SAP were to increase contribution rates to expand the size of the AP-funds to finance 
the upcoming increase in the number of retirements. The bourgeois parties, especially the 
Conservatives, had been advocating an expansion in private individual savings. This position 
went back to the 1950s with the so-called “ägardemokrati” (owner democracy), where the 
spreading of private property/ownership could balance an increasingly powerful concentration of 
power within the economy by the state and the bureaucracy. It was clear from the bourgeois 
parties’ perspective that no deal could be reached without granting a place for an individualized 
funded component (see Lidbom, 2001). Even though the Social Democrats accepted this demand 
in late December 1993, the thought behind this decision was a long process to maintain a high 
component of payg (thus, it was also related to the second issue mentioned above). 
 
It was a two front war actually to have a big public system. One front was the 
Ministry of Finance, which has really delayed, regardless of government by the 
way, and tried to minimise the level of the public pension system. That was 
more amazing with a social democratic government because that is of course 
what I feel is the importance of the democratic thing about it, to have a big 
public system, which means a big redistributing compulsory system. It was 
impossible to get it from the bourgeois party for more than what was needed to 
support old claims of the system because we did get the bourgeois parties, even 
Margit Gennser to accept a payg point of view, which supported old claims 
restrictively but still she realised that she will be claiming a more capitalized 
system it would mean double payments for a generation. She realised that as an 
argument. So, the calculation of what was needed to support the payg right was 
a very important part of the process, which turned out to be at 16.5%. So, block 
in between the bourgeois, at least the Moderates on one side, and the Ministry of 
Finance on the other, within my own government, I could only have a bigger 
system if I agreed to that extra thing (PPM). It could then begin an extra thing I 
                                                                                                                                                             
281 “Avgifter over denna gräns ger ju inga förmåner och är därför en skatt – vilka också de socialdemokratiska 
ledamöterna medger”. 
282 It had among other things, help the financing of housing.  
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felt then all right, it is not so bad to have eggs in different baskets either, so why 
not. Because, what people in general did not understand was that it was not a 
choice between a full payg or not. It was more actually a choice between the 
16.5% contribution system or 18.5% contributions (Interview, Anna Hedborg 6 
December 2000). 
 
The Social Democrats were thus willing to accept a funded component as long as it 
remained within the system,283 and the Conservatives were willing to make this compromise, as 
“it was very good for Sweden to have 5 millions new capitalists who are saving in accounts”.284 
Initially, both parties settled for a 2% in the 18,5% in contributions to be funded, and to be part 
of the state pension system.285 The social democrats offered to raised the funded component to 
2,5% if the bourgeois parties were willing to raise contribution rates to 19%. The Conservatives 
refused, as they seek to maintain low compulsory fees. 
The fourth major issue was the amount of the guaranteed pension. Historically, the 
Centre Party had promoted a high basic pension to be complemented by private options. This 
was Line 2 in the old ATP referendum. This line had not really changed by the 1990s. The 
Centre Party representative, Åke Pettersson, sought to increase it significantly: from 51 000 SEK 
to 80 000 SEK (roughly $5100 to $8000) (DN, 4 November 1993). Interestingly, not much had 
changed from the 1950s. Pettersson was not able to gather strong support from anyone else 
besides the Christian Democrats. Frustrated, he came out publicly against the Conservatives, the 
Liberals and the Social Democrats for their lack of consideration for his position (ibid; DN, 24 
November 1993). The Christian Democrats ended up withdrawing their support for a high 
guaranteed pension in mid December 1993 (DN, 18 December 93) marginalizing the Centre 
representative further.286 He obtained a small increase in the guaranteed pension (4000 SEK - 
$400).287 
                                                 
283 As underlined in Lundberg (2001), it was also important for the social democrats to ensure that everyone would 
participate, so that the funded component would just not be another tool to enrich the high-income earners. Also, it 
was key that these new savings be used for pensions. 
284 Interview, Margit Gennser 12 December 2000.  
285 Originally, calculations performed by the economists working within the pension group revealed that up to 2,5% 
of the new system could be capitalized. However, few weeks prior to the final discussion, they came back and 
claimed that the group could not go beyond 2% (Interview, Bo Könberg 20 November 2000; Marier, 2001). The key 
variable under study was the capacity of the AP-funds to finance the shortcomings of this transition since this 
implied a loss of 2% in contribution for a long period. 
286 According to Lindbom (2001), the Christian Democrat representative withdrew its support once it became clear 
that such alternative would be extremely expansive (17 billions SEK per year – roughly 0,17 billions US dollars), 
worst such a stance would have been difficult to support with Sweden being in a strong recession (74).  
287 In the new system the guaranteed pension is taxed, however (DN, 13 January 1994). This means that this increase 
is far more symbolic than real. 
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The final stumbling blocks concerned the compensation for early childcare. In the 
previous such measure was deemed unnecessary due to the 15/30 rule. However, in a system 
where life income is considered, consideration has to be given for the interruption of one’s career 
due to unemployment, sickness, military service, and childbirth. In this case, this is where the 
influence of the Christian Democrats was felt the most. Key for them was to find a way to give 
the opportunity to women to stay at home and raise their kid(s) without getting penalized in the 
pension system. This ran against the equality views of the Social Democrats, and even the 
Liberals. The Social Democrat representatives were keen on maintaining the individuality of the 
system. Further, “to make it more important for our daughters and grand-daughters to marry a 
rich pension than to get a good education and income is really not what we believe to be a good 
signal” (DN, 15 January 1993).288 The bureaucrats attached to the committee would produce 
more than 70 models for three options in order to resolve differences within the group.289 The 
final solution included a notional income to be added during the child years on top of any income 
earned during that year. Three options were made available to women (and men), where they 
could pick the one that is most favourable to them: 1) obtain a supplement raising pensionable 
income to 75% of the average income for all insured; 2) A supplement up to the income the 
insured person had the year before the child was born; 3) A fixed supplement to earned income 
of one wage base amount. These rights were granted to the parent deciding to receive the child 
credit for up to four years after the birth of the child. A decision on this matter was reached in 
early January 1994, and it was announced that it would be financed via the family policy budget 
(GP, 7 January 1994). 
 
The deal – a success in principle! 
In mid-January 1994, it was announced that an agreement had been reached (DN, 11 
January 1994; GP, 12 January 1994). The working group presented three volumes summarizing 
                                                 
288 “Att göra det viktigare för våra döttrar och dötterdöttrar att gifta sig till hög pension än att skaffa egen utbildning 
och inkomst tycker vi inte är någon bra signal”. 
289 There was great unity on the fact that women (or men) needed to be compensated for early child-care. However, 
there was great divergence as to how to introduce the compensation into the system. This was a brand new element 
since compensation was not included in the previous ATP system (the 15/30 rule doing the trick). Thus, everything 
was up for debate such the type of compensation, the number of years that would be allowed, and whether or not it 
would apply to both men and women. In order to find a solution more three broad options were analysed and RFV 
ran more than 70 models for each of them (Interview, Edward Palmer 5 December 2000).  
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their thinking on this question and explaining the reasoning behind their decisions.290 They also 
presented impact studies of the new system. The third volume is a study performed by the 
economist Ann-Charlotte Ståhlberg solely dedicated to the gender issue. The main lines of the 
agreements are presented in table 4.6. 
The agreement contained elements that had been mostly discussed publicly for a while 
such as the life income principle, the extension of funded options, sharing of pension points 
within married couples, and a new form of indexation. Nonetheless, few elements came as a 
surprise such as granting pension points for studies,291 and the sharing of contributions by both 
employers and employees. The later measure implied a reduction of contributions by employers, 
which would be forced to grant a raise to individuals to compensate for this new contribution. 
In order to rush this agreement to the Parliament before the end of the summer session, 
the last one before the elections, a very short period of time was granted for criticism (6 weeks). 
Even though one critic claimed that the two weeks remiss period was pretty much a joke (Stark – 
Expressen, 30 March 1994), the members of the Working Group on Pensions would come up 
with 8 minor changes to the previous proposal.292 One important point was that the group opted 
to discuss indexation later, stating that it would include price, wages or both. As seen in previous 
chapter, this is an important element in the long run and strongly affects both benefits and costs. 
To resolve these issues, the Working Group on Pensions announced the creation of an 
implementation committee (Genomförandegruppen) along the same lines as the working group. 
As a result of the technical details to be further analysed, the bill presented to the Parliament 
ended up being in principle. Nonetheless, two key changes would be introduced from January 1, 
1995. First, all individuals would have an individual contribution of 1% of their gross wage. 
Second, the new calculation rules would begin to take effect (i.e. Life income principle, points 
for studies, military service and childcare). The bill was adopted with an overwhelming majority 
(279-19) in early June 1994. 
                                                 
290 SOU 1994: 20; SOU 1994: 21; SOU 1994: 22.  
291 See below for an explanation, as to why this non-contributory element was added.  
292 The eight points were: 1) doing the transfer of contributions from employers to employees at once rather than 
gradually; 2) introduce the new system in 1996 rather than in 1995; 3) push further the discussion on indexation, 
which will be based on a combination of prices, wages, or both in combination; 4) leave the door open to the 
possibility of sharing pension points during childcare years; 5) change in the technical construction of the studies 
benefits, but its level remains unchanged; 6) want that sickness and unemployment insurance generates pension 
points based on the salary of reference; 7) choice of funds will be available after the taxes of the current year; 8) 
income earn after 65 will be solely calculated in the new system (DN, 4 May 1994).  
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Table 4.6 Main lines of the 1994 Pension Agreement between the Government (M, Fp, Kd, 
C) and the Social Democratic Party. 
• The new system is mandatory and covers the whole population. 
The new pensions are to be based on lifetime earnings on the basis of previous 
contributions (so-called life income principle). This includes other social security benefits such as 
sickness and unemployment insurance. 
Military service and years taken to raise children up to four years give pension points. 
A flexible retirement age is instituted on an actuarial basis. Meaning one can retire prior 
to 65, but receive a lower pension. But one could eventually retire past 65 to have a bigger 
pension. 
A guaranteed pension covers those who have limited contributions and those with no 
contributions at all. 40 years of residency in Sweden is required. 
Contributions will eventually be shared equally between employees and employers. ATP 
contributions came exclusively from employers. 
A contribution rate of 18,5% is instituted, of which 2% goes temporarily into a private 
savings account earning interest (National Debt Office). 
Pensions will be indexed considering both inflation and the evolution of real wages.  
Contributions are to be indexed according to many factors: life expectancy, mortality rate 
before retirement, income differences between men and women, and future growth in real wages. 
Thus, the first pension is calculated according to the divisor. 
Contributions will be taken up to 7,5 basic amounts, this ceiling is indexed on the trend of 
real wages. 
Married couples can share their pension benefits on an actuarial basis, this means that 
men’s points are worth less than women’s point since the former have shorter lives. 
The transition period will last 20 years. Individuals born between 1935 and 1953 will 
have their pensions based on both systems. For example, those born in 1935 will have 1/20 of their 
pension based on the new system while those born in 1953 will have 19/20 of their new pensions 
based on the new system. 
The AP-funds will be used as a buffer fund. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Source: Reformerat Pensionssytem (SOU 1994: 20) and Pension Reform in Sweden – a short summary (Ministry of 
Health and Social Affairs, 1994). 
 
As a result of the agreement, pensions disappeared almost completely from the political 
and electoral agenda, a stark contrast to the politicization of ATP leading adoption of the 
supplementary pension scheme in the late 1950s. It was even a strong reduction from the amount 
of times it was discussed among the party leaders compared to the two previous elections (see 
table 4.7). 
 
Table 4.7: Prioritizing of Pensions relative to other issues - by Political Parties in Electoral 
Programs and – in the Debates Among Party Leaders (1952-94) (In %). 
 52 56 58 60 64 68 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 
Programs 3 10 26 13 3 3 4 4 3 2 2 2 3 5 3 
Debates 8 19 35 18 27 10 9 4 5 4 5 5 8 8 2 
Source: Brander, Esaiasson, and Hankinson (1996). Svensk valfrågor: Partiernas valdebatt 1902-1994. 
Stasvetenskaplig Tidskrift, årg 99: 1. Pages 34-36. 
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Seeking to Implement the “In Principle” – The Implementation Committee 
(Genomförandegruppen) 1994-1998. 
Contrary to expectations, it did not take only a year to complete and implement the 
remainder of the agreement reached in 1994, but four years. Worst, some issues are still not 
resolved as of 2002! These four years were quite turbulent and, on few occasions, it seemed like 
coalition behind the agreement was going to break up. 
The victory of the Social Democratic Party did not change the dynamic of the newly 
formed Implementation Group since it consisted of almost the same individuals as the Working 
Group on Pensions. Every civil servant interviewed stressed that the election did not have any 
real impact on the continuation of the reform. As stated by Bo Könberg, “after the electoral 
defeat, the new Minister for social insurance, Anna Hedborg, and I changed chairs on the 
opposite side of the table and continued with the implementation”.293  
In 1995 few elements of the 1994 agreement began to being implemented. For example, 
pension points were first granted for studies, military service, and childcare. Out of the 18,5% 
contributions, 2% was confined to an independent agency (Riksgälskontoret – National Debt 
Office) that was investing for all Swedes while the decision on the structure of the funded part 
awaited. Nonetheless, many decisions remained extremely problematic, and the first decision of 
1995, to announce that the reform will come into first on January 1st 1997 instead of 1996 was 
the first sign of a difficult road ahead (GP, 12 January 1995). Other delays pushed the starting 
date to 1999. 
In the summer of 1995, the Implementation Group (genomförandegruppen) announced 
an agreement concerning the calculation of pensions rights and on the kind of income that give 
pension rights (see table 5.8). More sensitive issues such as switching some contribution over to 
individuals and indexation were postponed to the fall. The decision for the former was directly 
linked to the fact that labour market partners were entering a negotiation period and that 
introducing this issue in the middle of the negotiations would not have been welcomed (DN, 8 
July 1995). Both unions and employers were already quite critical of the decision to force a 
                                                 
293 Interview, Bo Könberg 20 November 2000. The only difference would be that Könberg would replace 
Westerholm as the Liberal representative since he was no longer Minister. As Hedborg became Minister and Chair 
of the Group, this led to an additional place for the Social Democrats. Further, Thalén became Minister of Social 
Affairs and left the group. Thus, two new Social Democratic representative joined the group (Maud Björnemalm and 
Arne Kjörnsberg).  
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change in the contribution structure without having been consulted and they stressed that 
switching contributions for a higher income was technically complicated.  
 
Anna Hedborg runs into hot water! 
A major shift in the pension system remains the transformation of the basic pension into a 
guaranteed pension. Despite the literature demonstrating the beneficial effects of having a 
universal program (see for example, Rothstein, 1998), the Working Group on Pension had opted 
to transform the universal basic pension into a means-tested pension. This philosophy, strongly 
rooted in liberal countries (Canada, US, UK, Australia), is based on need where the state enters 
as a hand of last resort. Therefore, means-tested benefits tend to stigmatize those receiving 
benefits.  
Thus, in the new Swedish pension system high-income earners would not receive any 
guaranteed pensions. The thinking behind it was that as income grows, the guaranteed pension 
diminishes. A line in the 1994 agreement stated that voluntary occupational pensions negotiated 
by unions and employers could be used towards calculating the guaranteed pensions. Even 
though this issue was not well publicized, it had attracted strong negative reactions from labour 
market partners who considered collective pensions to be part of wages and that it was not logic 
to include this pension and not private pension plans.  
In November 1995, this issue was frontline news for over a week. On national TV, Anna 
Hedborg acknowledged that voluntary occupational pensions would be integrated into the system 
to calculate the size of the guaranteed pension. More controversially, she went on to mention that 
she agrees with the criticism of the labour market partners that private pensions should be 
included as well if their negotiated pensions were integrated in the new system. She reconfirmed 
her statement in a newspaper interview the day after (Aftonbladet, 16 November 1995).294 The 
reactions fused from everywhere. As underlined by the Newspaper Aftonbladet, “the telephone 
rang many times from private insurance companies and banks” (Aftonbladet, 17 November 
1995). Despite re-assuring words from Hedborg that the government and Implementation Group 
were not proposing this course of action and that she was not seeking to count private pensions, 
                                                 
294 Journalist: Do you mean that people who invested in private insurance can end up losing these monies in the state 
pension? 
Hedborg: Yes, a part of it, it is a possibility. This is a way, which makes the whole a little bit more logic 
(Aftonbladet, 16 November 1995 – Author translation).  
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her statement fuelled uncertainties over the independence of private pensions. Politicians were 
quick to distance themselves from this possibility, and each political party promised not to touch 
private pensions. 
Nonetheless, the uproar eventually proved Hedborg’s logic right, as collective pensions 
were removed from consideration in the state system, much to her delight and that of labour 
market partners. This exclusion favoured mainly low-income earners who would have seen the 
size of their guaranteed pension shrink as a result of their collective pension. However, the 
decision to abstain from including collective pension meant that the Implementation Group 
would need to find 2 billion SEK elsewhere.295 
 
Delays for the Social Democrats…Do they still want an agreement?296 
With opposition rising within her own party, Anna Hedborg asked for a break into the 
work of the Implementation Group in early 1996 in the hope of convincing the sceptics. The 
upcoming congress in March, to invest Göran Persson as Prime Minister, was getting filled with 
motions quite critical to the 1994 agreement. Many of them, presented mostly by the labour 
movement, were actually advocating scraping the whole agreement. It was clear that the pension 
reform was going to be the major stumbling block at the congress (GP, 6 March 1996).297 
The congress turned into a major challenge for the political coalition behind the pension 
reform. First, there was the cabinet shuffle following the selection of Göran Persson as Prime 
Minister to replace Ingvar Carlsson. Persson was not very enthusiastic about the pension 
agreement of 1994, and his first action as Prime Minister did nothing to alleviate the critics. Both 
Hedborg and Thalén left the cabinet! Thalén became Party Secretary while Hedborg moved on to 
become Director General of Riksförsäkringsverket to replace KG Scherman who had held this 
position since 1982. Thalén’s replacement, Maj-Inger Klingvall, was not familiar at all with this 
                                                 
295 Hedborg made another controversial statement while seeking to defend herself a few weeks later by saying that: 
“private pensions are not necessary”. This would bring a sharp reaction from Gennser (SvD, 30 November 1995) 
and build Hedborg a reputation of getting into hot water with the mass media for thinking out loud. According to 
SvD, this was a major strike against her obtaining a promotion with the Ministerial Cabinet of Persson (SvD, 14 
February 1996). 
296 A more expanded explanation on the opposition within the Social Democratic Party is presented in the next 
section (Opposition Against the Working Group On Pensions and the Implementation Group).  
297 Over 80 motions were related to pensions, of which 20 sought to scrap the agreement and 22 sought to alter and 
reform the ATP system instead of instituting the new system (Lundberg, 2001: 42).  
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policy area. She would rely strongly on her secretary of state, Hans Svensson.298 Thus, the whole 
group dynamic was altered significantly at a time where difficult issues still had to be resolved. 
Most people interviewed stated that this change was a major cause behind many of the delays. 
Second, in light of the strong opposition, it was convened to gather opinions for an 
internal review (samråd) on three key elements of the new pension reform: the creation of 
individual contributions, the funded system, and the financing of the new system (SvD, 22 
March 1996). These were very sensitive issues for Social Democrats. The labour movement was 
opposed in principal to individual contributions. Funded options were supported as long as they 
remained public, and many uncertainties surrounding the financing of the new system and pre-
pensions needed to be clarified (SvD, 31 August 1996). The party waited until August to start the 
process and received more than 508 opinions on the matter by late December. The results were 
never published, supporting the thesis that many of them were quite negative (see next section). 
During all this time, the Implementation Group was at a standstill, unable to progress. Worst, 
following the internal review, Svensson answered the critics within its own party by taking a 
difficult stance on very sensitive issues within the Implementation Group. He announced that the 
switch to have more individual contributions in exchange for a wage increase could not be 
implemented because “people are worried that they will not be possible to find a system that will 
guarantee a wage increase” (SvD, 30 November 1996). More worrisome, was his challenge to 
review the funded part, the main element for the bourgeois parties in the new system. In late 
December, the party leadership confirm this new position on these two elements and added that it 
was necessary to find more money for the system and that the government would resolve the 
issue of pre-pensions on its own. As important, the party leadership stated that the life income 
principle, flexible retirement age, indexation with the state of the economy, guaranteed pension, 
share pension points among married couple, and pension points for child care, studies and 
military service were not in question. If there was a glimpse of hope for the Implementation 
Group, it was that the controversial elements were still being negotiated. 
The immediate response of the bourgeois parties was to minimise this opposition in the 
hopes of not raising conflict to another level. Nonetheless, their patience began to run out. In a 
debate article in Dagens Nyheter, the representative of the bourgeois parties in the 
                                                 
298 According to Börje Karlsson, the DN journalist who covered the pension reform, Klingvall never really took the 
case in the Implementation Group, leaving this role to Hans Svensson. He led the work of the group (DN, 12 April 
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Implementation Group stressed that the pension reform could not be changed without their 
involvement. They wrote that, unsurprisingly, social democratic members supported sections of 
the agreement closed to their position while rejecting those close to ours. They stated that they 
would obtain a similar result if they were to hold a similar consultation. They claimed that pre-
pensions and financing are part of the Implementation Group’s domain. When it came to the 
funded part, they wrote that “Vi kommer att slå vakt om premiereservspension” (DN, 11 January 
1997).299 The vice-President of the Conservatives, Lars Tobisson, was less forgiving claiming 
that the Social Democrats want to imply that the agreement is finished (SvD, 15 January 1997). 
To ease tensions, Göran Persson convened a meeting among all party leaders (meaning that the 
Green Party and Left Party were invited as well) in mid January 1997 to discuss pensions. 
Following the meeting, he stated that the agreement holds (GP, 16 January 1997). 
The agreement remained on thin ice, however, as pressure to reform it grew further 
within the Social Democratic Party. The protest movement against the reform culminated at the 
1997 congress. Many motions sought to strike down the five party agreement while many others 
asked for a reform following the guidelines proposed by RFV in 1991 (RFF, Anser 1991:7 – see 
above). Fearing an embarrassing defeat on this issue, the party executive ended up making a deal 
with some of the key opponents to the agreement as the critics began to be heard on the congress 
floor. The compromise stated that: 1) the new system would guarantee a similar replacement 
level as the old ATP system with 2% growth; 2) low income earners would be compensated if 
contributions were raised; 3) people can choose to invest their 2% into a public fund. If they 
want to change to a private fund, they would have to ask for it (DN, 13 September 1997). 
The other representatives condemned the SAP compromise right away. Wiklund said: 
“this is an unacceptable compromise to continue the work further” (DN, 13 September 1997).300 
Pettersson was more reassuring stating that the Centre Party was to remained within the 
agreement (ibid). Gennser criticized the AP funds and the importance of having private funded 
options in order to get a good return. She added: “We had an agreement. Why should we have sat 
and tried to come in agreement all these years if we were going to have the ATP system left in 
any case?” On the question whether or not the agreement was effectively dead, she answered: “I 
have no idea. We hold on to it. If they want to break it, so they do it not us” (ibid).  
                                                                                                                                                             
1998). 
299 We are going to strike guard on the funded part ??? (translation needs to be revised).     
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The five parties met two days later to discuss the future of the group. They released a 
statement underlining that they would continue to work within the framework of the five party 
agreement to resolve the remaining questions. The four bourgeois parties stressed that everyone 
has a veto in the negotiations (GP, 16 September 1997). 
 
Race against the Clock – Part II! 
The delays resulting from internal struggle within the SAP and the cabinet shuffle led to 
another run against the clock, this time to salvage the 1994 deal. Members of the Implementation 
Group met on several occasions in the fall to resolve their divergence. Their first decision was to 
increase further the guaranteed pension by 1067 SEK ($1000).  
The Implementation Group had strong difficulties in reaching a compromise to introduce 
individual contributions in the new system so that employees and employers contribute the same 
percentage (9,25). In the hopes of resolving it, the group narrowed the range of possibilities to 
three. The first option was to compensate the imposition of individual contributions by granting a 
wage increase. This was the original agreement and it was supported by the Conservatives, the 
Liberals and the Christian-Democrats, but it had been rejected by the Social Democratic party 
leadership at their last congress. Margit Gennser had given signs that she was willing to review 
this point, but Bo Könberg continued to be strongly attached to the split. This was rejected by all 
labour market partners previously, but was now accepted by the employers (SAF). The second 
option was presented by the social democratic government, and was supported by the Centre 
Party. A sickness insurance contributions of 5,95% paid by wage earners would be given to 
employers in return of a similar contributions in pensions. The remaining 2,3% would be 
obtained via a wage increase and the use of the tax system. The last option was to shelve the 
whole proposition and maintain all contributions with employers.  
In order to clarify each position and provide the group with criticism and comments on 
all three options, the proposals were sent out for opinions (remiss). The SAP government, fearing 
another deadlock, decided to move ahead by sending their proposal for parliamentary review, a 
move contested by the Conservatives, Liberals, and Christian Democrats (DN, 14 November 
1997). In early December the replies obtained clouded the picture further. Not only were political 
parties divided on the issues, but so were public authorities. The Implementation Group was back 
                                                                                                                                                             
300 “Det är en oacceptabel kompromiss som det går att arbeta vidare ifrån”.  
 238
to square one. Pessimism started to reappear strongly with one newspaper stating that the switch 
“could be the element that destroys the whole pension agreement. It is so difficult to resolve that 
no one believes it will work” (DN, 12 December 1997). This statement would turn out to be right 
on its conclusions, as it is still not resolved, but wrong on the outcome of the agreement. 
At the end of December, all five parties held a press conference promising not to make an 
electoral issue out of pensions (SvD, 29 December 1997). Intense negotiations followed New 
Year’s 1998, and an agreement was reached on January 9 1998, three days after it was 
announced that the negotiations could end up in a big political fiasco because of deep differences 
(Expressen, 6 January 1998). The social democratic option was selected to resolve the issue 
related to individual contributions. In exchange, the bourgeois parties gained another .5% in the 
funded system (DN, 10 January 1998). The other main lines of the new agreement are found in 
table 4.8.  
Resolving the question of the funded part turned out to be easier than first anticipated 
despite strong divergences in the two main political blocks. The Social Democrats sought to 
transfer the responsibility of managing the funded component to the AP funds, while all four 
bourgeois parties reiterated their preference to keep the management of the various funds as far 
as possible from the state. The European Union was indirectly involved in resolving parts of this 
conflict via its convergence criteria for EMU, which Sweden was seeking to follow in order to 
maintain its admission into the Euro zone as a political and not an economic decision. The 
Minister of Finance had stated on numerous occasions that the funded part had to be done in a 
way that does not damage the state’s finances (GP, 16 January 1997), and this was widely 
accepted within political circles. The option favoured by the bourgeois parties, however, would 
have implied that the AP-funds (included in the state’s finance) were to be drained overtime 
without any substitution within the state budget. This meant a sharp decrease in public resources 
making it much more difficult for the state to meet the EMU criteria. This forced the bourgeois 
parties to accept the creation of an independent agency within the state instead of leaving the 
funded part fully to the private sector, a solution much closer to the preference of the Social 
Democrats. This shift in position is expressed clearly by Gennser: 
There was another thing that was quite silly and that was the Maastricht Treaty 
and the convergence criteria. That was our own accounts, calculated into our 
state debt. If you made these standing in the statistics as private instead of state 
savings then we could not get our criteria right. Then we inherited the PPM (the 
independent agency responsible for the funded part), which I thought was a 
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really silly invention. I was very critical to most of the Treaty; we have got it so 
this is the only real solution you can have. So, my party bought it (Interview, 
Margit Gennser 12 December 2000). 
 
Thus, the compromise was to agree to the creation of the Prefunded Pensions 
Administration (Premiepensionsmyndigheten – known as PPM). This agency would be 
responsible for ensuring that the money is transferred to the selected fund or funds. Another 
point of the agreement was the creation of a seventh AP-fund, with free hands to enter the stock 
market, for individuals who do not select a private fund. However, a restriction was included: 
once an individual has selected a private fund, he/she can no longer revert to the public fund (7th 
AP-fund). Therefore, not selecting a fund was equalled to choosing the public fund. Most 
Ministers within the Social Democratic government would end up selecting this option for their 
personal pensions (SvD, 21 October 2000). 
Once again this pension bill gathered strong support in the Riksdag. 257 MPs voted in 
favour, 17 voted against it, and 16 people abstained. As a result of the sprint marathon to 
maintain the five party consensus, at least seven issues were postponed to a later: 1) the so-called 
broms (see paragraph below); 2) the technical application of pension rights for studies; 3) future 
housing subsidies; 4) transition of the basic pension (folkpension) into the new system; 5) raising 
individual contributions to 9,25%; 6) transfer of money from the AP funds (except the 7th 
pension fund created for the new system) to the state budget to compensate for the changing 
financial balance between the AP funds, the state and the new pension system; 7) issues related 
to survivor’s pension (DN, 9 June 1998; DN, 7 July 1998). The broms alongside the transfers of 
funds from the AP funds to the state budget, and the search of a solution to raise individual 
contributions to 9,25% would obtain most of the attention for the following year. The later issue 
resurfaced one month after a deal was reached in January 1998. The Tax Minister, Östros, would 
stress that the Ministry was unable to come up with a technical solution to enact the January 
agreement (DN, 14 February 1998). Still today, no solution has been found and the individual 
contribution rates remains at 6,95%. 
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Table 4.8 Main lines of the 1998 Pension Agreement between the Government (SAP) and 
the Four Bourgeois Parties (M, Fp, C, and Kd). 
• The new system is mandatory and covers the whole population. 
The new pensions are to be based on lifetime earnings on the basis of previous 
contributions (so-called life income principle). This includes other social security benefits such as 
sickness and unemployment insurance. 
Military service and years taken to raise children up to four years give pension points. 
A flexible retirement age is instituted on an actuarial basis. Meaning one can retire prior 
to 65, but receive a lower pension. But one could eventually retire past 65 to have a bigger 
pension. 
A guaranteed pension covers those who have limited contributions and those with no 
contributions at all. 40 years of residency in Sweden is required. Occupational and private 
pensions do not count towards the means test. 
A contribution rate of 18,5% is instituted, of which 2,5% goes into private pension 
fund(s) earning interest to be chosen by the insured.  The supervision of the funded part is 
granted to the Prefunded Pensions Administration (PPM). Those who do not select a fund 
will see their money managed by the 7th AP fund. 
The question of how much of this contribution will be paid by employers and how 
much by employees will be decided later. By the year 2000 the total contributions will be 
divided equally between employees and employers (9,25% each). 
Contributions are to be indexed according to the general earnings trend. If real 
earnings rise, the value of the pension points will rise too. If they fall, the value of the rights 
will be lower in terms of purchasing power than at the time of payment of contribution. 
Once a person retires, the value of one’s pension is calculated according to the aggregate 
pension assets collected. For the PAYG component, assets will be divided by a coefficient 
based on life expectancy and a notional future growth factor of 1,6%.  
Pensions will be indexed at a rate corresponding to the general earnings trend 
minus 1,6%. If growth is equal 2% in a given year, pension will rise in real terms by 0,4%. If 
on the other hand, growth is equal to 1,2% pensions will not be fully compensated for 
inflation (or reduced in real terms).  
Married couples can share their pension benefits on an actuarial basis, this means that 
men’s points are worth less than women’s point since the former have shorter lives. This can only 
be done for the money contributed into a private funded account. 
The transition period will last 20 years. Individuals born between 1938 and 1953 will 
have their pensions based on both systems. For example, those born in 1938 will have 1/20 of their 
pension based on the new system while those born in 1953 will have 19/20 of their new pensions 
based on the new system. 
The AP-funds will be used as a buffer fund. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Source: The Pension Reform. Final Report, June 1998. Lines or words in bold means that changes were made from 
the 1994 agreement.  
 
Few precisions are required for the so-called broms. In order to de-politicize the new 
pension system, the five parties came to agree that a technical device be introduced to stabilize 
the system (read a way to reduce pensions) in case of strong economic decline or a sharp decline 
in fertility rate. Klingvall as referred to the broms as an “automatic protective device” (DN, 7 
July 1998). A final decision on this item is expected in the year 2004. The whole reform is still 
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being implemented little by little. The selection of funds was further delayed to the fall 2000 in 
order to avoid having to deal with the computer bug of 2000. 
 
The Opposition Against the Working Group On Pensions and the Implementation Group. 
 The lack of traditional political conflicts and the economic crisis did not result in a high 
profile for the Working Group on Pensions group despite the political tensions associated with 
pensions in Sweden.  Nonetheless, the work of the group was not unchallenged even though five 
of the major parties in the Parliament stood behind it. This section analyzes 7 broad kind of 
criticism that was presented against the sketch presented in 1992 and the agreements of 1994 and 
1998. The criticism concerns: gender issues, studies, the life income principle, the costs of the 
new system, the difficulties to challenge members of the group, practical issues to introduce 
individual contributions, and the creation of the broms. Further, this section reviews some of the 
early struggles within the SAP and the Conservative Party, as well as the position of the unions. 
Despite the acknowledgement that the ATP system was not going to survive, most of the debates 
between those opposed to the new system and the politicians focuses on the differences between 
the two systems. Ironically, the members of the pension groups claimed that comparisons with 
the ATP system were not fruitful since it could not be sustainable in the future. However, they 
were themselves quite active in comparing the two systems to promote certain elements of the 
new system. 
 
Gender issues 
The most constant and challenging issue throughout this period was related to the 
negative impacts of the reform on women, a key group benefiting from the ATP system with its 
15/30 rule according to the critics.  Further, some criticism was aimed at the childcare solution 
since it seemed to encourage women to stay at home. By granting pension points worth 75% of 
the average income, many women could thus earn more by points by staying at home than 
working if they have a low wage job. The pension proposal was thus criticized for being “hostile 
to women” (DN, 27 January 1994)301 and “hostile to equality” (DN, 16 April 1994).302 
                                                 
301 Debate article written by the TCO president Rosengren and the economist Maria-Pia Boethius. 
302 Debate article written by eight women representing various professional occupations.  
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The first set of critics centred on the fact that introducing the life income principle meant 
a reduction of pensions for women since they tend to have interrupted careers and work part-time 
for long periods. The ATP system did not penalize them too extensively since they only needed 
30 years of work, under which 15 had to be very good. However, a switch to lifelong income 
puts them at a disadvantage compared to men, who do not experience such breaks in their career. 
Thus, women could end up with much lower pensions relative to men in the new system.  
Strong critics emanated from the Social Democratic Party. Its women’s association 
rejected the life income principle and asked its representatives to maintain the ATP rules in late 
July 1993 mainly on these ground (DN, 31 July 1993). 33 women MPs even wrote an open letter 
to Ingvar Calsson and Mona Sahlin with the title “Not one more deceit”! They acknowledged the 
need to reform the ATP system, but raised serious questions with regards to the pension 
proposal. They strongly criticized the two key issues mentioned above: 
 
We already know that women have the lowest wages. They often have longer 
study period for professions that nonetheless give low wages. They have often 
difficulties to find full time jobs. They will therefore get the lowest pensions in a 
pension system that is built on the whole life income…The pension that is 
currently proposed for the care of children is negative from an equality point of 
view. It will encourage women that have men with high income to refrain or 
reduce their paid work…Why would the Social Democrats say yes to that? 
(Aftonbladet, 7 April 1994 – author translation). 
 
Within the SAP, Karin Westergål emerged as a strong opponent of the pension proposal 
mainly on the basis it has negative consequences for women. She wrote on numerous occasions 
that the life income principle hurts women because they tend to have lower wages and more 
difficulties at finding full time employment (See for example, SdS, 6 October 1996). 
The critics went beyond the Social Democratic Party, however. 21 leading women figures 
including the President of the Women’s forum, a leading Liberal MP (Maria Leissner), and Karin 
Westergål asked for a longer consideration period (remisstid), and first questioned the impact on 
of the new system on women since they tend to earn less than man (Expressen, 2 February 
1994). A young liberal MP, Karin Pilsäter, criticized the childcare compensation for having a 
“construction built on the life patterns and circumstances of the 1960s” (DN, 8 April 1995 – 
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author translation). The President of TCO, Björn Rosengren, also criticized the working group 
along similar lines.303 
Interestingly, parties that support the Social Democrats in Parliament, the Left and Green 
Parties were opposed to the new pension reform and cited gender issues as an important reason 
why. The left representative within the “formal” working group, Ulla Hoffmann, criticized the 
stance of Hedborg and Thalén since its women’s association rejected the life income principle 
and that the SAP claimed to be a party that stands for women (Aftonbladet, 11 January 1994). 
Another Left MP, Ingrid Burman, stressed the fact that, on average, men already had place 3000 
SEK more than women and that by age 65, it could result in a difference of around 100 000 SEK 
(UNT, 7 March 2000). MP Kerstin-Maria Stalin criticized the life income principle by 
underlining that women already receive such a low income that they can barely survive on their 
own (GP, 6 June 2000).  
The Working Group on Pension did not remain idle on these issues. In fact, the inclusion 
of Ståhlberg’s study into the public inquiry was directly related to repeated attack concerning this 
issue. Citing her study, Hedborg and Könberg came out and argued that the previous ATP 
system did not benefit women, but mostly men with high income. Worst, women with precarious 
jobs were in fact gaining the least from the previous system and were contributing to finance the 
pension of those wealthy men, as they obtained only 0,64 Krona for every Krona put into the 
system (see table 4.9). The big winners were high educated women, the only ones to receive 
more than what they had contributed. 
Anna Hedborg defended her position by claiming that women could actually gain in the 
current system since low-income women will get full compensation for their contributions. 
Typical LO jobs, where individuals start working at a young age without sharp increases in their 
wages, would receive a full exchange for their contributions. With the four years childcare, she 
claimed that: “large groups of LO and TCO low wage women will receive a higher pension than 
with today’s rules” (GP, 3 March 1994; see also DN, 8 March 1996).304 Three women dominated 
unions within LO added credibility and support to Hedborg’s point of view by endorsing the 
proposal on the ground their members typically have long career and low wages (DN, 11 April 
                                                 
303 See DN, 12 September 1993; DN, 5 October 1993; Aftonbladet, 7 January 1994; DN, 25 January 1994; DN, 27 
January 1994 (with Maria-Pia Boethius).   
304 “Därmed kommer stora grupper lågavlönade LO- och TCO- kvinnor att få högre pension än med dagens regler”.  
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1994).305 Had these three federations been negative to the reform, it would have been impossible 
for LO to maintain its support at the central level.306 Further, pension economist Agneta Kruse, 
and Andreas Bergh came out strongly in favour of the life income principle and that fact that it 
encourages women to participate in the labour market and refuted claims that the ATP system 
was advantageous to women (SdS, 21 May 2000). 
 
Table 4.9: Benefits/Contributions in the ATP system for those born 1944-50 
Group Ratio 
Benefits/Contributions 
All women 0,78 
Women - high official/employee 1,06 
Women – low official/employee 0,73 
Women – qualified worker 0,79 
Women – unqualified worker 0,64 
  
All men 0,83 
Men – high official/employee 0,84 
Men – low official/employee 0,84 
Men – qualified workers 0,82 
Men – unqualified workers 0,77 
Source: Ann-Charlotte Ståhlberg, bilaga till SOU 1994:20 – (SOU 1994:22). 
 
This study was not sufficient to appease the critics, however. A social democrat 
economist, Agneta Stark pursued the debate by citing other cohorts studied by Ståhlberg in a 
1993 book, but not included in the public inquiry. She claimed that non-career women born in 
the period 1964-70 were actually gaining the most from today’s ATP system. LO women would 
benefit from the system as much as LO men, and more than SACO and TCO men (professionals 
and white-collar workers). Further, by the year 2003, women as a group were expected to gain 
more from the system (Expressen, 30 March 1994). There are, of course, lots of uncertainties 
attached to that cohort, however. Since we are talking about data from the early 1990s, this 
implies individuals aged between 22 and 28 years old. Many workingwomen tend to have 
children at an older age. Thus, no breaks in careers had been experienced by many of them yet.  
Hedborg tackled the critic that the system was encouraging women to be housewife, by 
underlining that the ATP system and its 15/30 rule was much more conducive to that. She 
                                                 
305 The three federations were Kommunal Förbundet (regional government – and the largest LO federation), 
Handelsförbundet (retail) and the one for hotels and restaurants.  
306 Interview, Tore Lidbom, 21 April 2002.  
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defended the paid employment incentive of the new system in a 1995 debate article in 
Aftonbladet:  
“In the new pension system, we have avoided to create some housewife traps. It 
will always pay off more to have a paid employment than to take care of healthy 
men at home. But at the same time, we know that women take most 
responsibilities for children. Therefore, the child pension points in the new 
system are first made available to women” (Aftonbladet, 29 November 1995 – 
author translation).   
 
She added on in a subsequent article that an ATP type of system “encourages women to 
be dependent on men or the state instead of encouraging them to establish themselves in the 
labour market with their own income” (DN, 8 March 1996). 
In closing, it is worth mentioning that the constant emphasis to compare the new system 
with the ATP system probably helped the members of the pension groups in this case. By 
focusing the debate on the relative differences between the two systems, less emphasis was 
placed on the simple fact that women are going to get a lower pension than most men since it 
does not acknowledge the wage and status differences in the current labour market. 
 
Studies 
This point was raised strongly by TCO following the release of the pension sketch of 
1992. Nothing was given for studies, or training. The thinking behind this decision was strongly 
related to the ATP system, which favoured those with high education since they tend to have a 
strong increase in their wages overtime with shorter career. Thus, they tended to obtain the best 
15 years, and reach 30 years without contributing too much beyond that. Statistics demonstrated 
that the redistributive effect of the old system was mostly from low-income earners to high-
income earners (see table 5.7). The thinking in the working group was that education leads to 
better wages, thus it did not need to be subsidized by those who are working at an earlier age, 
unlikely to experience large wage increases. That way, the system would not grant, what Anna 
Hedborg called a “career discount” (karriärrabbatt) (DN, 19 September 1993). 
 Nonetheless, this reasoning was not shared at all by TCO. It criticized strongly the fact 
that those who start working directly after high school might get a higher pension than those who 
opt to study further (DN, 29 November 1992). Rosengren stated that the pension proposal 
discourages parental responsibilities, education, and training. These are so important for the 
development of a community that they do not need further disincentives (DN, 12 September 
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1993). A student representative within TCO, Ann-Charlotte Jakobsson, further challenged the 
link between education and high wages by stating that many academic jobs do not lead to high 
income and that many low educated professions have really high wages (Expressen, 1 February 
1994). TCO demonstrated that those stopping in the middle of their career to further their 
studies, or obtain a new degree were heavily penalized (even more so, if it was a women who 
had children earlier), and that the new pension system could result in a 20% decrease in certain 
cases (DN, 29 March 1993). SACO added some support to TCO’s claim when its President, 
Milton, criticized four key elements within the agreement, one of them being that university and 
research training ought to be compensated (GP, 23 April 1994). 
Hedborg responded to Rosengren by emphasizing the points mentioned above. Thus, 
there are as many winners as losers since low-income earners will get a fairer link with their 
contributions. She acknowledged that there are some professions that do not receive full 
compensation for the education of its members, and they systematically tend to be women jobs 
within TCO. Nonetheless, she stressed that it is not the task of a pension system to resolve this 
wage failure (DN, 17 September 1993). Könberg used a fairly radical comparison of a 30 year 
career, with 15 of them being part-time with that of a 45 year career of a low wage earners to 
demonstrate that, under the ATP system and with the same yearly wage, they would receive the 
same pensions even though the later contributed 2,4 times the amount of the former (DN, 24 
September 1993). Nonetheless, the pension group added pension points for studies in the 1994 
proposal. However, it was highly symbolic since the pension points are based on a fictive income 
of 20 000SEK ($2000).  
The issue turned into proper compensation for studies instead of support for studies. It 
was, however, rarely mentioned in the debate. Rosengren sought to re-launch the debate by 
stressing that financial burden faced by recent graduates with student loans and possible 
replacement rates of 44% (SvD, 21 September 1999). However, two bureaucrats from 
Riksförsäkringsverket were quick to point out that TCO used unrealistic assumptions and that the 
replacement wage for the example used was in fact closer to 50-55% (SvD, 14 October 1999). 
Interestingly, the lack of compensation for studies even reached some Conservatives and it was 
part of a debate between Margit Gennser and Jan Carle in Svenska Dagbladet in the spring of 
1996.307 The lack of compensation for studies was also cited widely by those opposed to the 
                                                 
307 SvD, 14 March 1996; 22 March 1996; 4 April 1996; 24 April 1996.  
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reform as a whole such as writer Sven Lindqvist, economist Agneta Stark, Ulla Hoffmann and 
Karin Wegestål. 
 
The Life Income Principle – early retirement. 
Interestingly, the fact that the life income principle encouraged strongly people to have 
longer working career was never opposed as strongly as it was in France and Belgium. A 
possible reason behind this sharp difference is that Sweden’s participation rate in the labour 
market for those 55-64 is about twice that of France and Belgium (see Chapter 1).  
Nonetheless, critics claimed that the life income principle was not adapted to today’s 
labour market because a high number of blue-collars had been benefiting from pre-pensions or 
were out of the labour market at an early age. For example, it was stated that half of LO’s 
members were on pre-pensions by the time they reach the retirement age (Aftonbladet, 3 January 
1994).308 Following a governmental proposition to rise the retirement age, Doris Håvik, a SAP 
MPs and vice-president of the Social Insurance Committee in Parliament, expressed similar 
concerns. Based on statistics from Metall309 and the National Statistics offices, she underlined 
that the retirement age in Sweden was closer to 60 than 65 (DN, 22 March 1993). Lundqvist and 
Stark stated that the retirement age of LO’s member was worst at 57, and that for women it was 
56 years old. Even more worrisome, they claimed that only 17% of LO women worked full time 
between the age of 55 and 64 (Aftonbladet, 16 March 1996).  
The consequence of retiring before 65 results in strong penalty, which raised fear that 
many individuals would experience a lower pension. Citing a report from the Finance Ministry, 
Lundqvist argued that around 60% of individuals could find themselves below the pension floor, 
meaning that they would have to rely on the guaranteed pension (Ordfront Magasin, 5/2000: 11). 
Unsurprisingly, many LO members and Metall were therefore opposed the life income principle 
even though the central office stood behind the reform. Their voices were strongly heard during 
the SAP congresses of 1996 and 1997. 
The Left and Green parties have been opposed to the life income principle for the impact 
it will have on women (see above). The Left party was opposed to it on the grounds that it took 
away the solidarity that was found in the previous system. The 15/30 rules covered numerous 
                                                 
308 Debatt – Jan Hagberg.  
309 The second largest federation within LO.  
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events such as the birth of a child, studies, and long period of unemployment without being 
penalized heavily. Now the system is individualized.310 
Strongly favoured by all members of the Working Group on Pensions, the life income 
principle remained strongly anchored in the agreement. Comparing the new system to the 
“unfairness” of the ATP system was one of the favourite tools of the pension committee to stress 
the advantages and benefits of the life income principle. For example, it was stated on numerous 
occasions that up to 1/3 of contributions in the former ATP system did not result in higher 
benefits (SdS, 3 November 1996). However, this implied a working career of 45 years. On many 
occasions, they argued that LO types of career (high number of working years with slow rise in 
wages) were likely to benefit the most from the new rules.  
 
Costs of the new system 
Following the presentation of the pension proposal in early 1994, critics became to 
emerge within that the new system would be as costly as the old ATP and could still require 
large public sums. The Ministry of Finance, Riksrevisionsverket (the National Audit Office), and 
even some economists within the Social Democratic Party claimed that the current proposal was 
very expensive and that like the ATP system, it required 26% to cover current costs (current 
contribution rates would be around 20%) (DN, 19 February 1994; DN, 22 February 1994). There 
even was concerned within the Ministry of Finance that this proposal could be more expensive 
than ATP with a growth rate of 2%, the figure used by the Working Group to sustain its 
system.311 
The Ministry of Finance wanted to ensure that the resources taken from the state budget 
would be maintained at a minimum. It criticized the pension proposal for having a too large 
guaranteed pension, which is financed via taxes and not contributions, a generous indexation 
mechanism, and financing once the AP-funds are empty (DN, 22 February 1994). Indexing the 
ceiling on wages also required more resources according to the Ministry (Marier, 2001: 113). 
Even following the final agreement of 1998, the Ministry seems to be quite sceptical of its 
financial balance. A recent report stated that the amount collected from contributions would soon 
                                                 
310 Interview, Ulla Hoffmann 29 November 2000. 
311 Interview, Stefan Ackerby (Ministry of Finance) 17 November 2000.  
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not be sufficient to pay for benefits in a few years and that this trend was to continue strongly 
until 2030 (DN, 11 November 2000).312 
The opposition of the Ministry of Finance deserves a closer look to its role within the 
process. For the first few years, the presence of the Ministry of Finance was not strongly felt 
within the Working Group on Pensions. None of the party representatives had strong affiliation 
with this Ministry, as most had been primarily involved with social issues. The Ministry 
presented some analyses to the group but was not highly involved in the negotiations prevailing 
among the members of the group. The structure of the Working Group on Pension and the 
handful number of individuals within the Ministry of Finance working on this issue further 
marginalized its role. 
Thus, up to about the time the bill was to be introduced in 1994, the role of the Ministry 
of Finance was negligible. Usually, within a government, the Minister of Social Affairs presents 
his/her proposal to the Minister of Finance. Negotiations then follow on the proposal prior to 
presenting it to the whole government. In the case of the proposal brought forward by the 
working group, the Ministry of Finance did not have the opportunity to alter it significantly as 
the proposal was part of a five party agreement. Its strength was seriously reduced since 
modifying the proposal would require re-negotiating an agreement that took two years to build. 
The strong coalition behind the proposed reform raised the political price of turning down the 
proposal and forced the Ministry of Finance to work within the framework set up by the 
members of the working group (Marier, 2001). 
These constraints did not stop the Ministry for seeking to influence the deal. Regardless 
of the political colour of the members in the committee, it was often mentioned as the major 
stumbling block in the pension reform process.313 It was even mentioned that the relationship 
between the Ministries of Finance and Social Affairs was extremely adversarial (DN, 4 April 
1998). An important element of discord was the amount of money from the AP-funds that should 
be transferred to the state budget to cover the new responsibilities granted by the reform, which 
used to be financed by the AP funds. According to the former Director General of 
                                                 
312 Debatt – Kjell Olof Feldt former Minister of Finance in the 1980s.  
313 See citation of Hedborg above. On the question of what was the major stumbling block during the negotiation, 
Margit Gennser answered the Ministry of Finance with hardly any hesitation (Interview, Margit Gennser 12 
December 2000).  
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Riksförsäkringsverket, one of its proposal asked for a transfer of over 333 billions SEK to cover 
the costs, of which 120 billions were already transferred (SvD, 15 May 1998). 
Despite its intrusive role, it is worthwhile mentioning that the Ministry of Finance was 
pleased with many features of the system such as the life income principle providing a strong 
work incentive, and the funded part resulting in a higher individual savings rate. According to 
Könberg, it was very happy with 95% of the proposal and its direction, but they fought for every 
detail.314  
 
Difficulties to challenge members of the group 
The Ministry of Finance was not the only one frustrated by the close co-operation of the 
working group’s members. Strong critics would arise for two particular points: the secrecy 
behind the negotiations, and the short period granted for discussion (remisstid). TCO’s President, 
Rosengren, would raise the first point loud and clear in September 1993: 
“The doors of the Working Group on Pensions are almost always closed for the 
labour market partners. Therefore, we do not know exactly what is going to be 
proposed” (Debatt – DN, 12 September 1993 – Author translation). 
 
Könberg responded to Rosengren few days later by referring to the presence of a 
reference group, which met on many occasions to inform labour market partners of the progress 
made by the working group, and personal meetings he had had with them. He further stressed the 
publication of the reform sketch in 1992 (DN, 24 September 1993). 
Regardless of the efforts made by the member of the working group to integrate the 
labour market partners via the creation of the so-called reference group, it is clear that it cannot 
replace a place as a full standing member within it. There is no doubt that the collegial 
atmosphere would have been very difficult to create had the labour partners been involved as full 
members. Further, the advantages of being in the group go beyond having an influential role 
during the negotiations, but it also provides members with all documents and analysis performed 
by the bureaucrats attached to the group. In many cases, these documents can be the best source 
to critique one’s proposal. The exclusion of the labour market partners within the working group 
must be considered as an important part of this process, and an important political decision since 
                                                 
314 Interview Bo Könberg 20 November 2000.  
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it had the effect of reducing their influence. This would have been really difficult to do without a 
previous commission on this subject or with a social democratic government. 
The Working Group on Pensions gained the name of being a “secret” group, not as a 
result of the exclusion of labour market partners but because it excluded both the Left and Ny 
Demokrati representatives for the negotiation of the agreement. A journalist from Göteborgs-
Posten called Hoffmann, the Left representative, in mid-December to tell her about this. She 
claimed to have had no idea that this was going on (GP, 15 December 1993).315 All serious 
negotiations were made in this “secret” group, and few issues were negotiated directly between 
Könberg and Thalén (ibid). Thus, when all members of the Working Group on Pensions would 
meet, many decisions had already been taken. The members of the working group defended their 
actions by underlining the refusal of both parties to support the main elements of the pension 
sketch of 1992, which was the basis of all negotiations.316 
The fact that the Implementation Group continued with pretty much the same actors and 
employed the same structure did not appease the critics. Nonetheless, few, with the exception of 
the two parties not involved in the compromise, openly challenged it on the grounds it did not 
operate like other commissions even thought they questioned the openness of the group. One 
possible exception remains Karin Wegestål, who tried in vain to break up the agreement. She 
advocated a bigger group with more MPs and experts (SdS, 6 October 1996).    
The second point is clearly specific to Sweden and it relates to the times individuals and 
organizations are allowed to respond to the conclusions of commissions. Starting in the fall 1993, 
the working group was clearly running against the clock in order to reach an agreement prior to 
the elections. The final agreement was reached quite late for it to be legislatively processed in 
time. As a result, six weeks were granted for comments and opinions (remiss). This was a very 
short period considering the importance of the issue at hand and the size of the working group’s 
documents (more than 900 pages). In terms of comparison, six months was granted for the 
                                                 
315 She would push forward a challenge to the constitutional committee on this subject claiming that state resources 
were used for political reasons. The challenge would be rejected. The Ny Demokrati representative, Leif Bergdahl, 
opted for another way to express his displeasure. Citing bad treatment from the government during his work within 
the Working Group on Pensions, he would vote against a house doctor bill without warning the government first in 
March 1994. He supposedly was not able to held discussion alone with Könberg, who insisted of having a social 
democratic representative present (GP, 25 March 1994). 
316 For example, in a debate article in Aftonbladet, Thalén would justify the exclusion of Hoffmann on the basis of 
the refusal of the Left Party to accept the life income principle, thus refusing to take the responsibility to reform the 
ATP system (Aftonbladet, 6 January 1994).  
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reports of the previous pension commission.317 Moreover, the working group only gave itself two 
weeks to consider all of the comments prior to preparing the bill for the Parliament. 
Some of the critics even pointed towards mistakes within the report to stress that the 
whole process was rushed and that it was nearly impossible to compare the old system with the 
new one.318 Many of the comments received by the working group would concur that the 
proposal was not fully completed and that many aspects needed to be précised further (DN, 11 
April 1994). A week and half extension were granted following these protests. Könberg would 
then add: “the critics would be mush harsher had we not found a compromise” (GP, 12 April 
1994 – author translation).319 
Surprisingly, newspapers were not filled with similar complaints in 1998 despite the fact 
that the agreement came relatively late resulting, once again, in a short remiss period.  
This short period did not allow for a thorough discussion within large unions and other 
organizations, and provided many difficulties for those who wanted to prepare a strong 
opposition to the proposal. Unsurprisingly, many of the protest behind the remiss period came 
from those who were opposed to the system. Nonetheless, this decision was widely criticized in 
the comments and opinions received by the working group. 
 
Seeking to introduce individual contributions 
Unexpectedly, an element of the pension proposal included splitting contributions equally 
between employees and employers. It was one of the few elements from the pension reform that 
had not been mentioned in the media earlier. What is surprising, however, is that the labour 
market partners seemed to have received the news from the mass media. 
Following this announcement, SAF responded by stating that it is not that obvious that 
wage will rise if its contributions are reduced. It was argued that such rise would have to be 
negotiated within the collective agreement. A director even stated that the reduced contribution 
rates should go to share holders or to increase profits (DN, 4 February 1994).320 A few weeks 
                                                 
317 Ironically, Ingela Thalén had claimed earlier that the remiss period had to be significant for such a reform (DN, 
11 January 1994).  
318 See for example, Agneta Stark - DN, 30 March 1994; Margareta Frölich – GP, 24 April 1994.   
319 To this specific issue, Hedborg would state: “the question is if we will take the chance to get a broad agreement 
in the Parliament or take the risk that something happens during the elections…you can never know whether some 
or many parties will get off board” (DN, 5 February 1994).  
320 The journalist from GP would write that SAF has entered the pension debate “with the finesse of an elephant in a 
porcelain store” (GP, 5 February 1994).   
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later, its confrontational tone decreased, but it still claimed that a one for one krona exchange 
might not be possible since other social contributions were higher because of the wage increase 
(DN, 19 February 1994). 
The politicians were quick to react. Könberg stated the SAF was playing a dangerous 
game, which could endangered the whole reform while Hedborg claimed that it was a simple 
question of good will and moral (DN, 4 February 1994).321 The key difficulty for the members of 
the pension group was that they could not do much more than recommend an increase in wages 
for a reduction in contributions. 
This element of the reform was to become seriously jeopardized when LO expressed its 
opposition to individual contributions in principle. It also questioned how this would work in 
practice (GP, 15 February 1994). TCO criticized the proposal for its marginal effects. According 
to the economist Pia Nilsson, further wage increases would be required to maintain the same net 
wage. A key reason mentioned was that a rise in income implied higher taxes (DN, 20 June 
1994). 
Following the election of 1994, this issue was to remain the biggest stumbling block for 
the Implementation Group. However, few external critics intervened strongly in the debates. The 
labour market partners changed their tone once it became clear that the government would bear 
the costs of any adjustment that would be necessary to implement this change. The critics have 
all emphasised the lack of agreement on this question even though more than 5 years passed 
since its inclusion in the 1994 agreement. 
 
The so-called broms… 
As stated above, civil servants are currently working on a technical device that would 
allow an indexation of pensions in the case of stark changes in demographic and/or economic 
conditions. The main objective of the broms is to ensure a depoliticization of pension decisions 
when such time arises by having the problems resolved “automatically”.322 As stated by two civil 
servants within the Ministry of Social Affairs: 
                                                 
321 In an effort to reduce possible tensions within the committee as a result of SAF’s stance, Gennser declared that it 
is not catastrophic is individual contributions are not achieved. Key is that the tax relief for contributions above the 
ceiling remain (GP, 15 February 1994). Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that Könberg, and not Gennser, was the 
one insisting on this principle.  
322 Bo Könberg stated that the objective of the Broms was to “make the system as independent as possible. The 
alternative is naturally that the Parliament goes in and reduce pensions in the bad time and speeds them up in good 
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“the brom will be done as an automatic control system, which will be operative 
when the economic balance of the system is displaced…The aim is to create a 
completely stable financial system is not to free politicians from responsibility. 
The aim is instead to free future politicians from the risk to being forced to 
choose between breaking electoral promises or introduce higher taxes. 
Therefore, we take the responsibility today for the system’s sustainability and do 
not push the problem into the future. The system does not take away any 
responsibilities for future political decision-makers  (SvD, 24 July 1998 & 21 
August 1998– author translation).  
 
The technical properties of the broms are so complex that only a couple of experts 
actually seem to understand how it works!323 
Despite the fact that it is not yet finished many critics have sought to challenge its very 
existence and have speculated on when it will be used. A key cynical response to the broms by 
its critics has been to state something along the lines of “the new system was supposed to be 
financially stable and robust while being able to face changing demographic and economic 
situations. What has happened to that?” The broms has been viewed quite suspiciously as 
another device to reduce pensions beyond the mechanism already put in place in the new system.  
One line of argument advanced by KG Scherman (the former DG of RFV) and Barbro 
Westerholm (former MP for the liberals, member of the Working Group, and now President of 
the Swedish Pensioners’ Association) is that the AP-funds should be fulfilling this function; it 
was designed as the broms. Thus, they have been highly critical of the large sums of money 
transferred from the AP funds to the state budget. Further, they argue that if there is a big 
economic or social catastrophe in the future, future politicians should take care of that (SvD, 15 
May 1998; 11 August 1998; DN, 19 February 2000; UNT, 29 May 2000).324 
Critics have specified that the broms might end up being in effect a lot sooner than 
expected. According to Scherman and Westerholm, RFV and the administration of the AP funds 
have stated that they could be used within the next 10 years (DN, 19 February 2000). Feldt 
followed in the same footsteps by stating that the use of the broms could come very soon because 
benefits will soon outweigh contributions (DN, 11 November 2000). 
                                                                                                                                                             
times” (UNT, 26 May 2000). Nonetheless, he has continued to defend the “automatic” device rather than future 
politicians.  
323 Interview, Jan Bröms 15 November 2000.  
324 See also debate articles written by Scherman (SvD, 27 September 1999; 3 November 1999). The disappearance 
of collective savings (AP funds) was also criticized heavily by some social democrats and the Left party because of 
the way it had financed collective projects and provided further financial protection for the whole country.  
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The controversy surrounding the broms is unlikely to stop in the near future. Despite all 
the critics, its application may prove to be the most important element for the opposition. As 
stated during an interview with Westerholm, she is anxious to see the politician who is actually 
going to announce a reduction in pension benefits to current pensioners. 
 
Internal Critics: Social Democratic Party and Conservative Party. 
These two parties were really the only ones to question the pension proposal presented by 
the Working Group on Pensions and completed by the Implementation Group. Despite 
continuous support from the party leadership and executive, the work of Anna Hedborg and 
Ingela Thalén became increasingly criticized within the SAP. As seen above, its women’s 
association was strongly opposed to the life income principle. Many MPs under the leadership of 
Karin Wegestål started to question the actions of its representatives and criticize the reform. Few 
days prior to a vote on the approval of the pension proposal within the party leadership, 33 social 
democrat women even wrote an open letter raising a number of questions and asked for a broader 
debate (Aftonbladet, 7 April 1994). Nonetheless, the party leaders elected to go ahead with the 
pension proposal. There had been a strong belief that it had to be resolved prior to the election 
and could not become an electoral issue. 
As pointed out earlier, the SAP congress of 1996 and 1997 nearly forced the government 
to break up the agreement with the four bourgeois parties. Strong critics emerged during the 
congress of March 1996, which included few motions to scrap the agreement. Anna Hedborg 
presented the reform to the congress and spent a lot of time defending the position taken by the 
party. In the hopes of appeasing the opposition within the party the leaders agreed to have a 
broad consultation of its members, even thought the framework of the agreement had been 
approved two years earlier. However, this strategy backfired, as most comments were quite 
negative. Adding oil to the fire, Klingvall refused to make the results of the inquiry public.325 
More than 15 000 members participated in various forums, producing more than 500 official 
submissions of opinions. According to Lundberg (2001), around 80% of the opinions were 
negative towards the new system and advocated changing the parameters of the ATP system 
                                                 
325 In protest, the writer Sven Lindqvist quoted some of the responses given by some party districts in Dagens 
Nyheter, all of which were negatives. He would also cite one of LO’s newspaper who used the title Are 95% of the 
replies critical to the five party agreement? (DN, 18-19 August 1997).  
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instead (43). The reform proposal sketched by RFV in 1991 became the alternative model for the 
opposition.  
The result was a stormy congress in 1997. 28 motions were very critical of the new 
pension system while 17 mentions asked for a dismantlement of the pension agreement to 
replace it with a reform based on the ATP system (Lundberg, 2001: 42). The Minister Thage G 
Petersson and Metall’s representative Göran Borg, who had been advocating the dismissal of the 
proposal, saved the agreement thanks to a compromise stroke during the early stages of the 
debate on pensions.  
Margit Gennser also faced opposition within her party. The critics were mainly a group 
led by Lars Tobisson and individuals within the government’s office (Rosenblad) who had been 
advocated a fully funded system, or a higher funded component. Lars Söderstrom, who had been 
advocating a fully funded system himself (see above), would give his support to Gennser and 
convinced the others to do the same underlining the tax reduction and the closer link between 
contributions and benefits (Interview, Margit Gennser 12 December 2000). Eventually, Tobisson 
supported Gennser. Tobisson’s support would be key, as other influential party members such as 
current leader Bo Lundgren and the then Prime Minister Carl Bildt were more critical of the 
pension proposal (DN, 12 April 1998). 
 
Position of Labour Market Partners 
The specific positions of each labour market partners are summarized in table 4.10 for the 
1994 pension agreement. LO was the only organization to give its full support to the new 
pension proposal. Interestingly, it was also the quietest during this whole period. Not one article 
in a newspaper was found regarding LO’s action while the Working Group on Pensions was 
active.326 According to Lundberg (2001), there was a pre-negotiation between the leadership of 
SAP and LO to support each other throughout the process in order to avoid an internal conflict 
between those supporting reforming the reform and those seeking to maintain the ATP system 
(27). Despite frequent contact between the central office and the two SAP representatives,327 it is 
difficult to concur that LO was actively involved in the proceedings for many reasons. First, 
being outside the committee implied that it had to rely on the Social Democrats and the so-called 
                                                 
326 LO would break its silence few weeks after the release of the Working Group’s report by criticizing the 
introduction of individual contributions in principle (GP, 15 February 1994). 
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reference group to obtain information on the progress made by the committee and 
documentation. However, many documents were not made available making it difficult for the 
critics to argue against the pension groups. A key complaint from a TCO expert was that the 
Pensioner’s organisation328 could receive all internal documents, which were not accessible to 
them.329 Regardless of the ties between LO and the SAP, such contacts cannot replace full 
participation within a committee. Second, the elements that were difficult politically were 
negotiated during December 1993 and early January 1994. These negotiations were quite rapid 
and intense, diminishing the input of an external player. More importantly, LO had another 
major pre-occupation during this period: the resignation of its President, Stig Malm. Third, LO’s 
reactions to the introduction of individual contributions suggests that they were not fully aware 
of this decisions. 
 LO was also divided internally, marginalizing further its position. It had the support of 
its largest federation, Kommunal Förbundet and key women’s federation (see above), but not 
Metall’s, the second largest union within the confederation. It pronounced itself against the 
reform even though its leaders had suggested earlier the approval of the proposal. Metall claimed 
that many workers are forced to retire at 60 and would thus be heavily penalized by the new 
system. One of its objectives was to convince the SAP to go against the proposal (DN, 26 March 
1994). Metall proposed to lengthen the rules of the old system to 20/40 instead of adopting the 
life income principle. It was also highly critical of the introduction of individual contributions 
(GP, 19 January 1997). 
Despite the support granted by LO’s central office, newspapers stated on numerous 
occasions that LO members were very critical of the pension proposal. This came obvious during 
the internal review of the SAP in 1996 and during both congresses in 1996-7. Both LO and 
Metall stated publicly that there was no need to rush a new pension system as the problems with 
ATP would only arise in 2010-2020 (GP, 14 January 1997). 
The congress promise of holding on to collective funds was viewed as an important gain 
for LO. It saw the possibility of using pension accounts to promote the development of regional 
                                                                                                                                                             
327 Interview Anna Hedborg, 6 December 2000; Tore Lidbom (LO), 21 April 2002. 
328  Göran Persson surprised everyone in the Implementation Group by promising a seat for pensioners in their group 
in 1996 without prior consultation. 
329 Interview, Anita Elfwing (TCO), December 2000. She claimed that they did not even receive a first draft of the 
1994 inquiry. 
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economies in the way originally planned by the wage earners fund (GP, 14 September 1997). 
These hopes would, however, vanish rapidly. 
TCO had been opposed to the reform from 1992. Its confederation was the big loser of 
the new system. In a sense, TCO lost what it gained in the 1950s when its support was needed to 
support the creation of the ATP system. It was no secret, even then, that the 15/30 rule was 
created to secure the vote of a large chunk of its members. The Social Democrats representative 
were able to secure LO’s support by demonstrating that TCO type of jobs had been gaining 
under the ATP. This is extremely important since the new system, in fact, results in an increase 
in the length of contributions. By demonstrating that LO’s members became relatively better off, 
the social democrat representatives were able to secure its support. Nonetheless, it was unclear 
whether or not LO members would actually gain a higher pension with the new system.330 Thus, 
despite all the articles discussing the main advantages of Sweden as being a universal welfare 
state, where occupational divisions are minimized, it is along occupational lines that the political 
game was plaid. SACO would also come out against the pension proposal, but it stated that there 
positive with regards to the foundation of the system. There negative answer came as a result that 
many questions needed to be clarified such as the financial consequences of the system on the 
state’s budget. They claimed that this could result in higher taxes (DN, 7 April 1994). SAF ended 
up supporting the splitting of contributions between employers and employees and was quite 
positive to the reform despite certain elements it deemed expansive. It would not be active in the 
process.
                                                 
330 Regardless of what was said by the committee members, such promise could not be fulfilled without a clear 
decision on the rules of indexation. Further, due to the funded part, any prediction becomes even more volatile.   
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Table 4.10 Positions of Labour Market Partners on Specific Issues Proposed by Pensionsarbetsgruppen as Stated in 
Sammanställning av Remissyttranden över Pensionsarbetsgruppens Betänkande Reformerat Pensionssytem (SOU 1994: 20). 
 Life Income 
Principle 
Pension 
Rights for 
Children 
Pension 
Rights for 
Studies 
Pension 
Rights for 
Insured* 
Indexation 
based on 
state of 
Economy 
Basic 
Pension 
Transition 
Rules 
Splitting 
Contributions 
50% each 
PPM 
L
O 
Support – if 
considers 
redistribution 
based on 
sickness, 
unemployment... 
Support       Support Support Support Support Support Opposed Support – still
prefer use of 
AP-funds 
T
CO 
Opposed – based 
on labour market 
of yesterday, 
short work life 
heavily 
penalized. 
     Support –
should be
increased and 
granted for 
part-time 
studies 
 
 
Support – 
should be 
based on 
insured 
income 
Support Support Opposed –
need 
review 
 Opposed Leads to a 
decentralisation 
of savings 
S
ACO 
Support – even 
though it hurts 
academics (low 
early wages). 
 
Opposed – 
wants change 
(not equitable 
- men and 
women). 
Support - 
should be 
increased and 
granted for 
part-time 
studies 
    Support Mild
Support – 
period 
should be 
prolonged 
by 5 years 
Mild Support 
– ma
complication 
for this 
transition 
ny 
Support 
S
AF 
Support    Opposed –
benefits 
without 
contributions 
 Opposed – 
benefits 
without 
contributions 
Opposed – 
did 
propose an 
alternative 
solution 
Support Opposed
– too 
high.  
  Support Support
* People on unemployment or sickness insurance.
 260
The Swedish Reform: A system shift? 
Instead of fixing some parameters like France and Belgium, Sweden ended up creating a 
whole new pension system. The numbers of issues and difficulties raised by such undertaking are 
paramount relative to the aforementioned countries. The implementation of the Swedish reform 
has been quite complex and difficult. Numerous reports were published for many technical 
details and the final legislation was composed of 1091 pages excluding the annexes. This is in 
sharp contrast to the problems experienced in France when it introduced a pension reform in 
1993. When asked about implementation and legislation, Hourdain answered: “it was easy, I 
wrote three lines”! With this in mind, it is difficult to support Pierson’s view of stability for the 
Swedish case, not to mention his conclusions, where he states that “the pension reform 
introduced in June 1994, based on extensive consultations among the major parties and the 
representative of labour and capital, seeks to get Sweden’s public pension system on a stable, 
long-term footing without challenging its basic principles” (Pierson, 1996: 172-3). 
Curiously, it is practically impossible to present a picture of the financial consequences of 
the new system because it is still being constructed, and the inclusion of the fully funded 
component raise the level of uncertainties with regards to replacement rates that will be available 
in the future. Further, pensions become much more volatile and it is suggested that the system 
will balance itself as needed. The switch from a defined benefits system to a defined contribution 
system also means that contribution rates are expected to remain fixed at 18,5%, thus projecting 
future costs pressure by studying the contribution rates needed to cover it becomes a useless 
exercise.   
When the first pension deal was reached in 1994, many commentators claimed that it was 
in fact a blending of the three positions that were debated during the ATP conflict of the 1950s. 
It includes a large payg component guaranteed by the state, a somewhat high guaranteed pension, 
and a funded component. By default, such metaphor implies the acknowledgement of a system 
shift towards the right since they were not able to integrate any of their preferences in the 1950s. 
The introduction of a funded component into the state system was the key item that had to be 
accepted by the Social Democrats to get this agreement. It is worth noting, however, that the life 
income principle does not necessarily represent an anti-social democratic element. Contrary to 
the misleading picture of Sweden and its generous welfare state, the system encourages and 
pushes people into employment, not passive handouts. When answering the gender critics, 
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Hedborg would be quick to point out that employment not the state or a rich husband was the 
way for women to acquire independence (see above). 
 
Why did the Social Democrats agree to such a change? 
By accepting to reforming the whole pension system, the social democrats agreed to open 
the door to the demands of the four bourgeois parties. Thus, the key question becomes why 
would they do it? 
First, it is important to note that reforming an instituted system is not the same as 
modifying one. The responsibility of having a supplementary pension for all citizens was 
accepted by all actors as a given. Had this element been in question, discussions would have 
never begun. This goes beyond the commitment made to future generations and the difficulties 
related to changing the system that would fit under the label path dependency. 
Second, Sweden has had a tradition of solving crisis by consensus that was severely 
tested in the early 1990s when it entered in a terrible recession. The government adopted a major 
crisis package and it was supported by the Social Democrats. Thus, contacts between the 
opposition and the government were quite frequent and conducive to compromise. Even though 
the work of the committee began prior to the big economic crisis, it cemented the necessity to do 
something about pensions. The long-term vision required to introduce a new pension system also 
enhanced the need for co-operation.  
Third, the question becomes why would the Social Democrats agree to change the 
system? It is often mentioned that the Social Democrats were in office for all but a few years 
since WWII, but a closer chronological outlook presented another reality. For the period 1976-
1994, the bourgeois parties held office for 9 years (1976-82; 1991-1994) the same length as the 
Social Democrats (1982-1991)! At the beginning of the negotiations, the popularity of the Social 
Democrats was extremely low and the hopes of gaining office looked bleak at first. Despite 
SAP’s desire to reform the pension system according to its preferences, it had to acknowledge 
the possibility that a future bourgeois government could do the same and that this likelihood was 
much stronger today than it was tomorrow. Thus, the maintenance of a strong payg component 
required a broad political support to ensure its long-term viability. The politics of pension in the 
United Kingdom supports this hypothesis. This point of view was clearly stated by Hedborg 
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when asked why the Social Democrats accepted the proposal even though all polls in 1994 
switched into their favour: 
“Because there would be another election, perhaps it would have been 
possible to use pension reform as an opponent thing in an election 
campaign. This is so long run, if there is one real danger to pension 
reform is to have reform all over again. It is not a system we can carry 
and remake every four years, then it goes down the drain. We really felt 
that we needed to get it out of the election arena that one and the next 
election” (Interview, Anna Hedborg, 6 December 2000). 
    
Even though Carlsson was sceptical that an agreement could be reached among the 
largest parties, he was still extremely careful in selecting the SAP representatives. Hedborg and 
Thalén were chosen for upcoming difficult negotiations within the working group and the party 
(Lundberg, 2001: 25). This selection underlines that the SAP was serious about getting a 
compromise. It could have easily selected members that had been critical on the need to reform 
the pension system such as Doris Håvik who was had been the vice-president of the social 
security committee in the Parliament. The negotiations would have gone nowhere, and the SAP 
could have campaigned on saving pensions. Within this perspective, one has to wonder what 
were Persson’s true motives by appointing Klingvall as Social Affairs Minister in 1996 and a 
pensioners’ representative within the Implementation Group during the same year. 
Fourth, why did the Social Democrats stood by the agreement in 1996 and 1997 
when it became evident that grass-root support was, at best, questionable? The costs of 
renouncing to the pension agreement increased as time went on. Had the social democrats 
opted to renounce to the five party agreement, they could have face stark criticism from the 
population for leaving the pension agreement when it was widely understood that a pension 
reform was necessary. These costs were considered quite important, and might have been 
overestimated, but no party wanted to be blamed for the failure of reaching an agreement. 
Some internal critics (Tigle, Wesestål and Hagberg) would stress this situation by calling 
the five party reform process a “chicken race” to know which party will get out of the 
agreement first (SvD, 11 March 1999). Anna Hedborg mentioned the same point, as to why 
the social democrats stuck to the pension agreement: 
“…at the end, who would have been happy with the social democrats if 
they had left the reform except a small group in the party congress. 
Even if it was close in the party congress and it was a hard time to get it 
through in a positive way, it was also very impossible not to do it. If 
you look at it from the outside, or even inside. It is impossible to be the 
one to say no. That would have meant that the bourgeois party would 
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have sort of ruin, take down the public system making it pretty much 
smaller. Then how would that responsibility look for that individual? 
That is a similar logic that has kept the Moderates within the 
agreement. To be the one and say no, we do not want this, it would 
have never paid once you are there (mean in the negotiation). Because 
it is a fair deal, it is a way of saving rights. And the one who would 
leave the negotiating table would have to pay a price” (Interview, Anna 
Hedborg, 6 December 2000). 
 
 
Further, they would have faced many difficulties in pushing through their own 
preferences. Even the internal opposition admitted that themselves by pointing towards 
possible coalitions the party could make to avoid dealing with the Conservatives. Bengt 
Silfverstrand, a SAP MP, would argue in favour of a new pension agreement with the 
Centre Party and the Left Party (GP, 15 September 1995). The president of Metall, Göran 
Jonnsson was highly critical of both Centre and Conservative parties because they both 
favoured only a basic system of social protection. Thus, he advocated a new deal with only 
the liberals and the Left Party (SvD, 14 January 1997). Even if we accept the unlikely 
possibility of a co-operation of a tri-partite agreement that would include the Left and a 
bourgeois party, re-opening negotiations with a new party while seeking the co-operation 
of a bourgeois party would have resulted in further delays. Moreover, it did not provide 
any guarantee that a new coalition may be able to generate a system shift soon afterwards. 
As stated above, the bourgeois parties would have most likely opted for a very 
antagonistic stance and be able to criticize the social democrats for jumping off the boat to 
defend a unsustainable pension system it built. The bourgeois parties could attack the ATP 
system using all evidence pointing towards its demise. With a radicalization of the conflict, 
people seeking a much stronger private role would have replaced Gennser’s acceptance of a large 
payg component. Moreover, the bourgeois options had not been tested and could have been 
perceived as worthy of a try. The bourgeois parties would have most likely sought to reform any 
system adopted solely by the social democrats. They could not assume that their political 
hegemony would continue. As demonstrated by the UK example, a pension reform putting 
strong emphasis on the private sector makes it extremely difficult for any follow up government 
to reverse the clock.  
Another important element is that many elements of the new pension system started to be 
in effect in 1995 such as the life income principle, the investment of the 2% funded componenet 
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within the National Debt Office, pension rights for studies, military service, and childcare. 
Altering those to create a new system would have resulted in further transition difficulties and 
more confusion within the population. 
Finally, the alternative to the pension proposal was built on shaky ground. Its own 
members had stated on numerous occasions that the old ATP system would crumble in the new 
future and that it was unfair for LO types of workers. Turning back the clock to defend it would 
have resulted in a serious credibility dilemma and further internal conflicts. The mass media 
would have had a field day bringing back old comments made by the SAP representatives from 
various pension commissions. Once again, Hedborg’s insights are worth mentioning: 
“To be the one to ruin the thing would have meant quite a price. It 
would have meant staying in the old system, not changing anything. 
That would come back in the political process hammering on you for 
ages. You would also be stuck with the problem. Not doing this, mean 
doing something else, what would that be? If you just do not want to be 
in opposition forever, saying you could have had much and much 
better. But if you are a responsible party wanting to be part of a 
government of either kind, you would have to do something anyway. 
Come up with something better on your own after having left the table. 
I mean how respected as a reformer can you be” (Interview, Anna 
Hedborg, 6 December 2000). 
 
Obtaining a five party agreement also diffused the responsibility if the new pension 
system does not generate the promised outcome. It will be quite difficult in the future to point the 
finger towards the responsible of the new system (Pierson, 1994). However, one must careful 
when pushing this argument since the Left Party remained outside the agreement and could 
capture support from disenchanted Social Democrats. 
Therefore, it was better to hold on to the agreement and seek to alter some parameters 
such as pre-pensions to compensate for the earlier retirement of many industrial workers.  
 
Corporatism and union influence, a thing of the past? 
This chapter, and book, challenges previous works that have underlined the participation 
and importance of LO in the Swedish pension reform (see for example, Anderson, 2001). The 
traditional answer to any denial that LO was actively involved is to answer with a typical Olson 
(1965) argument: the concentration of interest results in a stronger political position where 
conflicts can be internalized because of the highly hierarchical structure of unions. Thus, a 
compromise can easily be reached where losses are spread out in a corporatist way. 
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As mentioned prior to the discussion of the pension reform process, this picture is 
becoming increasingly difficult to support. First, the role of labour market partners within the 
decision-making process and state apparatus has been declining sharply in the past two decades 
or so. Analysing a wide range of indicators and factors related to Swedish corporatism, 
Hermansson et al (1997) conclude that: 
“A systematic analysis of previous research completed with our own 
preliminary study has demonstrated that reports on the death of 
Swedish corporatism are not totally groundless. Yes, it is overstated 
and yes, the empirical literature tends to point out opposing trends. 
Despite all these caveats, there remains the fact that something quite 
palpable has happened within the Swedish state within the course of the 
past two, three past decades. With a lower degree of indirect 
parliamentary representation for the prevalent interest groups, we see 
less corporatist decisions. The past 20 years have also implied a 
decreased participation on the parts of interest groups in committees 
and independent agencies (the so-called verket or styrelsen)” 
(Hermansson, Svensson and Öberg, 1997: 378 – author translation).  
 
On this subject, Jan Bröms, chief economist with SACO, mentioned that the unions had 
experts like him participated actively into various commissions and inquiries in the past. It was 
not unusual for an expert to be involved in a few inquiries at the same time. Indicative of the 
changing involvement of labour market partners into the state, Bröms was only involved into the 
works of one committee at the time of interview and he sat in because of its expertise in the 
subject and not his union affiliation!331 Labour market partners now tend to confine themselves 
to labour market issues. 
As a result of ATP, a universal pension scheme was created and confined to the state. LO 
trusted the state and it sought (and did) capture the state (see Rothstein, 1996). Thus, its proposal 
was to build such a scheme within the state rather than apart from it. This is in stark contrast to 
France, where unions were highly critical of the state and its overwhelming presence. Thus, they 
constantly sought to obtain the control of occupational pensions while keeping the state at bay.  
These two factors can explain with the protest from the labour movement was very mild 
when Könberg announced the creation of the Working Group on Pension. In fact, I was unable to 
find a newspaper article stating opposition from unions or employers when the group was 
created. TCO would criticize its exclusion in 1993 only when it became clear that the new 
system meant a reduction of pensions for its members.  
                                                 
331 Interview Jan Bröms, 15 November 2000.  
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Being able to exclude them goes beyond the fact they had been consulted previously. 
During the interview, Könberg stated that it would have been impossible to exclude social 
partners if Sweden had Finland’s system because it is being taken care by social partners.332  
Thus, throughout the later part of the pension reform process, LO’s influence would be 
obtained via its links with the Social Democratic Party333 and not the state. This is the reason 
why protests from LO members were targeted at the SAP and both congresses and not the 
pension group directly, as it would have the case in France. Historically, this is nothing new. 
Korpi (1983) and Esping-Andersen (1985) claim that the rise of the Swedish welfare state was 
dependent on this collaboration. However, for this equation to work, the social democrats were 
able to sustain a long political dominance. In the early 1990s, it was not clear that they would 
govern for two consecutives mandates, and maybe a third, after the bourgeois coalition of 1991-
94. As underlined by Rothstein (1996) and Lindqvist (1990), the control of the state bureaucracy 
and a strong participation in the organs of the state was also an essential element. As mentioned 
earlier, the Ministry of Social Affairs would see a stark rise in staff members, which included 
few members from the Ministry of Finance. These shifts helped decrease the attachment to the 
ATP system (see Marier, 2001). And, as discussed above, the participation of labour market 
partners have been on decline for the past 20 years.  
Thus, LO’s influence into the deal cannot have been very strong. Of course, it had close 
contacts with the social democrats and they were aware of LO’s preferences. For example, they 
had plenty of time to discuss the sketch published in 1992. However, these discussions and 
contacts could not replace the fact that it was not directly participating in the negotiations. The 
two most serious rounds of negotiations (December 93/January 94 and January 98) occurred in a 
very short period of time, decreasing the likelihood of external consultations. LO was even going 
through a change of leadership in December 1993! Once the agreement was done, LO like other 
parties outside the “secret” Working Group on Pensions were left with a fait accompli. It could 
comment negatively on specific aspects, ask the social democrat to seek certain modifications, 
but it was forced to either accept the package or reject it. 
The second major element often stated as a major difference between Sweden and other 
countries, is the universalistic nature of the welfare state, which is partly the result of a highly 
                                                 
332 Interview, Bo Könberg, 20 November 2000.  
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centralized labour movement. This results in a welfare state that is supported by all groups of 
individuals since they all received benefits from it (Rothstein, 1998). Thus, reform or 
retrenchment measure will tend to be more easily accepted since it implies that all individuals 
make a sacrifice. This is in sharp contrast to countries that have means-tested or occupationally 
benefits where welfare state support clusters around these divisional lines. Thus, support for 
means-tested programmes tend to be low within the population, which make them vulnerable for 
retrenchment because many individuals do not receive any benefits from it. More conducive to 
the status quo, because of the potential political costs, are occupationally defined programs. As 
we have seen in the case of France and Belgium, it becomes difficult to enact a “fair” reform 
because of the differences in benefits accorded to the various occupational groups. 
This chapter raises doubt to the validity of the universal argument in times of 
retrenchment. The creation of a universal income related pension programme was the result of an 
occupational coalition of blue and white collars. The Social Democrats and LO needed the 
support of TCO members, many of whom already had occupational pensions, to ensure that it 
could emerge with a sufficient majority to beat the opposition. The Social Democrats agreed to 
the 15/30 rule in order to gather TCO’s support for the supplementary pension and expend the 
size of its electorate (Svensson, 1994). The fact that TCO types of jobs benefited most from the 
previous system should have not come as a surprise. The ATP system was built to get their 
support, not to improve the situations of women or those facing long period of unemployment 
and so on. Of course, they benefited from the system too (even though not in relative terms).  
The new pension system came into reality because of the opposite action, and an 
occupational logic led LO to support the system. As seen in France, blue-collar unions (FO and 
CGT) were strongly opposed to any increase in the length of contributions because many of their 
workers already had difficulties reaching the 37,5 years of contributions required and many of 
them relied on early retirement. Despite having a better situation than their French colleagues, 
the average retirement age of LO members was still below 60 and many workers were benefiting 
from pre-pensions. The new pension system with its life income principle has the same effect as 
an increase in the required number of years to obtain a full time pension, but it was not criticized 
as heavily as in France. Why? LO came to be relative winners in the new system at the expense 
                                                                                                                                                             
333 This was acknowledged by Tore Lidbom, LO’s pension specialist who was involved in the process from the very 
beginning (Interview, Tore Lidbom, 21 April 2002).  
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of TCO members. The five party agreement meant that the support of TCO was not as crucial as 
it was when the ATP system was created. It could no longer play the role of being the centre 
element sought by two blocks opposing each other. LO’s support, however, was more crucial 
because of its connection to the SAP. Moreover, the five party coalition were able to sale an 
extension in the length of contributions by stressing that the previous system disadvantaged 
them. Statistics demonstrated that they were financing the pensions of TCO’s members, who 
could obtain a higher pension even though they might have had contributed a similar amount. 
This was a powerful argument to justify counting all contributions made to the system. It would 
be powerful enough to quieten those criticizing the fact that many LO members could end up 
with small pensions because they tend to retire early. The later argument struck a cord among 
industrial workers, but could not outweigh the relative gain made by other professions within the 
union (regional government employees, retail and service sector employees).  
 
How can this group do so much? 
In terms of restructuring and creativity, the Swedish pension reform went way beyond 
reforms introduced elsewhere. It even served as an inspiration for other countries (Latvia, 
Poland, and Italy). Bluntly put, it was not simply a matter of a simple political compromise.  
A key aspect behind the reform was the cohesiveness and chemistry of the pension 
groups. Helping to develop this chemistry was the institutional manoeuvrings of Bo Könberg, 
who created an unusual working group rather than an official inquiry. The small group was 
composed exclusively of politicians and experts, which was conducive to a seminar like 
atmosphere generating a lot of open discussions among the members. As stated by Gennser, “it 
was really like we were sitting at a seminar at a University and we were discussing how to find a 
solution. Of course, I had to look at my customers and they had to look at their customers. But, I 
mean we had to find a solution” (Interview, Margit Gennser, 12 December 2000). The group 
approached the reform as an intellectual problem, with issues to be resolved one by one. The fact 
that Könberg was a Liberal Minister also helped to bridge the differences between the Social 
Democrats and Conservatives. Both Hedborg and Gennser would gain the reputation of being 
social engineers and members would learn to trust each other (DN, 12 April 1994; Affärsvärlden, 
15 November 2000). All members acknowledged that such strong personal chemistry was really 
the result of pure luck.  
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The members of the Working/Implementation Group all acknowledged that their 
experience within this group has been quite unique. The group was made to reach a genuine 
political compromise and the influence of each member remained virtually the same regardless 
of electoral results. Usually, the influence of opposition politicians in such a group tend to be 
rather limited since the government does not require their support to enact legislation.  
The strong cohesiveness would be felt strongly among those outside the group such as 
labour market partners, Ministry of Finance, and politicians opposed to the deal. They 
demonstrated strong resolve to stick together, and often speak with a single voice. Complaints 
would be formulated that speaking to different members of the group did not really change their 
response. Some comments from opponents almost gave the impression that they were part of the 
same political party.  
Such strong cohesion was required to transform the whole pension system, however. To 
conclude, the creation of the Working/Implementation Group made it possible to exclude labour 
market partners from actively participated into the reform process. This helped reduce the size of 
the group working on pensions, with all the advantages mentioned above, and extinguished other 
possible conflicts (such as between the Conservatives and LO; SAF and the Social Democrats). 
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5 - United Kingdom: A Marriage to the Private Sector? 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Pension policy in the United Kingdom is sharply distinct from the previous three 
cases because it has never had the chance to mature. Its most consistent feature has been 
the strong reliance on the private sector with the state seeking to minimise its 
responsibilities (Nesbitt, 1995: 141). This could be partly explained by the combination of 
a parliamentary system with a first-past-the-post electoral formula, which favours a 
bipartite system, single party majority with a strong executive. Other studies of policies in 
the UK, like Steinmo’s Taxation and Democracy, suggest this sort of pattern. Policies seem 
to be more easily changeable due to competitive and confrontational aspects related to 
British politics. Nonetheless, a popular argument in the literature of retrenchment is that 
this high accountability constraints the action of government because they cannot easily 
avoid blame (Pierson, 1994, 1996; Vail, 1999). This chapter demonstrates, in line with the 
theoretical framework presented in chapter 1, that British governments have introduced the 
most drastic pension reforms. They refute the claim that accountability restricts the actions 
of the government. 
 
Historical Overview 
As in the previous three cases, private charities and friendly societies have provided 
most of the assistance to the elderly throughout the 19th century. The friendly societies 
were supported and encouraged, via legislation, by successive government as they 
symbolised the ideology of self-help while reducing pauperism. Their number rose in 
accordance with diminutions to the generosity of the Poor Law (Raynes, 1957: 158-162). 
By the end of the century, friendly societies were an important political force within the 
 271
realm of social benefits. The friendly societies vehemently opposed any government 
intervention in pension since it would reduce significantly the number of their members.334 
The first government initiative occurred in 1833 with the creation of a voluntary 
program guaranteeing annuities, which could be purchased at the Post Office. This new 
scheme turned out to be very unpopular and inefficient. It was a vain effort to curb the 
increasing powers of friendly societies and private insurance companies. The civil 
administration did not dispose of an army of collectors, very few post offices participated 
in the scheme and very few needy enrolled into the scheme (Heclo, 1974: 158). 
By 1870, only 23% of the labour force was still working in the agricultural sector 
compared to 50% in Germany (Esping-Anderson, 1990: 89). The presence of 
industrialisation was already felt in most of the UK increasing the need for some form of 
social policies. However, even though the United Kingdom was the most industrial nation 
in Europe at the turn of the 19th century, its citizens would have to wait until 1908, almost 
20 years after the Germans, for the appearance of an old-age pension plan. 
The idea of a public pension scheme, although already introduced in the 1880s, was 
very difficult to sell to any government in a country that praises laissez-faire liberal values. 
Moreover, contrary to Germany, the labour movement in the UK was very weak at the turn 
of the century. Nevertheless, from the 1890s, there was growing national dissatisfaction 
with how respectable old-age persons were handled through poor-relief (Orloff, 1993: 211) 
and group of citizens from various backgrounds started to organise themselves to promote 
the idea of old-age pension. Key behind this movement was the publication of a social 
science study conducted by Booth, and published in 1891. He concluded that 38% of 
paupers were above the age of 65 and he became an ardent activist for a non-contributory 
pension scheme. Following the publication of Booth’s report, a parliamentary committee 
was created in 1892 and concluded in 1895 that no public pensions scheme is acceptable 
and such functions should be left to the friendly societies (Heclo, 1974: 162; Williamson 
and Pampel, 1993: 45). This outcome strengthened the emergence of the movement for a 
public pension scheme and led to the creation of the National Pension Committee (NPC). 
Pressure was mounting on the government to take action. However, the Boer War, 1899-
1902 and opposition of the Treasury, induced the government to postpone any discussion 
                                                 
334 In 1880, 50% of working-class males belonged to one (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 91). 
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on matters related to social policy since it would need extra financial resources to support 
the war (Heclo, 1974: 165-170). 
Neither major political party in the late 1800s was particularly eager to introduce 
old-age pension legislation. This attitude changed following the war as two key events 
pushed the government to introduce a public pension scheme. First, by the late 1880s, the 
portion of young workers in friendly societies started to decline, thus leading to major 
financing difficulties for many of the societies in the 1890s. Indeed, many friendly 
societies were very close to insolvency and unable to meet their financial commitments to 
the elderly. The extent of these problems forced the friendly societies to finally join the 
movement supporting the introduction of old-age pension in 1904 (Williamson and 
Pampel, 1993: 49). 
Second, the Liberal party was searching for a candy to give to the working class in 
order to establish itself as a party of social reformer. It was following the defeat of an 
important education bill that the Liberal Prime Minister Asquith turned its attention into 
pensions in the hopes of an electoral reward.335 Asquith asked the Treasury to come up 
with a pension plan. In the footsteps of Booth’s proposal and the conclusion of a 
commission on instituting old-age pensions launched in 1899, the Treasury proposed a 
means-tested non-contributory pension scheme. The provisions were based on the 
budgetary surplus forecasted for the upcoming year, and not on the social problem at hand. 
No efforts were actually made to assess the costs of the proposed program beyond the 
following year (Heclo, 1974: 174; Ogus, 1982: 177-9; Hennock, 1987: 128).  
The Liberals introduced the Treasury’s proposal in 1908. A weekly allowance of 5 
shillings would be granted to individuals above the age of 70 as long as they could 
demonstrate that they earn less than 10 shillings per week and have been British resident 
for at least 20 years. Other strict conditions promoting ‘good citizenship’ were attached.336 
                                                 
335 However, the liberals would not get their wish. The fact that pensions were only going to be accorded to those 
over the age of 70 resulted in “laughter and sarcasm” among most workers who were unlikely to survive past that 
age (Heclo, 1974: 176). 
336 “An applicant must not received poor relief after January 1908, must not have been imprisoned for any offence 
including drunkenness during the 10 years preceding the claim, was not an alien or the wife of an alien, and was able 
to satisfy the authorities that he had not been guilty of ‘habitual’ failure to work according to its ability, opportunity, 
or need, for his own maintenance or that of his legal relatives” (Ogus, 1982: 178). 
 
The new scheme was financed via general taxation. “It was a pension for the very old, the 
very poor and the very respectable” (Ogus, 1982: 177-8).337 
During this whole process, the insurance-based German system created in 1889 
received very little attention (Hennock, 1987: 138). An insurance-based system was never 
really considered by British politicians for many reasons despite a similar level of 
industrialisation. First, the strength of the individualistic ideology resulted in negative 
views towards compulsory schemes. Second, state intervention was alien in Britain (Ogus, 
1982: 165). As a result, it did not have a strong civil service, which was actually quick to 
point out that it did not have the resources to operate a scheme similar to the one in 
Germany (Heclo, 1974: 160).338 Third, friendly societies and private insurance companies 
had grown in importance during the 19th century and became strong opponents to public 
pensions.339 Fourthly, collectivist movements, such as trade unions, were slow to develop 
in Britain. Finally, the legal system did not favour the centralisation of policies and was 
substandard within the public realm vis-à-vis the private (Ogus, 1982: 165). 
The introduction of sickness and unemployment insurance in 1911 marked the 
beginning of a new movement towards the establishment of compulsory old-age insurance 
along the lines of the German system. The inclusion of pensions was considered but was 
soon abandoned due to its long-term nature. The key reason why pensions were not 
included was the belief that it would not result in immediate returns for the government 
(Heclo, 1974: 196). Nonetheless, a restriction of the means test was introduced with the 
consideration of capital resources such as property into the qualifying conditions for a 
pension (Raynes, 1957: 183). Increases in the pension rates were introduced in 1916 and in 
1919, following the work of a commission but they could not restore its pre-war value 
                                                 
337 Quote cited by Ogus from P. Thane (1978). ‘Non-contributory versus Insurance Pensions 1878-1908’ in P. Thane 
(ed.), The Origins of British Social Policy. 
338 Beveridge, who was then an editor of a newspaper, underlined the lack of public policy skill available. He was 
quick to point out that the government had misunderstood the German pension system while quoting the benefits 
obtained by the average pensioner. The information obtained by Asquith from its civil service failed to consider 
many categories of pensioners (Hennock, 1987: 131-4). Further, the number of old-aged was grossly 
underestimated. Many of them had refused to collect Poor relief benefits due to the high stigma attached to it. This 
led in higher costs (Bruce, 1973: 138). 
339 Hennock (1987) claims that the power of the friendly societies has been overstated. They were not unified behind 
the issue of public pensions and positions varied greatly among them. Few of them offered supperanuation benefits. 
Further, the introduction of sickness insurance in 1911 was far more damaging to them than proposed old-age 
insurance schemes, and the government was able to get them on board (140). 
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(Heclo, 1974: 197). World War I was important for the development of future social 
policies as it led to an increase in the role of the state (Ogus, 1982). 
During the early 1920s, intense discussions to combine sickness, unemployment 
and old age under one insurance scheme. A committee was created in 1923 under the 
Conservative government to study this question. While the committee was still working, 
the Labour Party won its first parliamentary election but only introduced a modest raise, 
which brought on heavy criticism  (Heclo, 1974: 205). The committee presented its report 
in 1924, which were adopted by the recently elected Conservative government after it 
failed to gather support for its own views. Once again, the Treasury was in charge. The 
new pension reform was introduced in 1925. The main feature was the introduction of a 
contributory pension plan. The establishment of a contributory scheme was only feasible 
after most participants in the pension debate came to realise that any improvement or 
supplementary pension scheme would not be financially possible without contribution. The 
new pension scheme advocated contributory pensions for those aged between 65 and 70 
and the means-test non-contributory pension benefits starting at age 70. Those who earned 
benefits through their contributions between 65 and 70 were entitled to a pension at age 70 
without any means test. Contributions were to be similar for all workers irrespective of 
wage differentials and the new plan was financed by workers, employers as well as by the 
government. Furthermore, this new system was incorporated into the British social 
insurance program (Heclo, 1974: 208; Williamson and Pampel, 1993: 51). As in the 
pension reform of 1908, the negotiations for this plan were held in total secrecy with the 
Treasury, Britain’s key actor in the transformation of the welfare state (Ashford, 1986: 
179). Despite these two major pension reforms, 1 out of every 6 pensioners still relied on 
Poor relief in 1940 (Bruce, 1973: 234). In order to improve the condition of the aged, a 
new legislation came about in 1940, introducing the supplementation of old-age pensions. 
These were means-tested benefits granted by the Unemployment Assistance Board.  
 
Post-World War II – Did Beveridge revolutionize pension policies? 
The war led to a blurring of class distinction and an increase in the strength of 
unions, which had been co-operating with the government during mobilization. The 
presence of the state was accepted and instituted an efficient tax system that could help 
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levy funds to finance public pensions (Williamson and Pampel, 1993: 58).340 This created a 
window of opportunity to upgrade social policies. In 1942, the Beveridge report, resulting 
from a parliamentary commission, became one of the most influential reports on social 
policy in modern history. The report advocated the universalisation of social policies.  
In the field of pensions, it sought to move away from the means test principles in 
order to relieve the stigma associated with such policies. As such, Beveridge proposed a 
contributory flat-rate pension, which would be the same for all  (Baldwin, 1990a: 117-8). 
The first pension benefits would be obtained after 20 years of contributions. One major 
difficulty related to the transition period. After many deliberations, Beveridge opted to 
maintain the current system during the transition period. He despised the means test but he 
could not find alternatives that could please the Treasury and he wanted to avoid an 
intergenerational conflict. His proposal was modified by the newly elected Labour 
government and became law in 1946. Among the modifications made by the government 
were the elimination of the transition period granting pensions immediately to those 
insured since 1925 and the granting of full benefits after 10 years of contributions for those 
who started to contribute in 1948. Both of these changes were actively pursued by the 
Trade Union Confederation (TUC) (Heclo, 1974: 256-7; Baldwin, 1990a: 117-126).341 The 
government felt that something had to be done right now for the old-aged and therefore 
instituted a pay-as-you-go system to avoid the double payment problem for the current 
workers (Baldwin, 1990a: 131-2). 
The Beveridge report was quite progressive for its time, despite the fact that 
Beveridge was a Conservative. Churchill became so worried that he set up a committee of 
MPs to get out of Beveridge. They eventually agreed on lowering the benefits bestowed in 
the new schemes (Nesbitt, 1995: 4). Nonetheless, its report enjoyed broad support from 
both the left and the right, and even the Treasury. The insurance principle without 
redistributive measures (ibid) and the universal flat-rate benefits pleased the Conservatives. 
The later was accepted as it resolved the problem of administrative selectivity and the issue 
of the unpredictability of needs, which varied a great deal during the war. Unions and 
Labour wanted a move away from means-tested benefits, and the former was a strong 
                                                 
340 The success of the central administration during the war also decreased the powers of the local administration 
(Chamberlayne, 1993: 303). 
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supporter of flat rate benefits (Baldwin, 1990a: 129. More importantly, Beveridge satisfied 
the Treasury, which was his biggest constraint (Heclo, 1974: 256). He demonstrated that 
his pension scheme could be afforded (Nesbitt, 1995: 4). 
Although, benefits were slightly improved overtime (usually preceding an election), 
inefficiency and increasing costs for pensions to relieve the aged from poverty after the 
changes of 1946 forced both the Labour and Conservative party to initiate proposals for 
reforms in the 1950s. The flat-rate system led to benefits that were too minimal for 
pensioners who could not afford the high levels of private occupational pensions necessary 
to obtain a decent living standard (Heclo, 1974: 255 and 261). The flat-rate approach 
resulted only in a small upgrading of the “old minimum pension” (Esping-Andersen, 1980: 
101). The Conservatives raised further concerns over an eventual financial crisis due to 
upcoming increases in the number of old age people resulting in a higher demand for 
pensions. The Phillips Committee of 1953, composed mostly of Conservatives, claimed 
that the later was a central problem and a move towards private sector solutions should be 
undertaken (Heclo, 1974: 259-60; Nesbitt, 1995: 8). 
During this period, the Labour Party adopted a study presented by academics under 
the leadership of Titmuss. They demonstrated that the Beveridge solution meant that two 
groups of pensioners would be formed in the long run. One group would rely solely on the 
low flat rate benefits, and another group would be able to receive a good pension due to 
their private occupational schemes. It proposed a new earnings-related pension plan that 
would be financed by the employees, employers and government. The plan also included a 
redistributive approach, which would guarantee a pension worth half the average wage of 
workers for those with low revenues. The Labour Party added a contracting out option to 
their plan and utilised this plan as a new Party policy for the election of 1959 hoping to 
regain power. This became necessary due to the growth of private occupational plans, 
which covered a sizeable number of workers. After guaranteeing a minimum level of 
benefits, TUC supported the plan in 1957 (Heclo, 1974: 260-270).  
In reaction to the Labour proposal, the Conservative Party, with the support of 
many interest groups, mainly private insurers and businesses, proposed its own version of 
an earnings-based scheme. The Tory plan would provide much less pension benefits than 
                                                                                                                                                             
341 Every year another year of contribution was to be added until it reached 20. 
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the Labour plan, or to use Heclo’s word, the benefits proposed were “meagre at best”. With 
its parliamentary majority, the Conservative government went ahead with this plan and the 
bill was approved prior to the 1959 election. The new plan introduced a contribution 
scheme for those earning between £9 and £15 a week with a contracting out clause. Those 
earning less than £9 were confined to means-tested benefits (Heclo, 1974: 270-272). It was 
clear that the main objective of the conservatives was to reduce pension costs. The plan, 
with its payg feature and low benefits, served as a new tax to finance the state flat-rate 
pension scheme for those contributing while promoting private occupational plans (Nesbitt, 
1995: 10). Following this defeat, the Labour Party made pension policy their number one 
policy issue for the 1959 election and actually lost further support. As a result, the 
Conservative plan stayed and it came into effect in 1961.  
Following an electoral victory in 1964, major changes to the Conservative plan 
were expected. However, coming up with an alternative plan proved to be quite difficult. 
The growth of private occupational plans complicated the task of policy development 
within the Labour party. These plans covered 55% of all workers by 1967 and 
demonstrated a pattern of stability, meaning that a good section of the labour force was still 
unable to have an earnings-related scheme to complement the flat-rate benefits. Most of the 
uncovered workers consisted of female and blue-collar workers (Nesbitt, 1995: 11). A 
national occupational plan could no longer replace the private plans. Nonetheless, Labour 
could not ignore those already covered by a private plan (Baldwin, 1990a: 243). This 
resulted in many administrative delays while seeking a solution. The Treasury consistently 
refused to accept higher spending on pensions, and unions were quite hostile and 
uninterested in the new plan. Finally, Labour proposed a new plan in 1969, which included 
a redistributive aspect guaranteeing up to 60% wage replacement for the poor workers and 
a partial contracting out option.342 The new scheme would be automatically indexed to 
prices, and 20 years of contributions would be required to obtain a full pension. Indicative 
of the importance attached to this issue, an election was called just prior to the final reading 
of the bill in parliament in June 1970. Worst, public pensions would not even constitute a 
major element of the election (Heclo, 1974: 274-9). The Conservatives returned to power 
                                                 
342 This option represented a major concession to the insurance companies in order to seek broad acceptability. The 
previous contracting out option had made the insurance industry a very powerful group (Fawcett, 1995: 155-9). 
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and the Labour proposal was shelved. The Conservatives launched a new plan securing 
flat-rate benefits, relying strongly on employers to provide earnings-related pensions. A 
new state scheme would be introduced for those uncovered by private plans. It would be 
fully funded and operate on the same principles as private ones. The plan would never 
come to life as Labour scrapped it immediately after its electoral victory in 1974 (Baldwin, 
1990a: 244-5; Fawcett, 1995: 156).  
A major reform would be introduced in 1975 instituting a broader earnings- related 
scheme. It answered the strong pressure put by the TUC to increase pension benefits 
(Chamberlayne, 1992: 307) and the reality that many workers were still uncovered by 
private occupational schemes. According to Reynaud (1997), 60% of all workers still did 
not have access to an occupational pension scheme. The new Act included all occupations 
and it improved the earnings-based scheme by providing higher benefits to pensioners. The 
State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) gave pensioners, who participate in the 
plan, benefits equal to 25% of their 20 best years of coverage adjusted to the cost of living.  
This scheme also encouraged employers to “contract out” as long as they could 
guarantee a minimum pension that would be equivalent to the one offered by SERPS. If the 
opt out clause was used, contribution rates were reduced by 2,5% for the employee and 
4,5% for the employer (Bonoli, 2000: 60). This clause was introduced because of the high 
number of individuals already contributing to private pension schemes, and trade unions, 
especially those in the public sector, had already a strong interest vested in them and 
desired opt-out options (Fawcett, 1995: 160). This incentive led to an increase in the 
number of workers relying on private scheme from 50% to 67% (Williamson and Pampel, 
1993: 54-5). This reform paved the way for a more Germanic, albeit a weak one, pension 
system (Chamberlayne, 1992: 307).  
Despite minor objections, the Conservatives at the time accepted this legislation in 
order to break the period of uncertainty faced by the insurance industry and repeatedly 
expressed support for the new pension legislation (Nesbitt, 1995: 14; Pierson, 1994: 58), 
which was implemented in 1978. Thus, after 30 years of partisan conflict producing high 
levels of uncertainty, pension policy finally seemed set for a long period of stability. The 
end result of these conflicts between Labour and the Conservatives was a fragmented 
pension system along the lines of private/public pensions. It also had an occupational 
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dimensions attached to it, as high wage earners tended to belong to private schemes while 
the others relied on the public scheme (see table 5.1). The election of Thatcher would soon 
destroy the foundation of the new pension compromise. 
 
Table 5.1: British Public Pension System as of 1979. 
Basic Pension Earnings-Related Pensions 
Flat-rate benefits + means-tested 
benefits (for those not receiving 
earnings-related pensions or 
insufficient amounts from them). 
SERPS Private Schemes 
(must guarantee 
similar level to 
SERPS) 
 
Theorizing Pension Reform within the British context - Where is the state? 
As it is necessary and assumed that any discussion of French politics begins with the 
state, it is extremely difficult to find discussions that actually centres on the state in British 
politics. Birnbaum (1988) claims that, for example, anarchism never rose in Britain because it 
had “no raison d’être”. There was no strong dominant state to fight as France, Spain or Italy 
(75). Using Krasner’s (1976) typology, the UK is clearly a weak state. The state is able to resist 
societal pressure, but unable to change the behaviour of private actors. The extent to which it has 
sought to change the behaviour of private actors has actually been quite limited by international 
standards. It is no accident that the burgeoning literature on policy networks originated from the 
UK, private actors tend to play a much larger role than their European counterparts. 
The UK is the country where the ideas of Lizst never stood a chance in the face of laissez 
faire. The combination of the elitist nature of policymaking and the strong entrenchment of 
individualistic assumptions within the society resulted in a lack of drastic action in the welfare 
sphere on the part of the government even in times of persistent social needs in the mid-19th 
century (Ashford, 1986; Polyani, 1944). Still today, self-reliance and individualism is so 
entrenched in the mentality of the society that a large number of elderly needy still refuse to 
accept means tested benefits.  
Despite being a political and economic hegemon (Gilpin, 1987), the benefices from this 
power were not translated into better social policies. Its vast international expansion implied a 
policy of open trade benefiting those having strong interests abroad and the City, which was not 
reversed even though it has resulted in a long period of decline. It also resulted in a very 
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powerful Treasury fearful of budget deficits and public finances that could impede its 
international interests (Gamble, 19xx), The strength of the Treasury ended up seriously 
constraining the expansion of social budgets (Heclo, 1974; Ashford, 1986: 236). 
The UK did not need to use welfare as a tool to support the creation of the state in ways 
similar to Bismarck in Germany. This can be related to the fact that state formation was done 
with ease compared with the continental countries because a strong state was not necessary to 
create unity, as it was the case for states seeking to incorporate territories from the city-belt 
(Rokkan, 1999). Thus, social policy was never strongly linked to the state even though everyone 
acknowledged it had a role to play (Ashford, 1986: 76). 
As evidence by King (1995), the strength of liberal ideas has had an impact similar to that 
of institutional arrangements in shaping debates and policy options. Contrary to Scandinavian 
countries, Labour has not been strong enough politically to alter this liberal legacy (203). To 
reverse the head start of the Conservatives, Labour would have needed a long period of political 
hegemony. Up to World War II, both parties had quite similar agendas and ideas (Esping-
Andersen, 1990: 46). A key difference was that the Swedish Social Democrats were able to 
extend its political bases successfully via the promotion of encompassing programmes 
(Svensson, 1994).  
The political system helped the Swedish Social Democrats dearly to move out of their 
liberal legacy. As stressed by Rokkan (1999) a proportional representation electoral system was 
adopted in Sweden because the opposition of primary and secondary economy reinforced the 
periphery/centre cleavage. The British structure did the opposition, it encouraged the gradual 
merger of rural and urban interest, thus making first-past-the-post an acceptable electoral system 
(321). As underlined in chapter 2, a first-past-the-post makes it difficult to establish unaltered 
long-term policies, especially if they are controversial. This is clearly demonstrated by the case 
of pensions, Labour was never able to establish a more socialist pension system because the 
Conservative ensured that strong reliance on the market would remain. The later preference was 
re-enforced by the consecutive electoral successes of the Conservatives. Quite opposite to the 
faith of Labour, Swedish Social Democrats were able to establish their power largely because of 
its coalition with agrarian interests. Thus, they were able to use the political system and the re-
enforcement of cleavages to their advantage. Such options were never truly available to Labour.  
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The end result is a state acting as a guarantor of last resort when market fails. As in other 
former British colonies, labour is considered to be highly commodified and it is assumed that 
individuals can fend for themselves (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This is evidence historically by 
the emergence of private actors such as the Friendly Societies, which never received the kind of 
state support their French counterpart obtained (Ashford, 1986). 
The role of the private sector in the field of pension never faded away to the point where 
it became marginalized at the detriment of the state system like the other three cases analyzed. 
Contrary to post-war reforms in the other three countries, Beveridge ended up instituting flat-rate 
benefits that were too minimal leaving ample room for the private sector. Thus, once the private 
sectors became highly entrenched, especially among white-collar workers, it was extremely 
difficult to for any government to include them into a new state system. This sort of action would 
have gone against the traditional politics of laissez-faire, and the Treasury would have never 
accepted the costs for their integration. 
 
Relationship between social partners, and their relationship to the state 
In lines somewhat similar to what happened later on in Belgium, the trade unions and 
employers have refrained from integrating themselves within the state structure by opting to 
maintain their independence. Further, contrary to their French counterparts, unions actually 
sought to divorce labour problems from social issues seriously delimiting their political 
importance (Ashford, 1986: 315). The Labour party was also at fault by keeping TUC within a 
certain distance early on, an action that has been blamed on an “overexaggerated respect of 
Parliament, forcing the socialist to behave in a certain way” (ibid: 210). This could partly explain 
the lack of interest on the part of TUC when the idea of a mandatory occupational scheme was 
first proposed while its Swedish counterparts were actively pushing the Social Democrats to do 
just that. 
These difficulties combined with weak state powers resulted in the absence of 
corporatism and the formal institutionalization of unions and employers within the state. As 
noted by Birnbaum (1988):  
“Corporatism is incompatible with British society, in which the state 
remains relatively unstructured. The failure of corporatism might be 
attributed to the centralised character of employers’ interests, the 
relative weakness of British trade unionism (incapable of controlling 
delegates from the base who react against any intervention that might 
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deprive them of their role), and the inability of the political system. 
More likely, however, the failure stems from the very nature of the 
British state – nondifferentiated, nonautonomous, noninstitutionalised, 
and without a particular personnel of high functionaries to serve it and 
impose its will (122). 
  
Unions and employers never became social partners or labour market partners as in 
Continental Europe and Scandinavia. Thus, even when concertation reached its high point within 
the British political system during the 1960s and 1970s, these interactions were never fully 
institutionalized. They were considered legitimate and institutionalize by British standards, but 
their role never really went beyond exchange information and inquiries, and rarely featured 
active participation in policy-making and implementation (Olsen, 1983: 167). It is far easier to 
exclude actors involved in this type of relationship than those who have had long-standing 
participation in committees and agency boards. The Conservatives under Thatcher were able to 
do that quite effectively. 
 
Bureaucracy 
When it comes to the influence of the bureaucracy on social policy, Heclo (1974) 
eloquently demonstrates its inherent weaknesses and incapacities to deal probably with emerging 
social problems. Many research on social problems have actually been performed outside the 
bureaucracy. He even blames its inefficient resources for the lack of consideration for a 
contributory pension scheme within the state (302). Peters echoes by stating that “unlike the case 
with the continental countries, bureaucracy and administration have not played a prominent role 
in British thinking about government” (138).   
Constraining the influence of the bureaucracy further is the ‘arrogance’ of the Parliament. 
Contrary to Sweden where MPs are expected to attach themselves on a committee and rely 
strongly on expert from both within and outside the state apparatus, a long held view has been 
the MPs in the UK consider themselves competent enough to carry on policies without strong 
external help. According to Ashford (1986), this was particularly true prior to 1945. “The 
presumption was not only that there were national solutions to social issues, but that ministers 
and Parliament were quite capable of finding them” (33). 
 283
The two main bureaucratic actors are beyond any doubt the Department of Health and 
Social Security (DHSS)343 and the Treasury. The role of the DHSS has been quite marginalized 
by the Thatcher government. As it will be demonstrated in the following pages, the 
Conservatives were quite successful at keeping them at bay. The Secretary of State responsible 
for pensions, Fowler, appointed someone alien to the department as his assistant secretary as a 
mean to avoid the influence of the department. The DHSS was also not consulted on many 
critical proposals, such as the elimination of SERPS. 
The influence of the Treasury can be resumed with one line: Nothing gets done without 
its approval. Bonoli (2000) even claims that it represents a veto points in British social policy 
making (84). Its historical importance emphasised above has not really changed. Contrary to the 
Swedish Working Group on Pensions, the Treasury was an important actor in the main inquiry 
into pensions and often stopped discussions when they were related to tax issues. It was also able 
to impose a zero-cost constraint on pension discussions and intervened effectively when 
proposals implied a rise in public expenditure.  
 
The New Right Wave Hits Pensions Subtly…But Efficiently (1979-1983). 
This section discusses the various pension reforms introduced by the Conservative 
governments from 1979-1997, and concludes with a brief analysis of the Labour period 1997-
present. In light of the history of pensions in this country, analysing the actions of the Labour 
government since both parties have traditionally been undoing what the previous government in 
this field previously did. However, the changes made by the Conservative governments 
combined with a long period in office have made policy reversal extremely expensive and have 
seriously constrained the policy options available to the Labour government. Thus, the core of 
the changes made during the 1980s has remained untouched. 
Even though this dissertation has not tackled the second pillar of pension systems, ie. 
Occupational pension schemes granted within the private sectors, it must be included in the 
discussion for this case. This is as a result of SERPS, which have let occupational schemes run 
alongside the state scheme. Consequently, the private sector is a key political player in the UK 
because it has a vested interest in the current system. 
                                                 
343 It later became the Department of Social Security (DSS), and it is now called the Department of Work and 
Pensions (DWP). 
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Prior to carry on the discussion on the British case, a caveat is in order. The UK was the 
only country where field research was not undertaken. Nonetheless, the literature on the pension 
reforms is abundant and has been part of large comparative projects by Pierson (1994) and 
Bonoli (2000). Moreover, Nesbitt’s (1995) British Pensions Policy Making in the 1980s provides 
an extremely detailed analysis of virtually every events related to pensions during that decade 
facilitating the elaboration of this section greatly.  
 
Switching to Price Indexation… 
The arrival of Thatcher into office brought in a government strongly committed to 
reduce the size of the public sector and grant as much space as possible to the private 
sector. As stressed by Pierson (1994), pensions seemed ‘a dubious target for reform’ (58). 
Benefits were quite low by international standards; the replacement rate of 25% is far cry 
from what is being offered by the other three countries analyzed in this dissertation. The 
replacement rate for a single person was considered to be 33% in 1980 while it was 66% in 
France, 69% in Italy and 44% in the US. Being married did not improve one’s position 
enormously generating 47% compared to 75% in France, 69% in Italy and 66% in the US 
(Walker, 1991: 20).344 Further, the strong reliance on the private sector via occupational 
pensions implied that future payments on the part of the state would not be as extensive as 
in Continental countries. Thus, it was unlikely that pensions would be the target of reform. 
The first budget of the Thatcher government in 1979 added support to this view. Apart 
from unemployment insurance, social security was relatively untouched (Nesbitt, 1995: 34-
5). 
The pension truce would be short lived, however. The 1980 budget introduced a 
changed in the modality of indexation for both the Basic Pension and SERPS pensions. 
Howe suspended the higher price or wage inflation indexation introduced by Labour in 
1978 by replacing it solely with price (based on retail price index). In order to minimise 
opposition, the government sold this measure as being temporary claiming that wage 
indexation would be reintroduced once the economy is better (Nesbitt, 1995: 35-6). The 
government never did, and Labour promised to re-establish the link once back in power. 
                                                 
344 If we go back to Table 1,7 in chapter 1, we can see that the total replacement rates for a 55 year old individual is 
33,8% in the UK while it reaches 62,5% in France, 70,5% in Belgium, and 77,1% in Sweden. 
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As seen in the case of France, switching to price indexation has big financial 
consequences.345 Already by 1989, a married couple had 25% less than what they would 
have obtained with the previous indexation mechanism (Walker, 1991: 26). Assuming an 
annual growth rate of 2%, the replacement rate of the Basic Pension would decline by 50% 
by the year 2020 (Pierson, 1994: 59). Pierson (1994) refers to this measure as an ‘implicit 
privatization’ since it encouraged further the involvement of the private sector to 
compensate for the loss of these benefits (59). Fawcett (1995) goes further by arguing that 
this reform was the most drastic of all pension reforms undertaken by the government. 
With a price tag of £4-5 billion per annum, it is unlikely that any future government will 
seek to alter this (Fawcett, 1995: 165-6). Accordingly, the Labour Party removed the 
restoration of the more advantageous indexation during its makeover (in 1996), and 
subsequent Labour governments have not made any alterations to Howe’s measure. 
 
Setting the table for more changes? 
The remaining years of the first Thatcher government included other discussions on 
pensions. One of the first actions of Thatcher in the field of pensions took the form of an 
‘Inquiry into the value of pensions’. Commissioned to study the difference between public 
and private sector occupational pensions, Thatcher had expressed on numerous occasions 
her concerns vis-à-vis the favourable treatment of the pension schemes enjoyed by public 
servants. Their occupational pensions were value and inflation proof and no private 
occupational pension scheme was able to match in the following decade due to high rising 
inflation. Contrary to Thatcher’s expectation, the report (Scott Report) of this inquiry did 
not condemn the public sector pension treatment, but rather argued that better treatment 
was required for private sector employees (Nesbitt, 1995: 36-7). A government seeking 
aggressively to reduce public expenditure and public intervention was unlikely to search 
for alternatives to increase its role in occupational pensions, and the report found itself at 
the bottom of the government’s drawer. 
The key pension issue dominating the political agenda was the problems of ‘early-
leavers’. As a consequence of their dependence on occupational pensions rather than the 
state pension, employees’ pensions became tied in with their employers. Thus, a switch of 
                                                 
345 Unless, as we have seen in the previous chapter, wages deline.  
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company or unemployment often resulted in the loss of pension benefits from the previous 
employers. Employers embraced occupational pensions as an effective mean to maintain 
loyalty among its members, and were reluctant to alter them significantly (Bonoli, 2000: 
73). It was clear from the early going that the government and the Secretary of State, 
Norman Fowler, were seeking to give every opportunity to the private market to find a 
solution to this problem. However, with the continuous silence of the market the pressure 
began to mount on the government to take action. The ‘early leavers’ were indirectly 
subsidizing other pensioners and addressing their concerns implied a rise in contributions 
or a decline in the benefits of employees with long and stable careers, two unpopular 
avenues. 
The ‘early-leavers’ problem slowly became associated with another potential 
‘difficulty’, the maturation of SERPS. The Conservative government of Thatcher was keen 
on increasing individual responsibilities and bringing on lesser dependence on the state. 
The White Paper ‘Growing Older’ released in 1981 was extremely clear on these 
objectives. It emphasized that pensions needed to be reformed on the grounds that: 1) 
individuals should obtain more rights and responsibility for their pension; 2) SERPS was 
likely to be very expansive in the future; 3) the problem associated with the ‘early-leavers’. 
According to Nesbitt (1995), the paper was “high on ideology and low on substance” and 
“indicated quite clearly that economic considerations must take precedence and that social 
need would be met as a consequence of lower inflation and increased growth” (37).  
A year later, the Treasury ordered the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS – a think 
tank) to write a paper on the state of public finance. The paper was immediately leaked in 
September 1982 and argued for deeper costs in order to avoid reaching a level of 
expenditure of 45%, a level reached by the previous Labour government. Its circulation 
was the object of many discussions within the cabinet and was brushed aside. Few months 
later, the CPRS released a report focusing explicitly on pensions stating that both state 
pensions and private occupational pensions were failing their objectives. The former did 
not alleviate poverty and removed individual responsibilities while the later was deemed 
too rigid and inflexible constraining career change. It argued for the elimination of SERPS 
and the creation of personal pensions. This time both the Department of Health and Social 
Security (DHSS) and the Treasury rejected it, albeit for different reasons. The paper was 
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considered so politically sensitive that Thatcher tried in vain to stop its publication because 
of the proximity of the election (Nesbitt, 1995: 42-9).346 
The CPRS was not alone in advocating changes to SERPS and solution to the 
‘early-leavers’ problem. Other think-tank, pension funds, and insurance companies began 
to point out the expected increase in SERPS, and the need to reform it before it is too late. 
For example, Stewart Lyon, a leading personality within the pension industry, criticized the 
generosity and future burden of SERPS on the economy during his presidential address to 
the Occupational Pensions Board (OPB) in 1982 (Nesbitt, 1995: 45). He would re-state this 
position in a later address at the annual meeting of the National Association of Pension 
Funds (NAPF) in 1983 (54-5). The think-tank co-created by Thatcher and Joseph, the 
Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) entered the debate in 1983 arguing strongly in favour of 
personal pensions, emphasising that market solutions can resolve the ‘early-leavers’ 
problem. Its input was deemed extremely important because it became a de facto arm of 
the Thatcher governments. Surprisingly, it remained silent on SERPS. This probably had 
more to do with the upcoming election rather than an implicit support for the public 
pension programme (50-3).  
Even though the government remained silent on its pension ambitions in the even 
of a re-election, its main supporters and sources of ideas had already laid down the carpet 
for possible scenarios. Many of them quickly re-surfaced following the overwhelming 
victory of the Conservatives, who obtained a majority of 188 seats in the elections of June 
1983. 
 
Seeking Permanent Change! 
“Neither I nor the Government generally are 
interested in securing temporary change. We 
want change to last” Norman Fowler, State 
Secretary for Social Services in the Thatcher 
Government during the 1980s. 
 
The re-election of the Conservatives allowed them to focus on longer-term policies 
and it erased the fear that the following government could alter changes introduced by 
them. Further, due to the size of its majority, the tone and attitude of the government as 
                                                 
346 The DHSS claimed that the CPRS solutions would break the ‘pension consensus’ while the Treasury argued that 
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well as its policy orientation became increasingly uncompromising and more ideologically 
driven (Nesbitt, 1995: 57-8). As it will be demonstrated in the following pages, pension 
policy did not escape this new reality. 
 
The Inquiry into Provision for Retirement. 
Following a failed last ditched effort to resolve the issue of ‘early-leavers’ via a 
meeting at the DHSS in September 1983,347 and pressure from the Prime Minister and 
Exchequer to reduce the long-term costs of SERPS, Fowler decided to create a special 
inquiry to deal with pensions. On November 22 1983, the Inquiry into Provision for 
Retirement was formally launched and its composition was announced at the same press 
conference (Nesbitt, 1995: 60-5). 
A key motive behind the inquiry was to reach a favourable political decision, this 
was evidenced by Fowler in an interview: “I had to make proposals not only proposals I 
believed in and supported but proposals which I could get past my colleagues” (cf. Nesbitt, 
1995: 68-9). Therefore, he set up the inquiry in an unorthodox way to achieve this goal. 
First, Fowler shied away from creating a Royal Commission or an internal committee since 
they would have been composed of civil servants. Despite claiming that he did so because 
pensions was not a high priority for the DHSS, his motives seemed really to push them 
aside. He nominated a newly member of the department (Nick Montagu) as his Assistant 
Secretary. As underlined by Nesbitt (1995), “he had only recently joined the DHSS and 
therefore had not had time to be socialised into their particular culture. Nor had he had time 
to establish formal or informal relationships with interested parties” (68).  
Second, he appointed important members of the pension industry alongside 
Conservatives MPs. However, key social security actors such as the Social Security 
Advisory Committee (SSAC), the Confederation of British Industry (CBI – the main 
employers’ association), and the TUC were left aside, but were nonetheless consulted (71). 
Considering the positions of both SSAC and TUC to maintain SERPS and not introduce 
                                                                                                                                                             
the proposals presented costs too much (Nesbitt, 1995: 49).  
347 The Meeting occurred on September 14, 1983 and was attended by the NAPF, OPB, CPS, Institute of Directors, 
Society of Pensions Consultants (SPC), Association for Consulting Actuaries (ACA), Life Offices 
Association/Associated Scottish Life Offices (LOA/ASLO), the Government Actuary’s Department (GAD), the 
TUC and the CBI. The presence of the think-tank CPS was highly related to the presence of the Conservative in the 
government. 
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personal pensions, their influence was close to nil in this process. TUC simply refused to 
discuss the introduction of personal pensions (Bonoli, 2000, 77-8). Third, to raise the 
profile of the inquiry and marginalize groups outside the ones invited, Fowler included 
three public sessions. Finally, Fowler created a sub-group to discuss the possible 
implementation of personal pensions, which was composed mainly of economists. This 
group was largely created to provide strong evidence to Fowler to go ahead with this 
policy, and SERPS was not part of the agenda of this group (Nesbitt, 1995: 74). A very 
short period was granted for interest groups to present evidence to this subject prior to the 
beginning of the deliberation. Considering that the budgetary impact of proposals 
considered by the inquiry were only published two years later (73), it is difficult to argue 
that these had a strong influence in the work of the committee. 
Albeit different institutional constraints, the actions of Fowler bears strong 
resemblance to what was done by Könberg in Sweden during the early 1990s when he 
instituted the Working Group On Pensions (see Chapter 4). Both actors sought to 
maximize the likelihood of reaching a politically acceptable proposal. They abstained from 
employing usual commission channels, allowing them to shape them according to their 
policy objectives. Key was their ability to exclude specific actors, especially employers and 
trade unions. Obviously, it was easier to find a political solution for Fowler because he 
only had to please his own government while considering the pension industry, which had 
been considered a supporter of the Conservatives. Thus, he did not really have to come up 
with a specific document or report, but a proposal to be negotiated within the Cabinet. 
Könberg had to create a political consensus among five parties, a much more difficult task 
considering that its proposal had to be a much more finite product. Both commission were 
extremely important as they set the political agenda for the pension reform and their 
proposals were the basis of future legislation. 
Most of the discussions in the Inquiry into Provision for Retirement centred on: 1) 
the impact of population ageing on the future costs of SERPS; 2) the introduction of 
personal pensions; 3) the ‘early-leavers’ problem and the age of retirement (Nesbitt, 1995: 
76-7). Upon the release of figures on the future costs of SERPS in 1984, the government 
was quick to interpret them as an intolerable financial burden, which required immediate 
attention. Wide objections by its political opponents, independent commentators and 
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academics (Bonoli, 2000: 63) would do little to stop the government’s campaign against 
the future costs of SERPS. The Treasury added support to the achievement of these goals 
via the publication of the Green Paper The Next Ten Years during the same year, where it 
advocated sharp reductions in public spending. Therefore, it was keen to reduce the costs 
of SERPS (Nesbitt, 1995: 82-3), and had pressured Fowler to generate savings from social 
security in the order of 5 to 10% (Pierson, 1994: 60). It is worthwhile stating that, contrary 
to Sweden’s committees on pensions, the Treasury was a present and effective actor at a 
very early stage. It firmly objected to any propositions resulting in more public expenditure 
and blocked any discussions related to taxes claiming that it was its reserved domain (70). 
The Inquiry held its final meeting in early 1985 (69). 
 
The Conservatives increase significantly the importance of the private sector. 
The Real Pension Time Bomb…Fowler’s Proposals! 
On June 3rd 1985, Fowler released the long awaited Green Paper on pensions, 
which was supposed to be the outcome of the discussion within the Inquiry into Provision 
for Retirement. In a nutshell, the Green Paper advocated eliminating SERPS to replace it 
with personal pensions, an idea that had been proposed earlier by the Conservatives’ own 
think-tank, the CPS and the Institute of Directors (IoD). Fowler’s propositions soon faced a 
mountain of criticism from both traditional opponents of the government (trade unions, 
Labour party) and supporters of the party (pension and insurance industry, CBI). Even 
more unexpected, is that the fiercest opposition actually came from within the government: 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson. 
It comes as no surprise that the Labour Party, the TUC, and the anti-poverty lobby 
were quick to express their disapproval with Fowler’s plans. The Labour Party had just 
recently launched SERPS with the support of the TUC, as part of the ‘pension consensus’ 
and was inclined on keeping it alive. The shadow secretary of state for social services, 
Micheal Meacher, criticized publicly the proposal as being “the re-introduction…of 
Victorian values in an invidious distinction between deserving and undeserving poor” (cf. 
Bonoli, 2000: 75). Labour promised soon afterwards to re-introduce SERPS if elected at 
the next election during their annual congress. TUC was also strongly opposed to Fowler’s 
intentions. It had actually sought to raise the replacement rates of SERPS to 33% in the 
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early 1980s (77). Implicitly relating the Green Paper to the ‘pension consensus’ of 1978, 
TUC claimed that the proposals represented a “colossal breach of faith on the 
Government’s part” (cf. Pierson, 1994: 61). The anti-poverty criticized the government’s 
plans as being detrimental to those with precarious employment, an argument supported by 
the conservative Institute for Fiscal Studies (ibid), and maintained that they would end up 
with lesser benefits than with SERPS (Bonoli, 2000: 78).  
What was more surprising, however, was the strong opposition the Green Paper 
generated from traditional supporters of the Conservatives including key members of the 
inquiry. First, insurance companies and the private pension industry were not too thrilled to 
add bad risks into their plans. Many individuals contributing to SERPS have erratic careers 
and are likely to be expansive clients, whose expectations are sure to be unattainable. The 
NAPF expressed concerns about the wisdom of such a plan if Labour was to repeal it once 
in office, and asked for a longer period of study (Bonoli, 2000: 75). More importantly, 
Stewart Lyon, a member of the inquiry and a representative of the largest pension funds in 
the country, also expressed his disapproval and further claimed that such proposals was 
never analyzed within the inquiry (Pierson, 1994: 62).  
Second, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) opposed the proposals because 
it challenged the current order of occupational pension schemes and left them with the 
double payment problem. They would have to pay for current employees and those already 
retired. According to the Financial Times, the estimated costs to employers of scraping 
SERPS would be between £1,5-2 billion (cf. Pierson, 1994: 61). Both employers and 
insurance companies also expressed their concerns to the administrative difficulties that 
would occur during the transition period (ibid). 
The death of Fowler’s proposal became a certainty with the strong opposition of the 
Treasury. According to both Nesbitt (1995) and Bonoli (2000), the Treasury had expressed 
its opposition to the Green Paper prior to its publication. A meeting chaired by Thatcher 
was held for this matter in early 1995, where supposedly the Treasury initially endorsed the 
move. However, it soon realized that scraping SERPS implied an immediate increase in 
expenditure, a fact acknowledged even within the Green Paper. This is the direct 
consequence of abandoning a payg system. The government would have had to continue 
paying retirees that had contributed earlier to SERPS without receiving any contributions 
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from current workers. Therefore, Nigel Lawson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, opposed 
it. Interestingly, Thatcher continued to support the elimination of SERPS (Nesbitt, 1995: 
87). Highly indicative of the extent to which Fowler’s proposals were contested, the 
Conservatives’ own social security officials opposed the Green Paper (Walker, 1991: 27). 
 
The Social Security Act of 1986 
Following the uproar caused by the Green Paper, the government withdrew its 
plans to eliminate SERPS. Nonetheless, this did not stop its effort to alter significantly 
pension policies. The White Paper Programme for Action released in 1985 included new 
proposals with the objectives of making SERPS unattractive to future contributors while 
encouraging a further expansion of the private sectors with the introduction of personal 
pensions. These were presented as having the advantage of being portable, thus facilitating 
movement within the labour market and, more importantly, as a solution to the ‘early-
leavers’ problem. The elements included in the White Paper were eventually adopted by 
the Parliament in 1986 in the Social Security Act. They were implemented in April 1988 
(Nesbitt, 1995: 89-90). 
The measures related to SERPS included a decrease in the value of the replacement 
rate from 25% to 20% and extended the period under consideration from the best 20 years 
to lifetime earnings. Those retired prior to year 2000 were saved from these measures and 
the transition phase would occur between 2000 and 2010. As important, these new SERPS 
measures meant a reduction in the Guaranteed Minimum Pension (GMP) that occupational 
had to guarantee when contracting out employees as long as they continue to guarantee the 
post-retirement value in line with prices up to a maximum of 3% (ibid). This new threshold 
made it more likely that small employers could establish new occupational plans and stay 
away from SERPS. 
The White Paper also mentioned the introduction of personal pensions with a 
special incentive for individuals to contract out of SERPS. The rebate being discussed was 
in the range of 2-3% for a period up to 1992-3. Finally, survival’s benefits were cut in half 
(ibid). 
The Social Security Act of 1986 put a serious dent into the role of the state for the 
provision of pensions. All SERPS and survival’s pension proposals from the White Paper 
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were included in this new legislation and the conditions surrounding personal pensions 
were defined more precisely. Individuals were granted the option to opt-out of either 
SERPS or occupational schemes depending on their current affiliation with an 
advantageous rebated of 2%. Employers were also given an incentive, a 3,8% rebate on 
their contributions for a total of 5,8% contribution rebate for the state.348 This option was 
offered for a limited time from April 1988 to April 1993. Such generous conditions after 
reducing strongly the appeal of SERPS underlines the commitment of the government to 
the expansion of personal pensions. As we will see in the following section, these generous 
conditions turned out to be extremely expensive. 
It is important to note that the new legislation challenged both SERPS and current 
occupational pensions. A direct consequence of the new legislation was the lost of many 
contributors to SERPS (see table 5.2). Employers could no longer force employees into 
their occupational schemes, and they could not stop an employee for switching to personal 
pensions. Thus, as demonstrated by table 6.2, the new legislation also had the effect of 
stopping the growth of occupational pensions. This measure was in line with the 
Conservatives’ views on promoting individual ownership. The Centre for Policy Studies, 
the think-tank created by Thatcher and Joseph, had previously criticized occupation 
pensions as a tool for concentrating wealth, which could have negative political and 
democratic impact (Nesbitt, 1995: 105).  
The new legislation was better received than the Green Paper, but it still did not 
lack critiques. First, the CBI and the NAPF still criticized the new bill because it extended 
the 2% rebate into occupational pensions and challenged the pension order. Many 
occupational schemes were benefit defined, and thus enjoyed an internal solidarity that 
could be threatened by exit options. Both organizations would have preferred an initiative 
limiting personal pensions as third pillar rather than instituting them as a competitor to 
occupational pensions (Bonoli, 2000: 75). They, however, supported the changes made to 
SERPS. In response to the Green Paper, the CBI had actually suggested to increase the 
period under which benefits were calculated from 20 years to the whole career and the 50% 
                                                 
348 According to Nesbitt (1995), employers were also provided with a strong incentive to soften their objections to 
the introduction of personal pensions, as they preferred to strengthen occupational pensions while decreasing the 
value of SERPS. The incentive also helped to make personal pensions attractive for employers contributing into 
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cut in survival benefits (Nesbitt, 1995: 89). Second, both Labour and TUC continued to 
criticize the government. Labour promised to stop the implementation of the new 
legislation if in power prior to 1988 (Bonoli, 2000: 76). After failing to capture office, 
Labour was forced to accept the new pension landscape without being able to alter it 
significantly when it returned to power in 1997 because of the large costs and 
administrative difficulties that would result from a policy reversal.  
 
Table 5.2: Pension membership of British Employees (thousands of employees paying 
class 1 contributions at the standard rate). 
 SERPS Occupational 
Pensions 
Personal 
Pension 
1987 10,878 8,042 - 
1988 10,043 7,904 1,288 
1989 7,973 8,030 3,397 
1990 7,679 8,270 4,172 
1991 7,436 8,202 4,810 
1992 6,653 8,068 5,340 
1993 6,335 7,804 5,667 
1994 6,527 7,476 5,732 
Source : DSS, 1996 (cf. Bonoli, 2000 : 80). 
 
Consequences of the 1986 legislation 
This section assesses the impact of the Social Security Act of 1986 on individuals, 
groups of individual, and the state. Its main effect goes way beyond a simple cost and 
benefit analysis. It reinforced the importance of the private sector for the provision of 
pensions by making SERPS less attractive while promoting personal pensions. As 
underlined by Nesbitt (1995), SERPS became a “scheme of default” for those who are 
unable to join an occupational scheme or find an appropriate personal pension plan (95). 
The introduction of personal pension has stark implications for those who adopted this way 
of securing their pensions. Contrary to many occupational pensions and SERPS, personal 
                                                                                                                                                             
SERPS while eliminating potential opposition on the part of employers for the loss of members in occupational 
plans (95). 
 295
pensions are based fully on contribution and do not guarantee a certain level of benefits. 
Further, the flip side of obtaining personal choice is that all the risks associated with one’s 
investment are borne by the individual without any guarantee of the state.  
The first element worth mentioning is that, surprisingly, the state ended up 
spending more rather than less money via the introduction of the new scheme. The 
personal at the DHSS did not envision that personal pensions would be so popular. The 
department had estimated that roughly 500 000 individuals would opt out of SERPS during 
the period 1988-1993. However, more than 4 million individuals choose to opt out of 
SERPS in favour of the personal pensions (Nesbitt, 1995: 98; see table 6.2). An aggressive 
campaign by private pension providers combined with the strong incentives provided by 
the government is to blame (Bonoli, 2000: 80).  
As a result of the DHSS’ misjudgement, the total cost of the rebate amounted to 
£9,3 billion while the savings from SERPS only amounted to £4,3 billion. Thus, the 
government was left with a tab of £5,9 billion (National Audit Office, cf. Ward, 2000: 
140). Nonetheless, the government is expected to obtain more savings since expected 
expenditure are expected to plummet to £7,1 billion by the year 2021, down from a pre-
reform estimation of £16.4 billion (Pierson, 1994: 63-4). Ironically, the total expected 
savings over a period of 35 years (£9,3 billion) barely covers the incentives provided by the 
government during the period 1988-93 (£9,3 billion). Therefore, the ‘astronomical cost’ of 
SERPS was never eliminated, but rather displaced into the hands of individuals who opted 
to switch to personal pensions resulting in a ‘regressive transfer’. The money saved was 
taken away from those remaining in SERPS to subsidize those fortunate enough to have 
personal pensions. As mentioned above, precarious career patterns entail a very high 
administrative fee and this group of individuals is highly unlikely to benefit from personal 
pensions. 
Second, as highlighted by the Maxwell affair, the behaviour of the private sector 
has not been too responsible in most cases resulting in heavy losses for many individuals. 
Financial service companies sold personal pensions in a way similar to a shark smelling 
blood. According to a research performed by the Security and Investment Board, 91% of 
personal pension sales were made without adhering to its standard business rules (cf. Ward, 
2000: 141). Nurses and steelworkers were convinced to leave the generous occupational 
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schemes in favour of less profitable personal pensions. Many individuals with precarious 
positions and low wages left SERPS for personal pensions despite the negative effect of 
this choice.349 
Finally, the overall effect is the elimination of difficulties to meet the financial 
challenge created by the time-bomb with many estimates suggesting a freezing of costs 
(see appendix C). However, the meagre benefits offered by SERPS and the limited 
protection available to those with precarious career patterns imply that action will most 
likely be required to alleviate many elderly from poverty. Prior to the reform of, it was 
estimated that a third of elderly lived in poverty (Walker, 1991: 21). The Social Security 
Act has likely ensured that this figure will rise in the future unless corrective action is 
taken. No action to this effect was taken by the Conservatives who constantly refused to 
admit that poverty was a problem among the elderly (29). 
 
Explaining the passage of the reform 
In terms of retrenchment, the effects of both the Social Security Act of 1986 and the 
indexation of pensions on prices in 1980 represent the most drastic measures implemented 
in the four countries studied in this dissertation. The prudent and careful approach adopted 
in the other three countries is in stark contrast to the uncompromising way under which the 
Conservatives pushed through the 1986 legislation. Interestingly, pension reforms in the 
UK represent the only policy area where even Pierson (1994) acknowledged that far-
reaching cuts were made (53). This section seeks to bring some light into how such reforms 
were possible. 
Nesbitt (1995) argues that a policy community was formed in the early 1980s, 
which strongly supported the individualisation of benefits. Fowler sought to integrate them 
to shape his own policy agenda. The nature of these contacts was considered quite informal 
and individuals were considered more important than the organisation they represent. His 
conclusion stresses that the policy community of the 1980s was sharply different than that 
of the 1970s, which relied more strongly on the DHSS, and institutionalized support from 
TUC (142-5). Nesbitt’s explanation centres on the participation within a policy 
                                                 
349 The first estimates claimed that 1 million people lost by leaving SERPS, a figure reduced to between 43,000 and 
238,000 after further analysis and consideration of the impact of the 2% rebate (Ward, 142). 
 297
community. What is lacking, however, is a better understanding of the political process. 
The individuals, whose roles were upgraded during the process, all had one thing in 
common: they supported the views of Fowler. TUC never took part in this policy 
community because it refused to co-operate with the government and its views were 
sharply opposed to that of the Conservatives. Fowler kept DHSS at bay, probably because 
its views were closer to the maintenance of the ‘pension consensus’ than his. Nesbitt’s 
detailed analysis cannot refute the claim that it was Fowler and his government that were 
controlling the policy agenda and not vice versa. 
Pierson (1994) argues that “Thatcher did not always get her way, but she controlled 
the political agenda and ultimately engineered a major transfer of responsibility for 
retirement provision to the private sector” (53). Thatcher engineered a highly visible and 
unpopular policy, and was not punished at the following election. Pierson and Smith 
(1993) proclaimed that the limited progress of Thatcher were the result of an unpopular 
welfare state in the UK (513). However, it is difficult to support this thesis once we 
consider that more than 5 millions opted for personal pensions (Bonoli, 2000).  Pierson 
(1994) himself shies away from the unpopularity thesis since the resilience of the welfare 
state is associated with its popularity with the electorate!  
Pierson (1994) emphasizes five reasons why British pensions deviate from his 
general theoretical framework, which is summarized in chapter 1. First, the system was 
quite fragmented between the private and public occupational schemes. This argument had 
already been presented by Walker (1991), who criticizes functionalist theories that 
considers the elderly as a single unified group.350 Prior to Thatcher’s reform there was 
already a social division with white collar employees benefiting from occupational and 
private pensions while others had to rely on the state (blue-collars, unemployed, those with 
precarious employment) (23).  
Second, Pierson pointed out to pre-existence of an extensive private market, 
making expansion easier. It would have been much more difficult for a government to 
introduce market solutions had the pension system been solely within the public realm. 
Third, it was easier to index the Basic Pension alongside prices because it was not earning-
related. Fourth, contrary to other occupational schemes in Europe, the financing structure 
                                                 
350 As we saw in Chapter 3, Guillemard (1986) does the same for the French case.  
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of SERPS remained part of the state’s financial structure. Thus, it was much more difficult 
to present a true picture of the financial state of SERPS. Finally, SERPS had not had the 
chance to mature, reducing the difficulties with the double payment problem (Pierson, 
1994: 71). These difficulties were underlined in a subsequent paper with Myles (Pierson 
and Myles, 2001). Thus, compared with Sweden, there was no talk of the limit under which 
contributions could be made to the private sector. 
Fawcett (1995) claims that Thatcher’s policies in the field of pensions did not mark 
a radical break with previous Conservatives government, thus challenging the distinction 
made by Pierson (1994) between the politics of expansion versus the politics of 
retrenchment of the welfare state. For example, she points out that privatization was such at 
a high level that its spreading by Thatcher was not something radical but rather the 
continuation of a trend (153). Araki (2000) follows similar lines when he concludes that: 
"the Conservative transformation of pensions indicates a high degree of 
'persistence' in pension policy...the cumulative trend towards 
privatisation and the high degree of persistence in pension policy 
ensured that the Conservative pension reforms from the 1980s onwards 
were more 'radical' than those of their predecessors" (617). 
 
Thus, the attitude of the Conservatives was not that different from its predecessors. 
What changed, however, was the 18 years of uninterrupted political power experienced by 
them protecting their reforms from being altered by Labour.  
As a conclusion to this section, it is worth analysing whether or not the Green Paper 
was actually a setback or rather a political strategy to make a future reform look more 
acceptable. The setback thesis is quite popular. Bonoli (2000) states that the abolition of 
SERPS was stopped as a result of strong pressure from interest groups and opposition 
from the Treasury. Thus, it “was a major concession by the government” (83). Pierson 
(1994) stresses that “a rattled Thatcher government was searching for a graceful way out” 
following the high amount of criticism (62). Fawcett (1995) argues that the abolition of 
SERPS was pretty much universally opposed (162). 
Puzzling is that both Nesbitt (1995) and Bonoli (2000) write that the Treasury had 
already expressed its opposition to the Green Paper prior to its release. Fowler’s plans “met 
with fierce opposition from the Chancellor of the Exchequer” during a meeting in early 
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1985 (Nesbitt, 1995: 87).351 Considering the importance of the Treasury, Bonoli (2000) 
claims that it represents a veto point (84), in ensuring that social policies do not challenge 
the stability of the public purse (see Heclo, 1974) and its strong commitment to reduce 
public expenditures, why would such a Green Paper be published if it is already doomed to 
fail? Moreover, why would such measures be presented without being part of any 
discussion with the Conservatives’ own supporters and members of the Inquiry? One 
possible explanation is that it made the Social Security Act of 1986 look like a step back or 
a compromise on the part of the government. However, all of the government’s objectives 
were achieved. Personal pensions were introduced and the appeal and costs of SERPS was 
starkly reduced. These were the two main elements discussed by the policy community 
surrounding Fowler during the inquiry!  
 
Adjusting the Pension Reform of 1986 – Can the Private Market Be Controlled? 
The changes made by Fowler in 1986 became more likely to last with the re-
election of the Conservatives in both 1988 and 1992. Following a wave of scandals related 
to both private occupational and personal pensions, the government withered the storm by 
strengthening the rules in the Pension Act of 1995, however the Conservative commitment 
to the market remained untouched. During the election of 1997, they proposed to suppress 
both SERPS and the Basic Pension (Reynaud, 1997: 43). Once in office in 1997, Labour 
had little choice but accept the policy consequences of the Conservatives. 
 
The scandals erupt 
The equivalent of the 401(k) Enron scandal in the United States actually occurred a 
decade earlier in the UK with the death of the newspaper tycoon Robert Maxwell on 
November 5th 1991. Regardless of the country visited during the fieldwork of this 
dissertation, his name was always at the forefront of any discussions on funded options to 
alleviate the burden of the pension crisis. On one hand, supporters of the later went to great 
lengths to ensure the population and policy analysts that well regulated and monitored 
                                                 
351 The Green Paper advocated clearly an increase in public liability during the transition period and was thus 
unacceptable to the Treasury: “The move to additional funded pension provision will be taking place while the cost 
of the pay-as-you-go state system continues unchanged. The total volume of resources being devoted to pensions 
will, therefore, increase” (cf. Pierson, 1994: 61). 
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funded options could generate higher returns. On the other hand, opponents of funded 
options were quick to stress the negative consequences of the Maxwell scandal and the 
adventures related to the launch of personal pensions, which have been summarized above. 
Maxwell had removed close to £1 billion from the pension funds of his employees 
in order to keep his business activities afloat (Bonoli, 2000: 81), even though this 
transaction went against what is considered appropriate practice. His companies would 
later be dissolved resulting in a huge loss to current and future pensioners. The estate 
originally claimed that only £8,75 million could be recovered. Eventually close to  £100 
million were recovered, but accounting fees of more than £300 000 per working day in the 
year following Maxwell’s death were taken directly from the pension funds recovered 
reducing the hopes of proper compensation. The government refrained from intervening 
decisively by creating a trust fund fearing liability (Nesbitt, 1995: 136-8).  
More worrying was the fact that the current legislation in place could have not 
prevented such a scandal even if actions had been taken by the appropriate regulatory 
agencies (Nesbitt, 1995: 136-7; Bonoli, 2000: 81). Thus, most of the decades would be 
devoted to establishing better rules to avoid the abusive behaviour of private companies for 
both occupational and personal pensions. 
Few commissions were established to analyze both the Maxwell affairs and the 
mis-selling of personal pensions. The government dealt with those issues in very different 
ways. First, for private occupational pensions, it introduced a Pensions Act in 1995 to 
constrain self-investment of pension funds by the employer by introducing a 5% limit to be 
enforced by trustees, a third of whom would now have to be elected. A new regulatory 
board was instituted alongside an emergency fund to be used when schemes become 
insolvent (Bonoli, 2000: 82). Far from simply restricting the practices of employers, the 
Pensions Act of 1995 further promoted the private sector by eliminating the guaranteed 
minimum pension (GMP) requirement, thus the link with SERPS was totally broken. 
Starting in 1997, private occupational scheme have now to demonstrate that they offer 
benefits similar to SERPS, but pensions have to be protected against inflation up to 5% 
instead of 3% (Fawcett, 2002: 15; Araki, 2000). Further, the incentive rebate were changed 
to make it age sensitive with the end result that those aged 47 and above could get 9% out 
of the 10% paid over to a private insurance company if they decide to opt-out of SERPS 
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(Ward, 2000: 142). Finally, in line with the EU directive on the equal treatment of men and 
women, the retirement age of women was to be increased gradually in line with that of 
men. In stark contrast to Belgium, this measure involved almost no discussions.   
Second, the government opted to ensure that the private companies find solutions to 
the misselling of pensions without intervening via legislation on the issue. As stated by 
Ward (2000), the government “resisted imposing any control on the sales practices of 
insurance companies and others, despite the evidence of the abuse” (142). The government 
pressured the missellers to correct their mistake. As in the case of the ‘early-leavers’ 
problem, this approach deemed highly unsuccessful with only 2% of to 1,5 to 2,5 million 
Britons waiting for compensation received satisfaction prior to the election of 1997 (Le 
Monde, 24 November 1997). 
 
New Labour, new era? 
Even prior to its election in 1997, it was obvious that the Labour Party was not 
going to repeal the changes made by the Conservatives. Doing so would have been 
extremely expensive. For example, simply re-indexing the Basic Pension in line with 
wages or inflation instead of inflation carried a price tag of £4-5 billion annually (Fawcett, 
1995: 166). This measure implied stronger reliance on the means-tested programmes (Rake 
et al., 2000: 298). Re-introducing a strong public occupational scheme was also not an 
appealing option for a party eager to demonstrate it can be ‘financially responsible’ (see 
Ross, 2000a). 
Nonetheless, this did not imply that the ‘new’ Labour would stand idle. It 
introduced legislation to take the wind out of the market forces. First, the government 
pursued actively the companies that were failing to compensate the victims of the personal 
pensions scandal. It fined companies and published the list of the late compensators on a 
monthly basis (Le Monde, 24 November 1997). 
Second, and more importantly, Labour presented a Green Paper entitled A New 
Contract for Welfare: Partnership in Pensions in 1998 where it announced a major 
reshaping of pension policies. Pension reform was presented as necessary to restore faith in 
the system. The elements contained in the Green Paper were legislated in 1999 (Welfare 
Reform and Pensions Act). Blair restated clearly that Labour espoused the private sector as 
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the primary source of provision, and that the state would intervene only when the market 
fails:  
“We are building a new contract for pensions between the State, the 
private, and the individual. We believe that those who can save for their 
retirement have the responsibility to do so, and that the State must 
provide effective security for those who cannot” (DSS, 1998: iii). 
 
Concretely, the Green Paper proposed to alter the means-tested assisted programme 
by providing more generous, create a new state pension scheme that would eventually 
replace SERPS for low wage earners and provide flat rate benefits called State Second 
Pension (S2P), and introduce a new form of private pensions designed for those who do 
not have the opportunity to join an occupational scheme, but can ill afford a personal 
pensions named stakeholder pensions. 
The Minimum income guarantee (MIG) introduces means-tested benefits that are 
more generous than the Income Support, which are expected to be indexed to average 
earnings in the upcoming future. The adoption of the name guarantee can be viewed as a 
way to reach the high number of entitled pensioners who do not seek to collect it because 
of the stigma attached to this kind of benefits. 
The Second State Pension is targeted to those earning less than £9000 per annum, a 
situation experienced by roughly 9% of men and 17% women working full time (Rake et 
al., 2000: 303). Substantial improvement would be made in terms of benefit. For example, 
someone earning £9000 could receive a pension worth double that of SERPS. Further, non-
contributive benefits are granted for those experiencing periods of sickness, childcare, and 
invalidity, as if they had earned £9000 (DSS, 1998). The government’s optimism is not 
share by everyone, however. Because S2P is price indexed, its value relative to wage 
earners is expected to decline. In a study analysing the effect of the Green Paper on low 
wage earners, Rake et al. (2000) argue that the combined benefits of both Basic Pension 
and S2P will be slightly higher than what will be offered by the Minimum Income 
Guarantee (MIG), and the later will be necessary to avoid a relative drop in benefits. “The 
level of income promised by S2P, in combination with the basic pension, is so close to 
MIG that many will not benefit in retirement from their lifetime’s contributions, and 
incentives to saves are compromised…The basic pension and the proposed new State 
Second Pension will de facto combine to provide a new flat-rate pension for the poorest” 
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(299-300 and 313). This is a long way from the aims of SERPS when it was introduced in 
the late 1970s. 
The answer of the Labour government to personal pensions is its stakeholder 
pensions, which targets those having earning between £9000-£18 500 per year. This group 
of wage earners rarely has access to occupational pensions and personal pensions are 
considered to be ill equipped to tackle their needs since it yields high administrative costs 
for low-income earners, and interruption in one’s career engenders penalties (DSS, 1998: 
5). Stakeholder pensions still rely on the private sectors, but the government plays a more 
active role in advertising the schemes that meet its standards. Thus, the principal behind it 
is similar to the ISO established for private companies, except that the government rather 
than an international agency sets standards. The requirements are that the pension schemes 
offered carry a yearly administrative cost of less than 1% of the value of the fund, charge 
no fee when the pension is transferred elsewhere (most likely the case when one change 
employer) or when payments are not made, and the schemes must be willing to accept 
contributions of £20 or more, though some may accept less.  
As part of the strategy to ensure lower administrative costs, employers that do not 
offer occupational schemes to their employees will have to provide a stakeholder pension, 
and collect the contributions for it. The trustees must also be independent, and have no 
relationship to the employer. Finally, new incentives would be introduced to encourage 
savings into these schemes (ibid). 
The government’s plan with some opposition from commercial firms, the 
Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA), and, as usual, the Treasury. (Ward, 
2000: 143). Further, Rake et al (2000) argues that in order for the stakeholder pension to 
keep low wage earners out of means-tested benefits, they would have to earn a life-time 
earning similar to that of the average male earnings (315)! 
 
Conclusion:  An End to The Politics of Wimbledon? 
The past ten years have resulted in controversy over the game of tennis, particularly 
at the fast grass court of Wimbledon. New technology has transformed the game of tennis 
into a game of serves. They are now so powerful that exchanges have been considered rare. 
Thus, recent Wimbledon champions have all been great servers.  
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Pension politics in the UK shares many of the problems facing the game of tennis. 
The party holding the reign of power can send powerful serve that are difficult to stop. 
However, once a serve is lost, the other player gets to serve and can serve similar medicine. 
Key is to hold on to his serve as long as possible if one wants to control the match. 
The only pension truce in British politics lasted from 1975 to 1979! Both Labour 
and Conservatives have been serving new pension reforms on an on-going basis for most 
of the post-world war period. The Conservatives were able to provide the private sector 
with an important share of the responsibilities in ensuring provision for retirement, but this 
is not because their plan was better. They were simply able to generate a tiebreaker by 
holding on to their serve for 11 years after the introduction of the Social Security Act of 
1986 (17 if ones prefers the indexation of the basic pension on prices). In order to get back 
into the game, the Labour party had to accept to play according to the rules established by 
the Conservatives. Nonetheless, it added three new types of pension scheme complicating 
the pension field even more. This assessment is the continuation of a long historical 
traditions where social polices have long been confrontational, but confined to the 
Parliament. This is clearly stated in Ashford (1986)’s analysis of the development of social 
policies between the years 1890 and 1950: 
“British social politics never lost its adversarial character and social 
policies continue to be treated as a reserve for political and 
parliamentary bargaining. British institutions seemed condemned to 
marginal and partisan attacks on basic social and economic questions 
so that even some of the most notable success, such as the NHS, have 
been constantly disrupted by political attacks from both left and 
right…In a sense, the complexities of French politics were reproduced 
within social policies while the British rather ingenuously set out to 
simplify social politics and policymaking” (310-11). 
 
In the UK, a political party faces relatively few constraints once in power and 
controls the political agenda. First, it does not have to negotiate with other political parties 
unless there is a coalition government, a rarity. The opposition can underlines the failures 
of a government, but it cannot really alter policy choices especially when the outcome 
carries a lot of uncertainties as in pensions. Second, the administrative capacities of the 
state are such that the pension expertise has historically come from the outside (Heclo, 
1974). This allows great flexibility on the part of the government since it can chooses the 
experts closest to its policy position. The individuals who ended up being actively involved 
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in the formal policy process when Fowler was Secretary of State were highly supporting 
the extension of private provisions, the reduction in the size of SERPS, and personal 
pensions. For example, the CPS was easily introduced into the policy process. The set up 
of the Inquiry into Provision for Retirement also demonstrates the extent to which the 
bureaucracy can be disregarded. Fowler appointed as Assistant Secretary an individual who 
had just arrived at the DHSS without any difficulties. Worst, the DHSS Research Unit was 
not even consulted when Fowler elaborated his Green Paper (Nesbitt, 1995: 68).  
Third, social actors such as unions and employers can be more easily avoidable 
than their French or Belgian counterparts. It is interesting to point out that both CBI and 
TUC were not granted a seat within the Inquiry into Provision for Retirement. Nesbitt 
(1995) emphasised that contacts between these two groups and the government became 
more informal in the 1980s, another indication of their weak institutionalization. These two 
groups were never formally involved in the creation of policy, their participation tended to 
concentrate “upon information exchanges and inquiries, and that participation less often 
includes policy formation and implementation” (167). This type of institutionalization 
makes it easier for politicians to discard them than the French or Belgian 
institutionalization. 
As expected, who is in power matters greatly for the kind of influence they have. 
TUC was an important actor in the elaboration of SERPS  (Walker, 1991: 21) and its leader 
traditionally met the Prime Minister at Downing Street for beer and sandwiches in the 
1960s and 1970s (Nesbitt, 1995: 142-3), but was off the radar screen as soon as the 
Conservatives took over. The belligerent attitude of Thatcher towards unions added more 
impetus to keep TUC out of the policy process. Interestingly, the CBI was not extremely 
influential in the process. It was in favour of maintaining strong occupational pensions and 
favoured personal pensions as a third pillar, but not as a competitor of its schemes. 
Fourth, as in the case of re-introduction of workfare, the institutional legacy can 
play in favour of interests seeking to retrench (King, 1995). The importance of the private 
sector within the pension system greatly helped the Conservative to pursue its agenda. As 
underlined by Fawcett (2002): 
“the legacy of past policy meant that there was an absence of well-
established and powerful interests in defence of the state sector. The 
strength of the private sector and the corresponding weakness of the 
state sector meant that the Conservatives did not face ‘veto points’ or 
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interest groups which would obstruct their agenda. Ironically, the major 
interest group that blocked certain policy proposals was the insurance 
industry itself” (11-2). 
 
Few policy constraints are notable, and apply to both parties. First, the Treasury 
continues to play a dominant role in social policy by ensuring that public finance will not 
be committed to large new expenditure. The resistance of the Treasury is far from being a 
new phenomenon and is a good reason why the British state never accepted a large 
expansion of the public pension system (Heclo, 1974). Second, as stated by Fawcett above, 
private companies are now so involved in pension provision that they cannot be ignored, 
and can represent a powerful source of opposition. 
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6 - Conclusion: Comparative Tests of the Hypotheses and 
Implications for Further Research 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it seeks to compare and analyze the hypotheses 
presented in chapter 1. Despite the difficulties associated with the comparison of pension 
policies, it is argued that the theoretical framework used in this book is promising. The process 
under which pension are being reformed tells us a lot about the breadth of these reforms. Key is 
the institutionalization of political actors. Further, the null hypotheses are studied and dismissed. 
Second, a brief exploration of the policy implications associated with this book is presented 
alongside further avenues for research. 
 
Review of the hypotheses 
 This section analyzes the hypotheses presented earlier in chapter 1. Each individual 
hypothesis is stated and then answered in line with the four cases studied in this book.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Parliamentary Integration structures are more conducive to broader pension 
reforms than Social Partnership structure since the latter has more built-in veto points. 
Parliamentary Integration structure = Programmatic Reforms. 
 This is the main hypothesis for this book, which is also referred to as the first ordering 
principle. Based on the four cases reviewed in this book, an affirmative answer can be granted to 
this hypothesis. Both the UK and Sweden, two cases representing the Parliamentary Integration 
structure, were able to introduce programmatic reforms (see table 6.1). The UK actively 
promoted the private sector by making the public scheme unattractive while granting generous 
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tax benefits to join private schemes. The Trade Union Confederation (TUC), and the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) to a lesser extent, were pushed aside during the 
discussion and elaboration of pension reforms in the Thatcher years. Even though the TUC was 
not opposed to the idea of privatization in principle, since many of its white-collar workers 
where benefiting from good occupational pensions, it really had no say in the outcome sketched 
by the Conservatives, who were committed to reduce the political influence of unions. More 
radical reforms were stopped by the intervention of the Treasury, which feared an escalation of 
the public deficit in order to finance transition costs implied by the elimination of SERPS. 
Further, the elimination of SERPS was also opposed by the pension industry fearful of having to 
integrate ‘bad’ risks into their pension schemes. 
 In the Swedish case, the Minister of Health and Social Insurance was able to push both 
unions and employers into a marginal position during the negotiations surrounding the reform of 
the whole pension system. By creating a working group on pension instead of commission, the 
Minister successfully reduced the number of individuals within the committee enhancing the 
chances of reaching an agreement. Among those excluded were unions and employers. Despite 
mild protest on their part, it was understood that it was the responsibility of the state to change 
the system. It was argued earlier in this book that this was a consequence of the pension reform 
of the late 1950s, which granted extensive responsibility to the state in the administration and 
financing of the pension system. Contrary to Continental Europe, unions and employers were not 
granted administrative responsibilities.352 Once a compromise was reached among the politicians 
involved in the committee, it was extremely difficult to change specific elements since it implied 
a re-opening of the negotiations among the five political parties. Because of their expertise 
gained via the workings of committees, Swedish MPs were able to defend their proposals. 
 
 
                                                 
352 It is acknowledged that they had seats within the administration board of the social insurance agency, but did not 
held a majority like Belgium and France. Further, union and employer representatives left the board in the early 
1990s. 
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Table 6.1 Comparative Analysis of the Successful Pension Reforms Introduced in Sweden 
and the United Kingdom (Parliamentary Integration).353 
 Parliamentary Integration 
 Sweden UK 
Pension 
Reform 
(Name) 
1998 – New Pension System. 1980 – Budget 
1986 – Social Security Act 
1995 – Pensions Act 
1999 – Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 
Pension 
Reform 
(Content – 
main 
elements) 
1998 – Whole new system. Increase in the 
length of contribution (from 30 years using 
the best 15 to life income); compensatory 
measures introduced for childcare, studies 
and military service; new indexation 
mechanism based on economic growth, 
prices and population ageing; 2.5% to be 
invested in the private sector; instauration 
of a means-test for the guaranteed pension; 
flexible retirement age. 
1980 – Pensions are indexed solely on 
prices. 
1986 – Decrease in the value of the 
replacement rate for SERPS (from 25% to 
20%); reduction in the minimum pension 
that needs to be guaranteed by private 
occupational pensions; introduction of 
personal pensions with fiscal incentives 
reaching 2-3% alongside rebates reaching 
3.8% for the employers. 
1995 – Constraints on self-investment for 
occupational pensions and creation of a 
regulatory board. 
1999 – Introduction of the stakeholder 
pension and of the second state pension. 
Conse-
quences 
1998 – Due to the extent of the changes, 
its strong connection to the state of the 
economy, and its reliance on the stock 
market the outcome of the reform is 
difficult to assess and/or predict.  
Expecting to lose: those with broken 
careers; blue-collar workers prone to early 
retirement; white-collar workers who were 
benefiting from the 15/30 rule of the ATP 
system (eg. Female university professors). 
Expecting to gain: those with steady career 
and low wage progression. 
Buffer fund created by the old system is 
scheduled to disappear to finance the 
transition to a private component. 
Dependence on the private sector for the 
bulk of pension provisions. Public policy 
shift from providing pensions to regulating 
the private sector in these functions. 
Expecting to lose: those with bad 
occupational schemes (eg. Maxwell 
scandal); those with broken careers 
(especially with long periods of 
unemployment); those who had invested a 
lot within SERPS. 
Expecting to gain: those with good 
occupational plans; those who play the 
market successfully. 
Inclusion 
of 
Employers 
and Unions 
Exclusion/Informal – a reference group 
was set aside – unions and employers did 
not participate in the negotiations of the 
new system; influence filtered by the 
political parties (eg. LO via SAP). 
No veto points. 
Excluded – both unions and employers 
were not active players during the 
preparation of the legislation, nor were 
they active during commission studying 
reform proposals. No veto points. 
Number of 
political 
parties 
involved 
1998 – 5 
(SAP, FP, M, Kd, C) 
1980 – 1 (C) 
1986 – 1 (C) 
1995 – 1 (L) 
1999 – 1 (L) 
 
 
                                                 
353 This table is not exhaustive. For a more detailed analysis of the reforms, please consult the country chapters. 
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Unsurprisingly, the need to do further cuts to the pension system in the UK and Sweden 
has disappeared and has been replaced by discussions on the efficiency of the previous reforms. 
The reforms introduced to these two pension systems bring a high degree of uncertainty for 
individuals, as to what can be expected for retirement benefits. Even though the guarantor of 
pensions differs (state vs. private market), both systems are contribution driven and place a 
strong emphasis on the state of the economy to generate adequate benefits. In the UK, it is the 
value of the investments that guarantees the level of benefits while Swedish benefits are adjusted 
in accordance with an index that emphasizes both the state of the economy and population 
ageing. 
 
Social Partnership = Parametric Reforms 
 France and Belgium have been limited to parametric reforms (see table 6.2). 
Governments have not been able to produce changes to the pension system as a whole, but were 
rather co-opted into adjusting existing parameters. The simple way to explain this outcome is 
that there are simply too many actors to consider the implementation of a new system. The 
formal inclusion of social partners into the reform equation plays a significant role since unions 
and employers serve different interests than political parties. Neither is preoccupied by re-
elections. Further, they have very opposite opinions as to what must be done to reform pensions. 
On one hand, unions tend to emphasize the past promises/commitments made by previous 
governments and are very defensive in their actions. Regardless of the country, unions have 
stressed that growth could compensate for population ageing and that the forecasts presented 
overexaggerate the pension crisis. On the other hand, employers are using the pension crisis as a 
mean to achieve lower labour costs. They stress the importance of not increasing employers’ 
contributions due to the detrimental effect such action cause on the economy.  
 The importance of social partners might be viewed as misconstrued for the French case 
due to the importance of the state and the lack of genuine concertation efforts. However, the 
social partners are well aware of the activities related to this field since they manage the 
programs even though they do not control the rules and regulations related to pensions. Both 
employers and unions are actually hostile towards the involvement of the government in this 
policy area and pay close attention to the actions of the latter. The reason why the Balladur 
reform survived and not Juppé’s is strongly correlated with the level of consultation done by 
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Matignon with the social partners prior to enacting a reform. The Balladur cabinet knew that the 
measures introduced had the support of one of the three major unions while Juppé did not even 
bother to discuss pension reform with any social actor.  
 
Table 6.2 Comparative Analysis of the Successful Pension Reforms Introduced in Belgium 
and France (Social Partnership).354 
 Social Partnership 
 Belgium France 
Pension 
Reform 
(Name) 
1996 – Colla Reform. 
2001 – Silver Fund & Second 
Pillar. 
1993 – Balladur Reform. 
1995 – Juppe Plan. 
Pension 
Reform 
(Content – 
main 
elements) 
1996 – Alignment of the 
pensionable age for women in line 
with men; reduction in the 
indexation rate for contributions 
made between 1955 and 1974. 
2001 – Government money put 
aside to create a buffer fund; 
creation of an second pillar 
managed by social partners. 
1993 – Increase in the length of contribution 
(37.5 to 40 years); benefits based on the best 
25 years of contribution instead of 10; price 
indexation instead of wage indexation; 
creation of a retirement fund. 
1995 – Increased managerial powers granted 
to the parliament. 
Consequences 1996 - Limited due to the long 
transition period and other social 
benefits that will compensate for 
the loss of pension for women – 
exception are women with long 
careers who may lose up to 11% in 
pension benefits. 
2001 – Nil. The buffer fund 
consists of government bonds. 
Same effect as paying back the 
debt right away; second pillar does 
not resolve any difficulties of the 
first pillar but add extra retirement 
income. 
1993 – Biggest impact comes from the price 
indexation of pensions (close to twice the 
savings generated by the other two measures 
combined). Pensions may decline by an 
average of 26% vis-à-vis average wages over 
a period of 50 years depending on the 
duration of benefits. 
1995 – No financial impact, but the 
parliament constrains further the managerial 
duties of the social partners. 
Inclusion of 
Employers 
and Unions 
Constant social dialogue between 
the government and the social 
partners. Act as veto points. 
Institutionalized dialogue between the social 
partners and the government. Government 
may act alone – the absence of consultation 
can be dreadful (events of December 1995). 
Veto points. 
Number of 
political 
parties 
involved 
1996 – 4  
(PS, SP, CVP, PSC). 
2001 – 6 
(PS, SP, VLD, PRL, Agalev, 
Verts) 
1993 – 1* 
(RPR-UDF) 
1995 – 1* 
(RPR-UDF) 
Worth Noting Public Sector schemes have not 
faced any reform despite being 
more generous. 
Public Sector schemes have not faced any 
reform despite being more generous. 
* Due to the ‘permanent’ coalition between the RPR and UDF, they are considered to represent one party (see 
chapter 3 for further explanation). 
                                                 
354 This table is not exhaustive. For a more detailed analysis of the reforms, please consult the country chapters. 
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 In Belgium, the situation is somewhat different because of the lesser power granted to the 
state. The communication channels between the social partners and the government are 
continuously open. Contrary to the other three cases, many of the discussions and debates occur 
behind closed doors. Interestingly, some of the scoops obtained by the media were all related to 
ideas for reforms that were strongly opposed by the unions leaving little to the imagination with 
regards to the origins of the leak. Thus, once a government tables a bill broad support is already 
guaranteed.  
 Obtaining a broad consensus on the action of a coalition government in Belgium is less 
difficult than conceived by those advocating the use of veto players. The déclaration 
gouvernementale provides the blue print of a grand bargain among the governing parties. There 
is a logrolling of policy choices among them. They tend to obtain support for some of their core 
issues in exchange for returning the favour. This type of behaviour causes a problem for issue 
that arise suddenly, but pension reform is not one of those. Pension reform remains difficult in 
this context because the social partners have the opportunities to poke at agreements among the 
political parties. As they are involved in the process from beginning to end, radical proposals are 
not even considered. This explains why a programmatic reform like the one implemented by the 
coalition of political parties in Sweden is not feasible in Belgium.  
 
H1a: Reforms are most likely to occur when unions have a co-operative relationship with the 
state (Belgium) compared to a confrontational one (France). 
 As implied by the discussion above, the unions are insiders in the policy process in 
Belgium while outsiders in France even though both have managerial responsibilities and can 
claim a ‘legitimate’ involvement. The inclusion of the unions within the process can ensure a 
‘smooth’ implementation since the government has the opportunity to secure their support ahead 
of time. In the French case, the government consults, but it is expected to make the final ruling 
resulting in greater uncertainties as to the kind of response it will get. Due to the fact that unions 
have been strong defenders of the pension system and opposed to the actions of the government 
in this field, at the very least in its rhetoric, it is expected that the Belgian government should be 
more successful. However, contrary to expectation, France has been more successful in its 
reform attempts than Belgium.  
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The Balladur reform introduced much more change than the Belgian reform of 1996 
since the long-term effects of the latter were heavily compensated by other social measures and 
they were already lesser in scope and breadth. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile noting that the 
Balladur reform was already implemented de facto in Belgium since its pension system had less 
advantageous conditions to begin with. It was already price indexed and it has had a contribution 
period of 45 years (compared to 40 years in France with the Balladur reform). When it comes to 
the public sector, the 1995 reform attempt by Juppé had the indirect consequence of muting the 
reform efforts of the Belgian government with its public servants. 
 
H1b: Assuming that Rothstein (1996) is right about the capture of the state by unions and Social 
Democratic interests in Sweden, then the expertise of the state is more likely to be accepted and 
trusted by unions in Sweden than in France, whose state has a confrontational relationship with 
unions. 
 Few economists (Tambori, 1999; Legros, 2001) have emphasized the importance of 
institutional credibility when seeking to reform pensions. People are most likely to distrust the 
politicians if there is a ‘credibility gap’, meaning when there is not a popular institution attached 
to a specific policy area (ibid). The evidence provided in this book supports this thesis. The polar 
opposites remain France and Sweden. In the former a vast amount of energy and a big part of the 
debate surrounding pensions relate to the expertise of the government and the accuracy of the 
projections. It is not an accident that many French people are confused about the need to reform 
the system. It has been difficult for citizens to trust French politicians for two main reasons. 
First, the state does not manage the system and has a difficult time ‘selling’ the need for a reform 
when the unions, co-manager with the employers, argue otherwise while employing studies from 
the agency responsible for managing pension programmes. Blurring the picture further is the fact 
that the French population is split in two when it comes to assessing who should be responsible 
for pension policies. 35% believe the state should manage the pension system compared to 34% 
in favour of the social partners. Thus, who conducts, chair, perform the statistical analysis is 
highly political and controversial. Second, clearly highlighting the lack of institutional leadership 
is the constant reliance on commissions, many of which considered to be external to the organs 
of the state. In the span of 16 years, 13 commissions have presented reports and no consensus 
has been achieved. More worrisome for the average citizens many reports have had starkly 
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opposed conclusion. For example, the Teulade report (2000), with its emphasis on the need to 
seek policies promoting economic growth rather than altering the pension system, negates 
virtually all of the conclusions presented by the Charpin report (1999), which prescribed specific 
reforms to the pension system (see chapter 2). 
 Many of these political issues are absent in Sweden because of the high trust placed in the 
hands of the national insurance agency (Riksförsakringsverket – RFV) and the various 
departments. None of the individuals interviewed raised the issue of contesting the analysis 
presented by these offices. Many competing alternatives coming from various parties were 
actually analysed by the same people. Further, ‘external’ expertise has been incorporated within 
the committee and complemented rather than challenge the work of the committee. The critics 
have focused on the consequences of the reform using the numbers and analyses provided by the 
state agencies.355 All of this has important consequences, especially if we compare to France. 
First, the endorsement of the reform by these three offices adds credibility to the actions of those 
involved in the committee because citizens trust them; they are highly credible and RFV is not 
nearly as politicized as the Bureau du Plan in France. The fact that RFV first came out stating 
that a pension reform was necessary helped politicians with this task since they did not have to 
pursue strategies of blame avoidance. The fact that a reform was necessary was highly 
consensual and did not become a vote-losing proposition.356 Second, more political energy is 
spent discussing substantive issues such as what elements should be included or excluded in a 
reform because the playing field is not being challenged. Third, when the credibility of an 
‘analyzing agency’ is not in question, a committee is taken far more seriously because there is 
less of a chance that an alternative group will be formed afterwards to challenge its findings, 
which is precisely what occurred after Charpin published its report in France.  
 
Hypothesis n2: The higher the number of political parties within a government, the less likely a 
programmatic pension reform will occur. 
                                                 
355 Of course, few individuals criticized the work of the committee and the assumptions made by RFV for the 
evaluation of the pension system. However, these individuals made this on a personal basis and did not have the 
backing of a powerful group within Swedish society such as a political party or a union. The Left was highly critical 
of many sections of the five party agreement, but did not challenge the basis (projections provided by state offices) 
under which these decisions were reached. 
356 Here it is important to differentiate between the consensus on the need to reform the system and the actual 
agreement on the reform itself. The latter was less consensual, but was simply not discussed during both 1994 and 
1998 elections. 
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 This hypothesis is rooted in the rational choice literature, which emphasises that the 
higher the number of veto players (Tsebelis, 1995) the less likely substantial policy reforms can 
be undertaken. For example, Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Mattson (1996) argue that coalition 
government have more difficulty obtaining fiscal discipline because the negotiations among the 
political parties within the coalitions result in higher spending. Albeit for institutional reasons, 
Scharpf (1988) makes a similar argument when he claims that the German political system, like 
that of the EU, produces a ‘decision trap.’ These arguments have been challenged by Hallerberg 
and von Hagen (1999), who emphasize the possibility of reaching binding agreement within a 
coalition government, and Peters (1997), who stresses the possibility of ‘logrolling’ as a way out 
of a decision trap (see chapter 1).  
 The empirical evidence presented in this book supports the latter authors. A grand 
bargain among five key parties in the Swedish parliament resulted in one of the most radical 
pension reforms in Europe while consecutive one party governments in France have been unable 
to reform a portion of its pension system (public sector) and managed to introduce parametric 
reforms in the other schemes. The new Swedish system is full of compromises and many of the 
issues were resolved in a ‘logrolling’ fashion. For example, a big public component was retained 
in exchange for a private savings account within the pension system (see chapter 4). Even in 
Belgium, the difficulties have lied with the social partners and not the governmental actors. The 
leadership of the Flemish Socialists has not been questioned by other political parties in the 
coalition, which are more concerned with their issues of preference (see chapter 3). As 
underlined by the main theoretical framework of this book, key is not the number of veto players, 
but rather the nature of the veto. The institutionalization of social partners within a pension 
system is more problematic than having many parties within a governmental coalition.  
 
Hypothesis n2a: Based on Tsebelis (1999), a broad political coalition that includes ideologically 
polarized political parties is unlikely to yield a (major) pension reform. 
 In light of the Swedish pension reform, such hypothesis cannot be supported in this book. 
Even Belgium, with its current rainbow coalition composed of socialists, liberals and greens, 
casts another challenge to this hypothesis since a consistent line of reform within the government 
is present. In the UK, Thatcher did not have to compromise as much as its Swedish counterpart 
to obtain an important reform. However, the French Prime Minister has had more difficulties.  
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 H3: The impact of pension reforms should be very limited in the Consensual pattern of reform 
making, and most extensive in the Cabinet pattern. The overall reform ranking should go as 
follow: Cabinet > Committee > Social Conflict > Consensual.  
Application: Belgium should be the case closest to the status quo, and the most extensive 
reform(s) should have occurred in the UK. Overall, the ranking of the four pension reforms 
should be as follow: UK > Sweden > France > Belgium. 
 This is the combination of both ordering principle: parliamentary integration vs. social 
partnership and proportional vs. majoritarian vision. It is argued that the number of veto players 
within a parliamentary assembly matters once it is integrated with the structural pattern of 
relationship. Thus, a high number of veto players might not be too cumbersome within a 
parliamentary integration structure, but a social partnership structure amplifies the difficulties 
associated with the negotiations among the political parties. For example, in the latter case, 
unions might effectively pressure socialist parties to act in a ‘socialist’ manner or simply veto 
reform projects (see chapter 1).  
 As expected, the most radical reforms occurred in the UK. The Thatcher government 
promoted actively a stronger reliance on the private market making it nearly impossible for 
successive government to re-establish a public system. The early years of the Labour Party have 
entrenched the reforms enacted by the Conservative governments by not seeking to re-create 
another strong public system. Most of the debate now centres on the ways under which private 
pensions can be regulated in order to ensure a financially secure retirement for citizens who now 
invest heavily in the private sector. The unions and employers were simply not included in the 
main committees studying pension reform and no other political party was consulted (see table 
6.1 and chapter 5). 
 The Swedes enacted the second most changes to their pension system by creating a whole 
new pension system, which is going to be implemented over the next 20 years. Among the most 
important features of the new system is the introduction of a funded account representing 2.5% 
of the 18% of contributions levied. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that the new system 
relies heavily on insurance principles with all contributions being counted towards one’s 
pension, a substantial change from an earlier system where benefits were calculated on the basis 
of the fifteen best years in a thirty (or more) year career. Furthermore, the basic pension is being 
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replaced by a means-tested guaranteed income, which is price indexed. The latter measure breaks 
the universal nature of the previous system where every citizen received the basic income. As 
argued by Rothstein (1998), it is the universalistic nature of the Swedish welfare state that led to 
its strong endorsement within the population. This shift could have negative consequences in the 
long run since countries employing means-tested benefits such as the US and the UK tend to 
have the lowest support for their welfare state. As stated earlier, the influence of the unions and 
employers were limited due to their exclusion from the main negotiations among the political 
parties. They were faced with a final product, which could not really be altered since changes 
would have resulted in re-opening a complex compromise. 
 It is more difficult to assess whether Belgium or France ranks third because the changes 
made in France are already built-in the Belgian system. Further, neither country has been able to 
alter the pension scheme for civil servants. Nonetheless, the Balladur reform results in more 
important changes since, contrary to Belgium, generous early retirement options do not exist to 
cushion the alterations of the public scheme for private sector employees. The three measures 
taken by the Balladur government (see Table 6.2),357 will result in lower pension benefits for a 
large segment of the population, especially if one considers the evolution of pensions versus that 
of the average wage.  
 Pension discussions involve the social partners, who contest the legitimacy of the state in 
this field. This results in highly publicized conflicts between governmental actors and the social 
partners. From the public stance of social partners, it is difficult to assess truly what is acceptable 
as a reform and what is not. As demonstrated by the events of December 1995, the social 
partners cannot be ignored. 
 The social partners are actually more powerful in Belgium because they are truly part of 
the policy process. As a result, conflicts are internalized and actions on the part of the 
government rarely occurs without their prior consent (or mild opposition). Social partners can 
also influence the outcome of coalition negotiations by pressuring related political parties to 
address the concerns of their electoral interests. For example, the Socialist Ministers have had to 
defend their negotiation stance within the government with the unions.  
                                                 
357 Price indexation, calculating benefits according to the best 25 years instead of the best 10, and extension of the 
contribution period from 37.5 to 40 years. 
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 Following the guidelines of the déclaration gouvernementale, the Minister of Social 
Affairs has had to present proposals to the other members of the coalition prior to seek their 
approval with the social partners. This adds another element of complexity in the process, which 
can be partially negated by ‘logrolling’ (see above). The end result is a policy process, which 
progress ‘à petits pas’ (with small steps). The 1996 reform was enacted after an extended period 
of negotiations even though it had to be done because of an earlier European Court of Justice 
ruling. The compensation package introduced (or maintained) with this reform result in a near 
status quo, with only career oriented women being strongly affected by it. The following reforms 
(the creation of the silver funds and occupational pensions) do not alter in any way the current 
public system. 
 
H3a: Unions will be better equipped to block drastic reforms when they are institutionalized 
within Social Partnership regardless of union density. 
Application: Unions are more likely to have a disruptive role in Belgium than in Sweden despite 
a similar level of unionization. 
 Belgium and Sweden represents two good comparative cases in this domain. Both of 
them have highly generous pension systems and high levels of unionization. Further, in both 
countries the state has historically sought to incorporate the unions within their policy process 
and they were consenting because the state was not perceived as a threat like in France. 
However, as evidenced by this book, Belgian unions had more input into the pension reform 
process than their Swedish counterpart because they could interact with policy-makers while 
proposals were being considered. Swedish unions were left to face a fait accompli, where they 
could only accept or reject the agreement. The fall of corporatism and the large responsibilities 
given to the state when the pension system was extended in the late 1950s explain the relative 
lack of union input. The unions played a stronger role within the political parties, where they 
almost forced the SAP to back track on its earlier agreement with the four bourgeois parties. 
 
H3b: Regardless of the number of veto players (Tsebelis, 1999), it is more difficult to generate a 
pension reform with the Social Conflict pattern than with the Committee pattern. 
Application: France is expected to have greater difficulties in generating a reform than Sweden 
even though it has fewer veto players. 
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 This is another test of the concept of veto players. On one hand, even though Sweden is 
not a case where coalition governments have been occurring on a regular basis, rare have been 
the occasions where a single party could push through its own agenda without the support of at 
least another party. In the early 1990s when the Working Group on Pensions began its functions, 
the support of five parties was necessary to obtain a majority. Despite this high threshold of 
acceptance an extensive pension reform was instituted. On the other hand, unitary French 
governments have been unable to carry such reforms. As argued in this book, the 
institutionalization of social partners in the French case explains why it has been more difficult 
to alter the system. 
 
H3c: The Cabinet pattern generates more extensive reforms than the Social Conflict pattern 
because the latter faces veto points. 
Application: The UK should be able to generate more extensive reforms than France because it 
does not have a structured relationship based on Social Partnership. 
 This is also an interesting comparison since, according to the literature on the ‘new’ 
politics of welfare, both countries should have a lot of difficulty to reform their system because 
accountability can easily be traced back to a single party in power. The government cannot 
blame another actor or political party for a retrenchment measure (see Pierson, 1994). Thus, any 
changes to the pension system resulting in negative consequences can be easily punished at the 
subsequent election. However, the UK has introduced radical pension reforms and the 
Conservatives did not suffer in the following elections. Even in France, the popularity of the 
Balladur government did not decline as a result of the pension reform of 1993. This explanation 
cannot help us differentiate why the UK introduced such radical reforms while the Balladur 
government, committed to introduce options, could not do more than alter three parameters.358   
 
H3d: The Consensual pattern leads to more reform difficulties than the Social Conflict pattern 
because it has more veto players in a similar structure of relationship (Social Partnership). 
Application: Belgium is expected to have more difficulties than France in generating reforms. 
 This is a test of the second ordering principle. In this case, both countries have a social 
partnership structure meaning that they must consider the unions and employers into their 
                                                 
358 One of these options, price indexation, was already implemented in 1987 and renewed every year. 
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decision-making process. The key difference between the two countries is that France can have a 
prime minister who decides to act ‘à la Bonaparte’ like Juppé did in 1995 (see Vail, 1999) while 
such action could have never been taken in Belgium since any ministerial proposal must receive 
the approval of other coalition members. Further, pension reform has tended to be included in the 
déclaration gouvernementale meaning it is an object of negotiation among the coalition members 
in the formation of a government. Thus, the governmental position of the government can be 
pushed more forcefully in France than in Belgium. Nonetheless, as evidence by the reaction to 
the Juppé Plan, these centralized powers do not imply that a reform will be implemented more 
easily since the social partners, more particularly unions in this case, are more likely to oppose 
such action vigorously and may even gather substantial public support. Thus, social partners 
have the capacity to act as a counter balance. 
 
H3e: The Committee pattern leads to more reform difficulties than the Cabinet pattern because it 
has more veto players in a similar structure of relationship (Parliamentary Integration). 
Application: Sweden is expected to have more difficulties than the UK in generating reforms. 
 This is clearly supported by the analysis presented in chapter 4 and 5. Both countries 
introduced substantial changes to their pension system, and yet the way under which this was 
achieved varied greatly because of the number of veto players in each setting. The Thatcher 
government was uncompromising and first sought to scrap the public system. It was the 
intervention of the Treasury, which foresaw a substantial rise in public expenditure, which 
stopped this proposal from going through. The plan B was still highly favourable to the private 
sector and jeopardized the viability of the public system in the long-run.  
 In the Swedish case, a single political party cannot have the kind of latitude Thatcher had. 
This is best exemplified by a response provided by Anna Hedborg, a SAP representative on the 
Working Group on Pensions, during an interview. She felt a political opposition from both the 
Ministry of Finance (regardless of the government) and the bourgeois parties. The Ministry of 
Finance had similar concerns as its British counterpart. The key difference was that Hedborg had 
to negotiate and compromise with the bourgeois parties to reform the whole pension system. 
Thus, the final agreement does not represent a solution advocated by any single political party, 
but rather a collage of wishes from each of the five parties. This explains why it took longer for 
Swedes to enact a reform. This is also, however, the strength of the Swedish policy making 
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process. Policies tend to be more stable in the long-run than in the UK since an agreement like 
the pension reform of 1998 is unlikely to be altered once a new government comes in power. 
Steinmo (1993) in his analysis of taxation came to similar conclusions.  
 
Hypothesis n2b:  A political party advocating stark changes in pension programme will face a 
reduction of political support. 
 Out of the four cases studied in this book, this event only occurred once. During the 1994 
election, the Flemish liberals advocated a strong privatization of the pension system and suffered 
a setback. Therefore, more cases would need to be studied in order to make any meaningful 
assessment of this proposition. 
 Most political parties have avoided this issue prior to and during elections. In Sweden, 
there was an explicit agreement among the five parties behind the 1998 agreement not to bring 
pensions as an electoral issue in 1994 and 1998. In the UK, Thatcher never mentioned that she 
had the intention of drastically reform the pension system in the 1984 election. Pension reform 
was also not mentioned during the 1993 electoral campaign in France and Balladur wasted no 
time after the elections. Even though reforming the public pension system is rarely mentioned 
explicitly, political parties have raised other types of issues related to the pension system such as 
the promotion of private alternatives to complement the public system. 
 
Hypothesis n2c: Based on Ross’ (2000a) critique of Pierson, left wing governments might have 
more facilities to introduce a pension reform since they benefits from the ‘Nixon-goes-to-China 
effect’ while right wing parties are likely to have ‘Nixon’s disease’. 
 Albeit limited, the evidence presented in this book does not support the ‘Nixon-goes-to-
China’ argument. This hypothesis is difficult to test since both Belgium and Sweden have had 
coalitions that included both left and right wing parties. Thus, only France and the UK can be 
tackled. As stated above, it would be difficult to state that Thatcher’s popularity was hurt by the 
introduction of pension reforms in 1980 and 1986. The same conclusions could be made for 
Balladur. Due to the extent of the reforms introduced by Thatcher and the length of her tenure, 
there was not much policy space left for the Labour Party when they came into power, nor could 
there have been a desire to make further cuts into the pension system. However, the Jospin 
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government, elected in the aftermath of protest towards the Juppé government, had five years to 
address the pension issue and did not introduce a piece of legislation to alter the pension system.  
 
Policy Implications 
 Due to the difficulties associated with institutional structures, it is clear that the options 
available to policy makers remain limited. Nonetheless, few conclusions can be introduced on 
the bases of our four cases. First, in order to reform public pensions one has to recognize the 
limitation of one’s structure. A state that has had delegated substantial authority to social 
partners in the past must include them in the decision-making process. This implies that a 
coherent strategy is more likely to be successful if it includes a serie of small steps and/or other 
policy issues where more negotiating room is available.  
In the long run, states can try to minimize the impact of the social partners by taking 
more responsibilities within the system. The revision of the social budget by the Parliament, as 
introduced by the Juppé Plan, represents this type of strategy. Albeit less likely in this day and 
age, a possible alternative would be to grant more responsibility to the social partners so that 
they face a larger share of the burden to reform the system. This action was proposed by 
Bérégovoy in the early 1990s in a desperate attempt to salvage the fortunes of the socialist 
government. The reaction from the social partners was quite cold, however, as they understood 
clearly that they would be forced to face the music and be responsible for future unpopular 
decisions. 
The fact that it is easier to reform pensions within a Parliamentary Integration structure 
can also be a disadvantage. The pension system of the United Kingdom is excessively complex 
because no pension policy has had the chance to mature due to the constant changes that have 
accompanied a new government. Considering the long-term vision required in the field of 
pension policy, this outcome is quite undesirable. The potential costs of uncertainty were 
actually a key factor behind the resolve of the five Swedish political parties to reach a 
compromise. Both socialists and bourgeois parties feared that a future government would undo a 
unilateral decision, thus resulting in an unstable policy for a hotly disputed political issue. 
Second, and derived from the latter point, policy change can be obtained regardless of the 
structure. Reformers are more likely to succeed within a Parliamentary Integration structure if 
they opt to carry an overhaul of the system or explicit reforms. It is worthwhile noticing that both 
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Swedish and British reforms tackles some financial shortcomings of previous systems, but 
introduce new difficulties. For example, despite all the efforts put by the pension committee in 
Sweden, there is no guarantee that the new system will prove to be sustainable in the long run. It 
remains to be seen whether or not politicians will have the courage to let that automatic 
indexation of pensions occur when the country falls into a recession.  
Ingenious ways to reform the pension system within the Social Partnership structure can 
be found even though one cannot be as explicit as the previous cases. For example, the Belgian 
reforms have put the burden elsewhere (pre-retirement), which may be easier to reform in the 
future, and have introduced new programs (occupational pensions) to compensate for a future 
lack of adequate replacement wages. Simply privatizing a component of the public scheme 
would have failed to gather support, but the creation of a new pillar obtained widespread support. 
At the end of the day, both policies achieve similar aim: increase the share of private savings into 
the system. 
 
Future Avenues for Research 
Generalizing the theoretical framework  
 Broadly speaking two avenues could be undertaken to expand the use and testing of the 
theoretical framework presented in chapter 1. First, one avenue consists of expanding the number 
of cases under study by analyzing other European and/or industrialized countries. Thus, it is 
expected that continental countries follow the Social Partnership structure while both liberal and 
social democratic welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990) are expected to fit with the 
Parliamentary Integration structure. For example, an analysis of Canada should yield results that 
are quite similar to that experienced by the UK. It is expected that the decisions to reform are 
centralized and do not include unions and/or employers. Further, the role of the opposition is also 
expected to be close to nil.  
 Another avenue consists of expanding the framework to other policy area. 
Unemployment and sickness insurance quickly come to mind due to a somewhat similar 
integration of the social partners into these schemes. Interestingly, Sweden becomes more of a 
Social Partnership type because the unions and employers manage these two programs. The 
Minister of Health and Social Security, Bo Könberg, pointed out during an interview that he tried 
to reform sickness insurance in the same manner he tackled pensions. However, a special 
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committee composed stricktly of parliamentarians was never set up due to the strong opposition 
of unions who firmly requested a seat due to their managerial role. An investigation into health 
policies would also be interesting since the Juppé Plan was implemented in this sector and not in 
pensions. 
 
Other institutions 
 One possible difficulty associated with an expansion of this dissertation remains the 
integration of other institutions. The USA illustrates this point perfectly. Due to the high 
influence of the two legislative chambers and the separation of power between the legislative and 
the executive, the framework presented in chapter 1 seems ill equipped to tackle this case. 
Simply considereing the US case as a strange form of coalition government could not resolve 
this difficulty because party discipline is not as strong as in most parliamentary systems. The 
German Bundesrat also provides a similar puzzle, as regional leaders may refuse to follow the 
national party line. Three of the four cases studied in this dissertation have a second chamber 
(Belgium, France and the UK), but none were considered because they are not influential. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
What Are Public Pensions? 
Pensoners rely on a multitude of resources to sustain their livelihood during their 
retirement years. The pension of citizens, thus, originates from various pension schemes 
composing a pension system.359 Whatever the pension system present in a country, specific types 
of schemes are present and can be regrouped into three pillars. The first pillar consists of public 
pensions granted to individual on the basis of citizenship or need. For example, Sweden 
guarantees a full basic pension for every citizen providing that they have resided in the country 
for a minimum of 40 years.360  Belgium, France, and the UK on the other hand, have provided 
means-tested benefits to needy pensioners who have been unable to reach a minimal standard of 
pension rights or savings.361 The average retiree in these three countries is unlikely to receive any 
amount from the first pillar due to its means-tested element. Regardless of the country, this pillar 
is usually not sufficient for individuals to sustain a high level of wage replacement. The second 
pillar consists of occupational pension schemes, which are contribution-based programmes 
                                                 
359 For the purpose of this dissertation, the distinction between pension system and pension scheme presented in the 
literature shall be used (see Bonelli, 2000: 9). For example, Dangerfield and Prangere (1998) claims that more than 
75% of French retiree perceive many pensions from various basis or complementary social insurance schemes (9). 
360 For the year 2000, the basic pension for a single individual was worth 37 300kr (3 730US dollars) (www.rfv.se – 
September 11, 2001). Note that this figure does not include other potential source of revenues such as housing 
subsidies. 
361 In Belgium the revenu guaranti aux personnes agees (guaranteed revenue for older people) was of 256 019BEF 
($5764) for a pensioner living alone. A person who had 2/3 of a full working career is entitled to a minimum of 346 
762BEF ($7720). In France, old age people living alone with little or no resources can claim a means tested 
allowance of 17 633Fr, which reaches 42 910Fr ($5894) with a supplementary allowance allocated to people who 
qualify for the means-tested allowance. In the UK, the minimal amount provided to a pensioner living alone is of 
£39.95 per week (£479.40 annually -  $2981) 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/missoc2000/missoc_132_en.htm).  
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financed by both employees and employers.362 These schemes tend to be mandatory and 
administered by either the social partners and/or the state. For example, in Sweden, citizens have 
two sets of mandatory earnings related pension schemes. One that is administered by the state 
and another one that is considered to be private and occupational, that is negotiated between 
labour and employers during wage settlements. (For the reminder of this dissertation, public 
occupational schemes will represent pillar 2a, while the private ones will be labelled 2b?). The 
third pillar consists of various private pension schemes ranging from private savings plan, 
insurance and, even, home ownership. Belgian officials are quick to point out that Belgium does 
not have a thriving capital market like the Netherlands, but a vast majority of its citizens are 
homeowners, which is not the case for its neighbour.363 This in turn represents a valuable 
investment. The importance of each pillar varies within the EU.  
For the purpose of this dissertation, reforms to public pensions in the EU are analysed with 
a particular focus on Belgium, France, Sweden and the UK. After all, the potential crisis behind 
old-age pensions is mostly related to the public aspects of the system and not private ones.364 
Defining what is public and what is private is quite troublesome. Esping-Andersen considers 
public all pension schemes legislated and administered by the state as well as private sector plan 
mandated by the public. As such, he considers the British second-tier pensions as public. France 
represents a special case of public pensions, since mandating exists informally even though it is 
not legislated.365 Interestingly, though, he excludes the government civil-service pension, which 
he considers to be a special category of its own (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 81).366 Bonoli (2000) 
defines pension systems as the totality of transfers to the older population that ”are either 
compulsory, provided by the state or encouraged by legislation” (9f). For the purpose of this 
study, public pensions refers to pension schemes that are legislated and administered by the state 
or schemes that are administered by other bodies mandated by the state. This definition includes 
                                                 
362 If the scheme is considered to be public, it also includes contributions from the state. 
363 According to Eurostat statistics, 68% of Belgian households own their home compared to 30% in the Netherlands 
(Eurostat, 1999). 
364 Although there is strong support for this position, one may ask who will buy the stocks of the baby boomers once 
they retired. 
365 This view was also acknowledged by the ECJ in the Pistre case, which considered that mutuelles cannot be 
considered as an entity engaged in economic activities due to their special status. 
366 He considered that the civil service scheme is a priori an occupational scheme that has little to do with social 
rights, but rather with ”status demarcation” (81). 
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pension schemes administered and financed by the government on behalf of public employees.367 
Like private workers, civil servants pay contributions towards their occupational pension. This 
includes the first and second pillar, with the exception of private occupational pensions. This 
implies, for example, that in Sweden the negotiated occupational pensions provided to 
individuals as a result of a collective wage agreement with their employers is not included. 
Excluding the main pension schemes for civil servant would imply leaving a large group of 
pensioners out of the analysis.  
                                                 
367 This would include the mandatory occupational pension schemes received by civil servants in France and 
Belgium, but not the occupational pension scheme for civil servants in Sweden. The logic behind this choice is that 
the public pension schemes for Belgium and France are considered to be the main program of pension benefits 
(similar to what workers obtain in the pension legale (B) or regime general (F)) like the universal pension scheme in 
Sweden while the occupational pension received by civil servants in Sweden is an addendum to the main public 
scheme that is negotiated as part of wage settlement, and is therefore considered private (similar to other unionised 
employees). UK?  
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
The Evolution of Public Pensions in Comparative Perspective 
Pension policies, like most public policies, are quite incremental in nature making original 
legislation in each country an important milestone in analysing it.368 Pensions are considered to 
be a policy area that is quite path dependent making it difficult to alter once it is in place. In 
concluding his historical study on the development of the welfare state in Europe, Baldwin 
(1990) states ”once made, choices in social policy exerted a determining influence on the course 
of event later possible” (290).369 It is therefore not quite surprising that the core elements of 
earlier pension schemes still remain in effect today for most European countries. This reality is 
reflected in the various typologies that have been generated on pension systems. 
 
Social insurance vs. means-tested 
The most simplistic classification separates pension systems into two specific models, 
which put emphasis on the origins of pension systems and the goals it aimed to achieve (Palme, 
1990: 41; Bonoli, 2000: 10). It underlines core elements of original pension schemes that remain 
in place today for most of these countries.370 First, the social insurance model implies a 
relationship between working activities and pension levels. Workers and employers pay social 
contributions to finance social insurance (along with the state), which are occupationally based 
                                                 
368 For a discussion on the evolution of pension rights and systems, see Joakim Palme (1990), Esping-Andersen 
(1990 – chapter 4), and Williamson and Pampel (1993). 
369 It is important to note, however, that previous policy choices constrain available options for reform, but they do 
not stop change from occurring (Baldwin, 1990). 
370 France and the UK first introduced means-tested programs in the early 1900s but adopted insurance-based 
pensions by the 1930. UK is usually classified as means-tested country. Sweden and the USA are considered to be 
means-tested countries but first adopted a social insurance system (Palme, 1990: 41-3). 
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and administered by the social partners.371 This implies that various pension schemes, with 
different rules, contributions and benefits, are present reflecting professional groupings. Key is 
that pension entitlements must be earned, and are not granted on the basis of need. Bismarck first 
introduced this type of pension systems in Germany at the end of the 19th century hoping to stop 
the increasingly popularity of the labour movement and social insurance was one of the tools 
employed to alt the rise of socialism. It was introduced along with laws banning the political 
organisation of workers (Alber, 1988: 5). As a new nation, Bismarck wanted to ensure social 
peace and order within the confederate state. His intervention in the field of welfare was also 
inspired from “the social control value of Napoleon III’s limited protection efforts” (Williamson 
and Pampel, 1993: 22 - 27). Moreover, Bismarck wanted to maintain patriarchal values against 
an increasing liberal bourgeoisie (Myles, 1989: 35).372 This model is predominant in continental 
countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy.  
The second model follows the footsteps of the old poor laws with countries introducing 
means-tested old age pensions. Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries followed the lead of 
Denmark (1891) and New Zealand (1898) who introduced means-tested benefits financed via 
general taxation. The key distinction from the social insurance model is that citizens were 
entitled to benefits, regardless of prior revenues as long as they satisfied the means-test 
conditions (Palme, 1990:41-2; Bonoli, 2000: 10-11). Still today, Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian 
countries have schemes in their pension systems where benefits are granted on the basis of 
citizenship and/or means-tested.  
This distinction between insurance and means-tested models represents an idealisation of 
the reality. Most countries actually have pension systems, which include both types of 
components. Continental countries, with the noticeable exception of Germany, all have means-
tested old-age pension schemes for citizens who do not achieve a specific level of income. 
                                                 
371 Social partners consist of both employees and employers. The terminology suggests that these two groups have a 
social duty towards the state and its citizens. 
372 Another key explanation behind the introduction of these schemes – pension insurance was introduced in the 
same wave as sickness and industrial insurance – was the pressure from industrialists, especially those working in 
heavy industries.  Some of them were highly concerned by the increasing number of liability suits, following the 
Liability Act of 1871 and pushed for social insurance as a way to reduce the number of claims (Williamson and 
Pampel, 1993: 25). 
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Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries, with the exception of Denmark,373 have added 
insurance-based schemes to their means-tested schemes.  
Palme (1990) actually identifies three paths of pension development within industrialised 
countries. First, a group of nations (Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Japan) added means-tested 
benefits to their insurance schemes.374 The second path consists of countries that first established 
means-tested programs and supplemented them by adding more generous benefits, which took 
the form of mandatory insurance based programs (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden) and/or flat rate schemes (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway and Sweden). Finally, the last path includes countries that had a means-tested 
model and later introduced insurance based schemes. These countries include France, Ireland and 
the UK. Palme underlines that the means-tested benefits in France have always been marginal, 
making it more similar to other continental countries like Austria, Belgium and Italy (58-66). 
  
The three worlds of welfare capitalism 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology on the three world of welfare capitalism provides 
interesting insights into the evolution of pension systems. Key in his typology is the concept of 
de-commodification, that is the degree to which citizens are not dependent on the market in the 
obtention of social rights (21-2). His typology takes the previous classification a step further by 
integrating causal factors in the evolution of these models. Further, he argues that two different 
trajectories arose from countries that first adopted means-tested benefits, thus leading to three 
different regimes. First, the corporatist regime includes the social insurance countries mentioned 
above. With relations to the market, the redistributive aspects of pension programs are minimal 
and the state, alongside social partners, plays a key role in providing welfare benefits. Such 
system also emphasises traditional values such as the Church and the family. Market 
considerations and concerns with commodification did not play a large role in their adoption 
(27).375 In relations to pensions, status remains a key element as pension schemes are highly 
segregated with civil servants being privileged. Countries typifying this pattern are the same as 
                                                 
373 Denmark has a universal pension system financed via sales tax. Its work related program is in fact based on the 
length of employment, and does not lead to a large increase from the universal scheme (Palme, 1990: 65). 
374 It is worth noting that the USA and Switzerland introduced means-tested schemes alongside their insurance-
based program (Palme, 1990: 59). Germany still does not have a means-tested program for the elderly.  
375 Supporting this thesis is the fact that Bismarck’s first proposals did not even include contributions for workers 
(Hennock, 1987: 110). 
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the ones presented above – Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy – plus Japan and 
Finland (85-6). 
Second, the liberal family consists of countries that have maintained means-tested 
programs with other modest social benefits. The key concern behind this strategy was to 
maximise reliance on the market leading to a low de-commodification level for citizens (26-7). 
This result in public pension system that is quite residual, in the sense that the state will offer 
benefits ’when all else fails’. In these countries, private pensions are quite important in 
establishing an old-age pension, which implies that income differentials are likely to remain. 
These countries comprise Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the USA (86).376  
Finally, the social democratic regimes include countries that have extended their means-
tested benefits to the remainder of the population while improving them, making their programs 
universal. The state de-commodifies individuals and rebuffs status privileges (86-7). This regime 
was called social democratic due to the importance of social democracy behind the extension of 
social benefits (27). Scandinavian countries tend to typify this regime.377 
  
Palme’s classification 
Palme (1990) proposes another typology based on the goals of pensions systems. 
More specifically, he classifies countries according to whether or not they aim to provide 
income security, in the form of wage replacement and whether or not they seek to provide 
a decent basic income for its citizens, hence basic security. Based on these two axes, he 
presents four models. First, the residual model comprises countries that have public 
pension schemes that provide neither basic security nor income security. Such countries 
leave elderly to depend on ’external’ sources of income to complement their public pension 
benefits to maintain their livelihood. Countries belonging to this model include Australia, 
Ireland, UK, USA, and Switzerland.378  
Second, the basic security model consists of countries that have universal programs 
ensuring that its population is guaranteed an ’adequate’ minimum income without any 
emphasis on income replacement. Canada, Denmark, Netherlands and New Zealand mostly 
                                                 
376 It is important to note that the UK is considered to be part of the liberal regime, but that it was considered an 
outlier when it came to pensions. Esping-Andersen (1990) claims that its public occupational scheme was not 
adequate in decommodifying individuals due to its opt-out clause, which led to the growth of private pensions (87). 
377 With the possible exception of Finland for pensions. 
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exhibit features of this model.379 Third, the income security model implies that the state 
seeks to provide a replacement income for its individual but no basic security. This model 
benefits the economically active while leaving the non-active vulnerable. Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Japan and France typify this cell. 380 Finally, the institutional model 
includes states that minimise the reliance on the market, since the state provides an 
adequate minimum income and a replacement wage. Sweden, Norway and Finland typify 
this model as they all have a basic pension that is supplemented by a mandatory universal 
occupational scheme. 
 
Table B.1 – Palme’s Classification of Pension Systems. 
                                                        Basic Security 
 No Yes 
No Residual Model: 
Australia, Ireland, United 
Kingdom, USA, Switzerland 
Basic Security Model: 
Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, 
New Zealand 
 
 
Income 
Security 
Yes Income Security Model: 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, France 
Institutional Model: 
Finland, Norway, Sweden 
Source: Joakim Palme (1990). Pension Rights in Welfare Capitalism. Stockholm: Sofi. P. 87. 
 
The previous models, albeit focusing on various aspects of pensions systems, 
demonstrate a certain level of consistency as most country groupings remain somewhat 
similar, especially when it comes to social insurance countries (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, and Italy). Norway and Sweden consistently classify as having highly universal 
schemes that protect its citizens from the market. Puzzling for this study is the UK. It 
originates as a means-tested model, and failed to significantly improve its public 
occupational scheme. Esping-Andersen (1990) does not classify it as either liberal or 
social-democratic when it comes to pensions, but Palme (1990), using data from 1985 and 
not 1980, clearly puts the UK into the residual category. 
The four cases selected for this study demonstrates great similarities and differences. 
France and Belgium have always been grouped together, as part of various social insurance 
                                                                                                                                                             
378 Check Castles and its critique regarding the coding of Australia… 
379 Denmark with its universal pension scheme based on citizenship and financed via its sales tax approaches the 
most this ideal model. 
380 Germany, which does not have a minimum pension, is the closest to the pure form of this model. 
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models. Sweden and the UK both had means-tested pension schemes and upholding status 
never figured predominantly in their pension structures.  Both sought to improve their 
pension systems with a mandatory universal occupational scheme (Sweden succeeded, 
while the UK failed). Sweden and Belgium, although not belonging to any pension model 
together, have similar levels of generosity as demonstrated by their high level of de-
commodification in Esping-Andersen’s analysis (17 and 15 respectively). This Belgian 
ranking has been associated with a strong social democratic movement within a 
conservative tradition (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and with the strength of the Christian 
Democrats who have advocated generous benefits within a conservative setting (Huber and 
Stephens, 1993). 
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
Is Reforming Public Pension Systems Necessary? Does It Depend on Whom You Ask? 
This appendix explains why pension reform found its way on the agenda of most EU 
member states. Virtually every member states have been faced with the political dilemma 
of reforming their pension systems, as their pension expenditure is expected to rise.381 The 
impact of pensions within public finance should not be underestimated. It is the biggest 
item within all social expenditure and already accounts for more than 10% of GDP in 9 EU 
member states (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
and Sweden) (EPC, 2000: 27).  
Based on the analysis presented here, it is argued that public pension systems are in 
dire need of reform, but not in need of a major surgery (see Disney, 2000). Many of the 
scenarios described in newspaper are exaggerated and privatization of benefits, as 
advocated by many, also has serious disadvantages and may not resolve the problems 
associated with population ageing. The scope of reform necessary varies from country to 
country depending on factors such as economic growth, generosity of pension benefits, 
fertility rates, unemployment, and life expectancy.  
This appendix analyses the causes associated with the so-called pension time bomb. 
It includes a review of endogenous and exogenous factors. Endogenous factors are 
domestic factors, specific to each country, which influence old-age pensions. Such 
elements include the generosity and coverage of pension benefits, structure of pension 
systems, population ageing, birth rate, unemployment and quality of health care. Most of 
                                                 
381 With the exception of the United Kingdom, where expenditure is expected to fall (EPC, 2000: 5). 
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these elements are responsible for the future problems of public pension systems. 
Exogenous factors, comprising the pressure occurring from globalization and 
europeanisation, do not directly affect public pension schemes but restrict the policy 
options available to governments in resolving the challenges brought on by endogenous 
factors.  
 
Are Pension Reforms Necessary? Why? 
Most industrialised states have been expecting a significant increase in pension 
expenditure over the course of the next 50 years. As a result, pension reform382 figures 
predominantly on the agenda of most governments within the member states of the 
European Union (EU) as they seek to reduce the upcoming financial pressure. This section 
presents the reasons why governments are seeking to reform their public pension system. 
This question is critical since it provides the driving force behind the need for reform. 
 
Population ageing 
 Already in 1975, a leading political scientist in the study of welfare state claimed that 
“if there is one source of welfare spending that is most powerful – a single proximate cause 
– it is the proportion of old people in the population” (Wilensky, 1975: 47). Still today, 
there exists a broad consensus among economists and political scientists that one of the 
leading causes, if not the leading cause, behind the (upcoming) financial difficulties of 
public pensions is population ageing. This is the result of two continuous and 
complementary factors: decrease in fertility rates and increase in life expectancy. Fertility 
rates have been declining after the ‘Baby Boom,’ which followed World War II, and are 
not expected to rise significantly (see table C.1).  Within the EU, the rate has decreased 
from 2,5 children per women to 1,5 between 1950 and 2000. This means that women today 
have 1 fewer children compared to women in 1950. To put it in another way, every family 
has lost a member compared to 50 years ago. 
                                                 
382 It is important to note that pension reform does not mean retrenchment. Most reforms in this century have 
actually led to an increase in the generosity and scope of the benefits made available to citizens. Nonetheless, 
pension reform is employed in this dissertation to signify a reduction in the size of financial commitment and 
benefits. 
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 Even though the decrease in fertility rates has occurred in every EU countries, there 
are some marked variations between them. The situation is quite acute in the case of Italy 
and Spain, which have faced extremely low birth rates this past decade. These differences 
have repercussions and highly influence the timing of the financial difficulties that will be 
experienced by EU countries. For example, the UK experienced a high fertility rate during 
the years 1955-65, which began in 1945. A high increase in the number of retirees is 
expected in 2010-30 (Algava and Plane, 2001). Sweden, on the other hand, will enjoy a 
smoother increase in the number of retirees partly because its fertility rate has been 
relatively continuous, without high peaks. Sweden also experienced a mini baby boom in 
the early 1990s. 
 
Table C.1 Female fertility rates and estimates in EU countries  
 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 
Belgium 2,3 2,5 2,3 1,7 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,7 
France 2,7 2,7 2,6 1,9 1,8 1,7 1,8 2 
Sweden 2,2 2,2 2,1 1,6 1,9 1,6 1,6 1,7 
UK 2,2 2,5 2,5 1,7 1,8 1,7 1,8 1,9 
Denmark 2,5 2,5 2,2 1,7 1,5 1,7 1,8 1,9 
Germany 2,2 2,3 2,3 1,5 1,4 1,3 1,4 1,5 
Greece 2,3 2,3 2,4 2,3 1,5 1,3 1,3 1,4 
Spain 2,6 2,8 2,9 2,6 1,5 1,2 1,2 1,3 
Ireland 3,4 3,7 3,9 3,5 2,3 1,9 1,9 2,1 
Italy 2,3 2,4 2,5 1,9 1,3 1,2 1,3 1,4 
Luxem. 2 2,2 2,2 1,5 1,5 1,7 1,7 1,8 
NLD 3,1 3,1 2,7 1,6 1,6 1,5 1,6 1,7 
Austria 2,1 2,5 2,5 1,6 1,4 1,4 1,5 1,6 
Portugal 3 3 2,8 2,4 1,6 1,4 1,4 1,5 
Finland 3 2,8 2,1  1,6 1,7 1,7 1,8 1,9 
EU-15 2,5 2,6 2,5 1,9 1,6 1,5 1,6 1,7 
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 1998 Revision. 
 
 Razin and Sadka (1998) demonstrates that an increase in the number of immigration could 
have positive effect on pension systems, which could compensate for decreasing birth rates. 
However, contrary to countries such as Canada and the US, EU members have not traditionally 
had high immigration levels. Unless immigration policies are changed drastically in the near 
future, many EU countries will actually begin to experience a decline in population.383 
Population growth peaks in 2030 for most EU countries. By 2040, if current trends persist, 10 
                                                 
383 Actually, immigration issues were largely ignored in the EPC report. No hypothesis was found on this topic 
(Math, 2001: 13-4). 
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out of the 15 member states will be facing the prospect of a declining population, a direct result 
of low fertility rates and insufficient immigration to cover the loss. All four countries studied in 
this dissertation will face this reality after 2030. Consistent with their low fertility rates, Italy and 
Spain face the sharpest decline in population within the EU (see table C.2).  The long-term 
implications of this decline are serious due to the nature of current public pension systems, which 
rely on payg. Under a payg system, current workers finance the pensions of retired individuals. If 
a generation cannot ‘replace’ itself by a similar number of individuals, it results in an extra 
burden in financing the public pensions of retirees. Workers must either pay more or retirees 
must accept less. 
 Population ageing is not only the result of low fertility rates. The improvement of 
social services, a direct benefit from the welfare state, has resulted in higher standards of 
living and higher life expectancy. These trends are expected to continue for the next fifty 
years. A Belgian man at age 60 could expect to live another 15 years in 1960. This figure 
had risen to 18,1 by 1995, a gain of 3,1 year. French men have gained 4,1 years, Swedish 
men 2,5 and British men 3. The improvement is even more pronounced with women. A 
Belgian woman at age 60 could expect to live 23 years in 1995, up from 18,7 in 1960, a 
gain of 4,3 years. This figure has risen by 5,4 years in France, 4,6 in Sweden, and 3,1 in the 
UK (Kalisch and Aman, 1998: 49). 
 The increase in life expectancy has a strong impact on public pension expenditure 
because pensionable age has not risen in line with this new reality. On the contrary, most 
countries reduced their pensionable age. For example, Sweden decreased its pensionable 
age from 67 to 65 in 1976, while France decreased it from 65 to 60 in 1982. The end result 
is a longer period of benefits for retired individuals, which requires more contributions 
from current workers or a decrease in the generosity of benefits.  
 A reduction in life expectancy cannot be sought for both political and humanitarian 
reasons. However, adjustments to a pension system can be made to take into account the 
increase in life expectancy. In its latest reform, Sweden included a life expectancy 
indexation, which would be taken into account when an individual retirement. If people 
live longer, the value of a pension would decrease accordingly. As a result, pension 
expenditure are expected to rise by 9% up to the year 2050, while the number of pensioners 
are expected to grow by 16% (EPC, 2000: 45). 
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Table C.2 Baseline projections of total population in EU Member States 
(beginning of the year, millions of persons) 
 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 % Change 
2000-
2050 
Belgium 10,2 10,4 10,5 10,5 10,4 10,1 - 1,0 
France 59,2 61,4 62,8 63,7 63,5 62,2 +5,1 
Sweden 8,9 9 9,1 9,3 9,2 9,2 +3,4 
UK 59,5 60,9 62,2 63,2 62,9 61,8 +3,9 
Denmark 5,3 5,5 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,6 +5,7 
Germany 82,1 83,4 83,3 82 79,6 76 -8,0 
Greece 10,5 10,8 10,8 10,7 10,6 10,2 -2,9 
Spain 39,4 39,9 39,5 38,6 37,3 35,1 -12,3 
Ireland 3,8 4,1 4,4 4,6 4,7 4,8 +26,3 
Italy 57,6 57,3 56 54 51,5 48,1 -19,8 
Luxem. 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,6 +50* 
NLD 15,9 16,7 17,3 17,7 17,9 17,7 +11,3 
Austria 8,1 8,1 8,2 8,1 7,9 7,6 -6,6 
Portugal 10 10,3 10,5 10,7 10,8 10,7 +7,0 
Finland 5,2 5,3 5,3 5,3 5,1 5 -4,0 
EU-15 376,2 383,4 386 384,6 377,6 364,5 -3,2 
Source: EPC (2000), 31; own calculations. 
* Due to rounding this figure is highly overestimated 
 
 The combined effects of a decreased fertility rate and an increased life expectancy 
rate leads to population ageing. One way to assess the importance of these changes, is by 
looking at the progression of the old-age dependency ratio for EU countries (see table C.3). 
This ratio expresses a measure of the population above 64 (65 is the legal age of retirement 
for most countries)384 relative to the population of working age. A ratio of 1 implies that 
there is one person over the age of 64 for one person of working age. In many cases, the 
ratio will increase by more than two folds by the year 2050 (Germany, Greece, Spain, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and Austria). Surprisingly, none of the four countries studied 
here reach the two folds mark. From a methodological point of view, this is a positive sign 
since it implies that demographic pressures are quite similar and thus, should not be held 
accountable for a variation in the scope of reforms introduced. 
Concretely, population ageing results in fewer workers supporting more retirees. 
This phenomenon is not new. France’s public pension scheme for private workers (régime 
général) has continuously seen its ratio of contributors over retired individual diminish 
since 1960. At that time, 4,14 workers financed one pensioner. In 1999, 1,54 workers were 
                                                 
384 France is a clear outlier here since its legal age is 60. 
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asked to do the same.385 Worst, this ratio is expected to decline further as the baby boomers 
retire.  
 
Table C.3 Old-Age Dependency Ratio in EU Member States 
(ratio of the people over 64 to working age population, in %) 
 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Belgium 28,1 29,4 35,6 45,8 51,3 49,7 
France 27,2 28,1 35,9 44 50 50,8 
Sweden 29,6 31,4 37,6 42,7 46,7 46,1 
UK 26,4 26,9 32 40,2 47 46,1 
Denmark 24,1 27,2 33,7 39,2 44,5 41,9 
Germany 26 32,9 36,3 46,7 54,7 53,3 
Greece 28,3 31,6 35,8 41,7 51,4 58,7 
Spain 27,1 28,9 33,1 41,7 55,7 65,7 
Ireland 19,4 19,1 24,5 30,3 36 44,2 
Italy 28,8 33,8 39,7 49,2 63,9 66,8 
Luxem. 23,4 26,2 31 39,8 45,4 41,8 
NLD 21,9 24,6 32,6 41,5 48,1 44,9 
Austria 25,1 28,8 32,4 43,6 54,5 55 
Portugal 25,1 26,7 30,3 35 43,1 48,7 
Finland 24,5 27,5 38,9 46,9 47,4 48,1 
EU-15 26,7 29,8 35,1 43,8 52,4 53,4 
Source: EPC, 2000. Page 32.386 
 
 
Because of the importance of the demographic change, it has been proposed to 
increase the age of retirement. Technically, this should be a simple issue. Reynaud (1998), 
for example, argue that increasing the age of retirement in France to 65 (up from 60), 
would result in a similar cut off line between the working and non-working population than 
the one found in 1990 (34). Not surprisingly, many EU countries have increased 
pensionable age. Using the EU directive on the equal treatment of men and women, four 
countries (Belgium, Germany, Portugal and the UK) have increased the retirement age of 
women in line with that of men. Italy raised the retirement age for both men and women in 
1992 (Kalisch and Amen, 1998: 57-63). Nonetheless, the political difficulties associated 
with such reforms make it less appealing than its technical efficiency.  
 
                                                 
385 Figures obtained at www.cnav.org. Website visited on November 16, 2001. 
386 Kalisch and Aman based on 1994 book had lower rates…the situation has worsened…Page. 47 
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Labour force participation, economic growth and indexation 
Due to the payg system, unemployment and other absences from the labour market 
put further stress and have resulted in fewer contributors to finance old-age pensions. 
Despite this intuitive link, the role of labour force participation is more controversial 
because of the structure of many public pension schemes, which will be discussed below. 
Despite an increase in the number of women in employment, labour force 
participation rates have fallen during the past 30 years. The fall has been quite pronounced 
for those aged between 55-65 (see table C.4), resulting in shorter contribution periods and 
higher demands for pensions (Boldrin et al., 1999: 295). Governments were not benign in 
this process. Tracy and Adams (1989) analyzed the actual age at which full time pensions 
were awarded in ten countries during the period of 1960-1986, and noticed a distinctive 
trend towards granting pension benefits at an earlier age than the legal requirements. This 
was the case for eight of the ten countries they studied (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Finland, France, Sweden and the US – Norway and the UK were the 
exceptions). Many governments actively pursued a policy of early retirement in the hopes 
of increasing the level of employment of its younger population and to resolve long-term 
unemployment among the aged. Belgium, France, Germany and the UK instituted highly 
visible pre-pension options directly related to favouring the integration of younger workers 
in the labour force (460). To achieve these objectives, generous benefits were presented to 
encourage early retirements. In Belgium, pre-pension options became widely used by 
employers to restructure human resources in order to make their firms more competitive 
resulting in the lowest rate of employment in Europe for those aged 55-64. Blöndal and 
Scarpetta (1998) argue that most public pension systems in the mid 1990s made it 
financially unattractive to work after the age of 55. 
Many of these advantages have been scaled back in the 1990s, which can partly 
explain the rise in employment rates in countries that pursued actively these programmes 
(for example, Belgium, France and UK).387 Despite these measures, the ‘real’ retirement 
age for many individuals still lies below the legislated age. Further, low employment rates 
among older workers persist and need to be addressed effectively if a policy of increasing 
                                                 
387 Other cases could have been cited, but these three countries were mentioned because there are part of the 
dissertation and because they were part of Tracy and Adams’ analysis. 
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retirement age is pursued (Legros, 2001). Disney (2000), while attempting to demonstrate 
that parametric reforms could not save payg systems, argue that retirement behaviour is 
notoriously absent from most models simulating an increase in the age of retirement. It 
remains unclear whether or not individuals could or would retire later (F15). In the same 
vein, Cichon (1998) refers to the pension problem as an employment problem. The key is 
to ensure employment for older workers, which could be accompanied by a raise of the 
pensionable age. Unemployment among older workers actually led France to reduce its 
retirement age in 1982. Many individuals above 60 were benefiting from special 
unemployment benefits with a replacement wage of 80% that led them to retirement and 
pension points as if they were employed. At 65, they received the old-age pension. Due to 
lower replacement rates found with old-age pension (around 60%) the government decided 
to lower the retirement (Rein and Friedman, 1998: 63).  
 
Table C.4 Employment rate of older workers in the EU 
(Employment of workers aged 55-64 as a % of the population aged 55-64). 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
Belgium .. 26 21,4 23,3 24,7 
France~ 50,7 37,2 35,6 33,5 34,2 
Sweden 65,7 65 69,4 61,9 64 
UK .. 47 49,2 47,5 49,4 
Denmark .. 50,1 53,6 49,3 54,2 
Germany 42,2 35,5 36,8 37,5 38,5 
Greece* .. 45 40,8 40,5 39,1 
Spain 44,7 38,2 36,8 32,1 34,9 
Ireland .. 40,9 38,6 39,2 43,7 
Italy .. 33,3 32 27 27,5 
Luxem. .. 25,4 28,2 24 26,3 
NLD 36,3 27,3 22,4 22,7 35,3 
Austria .. .. .. 29 29,2 
Portugal 51,3 47 47 44,7 50,8 
Finland 47,1 45,4 42,6 34,4 39,2 
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics. 
~ It is woth noting that the legal retirement age in France is 60 and not 65 as in most OECD countries. 
* The year 1999 refers to 1998. 
 
Once we consider pre-working years, work stoppage, and retirement years, a bleaker 
picture appears. As demonstrated by table C.5, years of non-employment has surpassed 
years of employment and the gap is expected to widen in the next 30 years. The crossover 
year, where non-employment years first exceeded employment years for male workers, 
varies across the four countries studied. Considering its policies of favouring pre-
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retirement, it is not a surprise to see that Belgium had its crossover year earlier than the 
other three cases studied in this dissertation. The UK is the only case where the crossover 
has not occurred yet. Based on the data presented, it can be predicted that it is likely to 
happen in the near future. The reduction of employment years relative to non-employment 
years adds implies that individuals earn a wage for less than half of their life, increasing 
their dependence on other forms of income for a larger part of their life. On the positive 
side, an increase in the number of employment years for women should result in more 
contributions to public pension schemes. 
 
Table C.5 Years of Employment and Non-Employment in Belgium, France, Sweden and 
the UK, Now and in the Future (Projection for 2030 in parentheses). 
 Years of Employment Years of Non-Employment Crossover* 
 Men Women Men Women  
Belgium 32 (28) 23 (33) 42(50) 58 Several Decades 
Ago 
France 32 (29) 25 (33) 43 (49) 58 (52) 1980s 
Sweden 37 (33) 34 (36) 40 (47) 48 (49) Recently** 
UK 38 (34) 32 (38) 37 (44) 49 (45) Not yet 
Source: Reforms for an Ageing Society, OECD (2000). 
*Crossover is the year where men/women began to spend more time in non-employment activities than in 
employment –for male workers. 
** This statistic was not granted for Sweden, but it can be assumed that it occurred recently due to the small 
difference between the number of years in employment and years in non-employment activities. 
 
Based on the realities and projections presented above, the OECD (2000) and the 
European Commission (COM(2001)362) have advocated reaching higher participation rate 
in the labour market for both men and women as one of the ways to resolve the upcoming 
pension crisis. Intuitively, this makes sense, as it would result in a slower reduction in the 
number of contributors relative to retirees. It would also reduce other social expenditure, 
which could be transferred to old-age pensions. Further, labour force participation rates are 
sensitive to fiscal and labour policies, which are less rigid than demographic trends and 
should therefore be easier to change (Boldrin et al., 1999: 302). These policy options are 
broadly endorsed even though they have been contested due to the structure of most public 
pension system. In most cases, an increase in labour market participation would only delay 
the problem onto the next generation, as it would result in a higher number of men and 
women obtaining a full-time pension (Breyer, 1999; Fernandez, 1999; cf. Siebert, 2002). 
This might be financially detrimental to many pension schemes due to the relationship 
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between contributions and pension generosity. Therefore, it seems unlikely that an increase 
in labour force participation may be sufficient to preserve existing public pension schemes. 
This become more evident once we consider that the working age population is set to 
decline after year 2010 in Europe (Algava and Plan, 2001: 5). 
This leads us to a complementary argument closely related to labour participation, 
economic growth. A popular argument among economists and political scientists is that the 
potential financial crisis of public pension systems is a combination of population ageing 
and economic growth (Esping-Andersen, 1996: 7-8; Pierson, 1998). Basically, the inability 
of industrial countries to sustain the growth rates of the years following World War II 
constrains the public finances of governments who can no longer increase their revenues. 
Reasons behind the slower growth rates have been associated with the rise of the service 
sector, which generates lower growth rates than manufacturing. Citing an OECD report 
from 1988, Esping-Andersen (1996) maintains that the additional pension expenditure due 
to population ageing could be finance by an annual rise of 0,5 to 1.2% (depending on the 
country) in real earnings growth (7). Boldrin et al. (2001) argue that much of pensions 
insolvency problems could be resolved if pre-1973 conditions were re-established (302). 
In France, this line of argumentation has been employed against the Charpin report, 
which advocated a longer period of contribution and the creation of a reserve fund by the 
state to alleviate the upcoming ageing of the population. Teulade (2000), in a report 
presented to and adopted by the “Conseil Économique et Social,” seeks a reversal of pre-
pension policies to increase the employment rates of older workers and higher economic 
growth, the latter being considered the key. In the analysis, it is argued that an annual 
growth rate of 3,5% for 40 years would guarantee current level of pensions without 
increasing its proportion as a percentage of GDP (37).  
Despite all the benefits generated from economic growth, it may not resolve the 
financial difficulties ahead for public pension schemes. Key is the indexation mechanism 
in place within a payg pension system. In most EU countries, pensions are indexed 
according to the increase of wages within the country. Bluntly stated, pensioners benefit 
from the wage increases offered to current workers. Blake (2000) claims that public 
pensions will be unviable in the future if real pensions are increased in line with the growth 
rate achieved in labour productivity (F49-51). A high level of economic growth coupled 
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with a price index pension system would improve the financial fortune of public pension 
schemes tremendously. In a pension simulation, it was concluded that a switch from a 
wage defined index to a price defined index combined with a higher rate of labour 
participation would reduce the future burden of pensions by half in all countries (Boldrin et 
al., 2001: 302-5). Few reforms, such as the one introduced in Belgium in 1996, reduce the 
indexation levels of previous or future year as a way to reduce pension expenditure. 
Nonetheless, an extensive use of this option remains politically unattractive because it 
results in a diminishing share of the relative wealth found within a country. 
Regardless of the validity of the argument concerning the indexation of pensions, 
the growth considered necessary to rescue pensions without altering them remains highly 
problematic. France, for example, has not experienced the high and continuous growth 
levels advocated by Teulade in the past 30 years, and would be hard press to achieve a 
continuous 3,5% growth for the next 40 years. 
 
Pension benefits 
One of the key elements brought into the debate by economists is pension 
generosity. Cremer et al. (2000) claimed that “we are living in the golden age of 
retirement” (975-6). Over the last century old-age pensions have shifted from a policy 
against poverty to an income-maintenance policy. This was clearly demonstrated in the 
historical overview presented in chapter 1. By the late 1970s all four countries analysed in 
this dissertation had extended their pension benefits beyond alleviating poverty to include 
other forms of benefits such as superannuation. The United Kindgom stands as somewhat 
of an outlier here since its replacement rates never achieved what is typically found in 
other EU member states. Replacement rates were above 45% in all EU countries by 1980, 
with the exception of the UK and Ireland. They were above 60% in Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Sweden (Palme, 1990: 77). Blöndel and Scarpetta 
(1998) have calculated the expected replacement rates for an average 55 year old worker 
for the years 1961, 1975 and 1995 and discovered a similar pattern (see table C.6).  
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Table C.6 Expected old-age replacement rates for a 55 year old in EU countries. 
 1961 1975 1995 
Belgium 72,6 70,5 67,5 
France 50 62,5 64,8 
Sweden 53,8 77,1 74,4 
UK 33,4 33,8 49,8 
Denmark 35,9 42,3 56,2 
Germany 60,2 59,6 55 
Greece .. .. 120 
Spain .. 50 100 
Ireland 38,6 28,9 39,7 
Italy 60 62 80 
Luxem. .. .. 93,2 
NLD 32,2 48 45,8 
Austria 79,5 79,5 79,5 
Portugal 85 77 82,6 
Finland 34,9 58,6 60 
Source: Blöndel and Scarpetta (1998). OECD Economics Department Working Paper n. 202. P.96 
 
  Another key element in the increasing financial burden relates to the extension of 
benefits. Governments sought to universalise pensions and achieve a broader coverage. 
France, for example, extended coverage to those previously excluded from typical 
occupational categories in the 1970s. 77% percent of individuals were covered by public 
pension schemes in 1970; this rate has climbed to 90% in 1995 (Blöndel and Scarpetta, 
1998: 14). 
As a result of this increasing generosity, pension benefits grew at a faster rate than 
economic growth during the last decades (Pierson, 1998). The upcoming difficulties 
mentioned above would only be enhanced by this factor because many of the policies 
resulting in an increased generosity will mature in the next decades when individuals 
collect their pensions. Economists have come up with various statements to underline the 
impact of pension generosity. Boldrin et al. (1999) state that 75% of the pension burden is 
due to increasing pension generosity, while only 25% comes from population ageing (291-
2). Cremer et al. (2000) refers to a study on pension liabilities up to the year 2010 to 
demonstrate the burden that will be left onto upcoming generations. It states that with a 
discount rate of 3% and a growth rate of 1,5%, liability ranges from 196% of GDP in 
France to 36% of GDP in the UK (975-6). 
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The Outcome 
The elements mentioned above would result in a pronounced raise in the costs of 
maintaining current public pension systems if they remained unchanged. The latter is the 
key as most projections assume that current pension systems will not change, resulting in a 
significant increase in the vast majority of countries (see table C.7).  
With the exception of Italy, Sweden and the UK, the financial weight of public 
pension will increase significantly. For most countries it is expected to rise by 3 to 5% of 
GDP. Belgium and France are quite similar to this effect as pension expenditure is 
expected to increase by 3,7 and 3,9% respectively. Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain are 
expecting increases above 6%. By 2010, public pensions will represent more than 14% of 
GDP in 8 of the 13 countries studied.   
There is a widespread consensus in the literature that pension expenditure will 
increase in the future if no reforms are undertaken. The main point in contention is by how 
much. The key difficulty lies with the reliance on projections. Table C.7 includes 
projections made by the OECD for the four countries studied. Large differences are found 
in Belgium and Sweden. Part of this difference could be attributed to reforms introduced in 
1996 and 1998 respectively. France, however, did not experience any pension reforms past 
1996 and we find a noteworthy difference. Reliance on projections in the making of public 
policies can be more an act of faith than a ‘scientific’ calculation. In projecting pension 
expenditure parameters for fertility, life expectancy, unemployment, immigration, and 
economic growth must be included. These elements can act like compounded interests. 
Any departure from the estimated parameters could result in a large change in the end. A 
small baby boom or a significant change in immigration policy would render these 
estimations useless. Math (2001) presents a critique of the projections presented by the 
Economic Policy Committee. He particularly contests the economic projections, which are 
very difficult to make in the short-term. Making them in the long-term is almost like 
making a random estimation. More specifically he claims that the EPC assumed low 
growth rates (1,6 to 3%) and a high unemployment rate (13-25). 
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Table C.7 Projected Pension Expenditure (%of GDP, before tax).  
 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 Change 
2000-peak 
year 
Belgium 9,3 9 10,4 13 12,6 3,7 
OECD 9,7 8,7 10,7 13,9 15 5,3 
France 12,1 13,1 15 16 15,8 3,9 
OECD 9,8 9,7 11,6 13,5 14,3 4,5 
Sweden 9 9,2 10,2 10,7 10,7 1,7 
OECD 11,1 12,4 13,9 15 14,9 3,9 
UK 5,1 4,7 4,4 4,7 4,4 0 
OECD 4,5 5,2 5,1 5,5 5 1 
Denmark 10,2 12,7 14 14,7 13,9 4,5 
Germany 10,3 9,5 13,2 10,6 14,4 4,3 
Greece NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Spain 9,4 9,3 10,2 12,9 16,2 8,3 
Ireland 4,6 5 6,7 7,6 8,3 4,4 
Italy 14,2 14,3 14,9 15,9 15,7 1,7 
Luxemb. NA NA NA NA NA NA 
NLD 7,9 9,1 11,1 13,1 14,1 6,2 
Austria 14,5 14,8 15,7 17,6 17 3,1 
Portugal 9,8 12 14,4 16 15,8 6,2 
Finland 11,3 11,6 14 15,7 16 4,7 
Source: EPC, 2000: 37; OECD (1996) for OECD data in Belgium, France, Sweden and the UK. 
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Appendix D 
 
 
 
PAYG versus Capitalisation: Is it a genuine debate? Are there other options? 
The debate between pay-as-you-go (payg) and capitalisation, where pension schemes 
are fully funded via investments in stocks, bonds or other investments, has been raging 
ever since the publication of Feldstein’s influential article in 1974. In light of the 
difficulties faced by payg systems, this debate has resurfaced and figures predominantly in 
the economic literature. This section seeks to expand on the various alternatives to resolve 
the upcoming financial difficulties of public pension systems by integrating them within 
the current debate between payg and capitalization. The reader will quickly denote an 
ideological tone to this debate. In a nutshell, experts from the Right favour a movement 
toward fully funded scheme claiming that it encourages private savings, and thus national 
savings, while providing incentives for longer working careers. They further claim that 
fully funded systems bring higher rates of return and protect individuals against the 
political risks associated with payg. Experts from the Left maintain that payg can be saved 
and that a move to a fully funded system ignores important redistributive isses and does not 
resolve the financial problems associated with old-age. They also dispute that payg 
discourages savings and underline the high administrative costs present in many private 
options. 
 
The Re-birth of Capitalization as a Retirement Option. 
Following negative experiments with capitalization prior to World War II (see 
historical development in chapter 1), virtually all industrialized countries opted for a payg 
system. This policy choice ensured immediately a decent pension for current retirees at the 
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time while avoiding an additional burden on public finance. The consensus behind payg 
began to be challenged in the 1970s. In his seminal article published in 1974, Social 
Security, Induced Retirement, and Aggregate Capital Accumulation, Feldstein present a 
virulent critique of the US social security system due to its reliance on payg. He presents a 
model to demonstrate that Social Security results in a loss of personal savings worth 50%. 
Feldstein uses this figure to discuss its impact on the economy: 
"The evidence that the social security program approximately 
halves the personal savings rate implies that it substantially 
reduces the stock of capital and the level of national income. 
During the 1960s, personal saving accounted for 60% of total 
private saving. By having personal saving, social security reduced 
total private saving by 38%. In the long run, this decrease in the 
rate of private saving would also decrease the private capital stock 
by 38%...A 38% decrease in the capital stock implies a substantial 
reduction in GNP. If this assest substitution had not occurred, the 
long-run capital stock would be 60% higher" (922). 
 
Feldstein’s argument, despite being more than 25 years old, has provided an 
important point of departure for the debate on how to resolve the upcoming pension 
‘crisis’. Five key elements are usually presented to justify a move away from payg toward 
a fully funded pension system. First, the market provides higher return than a payg system. 
Feldstein (1996) argues that huge losses in investment occurred since the publication of its 
1974 article. Because of the redistributive nature of Social Security, which result in a small 
return, large investment opportunities were lost. Due to the higher returns provided by the 
stock market, he estimates the value of these losses at 68 billion dollars in 1995, about 20% 
of total social security payroll revenue (5). Disney (2000) supports this argument by stating 
that funded schemes always yield a higher return than non funded schemes (F17). Similar 
claims are made elsewhere (World Bank, 1994; Disney, 1996; Blake, 2000; Boersch-Supan 
and Winter, 2001) 
Second, advocates of a fully (or partially) funded pension system claim that two 
economic goals could be achieved with the adoption of a policy abandoning payg systems. 
An increase in the rate of aggregate savings could bolster the rate of growth while 
resolving the demographic issues plaguing payg (see for example World Bank, 1994). 
Feldstein (1996) reassessed that Social Security has resulted in a decrease in private 
savings, stating that the median amount of saving for those between the age of 55 and 64 
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was $8 300 (6). To rectify this situation, a fully funded system is advocated. Boersch-
Supan and Winter (2001) argue that a move towards a fully funded pension system would 
be highly beneficial to France, Germany and Italy since it would increase the size of their 
relatively weak capital market resulting in higher growth. 
Third, the lack of linkage between contributions and benefits generate work 
disincentive and hurt the employment rate. Most of the incentives to retire early have been 
provided above and include generous pre-retirement policies and rules granting a full time 
pension prior to the legal retirement age. Disney (2000) points out that funding systems 
have the advantages of being highly transparent due to the direct link built up between 
benefits and contributions. Despite its attractiveness, notional accounts based in a payg 
system such as the ones established in Sweden, is still not transparent because its 
indexation mechanism can lead to a pension that is not indexed with inflation if there is 
population growth and no economic growth (F16).   
Fourth, there is an increasing political risk by holding onto payg. Many economists 
are implying a ‘natural’ selection process where future generations will slowly abandoned 
payg because of their refusal to support it. According to Blake (2000), it is in this context 
that a fully funded system becomes more attractive: 
 “Funding provides greated potential pension security than payg 
which, given demographic and labour market development, has 
become an increasingly unreliable vehicle for delivering the 
pension promise: there can be no guarantee that future generations 
will be prepared to pay for the increasing burden that payg now 
represents” (F77). 
 
A key aspect of this argument relies on the assumption that governments will have 
to reduce promised benefits in order to salvage pensions. It is argued that detoriating 
financial conditions might lead to a change of its own even if elected officials do not 
encourage it if current systems persist (Feldstein, 1996; Boersch-Supan and Winter, 2001). 
Vording and Goudswaard (1997) demonstrate that wage indexation levels have decreased 
during the 1981-93 period compared to earlier periods dating back to 1961 despite 
legislation limiting its tinkering. They maintain that changing economic circumstances 
have a stronger impact on indexing than actual legislation preventing it. McHale (1999) 
emphasises that fear of reductions to payg systems may lead younger generations towards 
private solutions.  
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 Is PAYG really such a bad alternative to capitalization? 
Switching from a payg to a fully funded system is far from being consensual. In fact 
many economists have argued that payg is not a bad system once its goals are considered. 
The seminal article on this subject is Diamond’s A Framework for Social Security Analysis 
(1977). He presented two key objections to Feldstein. First, he argues that Social Security 
make sense for individual workers since proper alternatives are not yet available, resulting 
in a market failure to provide adequate guarantees for a pension. A safe annuity indexed to 
inflation does not even exist yet, and many individuals do not have the necessary resources 
to diversify their portfolio. Moreover, the market does not provide good solutions for those 
representing bad risks such as the unemployed and the sick (279-81). Second, he points 
towards studies that indicate a lack of savings on the part of individuals. Individuals find it 
difficult to find the right information to save appropriately and face high levels of 
uncertainty while making retirement decisions. Further, for a variety of reasons, people 
tend “to spend more now and less later than seems sensible” (281-2). This phenomenon is 
widespread, regardless of income (286). This represents a direct challenge to a key 
assumption made by Feldstein with regards to capitalization since it implies that not all 
contributions made to social security would actually be replaced by private savings. 
Therefore, a paternalistic role from the state should be welcome to ensure an adequate level 
of savings for retirement. 
One of the key challenges posed by the instauration of a fully funded system is the 
transition period. Proponents of maintaining payg are quick to point out that such a 
transition would result in a double payment for a generation. Regardless of the strategy 
employed to switch toward a fully funded system, the double payment problem subsists. 
The only thing that changes is its form. If the government goes into debt because of the 
loss contributions, the generation that is financing its own pensions will likely face higher 
taxes. Even a movement towards partially funding a part of payg leads to difficult choices. 
For example, in the new Swedish pension system a new 2,5% component is now funded. 
To finance this loss in revenue in paying current retirees, the funds held from the previous 
ATP system are being sold overtime. What is alarming is the fact that such funds do not 
exist in most countries using a payg system. The transition towards private solutions in the 
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UK was not pain free and entailed high cost. It is worth noting that these costs would likely 
be higher in other European countries due to the fact that their pension systems are more 
generous. The delimitation put on public finance as a result of the Maastricht criteria 
makes this shift even more problematic. 
Payg advocates have challenged all five key elements that point toward a fully 
funded system to resolve the pension issue. First, the claim that fully funded scheme yields 
higher return than payg system is far from being consensual. Key reasons behind the 
creation of payg systems were the collapse of the stock market in 1929 and the rapid 
devaluation of many European currencies. Payg can result in higher returns than a fully 
funded system is if its indexation mechanism (based on wage and/or price increase) 
provides a higher rate of return than the stock market. A French economist, Artus, argues 
that the upcoming demographic cycle for the period 2005-2010 will actually favour payg in 
terms of return. This is because a strong increase in wages is expected with higher inflation 
(Legros, 2001). In a historical analysis of both payg and private systems in France, 
Reynaud (1995) argues that for some periods payg yielded higher return, while for others a 
fully funded system would have (42). Another key aspect worth mentioning with private 
funds is that administrative costs tend to be higher than with public systems. Diamond 
(1977), for example, states that administrative costs of 17% were present in the insurance 
industry compare to the 2% cost generated by the US Social Security program (296). 
Studies of the UK, which has experienced a large outburst of private funds, denote similar 
trends. 
Further, in all the arguments presented in favour of a fully funded system, there is an 
implicit assumption that population ageing does not affect private savings and the financial 
markets. This assumption, however, is also highly controversial. The financial markets are 
not immune to demographic changes since there will be an increasingly high number of 
selling stocks to a decreasing population. This has the ultimate result of decreasing the 
value of a stock. Thus, one cannot support an argument for a fully funded pension system 
by stating the constant and high rates of returns provided by the financial markets over the 
last 50 years. Brooks (2000) takes this argument a step further by arguing that even if 
markets are rational and aware of the demographic changes, the price of the stock will still 
decrease. A way out of this dilemma could be to assume that the population within 
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emerging markets will buy these stocks, but they are ageing as well and may not have the 
necessary capital to buy them. 
Second, a key element brought up by those supporting a move towards a fully 
funded system is that payg disrupt and reduce the size of national savings. A survey of the 
literature by McKenzie, Gerson and Cuevas (1997) demonstrates theoretical and empirical 
researches do not result in strong conclusions about a relationship between savings and 
public or private pensions (cited in Hemming, 1999: 18). Even the World Bank, a strong 
advocate of fully funded system, admits that the impact of public pension plans on savings 
and capital market is a nebulous one, with research pointing towards opposite directions 
(World Bank, 1994: 126). Reynaud (1998) argues that the introduction of fully funded 
plans may not even boost private savings.  
“Empirical research does not enable us to state incontrovertibly 
that the introduction of funded schemes has a positive effect on 
saving. It remains a controversial matter, and the debate is far from 
over” (37).  
 
Third, the lack of linkage between contributions and benefits is acknowledged. Key 
is, however, that most public pension systems were created with the purpose of favouring 
inter and within generational transfers. A variety of intra generational transfers occur in 
most pension systems, and goes beyond transferring wealth from the rich to the poor. 
Pension points are usually granted for childbearing years, unemployment and illness, 
which are risks that would be difficult to replace in the market. The market tends to 
compensate for the loss of the current income, but not for the reduction of income at 
retirement due to such events. The granting of pension points also reflects clear policy 
objectives. For example, granting pension points for child-bearing even though 
contributions are not made, is partly intended to encourage an increase in the fertility rate. 
Even if one refutes the validity of this argument, advocates of fully funded systems cannot 
guarantee transparency either. The link between benefits and contributions is not constant, 
because benefits can be highly volatile. The main problem is that rates of return vary. 
People who retired in 1972 had a 10-fold increase in their contributions; those who retired 
in 1974 a 4-fold increase (Hemming, 1999: 21). Many private pension plans have been hit 
hard by the Asian crisis and the low returns years experienced in the aftermath of the 
plunge experienced by Internet stocks. 
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Fourth, the claim that payg is plagued with political risks has been over exaggerated 
according to many. Tamburi (1999) refers to this phenomenon as a credibility gap where 
citizens begin to lose faith in the institutions providing public pensions. Such loss of faith 
may provide an added motivation to reform current systems. However, he claims that a key 
reason why reforms have been so difficult to introduce in Germany and France is related to 
“the absence of an institutional credibility gap” (19). Legros (2001) argues in the same vein 
by stating that “segments of public opinion remain doubtful about the gravity of the 
pension problem itself” (2). Parametric reforms, such as the one described in section 2.1 
(increase in the age of retirement, tightening up of pre-retirement conditions and decrease 
in the indexation rate to name a few), can save payg from its ‘supposedly eminent death’ 
and can restore faith and credibility in the system. Math (2001), in fact, blames alarmist 
reports like the one presented by the Economic Policy Committee (2000) for instauring 
fear and mining the confidence of the populace in current pension schemes (42-4).   
                                                
 
Why We Need Political Scientists. 
Economists are providing the best reasons why political science matters by being 
unable to state why various options debated in journals are not being adopted. Many 
economists have claimed political problems are responsible for the non-application of 
solutions that could rescue payg or lead to a (partial) funded system. Legros (2001) 
underlines that the difficulties of public pension systems raise conflicts with regards to the 
distribution of burden that reforms entail (2). 
It is not surprising that recent studies seek ‘political science’ variables to explain 
the lack of reforms in public pension systems and/or the acceptance of expensive social 
security programs.388 Cremer et al (2000) build a model to support the argument that 
suitable reforms are available but are being blocked by an entrenched interest: the elderly. 
Despite their numerical minority feeling of entitlement enhances their political weight 
(980). Tabellini (2000) argues that a coalition of elderly and poor individuals result in a 
 
388 Despite this ‘rapprochement’, many statements made by economist when analysing political variables raise many 
eyebrows. For example, Tabellini (2000) views social security programs as an anomaly. Seeking to answer a puzzle 
considering the size of social security, he mentions that “since the early 1980s, social security programs have grown 
in size almost everywhere. Yet, it is difficult to explain why a social security exists, let alone why it is so large. At 
any given point in time, the number of recipients of social security is smaller than the number of contributors. So, 
why do a large majority of citizens support a system that redistributes towards a minority” (523)? 
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majoritarian support for social security programs. This conclusion is, however, achieved 
only by considering the proportion of elderly, the proportion of poor individuals and the 
size of social security as a percentage of government spending. Another key problem with 
the economic literature is the underestimation that public pension systems are entrenched 
within existing institutions. As stated by Schmähl, “we are not starting from a clean slate” 
(1999). There are no careful analyses of elections, electoral systems, political parties, or 
institutions, which are common themes in political science.  
The economic literature provides a great starting point in understanding the causes 
of the upcoming financial difficulties of payg, and in providing solutions to enrich the 
debate over the future of public pensions. Nonetheless, it remains deficient when it 
attempts to explain why more significant reforms have not been implemented, and why 
certain reforms have been chosen over others.  
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